Author Archives: Sarah Phillimore

How pushing the ‘victim/perpetrator’ dichotomy in the Family Court system hurts us all

This is a talk delivered by Sarah Phillimore at the Families Need Fathers conference in London on September 14th 2019

The abstract concept of ‘Justice’ is often portrayed as the Greek goddess Themis, usually depicted holding a sword and scales. This represents her ability to cut fact from fiction with no middle ground and the need to be balanced and pragmatic. However the blindfold is a modern addition.  It symbolises that justice must be blind i.e. applied equally to all who come before her.

In recent years there appears to have been an orchestrated campaign against both the scales and the blindfold, when it comes to issues of violence in intimate relationships before the family courts.  For the first time in my 20 years now as a lawyer, I see not merely journalists and campaigners showcasing their lack of understanding of law and procedure – I see them joined and supported by actual politicians and actual ‘Inquiries’ established by actual Government departments. I and others have commented critically about this elsewhere

If this sounds harsh I am sorry. I do not say this to diminish the suffering of victims of abuse. Violence in relationships is common and is a blight on our society. I agree that a parent who is abusive to anyone, let alone their child’s other parent, is not a good parent and they should not have unfettered access to a child without some clear evidence that this is safe.  I agree that women are more likely to be the victims of violence at the hands of male partners. Further, I would be surprised to find anyone who doesn’t think it outrageous that people risk being cross examined directly by those who may be using the court system to further abuse and humiliate. Happily, in my experience at least this is not commonplace – Just out of interest – how many people in this room have either questioned directly an ex partner in court or been questioned directly by an ex partner?

We must be able to say the names of those children who have died painful and frightening deaths at the hands of their adult carers, when the child protection system failed to ask the right questions or properly assess risk – Ellie Butler, Alexa-Marie Quinn, Peter Connelly, Victoria Climbie, Elsie Scully-Hicks Daniel Pelka

Even this short list is too long. When the child protection system fails it is their faces that we must see.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

But. It is clear that children risk being hurt and killed by men AND women. Even in that short list above shows women are capable of hurting and killing children, or of deliberately lying to protect the men they know are hurting them.

The only fool proof way to prevent children from pain and suffering is to prevent them from ever being born.  There is no system that can protect against all risk. We need to do better – and I will discuss today how we can do that – but the answer to a system that you find unsatisfactory and potentially unfair is NOT to agitate to make it even more unsatisfactory and unfair.

I don’t agree the current crop of campaigners will achieve anything to make victims and their children safer. The MoJ Inquiry and the Sunday Mirror ‘campaign’ etc etc etc is a call to examine or change laws which do not actually exist.  I am repeatedly told via social media that we ‘must’ see a change to the law that permits ‘snap decisions which promote contact at all costs’. This is not, never has been and never will be the law.

To campaign on such a false premise is a waste of time and energy. More sinisterly, the ‘changes’ which people want to see, appear to involve very significant challenge to the integrity of both the rule of law and due process.

  • by describing complainants as ‘victims’ at the very outset.
  • Assuming that these ‘victims’ are women
  • By inviting under the campaigning umbrella a number of women who have been found to have caused very serious harm to their children, yet rejecting those findings as yet more ‘failings’ of the family courts. [For comment on Victoria Haigh and the very many judgments against her, see this post from The Transparency Project. ]

https://twitter.com/SVPhillimore/status/1168140277468545030?s=20

 

I believe Brexit has unleashed something very harmful into our attempts to talk about serious issues; experts are disdained, facts are distorted and feelings are what matter. This joined forces with another trend – the identification of ‘complainants’ as ‘victims’ before any allegation is either accepted as true or found to be so. This first emerged in the criminal justice system; tragically as a very well intentioned effort to combat some of the truly disgusting treatment meted out by police and lawyers to those who complained about sexual assault.

However, the law of unintended consequences continues to operate, and as Richard Henriques warned and the the trial of Carl Beech showed, to designate people as ‘victims’ at the very outset of any investigative procedure, has the potential to cause serious and damaging consequences for the integrity of what follows.

The time has long gone for those of us who are deeply troubled by all of this to attempt to reclaim the narrative, to restore the position that words have meaning. They are important. Because language shapes thought – not the other way around.

There are two fundamental and serious problems in using the word ‘victim’ to describe a complainant whose allegations have either not been proved or have not been accepted. It is unfair to all who participate in court proceedings.

  • setting up a complainant as a ‘victim’ at the inception of the court process gives that person a wholly unrealistic view of how their evidence may be treated in an adversarial court process. It is not enough to simply assert something – you must prove it.
  • Treating one party as a victim prior to any findings made about the factual basis for that status, risks undermining the fairness of the proceedings and casting the respondent as a ‘villain’ at the outset.

So I will attempt today to go back to basics.

  • What is the rule of law? What is ‘due process’? And why are they important?
  • What is evidence? And how does the family court use it? How should you present it?
  • Where is the system failing and what can we do to make it better?

 

What do we mean by the ‘rule of law’ and ‘due process’ ?

The Secretary-General of the United Nations defined the rule of law in this way:

a principle of governance in  which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.” (Report of the Secretary-General: The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies (S/2004/616).

The rule of law is one of six of the key Worldwide Governance Indicators (The others being Voice & Accountability, Political Stability and Lack of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Control of Corruption).

‘Due process’ is under the umbrella of the Rule of Law:

  • procedural due process – legal proceedings which are carried out in accordance with established rules and principles; and
  • substantive due process – legal proceedings should not result in the unfair, arbitrary or unreasonable treatment of an individual.

If you are in any doubt as to the importance of the ‘rule of law’ or due process, visit and spend some time in one of the countries which doesn’t have either.

 

So what IS evidence? And how does the court treat it?

I make no apology for going back to basics, such is the staggering level of misinformation  I am seeing on a daily basis from those who purport to have positions of authority and credibility.

Evidence is anything that you experience, read or are told that causes you to believe something happened. It is the information used in court to try and prove something. It can be obtained from documents, objects or witnesses.

Establishing the evidence in a case allows you to ask ‘what does it prove?’. A thing that is proved or accepted then becomes a fact which is relevant to the outcome of the case.  We need to know the facts in order to decide what consequences follow or what the risks are and how they are to be managed. The Family Justice System (FJS) puts proof of facts at its heart.

In 2013 Mr Justice Baker addressed a conference asking  – how can we improve decision making in the family courts? He identified the twin evils of delay and cost which impact on the quality of decisions made. He commented on the alternatives to litigation, such as mediation or arbitration that might work to mitigate those evils. But he was also clear that alternatives to litigation could never be complete substitutes for litigation.

But there will always be a substantial number of disputes in which a forensic process is unavoidable, a process that involves consideration of allegations and cross-allegations made by the parties, a judicial analysis of the evidence, the makings of findings and an assessment of the consequences of those findings. There are some people who genuinely believe this can be done by some sort of committee without involving lawyers at all. Such views are profoundly mistaken.

This does not mean of course that our current system is without flaws. ‘Fact finding’ may sound simple but is anything but. The foocus on most law degrees is dissection of the lofty legal decisions of the superior courts – but when they hit the ground in practice, the vast majority of legal endeavours will involve the identification and processing of facts.

Understanding how to identify and apply facts in court is complicated.  Jerome Micheal, the author of ‘The nature of judicial proof: An inquiry into the logical, legal, and empirical aspects of the law of evidence’ summarised his view of the ‘theoretical basis of the arts of controversy’ in 1948, pointing out that there are very many things we need to appreciate when we approach evidence in a court. Among others, we need to understand probability, causation, the distinction between direct or perceptual and indirect or inferential knowledge. We base much of our understanding on presuppositions about human nature and behaviour – these often change over time or as research develops – but we need some basic knowledge about how humans think and react.

Judges often say findings of fact must be based on evidence, not speculation – Re A (A Child) (Fact Finding Hearing: Speculation) [2011] EWCA Civ 12) but as that case illustrates, the line between the two is not always clear or easy to find and obviously involves some subjective discretion form the decision maker.

However, regardless of all the obvious imperfections of the fact finding exercise,  we have as yet, no other system to deal with contested allegations.  I am not sure what else could be suggested – we return to trial by combat? Or in the modern era presumably this will be ‘trial by Facebook’ – whoever can garner the most ‘likes’ and ‘shares’ or the biggest amount in their crowd funder will ‘win’. I have a horrible suspicion that this is exactly how some people think it should work, as we have seen in both the Minnock and Baldwin cases.

But unless and until Parliament decides to dissolve the courts of law in favour of the courts of public opinion, we need to focus on what we have got.

 

The family court process

Deciding what ‘weight’ attaches to the evidence will comprise a mixture of objective and subjective elements. Judges have a pretty wide discretion; it is not a ground of appeal that you didn’t agree with the judge’s decision. You have to show the judge was wrong – he or she took into account the wrong things or ignored the right things. Just because a Judge fails to explicitly mention a particular point, doesn’t mean the appeal court will allow your challenge to succeed. A useful example of this can be found in the case of A and R (Children), Re [2018] EWHC 2771 (Fam) where the Recorder was criticised for not making explicit reference to some parts of PD 12J.

Family courts operate an ‘adversarial’ as opposed to ‘inquisitorial’ system. This means that the Judge can only decide the case that is in front of him or her. The Judge does not take on an investigative role. Evidence is presented to the court and challenged by the parties as ‘adversaries’ in the court process. Claims that we are in fact ‘quasi-inquisitorial’ seems to mean in practice to amount to little more but that lawyers are asked to tone down their combativeness a notch.

The court must take into account all the pieces of evidence in the context of all other evidence, The civil standard of proof applies, which means facts must be proved ‘on the balance of probabilities’: If it is more likely than not that the thing happened it is proved – see Re B [2008] UKHL 35). This is known as the ‘binary system’ as there are only two options  – true or false. I appreciate that there is legitimate criticism of this, particularly given the low standard of proof and again I would like to see more official recognition of this, rather than the predominant congratulatory back slapping that the family courts have ‘discovered the truth’. 

Over time rules of evidence developed, to attempt to make proceedings as consistent and fair as possible. For example, in most civil cases ‘hearsay evidence’ is not permitted – that is the evidence of those who tell the court, not what they know themselves, but what they have heard from others. A fundamental point of fairness is that if you don’t accept the evidence offered against you, you must have the ability to challenge it. Its obviously very difficult to challenge the words of someone not in court. For this reason if hearsay is accepted in family court proceedings, the judge must think very carefully about the weight to be attached to it. 

 

Expert Evidence

particular bone of contention revolves around the use of experts – as these experts are often in the ‘soft science’ field of psychology.  I accept that the use of experts is not without controversy and I have seen a worrying lack of humility from some about the strength of their conclusions. However, it’s important to remember that ‘the expert advises but the court decides’ . Expert evidence is just one piece of a jigsaw that a judge needs to try and put together – it is rarely the entire answer to the case  – see Re T [2004] 2 FLR 838.

As Professor Luthert commented in R v Harris and Others [2005] EWCA Crim 1980: It is very easy to try and fill those areas of ignorance with what we know, but I think it is very important to accept that we do not necessarily have a sufficient understanding to explain every case.

 A judge does not have to accept an expert’s evidence but must explain why the evidence is not accepted. See the comments of Lord Justice Ward and Lady Justice Butler-Sloss in the case of Re B (Care: Expert Witnesses) [1996] 1 FLR 667

I accept we need a greater awareness of and willingness to challenge experts on the basis of confirmation bias or scientific prejudice but as barrister David Beddingfield comemented in 2013 –  this can be tricky  – see Expert Evidence – Another Chapter in a Continuing Story in Family Law Week:

The expert, as we all know, is expected to give an opinion about the most significant issues in a case. A paradox underlies the use of all expert evidence: the reason an expert is required is that the decision-maker lacks the expertise of the expert and requires that expert’s help. How is that same decision-maker also competent tojudge the content of the expert’s evidence? How is the decision-maker to choose, for example between two competing experts, each using different methodologies beyond the ken of any non-specialist?

 

Practical problems in family cases – Documents versus words

The uncontroversial ‘gold standard’ of evidence is the contemporaneous documentary record. And this is the fundamental reason why allegations about what did or did not happen in intimate relationships can be so difficult to prove in court, even on a low standard of proof. Many cases I have dealt with involve a bitterly fought battle between parents who make allegations each against the other which are starkly different. It is difficult to discern patterns of behaviour and very difficult to cross examine on a bare denial.

Relationships, which may have endured over decades, may offer the court little evidence but the words of the parties themselves.  Not many of us – I hope – enter into a relationship expecting to keep a running log of all the bad behaviour of our partners.

I was asked a very interesting question about this issue of ‘collecting evidence’

…. would it help to suggest that people keep diaries, records, photos, dates, times, places – particularly when there are already difficulties i.e. any statements may be seen to be more credible if they are detailed and based on contemporaneous notes?

And my answer to that is ‘be careful’. You do run a risk that you may appear to be offering self serving or manipulated evidence. The courts are often very wary of recordings of arguments etc because of course it is difficult to know what happened immediately before the recording started. I have seen recordings and diary entries used with powerful effect but there is always a suspicion that such one party may have acted deliberately to antagonise the other in order to ‘collect evidence’ . I appreciate this is a very difficult position to be in – much abuse occurs behind closed doors and the abuser is able to present a very different face to those outside the relationship.

But it remains an inescapable truth that the more serious the allegations you make, the less likely is any court to simply accept them, absent any supporting evidence – see for example the case of Sivasubramaniam v Wandsworth County Court & Ors [2002] EWCA Civ 1738. The complainant described events to the court in this way:

part of a long-running criminal conspiracy against him involving members of Wandsworth Borough Council solicitors, lawyers and the chief executive and the finance officer and their assistants, members of the Wandsworth police, doctors in the hospitals, social workers, local court officials, judges and the lessee occupying the flat below his. The conspiracy involved unsuccessful attempts to murder him … It had included impersonation of him, had involved the fraudulent termination of four sets of legal proceedings that he was conducting, including the two with which we are concerned, while he was detained under the Mental Health Act or under medication thereafter, and continued to this day.

Unsurprisingly the court declared that no Judge would be able to accept such a version of events on one person’s word alone.

 

 

Gold Standard Evidence versus Witness Credibility

The courts have said for a long time that the best way of testing witness credibility is to test witnesses against objective facts which are independent of their testimony.

Lord Goff in Armagas Ltd v. Mundogas S.A. (The Ocean Frost), [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, p. 57:

Speaking from my own experience, I have found it essential in cases of fraud, when considering the credibility of witnesses, always to test their veracity by reference to the objective facts proved independently of their testimony, in particular by reference to the documents in the case, and also to pay particular regard to their motives and to the overall probabilities. It is frequently very difficult to tell whether a witness is telling the truth or not; and where there is a conflict of evidence such as there was in the present case, reference to the objective facts and documents, to the witnesses’ motives, and to the overall probabilities, can be of very great assistance to a Judge in ascertaining the truth.

Lord Pearce in the House of Lords in Onassis v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyds Rep 403 at p 431:

Witnesses, especially those who are emotional, who think that they are morally in the right, tend very easily and unconsciously to conjure up a legal right that did not exist. It is a truism, often used in accident cases, that with every day that passes the memory becomes fainter and the imagination becomes more active. For that reason a witness, however honest, rarely persuades a Judge that his present recollection is preferable to that which was taken down in writing immediately after the accident occurred.

It is clear that people who have been traumatised by abuse over many years can behave in ways that reflect that trauma. They may not be able to be clear or consistent in their account.  They may have been too afraid or too ashamed to have told any one else so have no police or medical evidence. Or they may worry about ‘rocking the boat’ and risking losing contact with their children. Exposure to gradually escalating abuse and intimidation can become numbing and appear ‘normal’ – the ‘boiling a frog’ principle.

The massive problem for the court system however is that a tendency to be inconsistent or reveal crucial details at a much later stage is also strongly suggestive of someone who is lying.

Therefore the credibility of witnesses in family cases is often of supreme importance. It really matters how you come across when you give evidence. The appeal courts often say that they are at a disadvantage when examining a challenge to the decision of the first court, as they don’t have the same opportunity to assess how people gave their evidence as well as what they actually said. I think there is a danger – of which the courts are aware – that too much or improper weight can be put on demeanour as an indication of credibility.  They are two very different things –  ‘demeanour’ is concerned with whether or not a witness appears to be telling the truth.

It is usually unreliable and often dangerous to draw conclusions from demeanour alone. Is someone hesitant because they are lying or just naturally cautious? These problems are magnified where the witness is from a different country or culture than the Judge or is giving evidence through an interpreter. I accept that most of us still do have a view of how a ‘victim’ should present in court – particularly if that alleged victim is female, and I accept there is a risk that people who don’t fit the general stereotype of ‘victim’ – i.e. weak, timid, tearful – may find their accounts treated as less credible.

The case of Excelerate Technology v Cumberbatch [2015] provides some useful discussion about how Judges assess credibility. It is determined by looking at the following issues.

  • is the witness a truthful or untruthful person?
  • If truthful, is he telling something less than the truth on this issue?
  • if untruthful is he telling the truth on this issue? Not all liars lie all the time and motivations for lying can vary; see the Lucas direction.
  • If truthful and telling the truth as he sees it, can his memory be relied upon?
  • Is what is asserted so improbable that it is on balance more likely than not he was mistaken in his recollection?

 

 

What can we do to improve the situation?

So – what do we do? I accept that court arenas are unpleasant places at the best of times. Attempting to establish the truth or otherwise of your experiences in an abusive relationship is very far from the best of times.

The lawyers and judges must have a clear understanding of how to make proceedings as fair and efficient as possible:

  • have clear understanding of the requirements of PD 12J – see below.
  • Be wary of making any decision based on the demeanour of a witness or what a victim ‘ought’ to do
  • make sure vulnerable witnesses have a safe place to sit and wait before the hearing starts
  • make sure that issues of screens in court, video links and intermediaries are properly discussed in good time.
  • be more willing to impose serious penalties on those who are found to have lied in their evidence
  • list findings of fact as soon as possible and be prepared to take enforcement action as soon as it becomes clear the resident parent won’t accept the findings of the court

What will help the parties?

  • Understand the court process
  • Understand the burden and standard of proof
  • where ever you can – find some additional evidence that supports what you are saying. Are there any medical records or police reports? Did you say anything to a friend or family member at the time? Would they be willing to come to court and be cross examined about what you said?
  • If you have nothing other than your words – that is still evidence but you must be careful to be as clear and consistent as you can. Set out your statement in short numbered paragraphs and go in chronological order. Include everything that you can remember.

However, it has been my view for some time that the fundamental challenges to fair, efficient and humane processing of legal complaints about violence in intimate relationships are very little to do with the lawyers, the Judges and their lack of understanding or training. The real problems will require political will and a huge amount of cash to sort out.

  • court buildings that are not fit for purpose – no or very few waiting rooms, no separate entrance, courts sitting in cramped rooms with very little space, inadequate technology to accommodate video links etc
  • lack of judges and available court rooms to hear fact findings quickly – cases quickly become stuck and are allowed to drift.
  • lack of judicial continuity which is detrimental to effective case management – see comments in the case of A and R (Children), Re [2018] EWHC 2771 (Fam) para 57 -61.
  • lack of legal aid so that vulnerable witnesses may have be face being cross examined by their alleged abuser, the issues in the case are not identified and presented efficiently, litigants in person can’t afford to instruct experts etc, etc, etc.
  • wider societal problems, such as lack of available safe and affordable housing so that the financially weaker partner finds it very difficult to leave an abusive relationship particularly if there are children involved.

This is what we need to tackle. And I have to wonder why we are all so keen to be distracted by yet another newspaper campaign based on what seems to be a complete lack of knowledge or understanding of any of the issues I raise above. At the moment, the only people I can see who will benefit from all this are those who are pushing for Judges to be ‘trained’ – presumably by their own organisations and at significant cost.

And a the elephant in the room will remain. Why do so many people behave so badly in intimate relationships? And why do so many people have so little self worth that they accept it or cannot recognise it until many years have passed and great harm has been done? What as a society are we going to do about this? is there anything ‘we’ can do?

All I can say with certainty is that continued insistence on the FJS or any external agency to ‘fix’ the problems of cruel, unreasonable or otherwise dysfunctional people is doomed to expensive and emotionally harmful failure. And those who will suffer most, as they always do, are the children.

 

 

APPENDIX

Definitions in Practice Direction 12 J

Domestic abuse” includes any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are or have been intimate partners or family members regardless of gender or sexuality. This can encompass, but is not limited to, psychological, physical, sexual, financial, or emotional abuse. Domestic abuse also includes culturally specific forms of abuse including, but not limited to, forced marriage, honour-based violence, dowry-related abuse and transnational marriage abandonment;

“coercive behaviour” means an act or a pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten the victim;

“controlling behaviour” means an act or pattern of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday behaviour;

“development” means physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development;
“harm” means ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another, by domestic abuse or otherwise;

“health” means physical or mental health;

“ill-treatment” includes sexual abuse and forms of ill-treatment which are not physical

 

Para 5 what must the court do?

  • dentify at the earliest opportunity (usually at the FHDRA) the factual and welfare issues involved;
  • consider the nature of any allegation, admission or evidence of domestic abuse, and the extent to which it would be likely to be relevant in deciding whether to make a child arrangements order and, if so, in what terms;
  • give directions to enable contested relevant factual and welfare issues to be tried as soon as possible and fairly;
  • ensure that where domestic abuse is admitted or proven, any child arrangements order in place protects the safety and wellbeing of the child and the parent with whom the child is living, and does not expose either of them to the risk of further harm; and
  • ensure that any interim child arrangements order (i.e. considered by the court before determination of the facts, and in the absence of admission) is only made having followed the guidance in paragraphs 25–27 below.
    In particular, the court must be satisfied that any contact ordered with a parent who has perpetrated domestic abuse does not expose the child and/or other parent to the risk of harm and is in the best interests of the child.

Para 8

In considering, on an application for a child arrangements order by consent, whether there is any risk of harm to the child, the court must consider all the evidence and information available. The court may direct a report under Section 7 of the Children Act 1989 to be provided either orally or in writing, before it makes its decision; in such a case, the court must ask for information about any advice given by the officer preparing the report to the parties and whether they, or the child, have been referred to any other agency, including local authority children’s services. If the report is not in writing, the court must make a note of its substance on the court file and a summary of the same shall be set out in a Schedule to the relevant order.

How do we deal with tension around open justice and protecting the vulnerable? Para 10:

If at any stage the court is advised by any party (in the application form, or otherwise), by Cafcass or CAFCASS Cymru or otherwise that there is a need for special arrangements to protect the party or child attending any hearing, the court must ensure so far as practicable that appropriate arrangements are made for the hearing (including the waiting arrangements at court prior to the hearing, and arrangements for entering and exiting the court building) and for all subsequent hearings in the case, unless it is advised and considers that these are no longer necessary. Where practicable, the court should enquire of the alleged victim of domestic abuse how best she/he wishes to participate.

Why are fact findings important – para 16

The court should determine as soon as possible whether it is necessary to conduct a fact-finding hearing in relation to any disputed allegation of domestic abuse –

(a) in order to provide a factual basis for any welfare report or for assessment of the factors set out in paragraphs 36 and 37 below;

(b) in order to provide a basis for an accurate assessment of risk;

(c) before it can consider any final welfare-based order(s) in relation to child arrangements; or

(d) before it considers the need for a domestic abuse-related Activity (such as a Domestic Violence Perpetrator Programme (DVPP)).

Para 40 In its judgment or reasons the court should always make clear how its findings on the issue of domestic abuse have influenced its decision on the issue of arrangements for the child. In particular, where the court has found domestic abuse proved but nonetheless makes an order which results in the child having future contact with the perpetrator of domestic abuse, the court must always explain, whether by way of reference to the welfare check-list, the factors in paragraphs 36 and 37 or otherwise, why it takes the view that the order which it has made will not expose the child to the risk of harm and is beneficial for the child.

 

The Migrant Child with no Recourse to Public Funds

I am grateful for this guest post by Hal Fish who is a content writer for the Immigration Advice Service; an organisation of leading UK immigration solicitors that help migrant families regulate their immigration status.

Whilst there are numerous issues that affect and damage the many migrant families of the UK, the welfare of migrant children is a profoundly troubling matter which continues to be overlooked in mainstream media. Migrant children are being thrown into a state of vulnerability due to the immigration status of their parents. Street homelessness, poverty and other forms of dejection are rampant issues for these children as they grow up without access to the same public funding as those with British Citizenship.

The main reason causing this problem is the ‘No Recourse to Public Funds’ (NRPF) condition. Coming from theImmigration and Asylum Act 1999, the clause states that if a person is ‘subject to immigration control’ they will have ‘no recourse to public funds’.Without standard routes to public funding, the only support left to the children of migrant families can be found in Section 17 of the 1989 Children Act. This act places a duty on local authorities to safeguard and promote the welfare of children ‘in need’ in their area. This one source of provision has become a safety net for underprivileged migrant families; sadly, however, the children keep slipping through the many gaps of that net.

It seems that the government’s commitment to creating a ‘hostile environment’ for migrants is being prioritised over the commitment to providing safe living conditions for children in need. The Home Office have shifted their responsibility to support these children onto local authorities. However, pressures of austerity and other budgetary restrictions have left such authorities reluctant to provide financial support. With these limitations in mind, tactics such as misinformation, intimidation and unfair judgements on credibility are being employed by local authorities as to withhold their funds from impoverished migrant families.

It was found by Project 17, an organisation working with migrants fixed in the NRPF condition, that 60 percent of its clients were wrongly refused assistance when they initially contacted their local authority. On top of this, 22 percent of families were wrongly refused support on the basis of their immigration status. Habitually the reasoning for these refusals are arbitrary and baseless, often decisions are made before assessment is even conducted. Many families have been incorrectly informed that by requesting support under section 17 they were trying to claim ‘public funds’, whilst others have been told they can only be supported if they have leave to remain in the UK. One of the main problems is that local authorities seem much more concerned with trying to catch parents out for fraud as opposed to actually assessing the considerable needs of the children.

And even when support is granted, there is no statutory guidance on the rates of financial support provided under Section 17 of the Children Act 1989. This means that there is no set figure to determine exactly how much money families should be given. Different children have different needs, and therefore discretion should be used when judging just how much financial aid should be offered to each case – for instance, some children will have greater medical bills. But regardless, families with NRPF are overwhelmingly in need of basic level of financial support as to provide accommodation, food and other essentials for their children. Yet the Children’s Society found that some families received lower than the asylum support rate of £36.50 per person per week – a figure nowhere near the level required to alleviate destitution and one in breach of human rights law.

A report by Project 17, spoke to children living with NRPF and found that 41 percent of them felt unsafe as they were ‘homeless’, ‘moving around a lot’, ‘living with people they did not know’, ‘uncertain about their housing situation’, and ‘travelling long distances to school’. It’s clear that not enough is being done to keep these children safe and supported. Social worker and researcher Andy Jolly brought home this point when he recently said: ‘the death by starvation of Lillian Oluk and her daughter Lynne Mutumba in March 2016, while being supported by a local authority under section 17 of the Children Act (1989), illustrates the consequences of inadequate support for undocumented migrant families in the hostile environment.’

Worryingly, there is very little evidence to suggest a change in the Home Office’s or local authorities’ approach to families with the NRPF condition. Yet the number of families requiring support under section 17 has steadily been rising for years now: between 2012 and 2013 it rose by 19 percent. To exacerbate troubles, the Home Office have proposed cuts to asylum support contained in the Immigration Bill 2015. Which means, if passed, the number of children who rely on section 17 will increase as there will be even less financial support for them from other means. And rules such as those contained in the Immigration Act 2014, which limit rented accommodation to those migrants who have the ‘right to rent’, will lead to homelessness amongst migrant families; once more creating a greater need for section 17 support.

Ultimately, while section 17 support does provide a thin layer of protection for thousands of children in the UK, it does not offer enough. With minimal guidance given on how assessment should be made, and support administered, there is too much reliance on the discretion of local authorities; who often work with other (namely financial) concerns prioritised. There must be more done to fight against the harrowing circumstances and impoverished lifestyle that these vulnerable children are being exposed to. It is imperative that the government implements a consistent and adequate structure of support for migrant families living with the NRPF condition; one which is capable of offering the necessary level of provision for the children overwhelmingly in need.

 

Further Reading

Financial and Housing Advice.

Hackney Migrant Centre guide to section 17 – The guide contains information, advice and guidance gathered from those who have experience of seeking this kind of support. The guide covers an explanation of section 17 support, the child in need assessment, what support might look like, what happens if support is refused and a helpful evidence checklist. The guide also contains signposting to partner drop-in’s and immigration advice sources.

 

 

Can you challenge a finding of fact in a family court?

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore

TLDR; yes  – but its difficult. Don’t rely on being able to challenge a finding after it is made – it is far, far better to challenge it at the time of your court case, if you have all the available evidence.  

However, if you discover evidence after the hearing that shows the findings have been made on an inaccurate basis, it is clear that there is a mechanism to challenge this. 

So anyone who asserts the the Judge ‘got it wrong’ at their hearing and they have the evidence to prove this – ask yourself (and them) why they haven’t asked the court to look at this. 

in cases involving children, it is clearly very important that decisions about their welfare are based on sound factual findings. See W (Children), Re [2009] EWCA Civ 59. But what does a parent do if they think the finding of fact was made on the wrong basis?

Section 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 was inserted by the Crime and Courts Act 2013, section 17(6), Schedule 10, paragraph 1 and came into force on 22nd April 2014.  It gives the Family Court the power to “vary, suspend, rescind or revive any order made by it”. it’s an interesting provision as that undermines the principle in relation to finality of judgments and orders – but which itself is in tension with the principle that decisions about children, which have such long lasting consequences, should be made on the soundest footing.

in the case of Re E (Children: Re-opening Findings of Fact) [2019] EWCA Civ 1447 the  Court of Appeal held that the Family Court had the statutory power under the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 s.31F(6) to review its findings of fact at any time.

In this case, the children were removed from the mother’s care, after the youngest was found to have cigarette burns on her arm. The mother said it was an accident but her accounts were inconsistent. In the criminal investigation, the police medical evidence supported the mother and said she offered a plausible explanation for accidental burns. The mother then got permission to appeal out of time on the basis of that report.

The Court of Appeal found that a finding of fact was not “an order” in the strict sense of s.31F(6), but it could be appealed if it was integral to the order on which it was based and therefore came within the scope of section 31F(6). A finding of fact that the mother deliberately hurt her child was clearly integral to the order made to remove them.

Nor did section 31F(6) express that it was limited to a particular time after the hearing, given that findings of fact often have longstanding consequences for children and their families.

The court refused to follow G (A Child), Re [2014] EWCA Civ 1365  where the judge commented that when a sealed order, after a fact finding hearing, is challenged then that challenge must be to the appeal court and the mother should not have been allowed to apply to the first court to re-open factual issues.

However, the Court of Appeal in Re E dismissed the mother’s appeal and found she should apply directly to the trial court – the trial court was more likely to be in a better position than any appeal court to assess the true significance of the further evidence and was likely to be able to deal with the application more quickly and cheaply.

Applying to the first court to look at its findings again.

So if a parent wants to review a finding of fact the approach is set out in Re ZZ, (Children) (Care Proceedings: Review of Findings) [2014] EWFC 9;[2015] 1WLR 95.This case adopted a three part test first set out by Charles J in Birmingham City Council v H and Others [2005] EWHC 2885 (Fam):

  • the court must consider whether it will permit any challenge to the earlier findings
  • it then has to decide the extent of the investigation and evidence heard by the review
  • then it hears the review and decides whether or not the earlier findings still stand.

The court will not get beyond the first stage unless there is some ‘real reason; to believe that the earlier findings can be challenged. ‘Mere speculation and hope’ are not enough. The over arching question for the court will be whether there was any reason to think that a rehearing would result in a different finding.

See also CTD (A Child: Rehearing) [2020] EWCA Civ 1316 (14 October 2020)

Appealing to another court to about the findings

Or a parent could appeal based on further evidence but this might need an application to extend time, as applications to appeal have strict time limits.  Pursuant to CPR r.52.21(3) an appeal to the Court of Appeal would be allowed where the lower court decision was either wrong or unjust because of a serious irregularity.

Under r.52.21(2) any evidence not before the lower court would not be admitted without permission, looking at criteria in in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1489

  •  that it hadn’t been possible to get the evidence for use at the first hearing
  • if heard, the evidence would have had an important impact on the case
  • and the evidence was credible.

An appeal was allowed against a judge’s decision in Re A (no 2) (children: findings of fact) [2019] EWCA Civ 1947 where the Judge came up with his own ‘theory of the case’ that had not been argued before him and which was not supported by the evidence.

What happens when one parent wants to leave the country – but the other parent doesn’t

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore

If you are a person ‘connected to a child’ who is under 16 – i.e. you are that child’s parent – and you take the child out of the jurisdiction of England and Wales without getting permission from the other parent, then you could find that you are committing the criminal offence of child abduction.  See the Child Abduction Act 1984. However section 4 gives you a defence IF you have a child arrangements order which sets out that you are the person the child lives with AND you are out of the country for less than a month.

Therefore, if either parent wants to leave England and Wales – to either return to their home country or start a new life with a new job etc – that parent will either have to get the agreement of the other parent or a court order.

Such applications to court are known as ‘leave to remove’ applications. There is no specific provision in the Children Act dealing with relocation cases. The child’s welfare is paramount and the court will go through the welfare checklist.  It may need to ask CAFCASS to provide a section 7 report to help it determine the weight to put on the different items in the checklist.

The case of Payne v Payne [2001] for a long time was the key authority in this area, but there was increasing concern growing about how the courts interpreted this case and a perception that too much weight was being put on the disappointment of the parent who wasn’t allowed to leave.

Therefore, there has been a shift in more recent case law to considering more carefully the impact on the child of the loss of direct contact with the parent who remains behind.

Each case turns on its own facts and case law can be no more than a guide. The court will be keen to understand the motivations behind the move. Is it a genuine wish to return to a familiar place, with possibly more family support? Is it a wish to take up a job offer that represents a real opportunity? Or is the move possibly a tactic in an acrimonious relationship breakdown to prevent continuing contact between child and parent?

There have been a number of cases decided since Payne v Payne. One useful case is S v G (Relocation to Russia) [2015] EWFC 4 which considered if there should be any distinction between those cases where before the suggestion of relocating, one parent had ‘primary’ care or where both parents had more or less equal time with the child.

The legal principles can be summarised in this way

  • The child’s welfare is the court’s paramount consideration.
  • The court is to have regard to the welfare checklist in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989.
  • Courts should not categorise cases in terms of concepts of shared or primary care but should use the facts of the case and the answers arrived at in consideration of the checklist to
    • describe the arrangements for care on the ground as they have been;
    • as they are at date of the hearing; and 
    • as the parties intended them to remain had it not been for the question of relocation.

In applying these principles the court will examine:

  • The applicant’s proposals for relocation; a ‘going home’ case may be less arduous than an entirely new venture;
  • The applicant’s motives – in particular is a significant motivation to exclude the other parent?
  • The motives of the respondent – are any objections truly child centred?
  • The impact of relocation upon the respondent.
  • The impact of refusal to permit relocation upon the applicant, insofar as this impacts upon the child.

How do you assess motivation?

In essence, by examining how well planned and researched any proposed move is. What plans have been made for where the child will live and go to school? What language will the child be speaking? What plans for contact with the other parent have been made? How easy is it to travel? If direct contact isn’t going to be possible more than a few times a year, what other arrangements such as Skype can be put in place? Is the child simply to too young to be able to benefit from that kind of indirect contact?

it is clearly very important to make an application to relocate in good time. These applications are unlikely to be dealt with in less than six months so if a move is planned to coincide with a new school term, it is important to give enough time for the court process to conclude.

Similarly if a parent is objecting to a move even when remaining in the UK would mean the other parent facing poverty, insecure accommodation and lack of support for e.g. then this will inevitably impact on the weight the court gives to the objections against relocating.

An example of a case where relocation was refused

See Re R (A Child – Relocation) [2015] EWHC 456 (Fam). The court set out a number of reasons why the mother’s application failed. The child was 2 1/2 years old and had been born in America following IVF treatment of a donor egg and the father’s sperm. The mother wished to leave the UK and go to Hong Kong. No issues were raised about the father’s ability to care for the child and the court noted a strong bond between the. On the facts of this case, the court rejected the view of CAFCASS that it was a ‘finely balanced’ one.

  • The father’s work commitments made it almost impossible for him to travel to Hong Kong even for short periods.
  • No argument was made, nor would the court have accepted such an argument on the evidence, that the mother was isolated or lonely in England.
  • The court didn’t accept the mother’s arguments that remaining in England would cause her financial hardship, for example, accepting the father’s evidence that there were a number of agencies that the mother could have approached for work but had failed to do so.
  • The court concluded that the mother had presented barriers to the father spending time with the child, some of which disappeared without any explanation and she had been disdainful of the father when making holiday arrangements. 
  • The mother’s proposals for contact between the child and father following relocation were insufficient to make up for the loss in the relationship. This harm to the child would be compounded by the likely sense of abandonment upon the child finding out, as he will in the future, that the father was his only natural parent.

 

Conducting a comparative analysis of standards of living in different countries

What if one parent argues that the living conditions in the country of relocation are significantly inferior to those in the UK?  Unless the situation is so dire the that – for example, the Foreign Office advises that a particular country is not safe, i argue that the English court can go no further than to scrutinise the information offered by the parent wishing to relocate, to be satisfied that the parent has made reasonable plans to meet the child’s basic requirements for accommodation, education and health care.

An attempt by the English court to carry out an analysis of standards of living in two very different countries is inappropriate for two main reasons:

  • this exercise risks diverting the court’s focus away from the welfare of the particular children before them, as demanded by the Children Act 1989. The court must consider what advantages/disadvantages of the move pertain particularly to them. For young children the focus will be largely upon the quality of the relationships they can sustain with their adult carers. A variety of factors go into assessing quality of life in various countries, not all of which have relevance to the experiences of the particular children before the court.
  • The overriding objective for the court under both the Family and the Civil Procedure Rules is to deal with cases justly but proportionately. To conduct a comparative analysis of life in  different countries would be a lengthy and expensive exercise, which is likely to require possibly contested expert evidence and consideration of a variety of reports from the United Nations and other organisations. By argument with analogy as to how the court have approached attempts at ‘comparative country analysis’ in immigration/asylum cases, in Re A (Care Proceedings: Asylum Seekers) [2003] 2 FLR 92 the court found that absent any established risk to the children on being returned to their country of origin, it was an abuse of process to continue care proceedings to prevent the parents and children being returned.

The Hague Convention 1996 and Mirror Orders in the foreign court.

The Hague Convention provides that all contracting states shall recognise by operation of law all measures taken by the authorities of another contracting state. Therefore, if the parent wants to relocate to a country that has ratified the HC, a ‘mirror order’ may be made in that country’s court,  permitting the respondent to take enforcement action if the applicant does not abide by its terms.

An example of a case where a mirror order was made when relocating to South Africa can be seen in the case of Re MM (A Child: Relocation) [2014] EWFC B176

What’s in a name? Complainant versus victim.

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore. 

The verdict in the Carl Beech case has only just been delivered and the recriminations have begun. If anyone was in any doubt about the dangers inherent in identifying a complainant as a ‘victim’ at the outset of any investigation or court hearing, then here you have it.

An allegation which is not accepted or not proven is not a fact. Someone may identify themselves readily as a victim when in fact they are mistaken – or worse, a fantasist or a liar. Proceedings in either a civil or criminal case hear evidence and make determinations. There is no presumption of guilt in a criminal court. Those making assertions in civil courts must prove them on the balance of probabilities.

I have had cause to be critical of the Ministry of Justice and its recently set up 3 month Inquiry into how the family courts deal with allegations of domestic abuse. My unease stems largely from the fact that the MoJ appear to be operating from the presumption that men are perpetrators of violence and women their victims, even before any evidence has been heard.

My unease has now increased when I learned today of a ‘new service’ set up and funded by the MoJ to deliver support to ‘victims of domestic abuse in family courts’. I queried use of word ‘victim’ and was told the MoJ have set the terms of the service, including its terminology.

I have had long standing concerns about the use of the word ‘victim’ to describe a complainant. In summary:

  • setting up a complainant as a ‘victim’ at the inception of the court process gives that person a wholly unrealistic view of how their evidence may be treated in an adversarial court process.
  • Treating one party as a victim prior to any findings made about the factual basis for that status, risks undermining the fairness of the proceedings and casting the respondent as a ‘villain’ at the outset.

This raises so many questions

  • Who benefits from this dangerous muddying of the forensic waters?
  • Why isn’t it possible to offer support to anyone going through the court process without first deeming them a ‘victim’ on possibly nothing other than their wish to identify as such?
  • Is this seen as an ‘easier’ response than improving the woeful physical nature of many court buildings or cheaper than providing legal representation to both sides of a private law dispute?

 

I have therefore made a FOI request on 8th August 2019 and will update on 29th August.

I would be grateful for the following information, relating to the project which the Ministry of Justice has asked the Citizens Witness Service to run ‘delivering support to victims of domestic abuse in family courts’.

I am told that this service has already launched in Worcester Family Court in July and is about to launch In Swindon. I can find no information about this service on line but was told that the MoJ ‘as funder’ has set the definition and scope of this service, including the terminology of ‘victim’ . Either applicant or respondent – or presumably both – are apparently ‘deemed’ to be victims if they declare themselves to be. The service is offered prior to any determination of any contested allegation by the family court.

I have raised concern that this practice of identifying a complainant as a ‘victim’ prior to such determination of what actually happened, is fraught with difficulty; there is a clear tension between a forensic process that may end in rejecting a complainant’s account and a service that supports someone as a ‘victim’ at the very inception of the court process.

I am told that this service is being offered after ‘wide ranging consultation with victims of domestic abuse’.

I would like to know therefore

1. The time period over which this consultation took place
2. The identities of those individuals or organisations who were consulted.
3. The cost of this consultation
4. The cost of the service to date
5. The anticipated running costs of this service over the first 12 months of its inception.
6. The number and location of those Family Courts who will be running the service

Further Reading

My response to the Inquiry Assessing risk of harm to children and parents in private law children cases

 

Feelings and Dogma cannot set the agenda in Family Justice

Judges don’t need ‘training’ about violence – they need evidence.

Information about the Family Justice System: Who can you trust?

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore

I have been asked to provide a synopsis of information about those organisations and people that I think should be treated with caution when it comes to information about the Family Justice System.  What follows is my personal opinion – but, as ever, my opinion is based upon evidence from a variety of sources, including criminal convictions and criticism from the civil courts.

The people I list range from serious criminals to those who genuinely and passionately believe what they say and may have some grounds to support it. I do not suggest that people on this list – save for the obviously criminal – have nothing of value or interest to say about the state of our family justice system.

I do however think that, given the nature of their sources and associates, whatever they say needs to be treated with caution and checked against independent sources, wherever possible.

I believe we all have a moral duty to make decisions with the best possible information and take conscious efforts to be aware when bias and prejudice might lead us astray.

 

CARVATH Richard

Self identifying ‘investigative journalist’, arrested at court in support of Samantha Baldwin. Also believes in organised satanic ritual abuse and accusing those who report accurately about family law cases of ‘defamation’.

The Freeman on the Land

Be very wary of anyone who identifies as a Freeman.  In essence, they believe that they can escape being subject to the law by refusing to recognise it. This causes immediate and obvious problems in care proceedings and is almost inevitably an entirely doomed strategy.  For further detail see this post. 

GERRISH Brian and UK Column

Part of UK Column, which describes itself as ‘an independent multi media news website’ long standing associate of Hemming et al. Was one of the first people McNeil approached with videos of the children in the Hampstead Hoax case – but looks like he had the sense to turn her down. 

See also the Richie Allen Show.

HAIGH Victoria

Supported by Hemming; unusual for being named in family court judgments after she was found to have caused serious emotional harm to her child by pushing a false narrative that the child’s father had sexually abused her. Was given a custodial sentence for her breach of a non molestation order and worked with Elizabeth Watson, who was also given a custodial sentence for contempt of court in revealing details about Haigh’s case. Believes that the family court sanctions the deliberate ‘breeding ‘of babies to be handed over to paedophiles.

For further information see this post. 

And ‘The danger of crusades’ from The Transparency Project.

HAINES Tim and Julie

Close associates with Hemming and his organisation Justice for Families, which no longer appears to have a web presence. Following Tim Haines arrest in 2014 for leaving his daughter alone in a car, the couple developed a keen interest in the child protection system and appear to operate from a starting point that any social work intervention with a family can rarely be justified. They offer their services as paid McKenzie friends and appear to encourage people to make appeals to the Court of Appeal that they know to be hopeless, simply to send a message about how strongly people feel. I advise that you do not give either money or documents to either of the Haines, without having a clear idea about what they are proposing to do to help your case.

HEMMING John

Hemming has been a dedicated campaigner against the FJS since 2007 after some social work involvement with his then pregnant partner. He has over the years made some reasonable and sensible points. However what good he has done is significantly eclipsed by the bad.  He was patron of Sabine Mc Neil and Belinda McKenzies’ Association of McKenzie friends along with MP Austin Mitchell until early 2015. Has repeatedly urged parents to leave the jurisdiction as they won’t get a fair hearing in the UK.  Has worked closely with Ian Josephs and Christopher Booker. He was seriously criticised by Lord Justice Wall. I have no doubt he caused a lot of damage while a serving MP as his position gave him credibility. However his influence appears to have diminished since he lost his seat in 2015.

I made a formal complaint about the activities of JFF in January 2017. I am still waiting for a response.

Further information is here.

JOSEPHS Ian

A long standing critic of the FJS and author of the infamous ‘Golden Rules’ which includes advice to mothers to think very carefully before even reporting fears about sexual abuse of their children. He is a wealthy man and has given large sums of money over the years to parents who wish to leave the jursidction to escape care proceedings. He carries out no risk assessments of the parents to whom he gives money; his finest hour so far was providing money to Marie Black to travel to France – she was later convicted of over 20 serious sexual offences against children.

MCNEIL Sabine and the Hampstead Hoax

McNeil is currently serving a 9 year sentence for her harassment of families involved in the ‘Hampstead Hoax’ case. This case has proved a useful short cut to identifying the most dangerous of the FJS Conspiracy Theorists. Hoaxstead Research has done sterling work in unmasking the hoaxers and is a good point of reference. It recently reported that McNeil’s appeal against her sentence was refused.

Sabine McNeil has been associated with almost every person or organisation that causes me serious concern with regard to misinformation about the family justice system. See also Belinda McKenzie and the damage done by her and McNeil in the Melissa Laird Case, as just one example out of many.

The Ministry of Justice

It is a tribute to just how odd 2019 has been that I include a Government Department in this list. But the MoJ easily make the cut following their bizarre decision to launch an Inquiry over 3 months into how issues of violence are dealt with in the family courts; that Inquiry apparently proceeding on the basis that men are perpetrators of violence and that law and policy are best discussed in the context of a raft of subjective and unchecked submissions from the public.  It maybe that the outcome of the Inquiry is sensible and I can remove them from the list. But I am not holding my breath and will treat information disseminated by this Department with caution from now on.  Further further details see this post.

PEACHER Andy

Runs Freedom Talk Radio which he asserts ‘has become the very platform for people with an alternative view point to come onto the show and to announce their findings, ideas and suggestions and allows them to open up to the citizens by revealing their true beliefs on just exactly what is taking place in our World from their view point, which does on so many occasions, conflict and call into question with what is being broadcasted by the mainstream media, which they dare not report the truth’. Associated with and friendly to a great many of the most pernicious influencers on the FJS Conspiracy circuit. 

PHILIPS Natasha

Runs the Researching Reform Website. Has connections with Hemming and at one point made Sabine McNeil her ‘star commentator’. As the comments on her web posts shows, she continues to interact largely with those who are identified ‘players’ on the conspiracy scene.

 

Further reading

Are you sitting comfortably? The art of Story Telling. 

The Particular Dangers of Conspiracy Theories for Parents 

You Had Better Make Some Noise – Abusers will exploit bad laws and poor safeguarding

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore

I was delighted to be asked to speak on July 27th 2019 by Make More Noise

As the organisers say:

There has been a surge of Feminist activism across the UK in the past year. Women are agitated and organised. We are finding our voice and our voice is saying NO.

Make More Noise are one such group, created to provide a space for women to talk freely and address uncomfortable truths.

 

Why am I interested in this?

I am a woman. I am a disabled woman. The delusion of self ID as a cure for unhappiness is shown to me, and every other disabled person in the world, every single day. We cannot identify out of ourselves. Every day the people around us and the hostile environments we have to navigate tell us what our reality is. To claim another’s identify is a choice for the privileged – a black woman cannot self Identify as white but Rachel Dolezal can claim to be a black woman and take a Nigerian name.

But I am also a lawyer. Who has worked in child protection for 20 years. I have been campaigning since 2014 for greater openness and honesty in our debate about the family justice system.

So it would seem that my experiences both personal and professional have led me to this moment. There is so much to worry about when we face the erasure of biological sex as a category of identification that I have decided to focus my concerns on the implications for children.

 

My central hypothesis this: people would rather cause pain than feel it.

We have a lack of mature discussion in our society about issues of grave importance to us all. I am quite sure that social media is partly behind this.  I see the law being increasingly used as a weapon to silence people who step out of line, the rights of a few achieving dominance over the rights of many others. I see the efforts of some groups and individuals to push back against this – such as Fair Cop and Maya Forstater – but the fact that such groups have felt compelled to take action is an indication of what a strange place our public discourse has reached. People are sacked for expressing ‘wrong think’, the police are used to enforce one person’s feelings against another person’s Article 10 rights to freedom of expression.

And who suffers most in such a scenario where a legal system is used to prioritise the rights of one minority above others? Those at the very bottom of any pyramid power structure – children.

So what supports my hypothesis?

  • High court decisions only 3 years apart about transitioning pre schoolers
  • The NSPCC debacle and the intervention of Prostasia

The shifting position of the High Court

The case of Re J in 2016 involved a 4 year old, who his mother claimed ‘disdained his penis’ and wished to be a girl. The High Court did not agree and ordered that the child lived with his father. Mermaids supported the mother and issued an angry press release after the judgment saying they would appeal – they did not.  I wrote about this case here which contains links to the judgment and press release.

However, only three years later came the case of Lancashire County Council v TP & Ors (Permission to Withdraw Care Proceedings) [2019] EWFC 30. This involved foster carers who had two unrelated children in their care who decided they wanted to transition – the youngest aged 3 years old. [EDIT apologies – youngest was transitioned at FOUR YEARS OLD. Doesn’t make any difference to my argument] The LA were applying to withdraw care proceedings, so it was a different situation from re J. But even so, its interesting to see how the Judge framed this issue of transitioning pre schoolers:

Notwithstanding even the Guardian’s caution in respect of the openness of [the foster carers] to the possibility of an alteration in the children’s attitude to their gender identity I conclude that Dr Pasterski’s evidence demonstrates that it is obvious that neither of these grounds would meet threshold. Taken together with the panoramic evidence of the child focused approach of [the foster carers] it is overwhelmingly obvious that neither H nor R have suffered or are at risk of suffering significant emotional harm arising from their complete social transition into females occurring at a very young age. The evidence demonstrates to the contrary, this was likely to minimise any harm or risk of harm. The evidence does not support the contention that it was actively encouraged rather than appropriately supported.

How on earth is it ‘overwhelmingly obvious’ that a 3 year old will experience no harm from a decision to transition from male to female? I have a difficulty here with such an uncritical acceptance of the evidence of Dr Pasterski. Not merely because I find it extremely hard to accept that any 3 year old has the understanding or the language to communicate a desire to change sex, but I note the approach of Dr Paterski in an earlier case.

Jay v Secretary of State for Justice [2018] EWHC 2620 (Fam) (08 October 2018) considered a man in his 40s who wished to become a woman. While Dr Paterski opined without any reservation that this was a genuine case of gender dysphoria, Dr Barrett struck a more cautious note, given that some of Ms Jay’s reported history was ‘directly at odds’ with documentary records.

“… If collateral corroboration is not convincingly elicited I would have grave doubts and wonder whether [Ms Jay]’s somewhat dependent personality had caused her to unwisely latch onto a change of gender role as a seemingly universal solution to both why her life had gone wrong and how it might be rectified.”

It is worth contemplating, with considerable unease, just what would happen if Re J was being heard and decided this week. Would the High Court have been able to protect a little boy from the mother who was telling everyone he ‘disdained’ his penis? Or would he have been sacrificed to what appears to be compulsive drive to be seen as ‘woke’ and ‘inclusive’ ?

The NSPCC debacle and the intervention of Prostasia

All of you I am sure are familiar with the NSPCC’s public response to people who raised concerns about one of their employees who allegedly filmed himself masturbating at work and published a video online. I am pleased that, belatedly, they had the sense to realise that telling people who raised concerns that they were bigots who should be reported was not an appropriate response and they have referred themselves to the Charity Commission. I await with interest the outcome of that.

What happened to me on Twitter after that was also interesting.

I was discussing that people should consider not making further charitable donations to the NSPCC but consider smaller local charities. An organisation called Prostasia popped up and suggested they might be a worthwhile beneficiary. Which was odd as a quick google showed them to be based in California and advocating ‘sex positive’ child protection, whatever that means.

What I suspect it means is support for men who want to have sex with children. This suspicion was confirmed when another Twitter user found a copy of a mug shot of a man who was active in the conversation and on the Prostasia website. This stated he had been arrested in 2012 for sexual conduct with a child under 13. Prostasia then blocked us all and then tried to blackmail me, which is a whole other story I don’t have time for now – but is a clear indication of the murky ethical waters in which this organisation swims.

 

What does this show me?

The inability or unwillingness of both pro-trans activists and pro-paedophile groups to distinguish teenagers from pre-schoolers.

Because what Prostasia has in common with the views of the legal adviser for Mermaids is a persistent refusal to identify what they mean by ‘a child’.

  • A child is defined as a person aged 0-18.
  • The majority of children under 12 are unlikely to be considered ‘Gillick competent’ to make important decisions about their own lives.
  • We have a difficult and grey area around 13-16 where children may well as individuals have greater capacity than the law allows them. But we have to draw a line somewhere.
  • And for children, sex and the criminal law, that line is firmly set at 13 years.  See the Sexual Offences Act 2003. A child under 13 cannot consent to sex. It is rape.

I therefore consider myself on firm ground to say that the vast majority of children under 12 neither want nor need exposure to adult sexuality. It is important that they are allowed the time and space to develop their own identities and their own sexual preferences; free of the coercion or manipulation of an adult. And once they cross that threshold into adulthood they should be free to live and love as they wish, according to the boundaries of the existing laws. Sexual activities between consenting adults is none of my business or concern.

What I have witnessed developing over the last year or so has caused me increasing concern about the extent to which some men wish to re-frame the discussion about the sexuality of children. They wish to push back the boundaries regarding age and consent. This seems clear to me because of the extent to which they are often coy about stating exactly how they define ‘a child’. The difference between – for example –  a typical 9 year old and a typical 16 year old is vast and in every domain; physical, sexual, social.

And what is the problem with this?

I was alerted to a blog post in March of this year by the Mermaids legal adviser. The author remained anonymous but was arguing that

….someone’s gender identity, at any age, must be respected. A child identifying as trans, whether it has been submitted this is as a result of harm or not, is identifying as trans and that must be respected throughout proceedings…More often than not, if a child says they are trans, they will be trans.

I commented at the time

As I hope I have made clear, any such assertion made without attempting even the barest of analysis of the vast gulf in understanding and capacity between a 6 year old and a 16 year old is an assertion of no value. Worse than that, it is an assertion which attempts to pave the way to leave young children entirely unprotected from their parents.

Most parents love their children and want to do what is in their best interests. A small minority of parents fail to do that. The courts absolutely must be ready, willing and able to step in and to protect such children.

Anyone who is unwilling or unable to see the difference between a child of 6 and a child of 16 is someone who wishes to blur the boundaries around child protection and safeguarding. Why would anyone wish to do this? I can only assume it is to make it easier to secure the eradication of the rights of children to be protected from the imposition of men’s sexual will.  And what is worse, their rights will be eradicated at the same time we are told WE are the villans, WE are the bigots.

The facts are always friendly. That was and will remain my rallying cry. Lets have proper discussion . Not all who wish to transition do so out of realistaion of their ‘essential self’ – a self that no one apparently can define. Some will do so because they are predators. Predators predate. That is what they do. For example, the recent trial of convicted paedophile Carl Beech revealed that he had volunteered at the NSPCC between 2012 and 2015 .

The wolf is no longer at the door. The wolf Is in the kitchen and claiming a legal right to be there.  And I am now too old and too fed up to do anything other than speak up. This will not be done in my name.

 

FURTHER READING

In whose best interests? Transgender Children: Choices and Consequences.

When should a child’s trans identity be permitted to be a material issue in a family case?

Video of talk now on YouTube

Transparency Made Simple!

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore

I was asked if I could re-state the law about confidentiality in family proceedings for the benefit of parents who want to talk about their proceedings publicly. What follows is an attempt to simplify the main post on this site about transparency. The usual warning applies – this cannot be used as particular legal advice for a particular case. If you are worried about the consequences of anything you do, you need to get advice from someone in real life who knows what is going on in your particular case. But I hope it can be a useful condensed guide to the general principles. 

Contempt of court is a really serious thing and can lead to you going to prison. But what the courts really don’t like are people who deliberately break the law in an attempt to show how much they dislike the court system. If you can show that you tried your best to stay on the right side of the law I think its unlikely any court would want to give you serious punishment. 

Golden rules

  • Don’t identify any children – by name or by providing information that would make it easy for others to work out who the child is for example, names of older siblings or school the child goes to.  This is called ‘jigsaw identification’
  • Don’t publish any evidence or talk about in detail what happened in court unless you have the permission of the Judge
  • Generally to ‘publish’ means ‘making information known to the general public’ so would include putting information on the Internet, such as a Facebook profile.

Why is it so complicated?

Because the law in this area has developed over a long time and in a variety of different ways. If you find it hard to understand – don’t worry. So do the Judges and the lawyers.

Why can’t I just talk about my case?

Because children do not get a choice about whether or not they are part of care proceedings and it is very unfair to publicise information they might find very embarrassing or shameful.

Important laws you need to know

Section 97 of the Children Act 1989

Section 97(2) says no person shall publish anything which is intended or likely to identify any child as being involved in any proceedings under the Children Act 1989 or the Adoption Act 2002, including the child’s address or school.

If you do this it can be a criminal offence but you have a defence if  you didn’t know or suspect that the published material was intended or likely to identify the child.

Section 12 Administration of Justice Act 1960.

It is a contempt of court under this section to publish information about ‘private proceedings’ UNLESS you are telling a professional something they need to know to protect a child.

You can publish information about ‘the nature of the dispute’ but you can’t refer to the actual evidence, not even in summary. This is quite a tricky distinction.  There is no time limit to this section so you are caught by it even when the care proceedings are over.

This doesn’t cover the identify of witnesses in care proceedings so they can be named unless the Judge makes a different order.

In Re B (A Child) (Disclosure) [2004] EWHC 411 (Fam) [2004] 2 FLR 142 at para [82](v)-(vii); Munby J tried to shed some light on what section 12 covers:

  • section 12 protects is the privacy and confidentiality:
    • (i) of the documents on the court file; and
    • (ii) of what has gone on in front of the judge in his courtroom. …
  • section 12 does not prevent publication
    • of the fact that proceedings are happening, or
    • identification of the parties
    • or the comings and goings of the parties and witnesses,
    • or incidents taking place outside the court or indeed within the precincts of the court but outside the room in which the judge is conducting the proceedings.

I want to talk about my case at a conference or to a  journalist

So how does section 12 stop you talking about the details of the case?  This is a difficult area and causes problems for the lawyers to understand.

Sir James Munby looked at one example;

“Says a friend of [the mother]: “She has been portrayed as a bad mother who is unfit to look after her children. Nothing could be further from the truth. She is wonderful to [them] and they love her. She wants custody of [them] and we will see what happens in court”.”

The Judge dealing with the case found that WAS a breach of section 12 as it went ‘far beyond a description of the nature of the dispute and reached deeply into the substance of the matters’

However, it is clear that every case turns on its own facts, which makes it difficult to provide clear advice about what would or would not be acceptable to talk about. If you are worried, then ideally you need to ask the Judge who heard your case for permission to raise certain issues.

As a general point you are probably ok if you

  • talk about the fact that there were care proceedings
  • talk about what happened after the care proceedings and how it made you feel

How does the court approach applications for publicity?

The High Court has the power, due to section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and its own ‘inherent jurisdiction’ to make orders outside of the statutory provisions about people coming into court or being able to talk about what happens in court.

If the High Court wants to make such an order, the court must examine any competing rights under Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention and undertake the ‘balancing exercise’ as set out in Re S (A Child) (Indentification: Restrictions on publication) [2004] UKHL 47

The case of Re Webster: Norfolk County Council v Webster and Ors [2007] 1 FLR 1146 identified 4 important factors for the court when it considered whether or not to allow information about a case to be publicised:

  • The case was alleged to involve a miscarriage of justice
  • The parents wanted publicity
  • The case had already been extensively publicized
  • There was a need for the full facts to emerge in a way which would improve public confidence in the judicial system.

In Re J [2013] where the Local Authority wanted an order ‘contra mundum’ (against everyone in the world), preventing the identification of a child in care proceedings, to last until the child was 18. The court didn’t agree.

This case involved J, one of the parents’ four children (all of whom went on to be adopted). J’s father posted on the internet various pictures and film of J being removed from the parents’ care, describing what he had published in these kind of terms:

“Waiting in the corner, in the shadows lurks a vampire-ish creature, a wicked, predatory social worker who is about to steal the child from the loving parents. Caught on camera – [name] of Staffordshire social services creeps in the corner like a ghoul, like a dirty secret, like a stain on the wall … You are a wicked, wicked woman [name] – God knows exactly what you have done, you must be very afraid, now! You WILL suffer for this.

Here is an interesting article about this case, in particular the ironic consequence that in attempting to restrain the father from posting his videos on the internet, the LA ensured that he received a great deal of publicity and probably more people saw the videos than would have done if they had not applied for the order.

Sir James Munby said this about Re J

26. The first matter relates to what it has become conventional to call transparency. There is a pressing need for more transparency, indeed for much more transparency, in the family justice system. There are a number of aspects to this.

27. One is the right of the public to know, the need for the public to be confronted with, what is being done in its name. Nowhere is this more necessary than in relation to care and adoption cases. Such cases, by definition, involve interference, intrusion, by the state, by local authorities and by the court, into family life. In this context the arguments in favour of publicity – in favour of openness, public scrutiny and public accountability – are particularly compelling […]

28. I have said this many times in the past but it must never be forgotten that, with the state’s abandonment of the right to impose capital sentences, orders of the kind which family judges are typically invited to make in public law proceedings are amongst the most drastic that any judge in any jurisdiction is ever empowered to make. When a family judge makes a placement order or an adoption order in relation to a twenty-year old mother’s baby, the mother will have to live with the consequences of that decision for what may be upwards of 60 or even 70 years, and the baby for what may be upwards of 80 or even 90 years. We must be vigilant to guard against the risks.

29. This takes me on to the next point. We strive to avoid miscarriages of justice, but human justice is inevitably fallible. The Oldham and Webster cases stand as terrible warning to everyone involved in the family justice system, the latter as stark illustration of the fact that a miscarriage of justice which comes to light only after the child has been adopted will very probably be irremediable. […] We must have the humility to recognise – and to acknowledge – that public debate, and the jealous vigilance of an informed media, have an important role to play in exposing past miscarriages of justice and in preventing possible future miscarriages of justice.

 Rule 12.73 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010

You won’t be in contempt of court if you discuss information about care proceedings so long as you are talking to a person named on this list.

  • a party to the proceedings;
  • the legal representative of a party;
  • a professional legal adviser;
  • Cafcass
  • the Legal Services Commission;
  • an expert whose instruction by a party has been authorised by the court for the purposes of the proceedings;
  • a professional acting in furtherance of the protection of children;
  • an independent reviewing officer appointed in respect of a child who is, or has been, subject to proceedings to which this rule applies;

Further reading

My response to the Inquiry Assessing risk of harm to children and parents in private law children cases

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore

Good practice’ would be to commission serious and proper research into the actual nature of the problem, rather than inviting personal anecdote to take the place of robust data. I am very concerned about the nature of this Inquiry; the manner of its inception and the choice of its Panel. Why are there no representatives of any father’s charities? Why has the Inquiry proceeded on entirely partial assumptions about Judges simply ignoring evidence? Is evidence going to be gathered about the rate of false or exaggerated allegations of violence? About the impact of LASPO on encouraging such in order to qualify for legal aid?

Take the survey here

Response ID ANON-CNG1-5F53-C
Submitted to Assessing risk of harm to children and parents in private law children cases
Submitted on 2019-07-19 20:27:16

Your experience of private law children proceedings

1 Please tell us in your own words about how the family court responded to allegations of domestic abuse or other serious offences in
your case, and/or the effects on you and/or your children.

I have represented mothers, fathers and children in contested private law cases for 20 years now. In my experience, the family courts respond as appropriately as they can, taking into account the serious difficulties caused by lack of availability of legal aid and judges. The failings in the law, in my view, has been a reluctance to hold early findings of fact and allowing intractably hostile parents to drag out proceedings over many years, by which time the children have ‘aged out’. I have not experienced any judge being ‘ignorant’ of issues around abuse and violence. I do not think Judges need ‘training’ about violence – they need space and time
to adjudicate properly upon cases. I am extremely concerned that many calling for ‘training’ appear to have a financial interest in such training becoming widespread.

2 Was your experience in the family court:
In 2018-2019, In 2014-2017, Before 2014

Raising allegations of domestic abuse or other serious offences in private law children proceedings

Are there any difficulties in raising the issue of domestic abuse or other serious offences against a parent or child, in private law children proceedings?
Yes

The difficulties in raising issues of domestic violence, in my view, clearly do NOT arise from misunderstanding or ignorance of the law. The difficulties arise from the lack of available court time and the increasing number of litigants in person. There is clearly a lack of understanding about the forensic process and the requirements of proof amongst those who are not legally trained. Better education about this might help. I suspect the ‘I believe’ policy has done enormous harm here. Women come to court expecting to be ‘believed’ and it is a shock to find out that the court process demands proof.

Children’s voices

4 How are children’s voices taken into account in private law children proceedings where there are allegations of domestic abuse or other
serious offences? Do children feel heard in these cases? What helps or obstructs children being heard?
It is my experience over 20 years of representing children that the vast majority do NOT wish to participate in court proceedings. They want a decision to be made about their future by an adult who cares about what happens to them. They generally cannot and do not wish to engage with the evidence. My experience of guardians is generally positive; they appear to be committed and produce thoughtful and helpful reports. I have also noticed an increased willingness amongst judges to see and speak to children outside the actual proceedings, which I think is very positive.

The procedure where domestic abuse is raised

5 Are fact-finding hearings held when they should be?
No
There appears to be a reluctance to hold findings of fact on the basis that ‘it won’t help’ if there is a perception that the allegations are not ‘serious’ enough to mean that direct contact would not be ordered. This seems to offer only a short term gain; my experience is that allegations which are not ‘put to bed’ continue to cause considerable difficulty for the proper resolution of contested private law cases.

6 Where domestic abuse is found to have occurred, how is future risk assessed and by whom? Is risk assessed only in relation to
children, or also in relation to the non-abusive parent?
In my experience risk is assessed by CAFCASS, a social worker or the judge. Risk is generally seen ‘in the round’. I am not aware of any Judge who would say that a person who is violent to a parent but not the child could still be a ‘good parent’.

7 How effective is Practice Direction 12J in protecting children and victims of domestic abuse from harm?
It does what it can. But it clearly cannot assist in those cases – sadly frequent – where women will continue or resume a relationship with a violent man. Nor can it mitigate against structural problems such as lack of alternative housing.

8 What are the challenges for courts in implementing PD12J? Is it implemented consistently? If not, how and why do judges vary in their
implementation of the Practice Direction.
In my experience in London and and on the South Western Circuit I have not noticed any worrying inconsistencies in implementation of the PD.

9 What has been the impact of the presumption of parental involvement in cases where domestic abuse is alleged? How is the
presumption applied or disapplied in these cases?

The presumption is a joke. It is meaningless. It has no impact.

10 Where domestic abuse is found to have occurred, to what extent do the child arrangement orders made by the court differ from orders made in cases not involving domestic abuse?

Depending on the level of severity of abuse, the distinction is in the nature and degree of contact ordered. When serious allegations are found proved, the order is
invariably for indirect contact only.

Safety and protection at court for victims of domestic abuse and other serious offences
11 What is the experience of victims of domestic abuse or other serious offences in requesting arrangements to protect their safety at
court?
Over 20 years I have found the courts become much more responsive to issues around safety at court. However, much of this depends on the physical resources of the court building itself. Some are simply not fit for purpose and it is very difficult in those buildings to ensure that the parties are kept separate.

12 Do family courts make the right decisions about whether an alleged victim of domestic abuse or other serious offences is vulnerable?
Yes
Vulnerable people clearly need appropriate help and representation at court. There appears to be good and widespread understanding amongst lawyers about what is needed.

13 What is the experience of victims of domestic abuse and other serious offences of being directly cross-examined by their alleged
abuser/alleged perpetrator? What is their experience of having to ask questions of their alleged abuser/perpetrator?
I have never known this to happen. When my client was facing XX by a former partner she alleged was abusive, the Judge asked questions. But this is clearly a dreadful situation and should not be tolerated. Both alleged victim and alleged perpetrator ought to have legal representation. It is not fair to ask that the Judge undertake this role.

14 What are the challenges for courts in implementing FPR Part 3A and PD3AA? Are they implemented consistently? If not, how and why
are they inconsistent?
Resources and time.
My experience is that they are implemented consistently.

15 How effective are these provisions in protecting victims of domestic abuse or other serious offences from harm in private law children
proceedings?
I have no idea. The proceedings themselves are very difficult for vulnerable parties, regardless of the efforts made. I do not know what is meant by ‘effective’ in this question.

Repeated applications to the family court in the context of domestic abuse

16 What evidence is there of repeated applications in relation to children being used as a form of abuse, harassment or control of the
other parent?

I do not think this happens very often. Such applications may well be interpreted by one party as an attempt at control. But people are entitled to make applications to the court to secure their legal rights. I have found Judge’s willing to make section 91(14) directions in the appropriate circumstances.

17 Under what circumstances do family courts make orders under s.91(14)?
add text in box:
They are mindful of the guidance of the Court of Appeal and consider it a serious application.

18 How do courts deal with applications for leave to apply following a s.91(14) order?
add text in box:
i have very little experience of this, which suggests to me it is not a common occurrence

19 What are the challenges for courts in applying s.91(14), including applications for leave to apply? Is there consistency in
decision-making? If not, how and why do inconsistencies arise?
I have found the majority of tribunals to consistently apply the Court of Appeal guidance. One judge did not; I appealed her decision and succeeded on that point. She wrongly stated that section 91(14) was not draconian and made an order against my male client.

20 How effective are s.91(14) orders in protecting children and non-abusive parents from harm?
add text in box: I have no idea. They appear to be an effective safeguard against unmeritorious applications.

Outcomes for children

21 What evidence is there of children and parents suffering harm as a result of orders made in private law children proceedings, where
there has been domestic abuse or other serious offences against a parent or child? (This can include harm to a parent caused by a child arrangements order which requires them to interact with the other parent in order to facilitate contact).

This is the problem. There is no ‘evidence’. There is a wealth of anecdote and complaint. But I am aware of no robust evidence. I do not consider the Women’s Aid reporting to be robust. This inquiry is going to invite a great deal of personal anecdote which may or may not have a firm factual foundation. I do not consider this is the way for a mature democracy to proceed to make decisions about any kind of justice system and I am frankly alarmed by this venture and the questions I have just attempted to answer.

22 What evidence is there about the risk of harm to children in continuing to have a relationship – or in not having a relationship – with a
domestically abusive parent (including a parent who has exercised coercive control over the family)?
I REPEAT ANSWER ABOVE

23 What evidence is there about the risk of harm to children in continuing to have a relationship – or in not having a relationship – with a
parent who has committed other serious offences against the other parent or a child such as child abuse, rape, sexual assault or murder?
I REPEAT ANSWER ABOVE

Any other comments or suggestions

24 Are there any examples of good practices in the family courts or which the family courts could adopt (perhaps from other areas of law)
in relation to the matters being considered by the panel?
‘Good practice’ would be to commission serious and proper research into the actual nature of the problem, rather than inviting personal anecdote to take the place of robust data. I am very concerned about the nature of this Inquiry; the manner of its inception and the choice of its Panel. Why are there no representatives of any father’s charities? Why has the Inquiry proceeded on entirely partial assumptions about Judges simply ignoring evidence? Is evidence going to be gathered about the rate of false or exaggerated allegations of violence? About the impact of LASPO on encouraging such in order to qualify for legal aid?

25 Do you wish to make any other comments on the matters being considered by the panel?
write text in box:
I think I have said enough. I hope my cynicism and alarm at this exercise prove unfounded

EDIT 

Have a look at this.  The aim is to protect against ‘perpetrators’. But tricky thing is this – who is deciding they are perpetrators? Is mere assertion now enough?

 

Attachment – Who Makes the Diagnosis?

Sarah Phillimore writes

My post on a general guide to attachment theory – what it means and its importance in care proceedings, remains one of the most popular posts ever on this site. There is also a useful discussion from the perspective of a social worker by guest poster Kate Wells. 

Basically ‘attachment’ is a theory developed by psychologists to explain how a child interacts with the adults looking after him or her. If a child has a healthy attachment, this means the child can be confident that the adults will respond to the child’s needs, for example if he is hungry, tired or frightened, the adult caregiver will respond to meet his needs or reassure and comfort him.

This gives the child confidence to explore his environment and develop a good sense of self-esteem. This will help the child grow up to be a happy and functioning adult.

If a child can’t rely on his carers to look after him and respond consistently, this has been noted to have potentially very serious and damaging consequences for the adult that child will become. If adults are seriously inconsistent or unresponsive in their behaviour to the child, he may become very anxious as he is not able to predict how the adults around him will act; the child may even give up trying to get his needs met.

So Its clearly an issue of interest; unsurprisingly as it often takes centre stage in discussions about children’s welfare in care proceedings.  In this post I will look at at more particular question – who are the people the court rely on to give evidence about attachment?

I am grateful to everyone who took the time out to consider my question – there is clearly a lot to think about and I am increasingly concerned that the knowledge base of the lawyers may not be sufficient to allow us to navigate this area with ease.

Assessing attachment for the court.

Mostyn J was pretty dismissive about the idea that he needed an expert (or indeed anyone!) to help him understand a child’s attachments – see his judgment in GM v Carmarthenshire County Council & Anor [2018] EWFC 36 (06 June 2018). He said at para 18

Second, the theory is only a theory. It might be regarded as a statement of the obvious, namely that primate infants develop attachments to familiar caregivers as a result of evolutionary pressures, since attachment behaviour would facilitate the infant’s survival in the face of dangers such as predation or exposure to the elements. Certainly, this was the view of John Bowlby, the psychologist, psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst and originator of the theory in the 1960s. It might be thought to be obvious that the better the quality of the care given by the primary caregiver the better the chance of the recipient of that care forming stable relationships later in life. However, it must also be recognised that some people who have received highly abusive care in childhood have developed into completely well-adjusted adults. Further, the central premise of the theory – that quality attachments depend on quality care from a primary caregiver – begins to fall down when you consider that plenty of children are brought up collectively (whether in a boarding school, a kibbutz or a village in Africa) and yet develop into perfectly normal and well-adjusted adults

For my part I would say with all due respect that I do not need a social worker to give me evidence based on this theory to help me form a judgment about L’s attachments.

I am not sure I would share Mostyn J’s confidence that he was able to assess a child’s attachment without any help. I have certainly had my fair share of cases where opinions about attachment were bandied around the court and often relied upon as very important. If what is being discussed is some serious psychological problem which is having a detrimental impact on the child’s ability to live happily in the world, then I think most would agree we need some clear and reliable evidence about the how, the why, and what can be done to remedy this – if anything.

Which raises the interesting and particular question of this post – what expertise precisely?  I asked the experts of Twitter this question.

One poster helpfully provided a link to the Family Relations institute They offer a guide to assessments and reporting to the court which look very useful. They note:

Attachment has long been considered relevant to care proceedings. Nevertheless, its usefulness, as compared for example to medical evidence, has been limited by the diverse ways in which attachment is assessed, the different training of experts, and the lack of verifiable evidence upon which to base opinions. In an effort to move from expert opinion to verifiable evidence, The International Association for the Study of Attachment (IASA) has developed a protocol for assessment and formulation of issues related to attachment. The purpose of the protocol is to act as a guide to good practice and to begin a process of improving the application of attachment to family court proceedings.

So it does seem clear that the situation about who assesses and how is currently a little opaque.    What was the general advice from the Twitter experts?

https://twitter.com/ProfSueWhite/status/1151526085588336640

This was opening doors into worlds I hadn’t anticipated – that ‘attachment disorders’ may not actually be anything to do with ‘attachment’ in the classic Bowlby sense but more a problem with neurodevelopment – which clearly needs expertise to identify and assess.

The point was echoed by others – assessment of attachment is not linked to a specific profession.

I received an interesting message from a student on a MSc course in attachment studies

You definitely need to have undertaken specialist training in attachment to state what ‘type’ of attachment a child has in relationship with their primary carer. You’ve already been sent links to some, such as the Anna Freud centre and I’m doing my training at Roehampton University who use Pat Crittendens Dynamic Maturation Model (DMM). It’s a funny area though as we don’t really have a specific title. I’m on a course with social workers, psychologists and OT’s. We will all come away being able to use and possibly code the attachment procedures but will all still come from and work within different professions. We won’t belong to a different ‘attachment’ profession as such but will have had specific training in the area of attachment. (I suppose a bit like social workers can be trained to undertake ABE interviews and so can the police. I couldn’t however ‘diagnose’ an Attachment disorder. It’s a very different thing to diagnose a psychiatric disorder to being trained to observe and analyse a specific type of attachment strategy.

Which in turn leads to the even wider question about the point and purpose of diagnosis – as Roger Smith pointed out, an ‘attachment disorder’ could be seen as a rational choice to avoid relationships after a life time of being ‘let down’.

 

And of course I could rely on the lawyers to continue the proud tradition of Mostynesque cynicism