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Parents seek an injunction to prevent child having gender affirming treatment

The court dismissed the parents’ applications, finding there was no evidence that EE at age 17 lacked capacity and no evidence that she sought imminent treatment. There was no ‘matter’ before the court to undertake an assessment of capacity. This case has provoked controversy about the extent to which any person who wants to remove healthy parts of their body can be said to have ‘capacity’ but the parents’ legal action appeared doomed at the outset on the basis of the evidence they presented and their obvious hostility to ‘LGBT’.

I use she/her pronouns for EE as she is female.

Judgment was handed down by Mr Justice MacDonald in September 2023 in the case of GK and LK v EE (formerly RK).

The facts

EE’s parents applied to court in June 2023 under the inherent jurisdiction and via the Court of Protection under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) with regard to their 17 year old daughter, who turned 18 shortly after the judgment. EE self identifies as a non binary lesbian and at the time was in the care of the local authority via section 20 accommodation. The parents wanted to instruct experts to assess her capacity and asked for an injunction preventing EE from having any kind of gender affirming medical treatment, arguing that she lacked capacity to make decisions about this.

EE and the local authority told the court that the parents were driven by prejudice against EE’s gender identity and pointed out that EE had no current plans for any medical treatment. Therefore, the court had no ‘matter’ under the MCA to make any decision.

Further, there was no sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that EE had capacity under section 1(2) of the MCA. EE’s GP records contained no diagnosis of mental illness. The parents claimed EE had been diagnosed with ‘schizoptypal disorder’ by a psychiatrist in country X, from which the family originated, moving to the UK when EE was three.

EE could not recall speaking to any foreign psychiatrist and had received no medication. She alleged that her parents had been physically and emotionally abusive to her, which they denied. But there were police records that in July 2022 EE was assaulted by her parents who ‘did not like’ that she was ‘LGBT’. She asserted that she had tried to talk to her parents about this since she was 11, but they were very hostile and she gave up aged around 13/14.

There was a child protection medical and EE was found to have non accidental injuries, but there was no mention of any mental health issue or personality disorder in any of the reports at the time. A child protection conference followed, the parents now asserted that EE was undergoing a psychotic episode. EE returned home in August on the basis that there would be no further physical or emotional abuse from her parents.

But EE then discussed with her parents the desire to have ‘top surgery’ i.e. a double mastectomy to remove her breasts. The parents asked her to postpone any decision until she was 25 and EE asserts that they became increasingly controlling, insisted she undergo online therapy and persistently made homophobic/transphobic comments. The local authority undertook a Child and Family Assessment, with no concerns for EE’s mental health. By November 2022 matters had seriously degenerated to the point that EE’s father attempted to restrain her and she hit him. EE then agreed to be accommodated by the local authority.

The parents were very unhappy with this situation and asserted that the local authority had referred EE to Mermaids and was encouraging her to take testosterone. EE had a further medical assessment in February 2023 which raised no concerns and recorded a significant improvement in EE’s mood and outlook since leaving home. She expressed gender dysphoria, but had no current plans to engage in medical treatment.

The parents argued that EE lacked capacity to make decisions about any such treatment and relied upon the Cass Review that social transition should not be seen as ‘neutral’. The parents asserted that the wider paternal family had a history of mental health issues, EE had self harmed, used a binder, abused alcohol and drugs and these issues along with others showed that EE was unable to retain, use and weigh relevant information relating to gender affirming treatment. Therefore experts were needed to assess her.

The law

EE was 17 at the relevant time but was very close to 18, when the court would cease to have jurisdiction under the inherent jurisdiction. Therefore, the judgment focused on the legal principles under the MCA. This Act allows the court to make decisions in the best interests of those aged over 16 years, if they are found to lack capacity to make their own decisions. Section 1 of the MCA sets out its key principles – a person is assumed to have capacity, and cannot lack capacity just because he makes an unwise decision.

EE could only lack capacity if her inability to make decisions was due to ‘an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain‘ and due to this she could not understand information relevant to the decision, retain the information, use or weigh the information, or communicate her decision. Capacity is assessed in relation to the specific decision at the time the decision needs to be made.

Therefore the court couldn’t make any decisions under the MCA as there was no ‘matter’ to be decided; EE had no current plans for any gender affirming treatment. Even if there had been a ‘matter’ before the court, not only does the MCA presume capacity, EE had ‘legal capacity’ under section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 which sets up a rebuttal presumption that 16 year olds can consent to medical treatment.

The court examined the interplay between the MCA, FLRA and ‘Gillick competence’ in para 48, approving the position that a child under 16 must be found ‘Gillick competent’ to provide consent to medical treatment. Once the child is 16, their legal capacity is assumed and their mental capacity is examined under the MCA. Thus, absent any evidence that EE lacked capacity, she could at 17 make a decision to have gender affirming treatment. There was no need for any expert evidence.

The court noted at para 60 the kind of evidence it would need to engage with the applications made by the parents

In the absence of any gender affirming treatment being proposed at
this time, the court does not have before it any evidence as to what such treatment involves, what the potential dangers and side effects of such treatment are, the nature and extent of the preparatory counselling with respect to the decision to have, and the consequences of, gender affirming medical treatment and any assessment of the treating clinicians of EE’s capacity to consent to such treatment.

Comment

The court did not make a finding that the parents considered EE mentally ill simply because of her stated sexuality and identification as ‘non binary’ but did comment at para 67 that the court was left with the ‘distinct impression’ that this was the case.

I agree that the evidence is sparse to suggest that gender affirming care has long term positive benefits. I agree it is sad to see EE assert (para 36)

I have thought about gender reassignment for many years, and it is
something that has always been on my mind. I feel quite strongly about this, and I am of the view that my real life would begin once I undergo Bilateral mastectomy, also known as top surgery.

If in fact her ‘real life’ does not begin after the removal of her breasts then of course it is too late to reverse the surgery. It does not seem likely that EE is able at 18 to confidently foresee how she would feel about the amputation of her breasts when she is 30, alongside her possible infertility if she begins taking testosterone.

Many who objected to this decision on social media appeared to share the parents’ views that simply to claim a ‘non binary’ identity or want to remove healthy breasts, was in and off itself evidence of ‘profound mental illness’ that rendered EE incapable of making any decisions about gender affirming care.

But it is not the court’s place to prohibit an entire regime of medical or surgical treatment without compelling evidence. The courts have to place trust and reliance in the medical profession to stick to its own code of conduct. If EE has capacity, and can find a willing surgeon, she has the freedom to make unwise choices. I do not see how the court could have made any other decision on the evidence and the law before it.

I understand that many people were unhappy with this decision, but any changes to the culture around ‘gender identity’ and affirmative treatment will have to come from Parliament and the medical profession. My hope is that the final report of the Cass Review will continue to support therapeutic interventions as first call. If parents do wish to assert that their children lack capacity to make decisions about gender affirming care, then they are going to need to bring hard evidence to the court proceedings, which these parents could not.

While I personally think it is very sad that a young woman would ever contemplate drastic and irreversible surgery so that her ‘real life’ could begin, the simple response is that it is not my life, nor my breasts. EE may well regret such surgery when she is older, but the MCA exists to protect the freedom to make unwise choices. If asked to choose between ‘freedom to’ and ‘freedom from’, I choose the first, every time. And I must extend that freedom to all others with capacity.

Fact finding in private law proceedings – where are we now?

This is the text of a presentation at the St Johns Private Law conference on 14th June 2023

To have or not to have a finding of fact hearing is a key decision in proceedings. Relationships that are ending up in court have ended badly. The adversarial process is undoubtedly harmful to parties and finding of fact hearings cause enormous delay. It can be very necessary to establish what happened, in order to make sensible decisions about the way forward, but the courts are not there to validate either party’s perspective as to why the relationship broke down or how horrible the other one was. The guidance is now very clear – Unless it will be relevant to, and necessary for, your decision regarding the welfare of the child, do not allow the court to be used to litigate such allegations.

These cases can be very difficult to run in practice, given how high emotions can run and how relatively unobjectionable behaviour during a relationship can be seen in a very different light once that relationship has soured. The gulf between the expectations of the client and what the court can deliver is often very wide indeed. The guidance with regard to decisions about findings of fact will be your shield against unreasonable client expectations. 

I will examine the following 

  • Some historical context
  • Summary of the May 2022 guidance
  • Case law – when it goes wrong

Some historical context 

The family justice system is caught between two very polarised views; those who assert it is a tool of misogynistic oppression, with a ‘pro contact culture’ that routinely hands over children to violent men and those who assert it is absurdly pro women and happy to cut men out of their children’s lives. Those of us who work in the family justice system know that both positions are false. We are however very much alive to the problems caused by a system which lacks resources and judicial continuity. It’s fair to say that men and women feel equally traumatised and let down in the majority of proceedings. 

Of recent years however, the campaigning groups who characterise the family courts as tools of misogynistic oppression have gained the ascendancy and the ear of the Ministry of Justice. This explains the renewed focus over the last few years on issues of domestic abuse in family proceedings. 

We begin with the Victoria Derbyshire show in May 2019, whose eviscerating exploration of the family justice system, prompted the Ministry of Justice on 21st May to announce that a ‘panel of experts’ would review how the family courts protect children and parents in cases of domestic abuse, and that this would be completed in only three months. I laughed at this remarkably optimistic time scale and I was right to do so – we didn’t see the finished ‘Harm Report’ until June 2020 [Assessing risk of harm to children and parents in private law cases https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/895173/assessing-risk-harm-children-parents-pl-childrens-cases-report_.pdf]

I have been critical of this report as it relies primarily on self selecting accounts from those who felt badly done by the family justice system, with obviously no ability to fact check assertions they made. It was clearly written from the perspective of the ‘misogynistic oppression’ camp, identifying a ‘pro contact culture’ which resulted in ‘systemic minimisation of allegations of domestic abuse’. From my own experiences in practice over 20 years now, I think that is overstating it. 

However, it identified other issues with which I can’t argue: resource constraints, working in silos and lack of communication and crucially the adversarial system itself, with parents placed in opposition on what is often not a level playing field in cases involving domestic abuse, child sexual abuse and self representation, with little or no involvement of the child. 

The stage was the set for the Court of Appeal decision Re H-N [2021] EWCA Civ 448  where it was argued that the family justice system’s understanding of domestic abuse was not fit for purpose. 

The Court of Appeal considered the development of the family courts’ approach to issues of abuse. The definition of ‘abuse’ was expanded in 2017. PD12J paragraph 3 reflects the need to move away from characterising domestic abuse as separate incidents of violence, but looking more to patterns of acts and incidents, including incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour which can be demonstrated by psychological, physical, sexual, financial, or emotional abuse. Domestic abuse also includes culturally specific forms of abuse including, but not limited to, forced marriage, honour-based violence, dowry-related abuse and transnational marriage abandonment. 

We have come a long way from the 1970s and the focus on ‘violence’ only. No one argued before the court that this definition of ‘abuse’ should change and the Court of Appeal concluded therefore that it was fit for purpose. Although the structure of the definition of ‘domestic abuse’ in clause 1 of the Domestic Abuse Bill [‘DAB’] currently before Parliament differs from that in PD12J, the content is substantially the same.

The Court of Appeal therefore concluded:

We are therefore of the view that PD12J is and remains, fit for the purpose for which it was designed namely to provide the courts with a structure enabling the court first to recognise all forms of domestic abuse and thereafter on how to approach such allegations when made in private law proceedings. As was also recognised by The Harm Panel, we are satisfied that the structure properly reflects modern concepts and understanding of domestic abuse

The key guidance is at para 139:  

Domestic abuse is often rightly described as pernicious. In recent years, the greatly improved understanding both of the various forms of abuse, and also of the devastating impact it has upon the victims and any children of the family, described in the main section of this judgment, have been most significant and positive developments. The modern approach and understanding is reflected in the ‘General principles’ section of PD12J(4). As discussed at paragraphs 36–41 above that does not, however, mean that in every case where there is an allegation of, even very serious, domestic abuse it will be either appropriate or necessary for there to be a finding of fact hearing, so much is clear from the detailed guidance set out in paragraphs 16–20 of PD12J and, in particular, at paragraph 17.

Summary of May 2022 Guidance from Lady Justice Macur for Judges and magistrates. 

  • Make every hearing count. 
  • Judges must remain in control. 
  • Delay is inimical to child welfare. 
  • It is for the judge to determine the need for a finding of fact. ‘

At the FHDRA / first directions appointment/ to be considered at gatekeeping

If a MIAM hasn’t taken place, ask why not – duty to consider non-court dispute resolution: FPR r3.3.

TRIAGE – what are the real issues in the case. Are they safeguarding concerns? 

What is being alleged in terms of domestic abuse – look at definitions at FPR PD 12J [2A] and [3] in addition to PD 12J [14].

Has Form C1A been completed? Is there a response? If so, are there admissions? Can you see a possible way forward? 

Have you got enough information to avoid seeking further evidence? If not, consider what is needed in the fact specific circumstances of the case.

The judgment in Re H-N [2021] EWCA Civ 448 (paras 41-49) cautioned against allowing a Scott Schedule to distort the fact finding process (by becoming the sole focus of a hearing), but did not rule out the use of a schedule as a structure to assist in analysing specific allegations. Specific allegations of physical abuse fit well with a schedule, other allegations that require the court to look at a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour will require a statement. Probably most cases will benefit from both. 

Is a fact-finding hearing required?

RELEVANCE, PURPOSE, PROPORTIONALITY AND MITIGATION

Consider: 

  • the nature of the allegations and the extent to which those allegations are likely to be relevant to the making of a child arrangements order;
  • that the purpose of a fact finding is to allow assessment of the future risk to the child and the impact of any abuse on the child;
  • whether fact-finding is necessary or whether other evidence suffices; and,
  • whether fact-finding is proportionate. Do the allegations at their highest go to safeguarding in general or could they be mitigated by supervision of contact or other measures? 

If the decision is made to have a finding of fact hearing, then robust case management is required. 

The court controls the evidence in the case. FPR r1.1, r1.4, r.4.1 and that the court controls the evidence in the case: FPR r.22.1.

No case should be timetabled to a fact-finding hearing without a properly completed witness template. This will assist the parties and manage their expectations.

Participation directions. 

Section 63 Domestic Abuse Act 2021 established a presumption that where a party or witness is or at risk of being a victim of domestic abuse from a party to the proceedings, the quality of their evidence and/or their participation as a party is likely to be diminished by reason of vulnerability and this requires some thought. 

Part 3A FPR deals with vulnerable witnesses and their participation in proceedings.. PD3AA para 5.2 requires a ground rules hearing (or ground rules component of a hearing) before the vulnerable person gives evidence. Participation directions are a general case management direction made for the purpose of assisting a witness or party to give evidence or participate in proceedings; 

Consideration of FPR r.3A and PD 3AA are mandatory and the obligation to consider vulnerability is the court’s, regardless of whether a party is represented or if participation directions are sought. 

Under sections 65 and 66 of the Domestic Abuse Act, the court will appoint a qualified legal representative (QLR) to cross-examine relevant witnesses if parties:

  • do not have their own legal representative
  • are prohibited by the court from cross-examining, due to allegations of domestic abuse

Lucy Reed KC has blogged about her frustrations with this scheme, noting in March 2023 that the QLR scheme was only introduced for cases issued after 21st July 2022 and court listing is backed up, very few eligible cases have reached the finding of fact stage so far. But many more will be coming. And its not at all clear that enough people have signed up to the scheme to enable it to operate effectively. I will say no more, because I am not touching it with a bargepole. The removal of legal aid for private law family cases will risk the collapse of many hearings; where there will be no QLR and guidance for Judges is that they may not cross examine – which must be right. 

Re-visiting a decision not to have a fact-finding hearing

The court must, at all stages in the proceedings, consider whether domestic abuse is raised as an issue: FPR PD 12J [5]. However, guard against attempts to re-argue the question once a decision has been made. What is said to have changed to undermine the original analysis? Proceedings should have judicial continuity, wherever possible, and a consistent approach.

If ‘new’ evidence relating to past events is presented, ask why it was not available or disclosed before. If no good reason is advanced, then you may refuse to admit it. The more significant the evidence is said to be, the more compelling the explanation needs to be for its late receipt.

Case Law – when it goes wrong. 

B v P [2022] EWFC B18 (31 March 2022) 

Parents made cross allegations against each other. The district judge found most of the mother’s allegations not proved, and the mother appealed.  

The district judge was not referred to the need for a ground rules hearing, Part 3A of the FPR, practice directions 3AA or 12J; she was not referred to the definition of domestic abuse and she was not reminded of the decision in Re H-N. 

At para 40 of the appeal judgment it is noted:

The judge does not set out a history of the relationship or a chronology of the events relied upon. She sets out each of the allegations made by either of the parents and considers whether it is proved or not proved. It appears to me that she did not follow the approach endorsed in Re H-N, of stepping back from the precise allegations and considering the behaviour as a whole. She did not rule on whether the father’s behaviour was coercive or controlling.

The judge also got some of the facts wrong – for example, finding that the respondent had not entered the appellant’s bedroom, when in both his oral and written evidence he admitted that he had, in order to gather up her clothes and throw them outside. 

The court expressed sympathy for the district judge, who had to deal with a remote hearing, a litigant in person and an interpreter but regardless, the findings could not stand. 

 K v K [2022] EWCA Civ 468 (08 April 2022)

This case re-emphasised the general Re H-N guidance  and provided a fresh emphasis on methods of ‘non-court’ dispute resolution and when they should be considered. 

Briefly, the father submitted that the district judge had not considered his case that the mother had alienated the children and the findings made of rape, coercive and controlling behaviour and physical abuse of the children are unsound. The mother argued that there was a high threshold needed to over turn findings of fact, and it had not been reached in this case. 

The Court of Appeal found that there had not been proper consideration of the need for a finding of fact, and the findings made were unsafe. The case would therefore be sent back to a circuit judge to decide if a fresh finding of fact is needed, following the guidance set out in Re H-N.  In brief: 

  • The parties had not taken advantage of a MIAM – Mediation Intake and Assessment Meeting and this might have resolved logistical issues about the father’s contact. The mother had initially agreed to unsupervised contact and had not seen the allegation of rape or generalised controlling behaviour as central to the resolution of the issues between them. . 
  • Any judge considering a finding of fact must identify at an early stage the real issues in the case, as relate to the welfare of the child. A finding of fact is only necessary if the alleged abuse is relevant to what the court is being asked to decide relating to the children’s welfare. 
  • The finding of rape was unsafe as the Judge did not consider all the available evidence, including the mother’s untrue assertion that she had reported this to the family doctor.

The key quote can be found at para 65: 

A fact-finding hearing is not free-standing litigation. It always takes place within proceedings to protect a child from abuse or regarding the child’s future welfare. It is not to be allowed to become an opportunity for the parties to air their grievances. Nor is it a chance for parents to seek the court’s validation of their perception of what went wrong in their relationship. If fact-finding is to be justified in the first place or continued thereafter, the court must be able to identify how any alleged abusive behaviour is, or may be, relevant to the determination of the issues between the parties as to the future arrangements for the children.

So where next?

The family justice system puts proof of facts at its heart. An allegation which is not proved and which is not admitted is not a fact. I think there is a real risk to the fairness and integrity of court proceedings if a presumption is made at any stage that one party is more likely to be telling the truth. 

In May 2023 the Ministry of Justice produced its implementation plan – a progress report of what’s happened since the Harm Report. Of particular note is the Domestic Abuse Act, automatic eligibility for special measures, right to be supported in court by an IDVA, the pilot scheme in courts in Devon and North Wales launched in February 2022. The November 2020 review of the presumption of parental involvement remains ongoing!

But the language of this report is interesting. It speaks only of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ – no room for ‘alleged’ or ‘assertions’. This speaks very much to the FJS as ‘tool of misogynistic oppression’ and I do not think this is helpful. 

There remains considerable dissatisfaction from campaigning groups. Women’s Aid issued a statement in May 2023 about its view of progress since the Harm Report

Almost three years on from the Harm Panel report, we have not seen evidence of ‘cultural changes’ to improve safety for women and children experiencing abuse. This was a landmark report and we had high hopes for the change which was promised – but we continue to hear day in, day out from survivors that they are still experiencing disbelief, danger and trauma within the family courts. 

….. We remain unclear what ‘compulsory’ training on domestic abuse for judges includes, and in our experience women who allege domestic abuse continue to face discrimination and victim-blaming attitudes when trying to secure safe child contact arrangements for their children. 

“We urge the government, judiciary and family court professionals to work together with specialist domestic abuse organisations and survivors to deliver the system wide reform which is still so desperately needed to ensure children are put first in the family courts.” 

The tensions will of course always remain between those who see cases primarily through the eyes of a ‘victim’ who ought not to have to prove herself and be re-traumatised and those who must apply and obey fundamental legal principles in articles 8 and 6 of the ECHR. The likely collapse of the QLR scheme does not bode well for anyone. 

But all we can do is try and manage those tensions as best we can and in the framework set by law. And resist unilateral attempts by single issue campaigning groups to influence law and policy. 

Further reading

Report to the UN re ‘parental alientation’ as a ‘pseudo concept’ which leads to courts ignoring domestic abuse https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G23/070/18/PDF/G2307018.pdf?OpenElement

Complaint against the report from Gender Parity UK https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FWv2JnDVLXbyjC-LEMShk4KqqQYC7Enl/view

Gulf between the Victims Commissioner and practice in the family courts grows wider – see July 2023 report – The Family Court and domestic abuse: achieving cultural change.

Summary of the law to be applied in a finding of fact about suspected injury to a child

Burden and standard of proof

The burden of proof lies with the local authority. The inherent probability or improbability of an event remains a matter to be taken into account when weighing probabilities and deciding whether, on balance, the event occurred (Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35 at paragraph 15].  There is no room for a finding by the court that something might have happened. The court may decide that it did or that it did not happen [Re B at paragraph 2]. The standard of proof does not shift according to the seriousness of the allegation, nor the inherent probability or improbability of an event occurring.  See Baroness Hale in Re B (Children)(Fc) [2008] UKHL 35:

The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities (Re B [2008] UKHL 35).

Do not speculate and do not reverse the burden of proof

Findings of fact must be based on evidence. As Munby LJ, as he then was, observed in Re A (A Child) (Fact-finding hearing: Speculation)[2011] EWCA Civ 12:

“It is an elementary proposition that findings of fact must be based on evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation.”

Findings of fact must not be based on hypothesis. The Court must avoid speculation, particularly in situations where there is a gap in the evidence. As stated by Munby LJ in Re A (Fact finding hearing: Speculation) [2011] EWCA Civ 12 at (26)

It is for the Local Authority to satisfy the court, on the balance of probabilities, that it has made out its case in relation to disputed facts. The parents have to prove nothing and the court must be careful to ensure that it does not reverse the burden of proof.  

Lancashire v R [2013] EWHC 3064 (Fam), ‘there is no pseudo-burden upon a parent to come up with alternative explanations’ [paragraph 8(vi)].  Having heard all the evidence it is open to the court to conclude that the evidence leaves it unsure whether it is more probable than not that the event occurred and accordingly, that party who has the burden of proving that event has occurred has failed to discharge the burden – The Popi M, Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds, Rhesa Shiping Co SA v Fenton Insurance Co Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 948.  The fact that  the local authority relies on the lack of a satisfactory explanation for the injuries does not amount to a reversal of the burden of proof – Re M-B (Children) 2015 EWCA Civ 1027, [2015] All ER (D) 135.

Consider all the evidence

When considering cases of suspected child abuse the court must take into account all the evidence and furthermore consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence. As Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P observed in Re T [2004] EWCA Civ 558, [2004] 2 FLR 838 at 33:

“Evidence cannot be evaluated and assessed in separate compartments. A judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the local authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof.”

Reliance on expert evidence

Whilst appropriate attention must be paid to the opinion of medical experts, those opinions need to be considered in the context of all the other evidence. The roles of the court and the expert are distinct. It is the court that is in the position to weigh up expert evidence against the other evidence (see A County Council & K, D, & L [2005] EWHC 144 (Fam); [2005] 1 FLR 851 per Charles J). Thus there may be cases, if the medical opinion evidence is that there is nothing diagnostic of non-accidental injury, where a judge, having considered all the evidence, reaches the conclusion that is at variance from that reached by the medical experts.

The court must be careful to ensure that each expert keeps within the bounds of their own expertise and defers, where appropriate, to the expertise of others (see observations of King J in Re S[2009] EWHC 2115 Fam)

In Re U (Serious Injury: Standard of Proof): Re B [2004] 2 FLR 263 at paragraph 23. Butler-Sloss P –

The cause of an injury or an episode that cannot be explained scientifically remains equivocal.

  • Recurrence is not in itself probative.
  • caution is necessary in any case where the medical experts disagree, one opinion declining to exclude a reasonable possibility of natural cause.
  • The court must always be on guard against the over-dogmatic expert, the expert whose reputation or amour propre is at stake, or the expert who has developed a scientific prejudice.’
  • The judge in care proceedings must never forget that today’s medical certainty may be discarded by the next generation of experts or that scientific research will throw light into corners that are at present dark.’

As observed by Hedley J in Re R (Care Proceedings: Causation)[2011] EWHC 1715 Fam:

“There has to be factored into every case which concerns a disputed aetiology giving rise to significant harm a consideration as to whether the cause is unknown. That affects neither the burden nor the standard of proof. It is simply a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the causation advanced by the one shouldering the burden of proof is established on the balance of probabilities.”

Evidence of the parents/carers and the impact of lies.

The evidence of the parents and any other carers is of the utmost importance. It is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability. They must have the fullest opportunity to take part in the hearing and the court is likely to place considerable weight on the evidence and the impression it forms of them (see Re W and another (Non-accidental injury) [2003] FCR 346).   

As observed by Mostyn J in Lancashire County Council v R [2013] EWHC 3064 (Fam) (citing Onassis and Calogeropoulos v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 403, per Lord Pearce and A County Council v M and F [2011] EWHC 1804 (Fam) [2012] 2 FLR 939 at paras [29] and [30]) ‘The assessment of credibility generally involves wider problems than mere “demeanour” which is mostly concerned with whether the       witness appears to be telling the truth as he now believes it to be. With every day that passes the memory becomes fainter and the imagination becomes more active. The human capacity for honestly believing something which bears no relation to what actuallyhappened is unlimited. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance’.

It is common for witnesses in these cases to tell lies in the course of the investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress, and the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything (see R v Lucas [1981] QB 720). In Re A-B-C (Children ) [2021] EWCA 451 Macur LJ provided updated guidance on the assessment of credibility.

That a witness’s dishonesty may be irrelevant in determining an issue of fact is commonly acknowledged in judgments, and with respect to the Recorder as we see in her judgment at [40], in formulaic terms:

“that people lie for all sorts of reasons, including shame, humiliation, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress, confusion and emotional pressure and the fact that somebody lies about one thing does not mean it actually did or did not happen and / or that they have lied about everything”. 

But this formulation leaves open the question: how and when is a witness’s lack of credibility to be factored into the equation of determining an issue of fact? In my view, the answer is provided by the terms of the entire ‘Lucas’ direction as given, when necessary, in criminal trials. 

Chapter 16-3, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the December 2020 Crown Court Compendium, provides a useful legal summary:

“1. A defendant’s lie, whether made before the trial or in the course of evidence or both, may be probative of guilt. A lie is only capable of supporting other evidence against D if the jury are sure that: (1) it is shown, by other evidence in the case, to be a deliberate untruth; i.e. it did not arise from confusion or mistake; (2) it relates to a significant issue; (3) it was not told for a reason advanced by or on behalf of D, or for some other reason arising from the evidence, which does not point to D’s guilt. 

The direction should be tailored to the circumstances of the case, but the jury must be directed that only if they are sure that these criteria are satisfied can D’s lie be used as some support for the prosecution case, but that the lie itself cannot prove guilt. …”

56. In Re H-C (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 136 @ [99], McFarlane LJ, as he then was said: “99 In the Family Court in an appropriate case a judge will not infrequently directly refer to the authority of Lucas in giving a judicial self-direction as to the approach to be taken to an apparent lie. Where the “lie” has a prominent or central relevance to the case such a self-direction is plainly sensible and good practice. 100 … In my view there should be no distinction between the approach taken by the criminal court on the issue of lies to that adopted in the family court. Judges should therefore take care to ensure that they do not rely upon a conclusion

57. To be clear, and as I indicate above, a ‘Lucas direction’ will not be called for in every family case in which a party or intervenor is challenging the factual case alleged against them and, in my opinion, should not be included in the judgment as a tick box exercise. If the issue for the tribunal to decide is whether to believe A or B on the central issue/s, and the evidence is clearly one way then there will be no need to address credibility in general. However, if the tribunal looks to find support for their view, it must caution itself against treating what it finds to be an established propensity to dishonesty as determinative of guilt for the reasons the Recorder gave in [40]. Conversely, an established propensity to honesty will not always equate with the witness’s reliability of recall on a particular issue.

58. That a tribunal’s Lucas self-direction is formulaic, and incomplete is unlikely to determine an appeal, but the danger lies in its potential to distract from the proper application of its principles. In these circumstances, I venture to suggest that it would be good practice when the tribunal is invited to proceed on the basis , or itself determines, that such a direction is called for, to seek Counsel’s submissions to identify: (i) the deliberate lie(s) upon which they seek to rely; (ii) the significant issue to which it/they relate(s), and (iii) on what basis it can be determined that the only explanation for the lie(s) is guilt. The principles of the direction will remain the same, but they must be tailored to the facts and circumstances of the witness before the court.

Pool of perpetrators

When seeking to identify the perpetrators of non-accidental injuries the test of whether a particular person is in the pool of possible perpetrators is whether there is a likelihood or a real possibility that he or she was the perpetrator (see North Yorkshire County Council v SA[2003] 2 FLR 849. In order to make a finding that a particular person was the perpetrator of non-accidental injury the court must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities. It is always desirable, where possible, for the perpetrator of non-accidental injury to be identified both in the public interest and in the interest of the child, although where it is impossible for a judge to find on the balance of probabilities, for example that Parent A rather than Parent B caused the injury, then neither can be excluded from the pool. (see Re D (Children) [2009] 2 FLR 668, Re SB (Children) [2010] 1 FLR 1161)

The further point, made in Re D (Children) 2009 2FLR 668 above and endorsed by the Supreme Court in Re SB (Children) 2010 1FLR 1161 above that, in circumstances where it is impossible for a judge to find on the balance of probabilities that Parent A rather than Parent B caused the injury and neither can be excluded from the pool, that ‘the judge should not strain to do so’ was expressly rejected by the Court of Appeal in Re A (Children) (Pool of Perpetrators) 2022 EWCA Civ (decided on 17 October 22).

In Re A (Children) (Pool of Perpetrators) above, at pr. 34, King LJ says as follows:

‘I suggest, therefore, that in future cases judges should no longer direct themselves on the necessity of avoiding “straining to identify a perpetrator”. The unvarnished test is clear: following a consideration of all the available evidence and applying the simple balance of probabilities, a judge either can, or cannot, identify a perpetrator. If he or she cannot do so, then, in accordance with Re B (2019), he or she should consider whether there is a real possibility that each individual on the list inflicted the injury in question.’

In Re B (Children: Uncertain Perpetrator) [2019] EWCA Civ 575 the correct approach to the concept of the ‘pool of perpetrators’ was reiterated. Jackson LJ says: 

48. The concept of the pool of perpetrators should therefore, as was said in Lancashire, encroach only to the minimum extent necessary upon the general principles underpinning s.31(2).  Centrally, it does not alter the general rule on the burden of proof.  Where there are a number of people who might have caused the harm, it is for the local authority to show that in relation to each of them there is a real possibility that they did.  No one can be placed into the pool unless that has been shown.  This is why it is always misleading to refer to ‘exclusion from the pool’: see Re S-B at [43].  Approaching matters in that way risks, as Baroness Hale said, reversing the burden of proof. 

49. To guard against that risk, I would suggest that a change of language may be helpful.  The court should first consider whether there is a ‘list’ of people who had the opportunity to cause the injury.  It should then consider whether it can identify the actual perpetrator on the balance of probability and should seek, but not strain, to do so: Re D (Children) [2009] EWCA Civ 472 at [12].  Only if it cannot identify the perpetrator to the civil standard of proof should it go on to ask in respect of those on the list:  “Is there a likelihood or real possibility that A or B or C was the perpetrator or a perpetrator of the inflicted injuries?”  Only if there is should A or B or C be placed into the ‘pool’.

Finally, when the court is considering failure to protect there must be a connection between the facts found and the risk alleged in the form of evidence that the parents knew or ought to 

Can a local authority restrict a child’s use of a mobile phone?

I was recently asked to consider a case involving a 16 year old child in local authority care, following fears of child sexual exploitation. The local authority wanted to apply to the court for permission to put ‘spyware’ on the child’s mobile phone, in order to monitor any conversations the child was having with those who posed a risk of harm. The local authority made an application for permission under the inherent jurisdiction to deprive the child of liberty. The court raised a question mark about the appropriateness of this application – was it really a deprivation of liberty? 

The questions raised here have broader applicability to on going tension between ‘paternalism’ (protect the child from his foolish decisions ) or ‘autonomy’ (allow the child the freedom to make decisions). I find it interesting that there is such intense scrutiny of a child’s access to a mobile phone but rather less of a child’s assertion that they have ‘changed sex’ and want access to cross sex hormones. Children aged 16 and over pose particular problems in this debate, but it is one we must keep on having. 

The local authority wanted permission to restrict a 16 year old child’s access to the internet via a mobile phone or other device and in particular asked the court to give it permission to remove the phone and monitor the child’s access to the internet by installing ‘spyware’ that would log texts and messages. This was done with aim of protecting the child from further sexual exploitation and it was argued this was proportionate and necessary. The local authority suggested that these restrictions be in place for a relatively short period of time, and they could then be reviewed. 

I identified the following questions to the court

  • Is removal or monitoring of a child’s mobile phone a deprivation of liberty?
  • If it is, is it lawful? i.e. a proportionate and necessary response in the best interests of the child or does the child have capacity to consent and does consent?
  • If this isn’t a deprivation of liberty, is it rather a a breach of article 8 ECHR (right to privacy)
  • If so, is that breach lawful? 

If the proposed restrictions are neither a deprivation of liberty nor breach of article 8 ECHR, then the local authority does not require the authorisation of the court to exercise parental responsibility for the child. However, given the child’s age and the nature of the restrictions sought, it was sensible to put this matter before the court. 

Use of mobile phones by teenagers in local authority care

A survey from Ofcom in 2014 showed that in the UK, 88% of sixteen-to-twenty-four-year-olds owned a smartphone. It seems unlikely that this percentage has fallen in intervening years. The use of mobile phones with internet access is now commonplace and most teenagers will have and use one. Although there are obvious risks inherent in the use of mobile devices that can connect to the internet, such as making children more vulnerable to sexual exploitation, they can be a very useful tool to allow a child to maintain contact with friends and family. 

The Institute for Research and Innovation in Social Services noted

The use of mobile devices and the internet are a normal part of everyday life for children and young people, including those in care.

A balanced view of use of devices and the internet by children and young people in care is to appreciate both opportunities and risks associated with use.

There are a number of factors known to increase the vulnerability of children and young people online. However, in considering vulnerability online, this should be done holistically, taking account of a child or young person’s life in general at a given time, and with awareness of both protective and risk factors.

There is a need for practitioners to move towards a more expansive and child-centred approach with a focus on relationships. This should encompass an appreciation of stepfamily and biological family, and the maintenance of relationships with a wider variety of individuals that reflect the world of the child or young person in care.

As the child is subject to a care order, the local authority ‘shares’ PR with the parents and may override the parents’ wishes if it is ‘necessary’ to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare.  The parents in this case did not object to the proposals but the child was refusing to discuss the matter with social workers. However, parents cannot consent to their child’s deprivation of liberty. A child can, if they have capacity, but also that consent may be withdrawn.

For a child under 16 it is submitted that the removal of a mobile device, restriction on its use or monitoring of conversations on it, are likely to be well within the ‘zone of parental control’ and do not require the local authority to seek the court’s permission. The UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS) is clear that parental controls on internet usage is accepted and necessary – such as requiring phones to be turned off at school or surrendered during the night. 

Some local authorities have set out advice for foster carers around removal/restriction of mobile phones which suggests that certainly for younger children, the local authority as corporate parent does not need to seek the court’s permission to exercise control over a child in care’s mobile phone use. For example, see the guidance from East Riding which considers the removal of a mobile phone as a decision of ‘last resort’ 

…  taken when other measures have failed. This decision should itself be reviewed regularly and the phone returned as soon as possible. Any decision to remove the mobile phone for a long period (more than a few days) should be endorsed by the Safeguarding/LAC/Pathway Team Manager, with confirmation for the reasons in writing to the young person and a copy to the carer.

Not only is removal of a mobile phone considered a serious matter, the older a child gets, the less likely it will be that this is a reasonable exercise of parental responsibility. The House of Lords in Gillick approved the following dictum of Lord Denning MR

… the legal right of a parent to the custody of a child … is a dwindling right which the courts will hesitate to enforce against the wishes of the child, and the more so the older he is. It starts with a right of control and ends with little more than advice.

Once children reach 16, they are held by various statutes as able to make their own decisions across a range of issues. These are set out in the judgment of Lady Hale at para 26 of D (A Child) (Rev2) [2019] UKSC 42 (26 September 2019). For example Section 8(1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 provides that the consent of a child of 16 to any surgical, medical or dental treatment “shall be as effective as it would be if he were of full age”.

Therefore, it is important to consider what is the lawful basis for depriving or restricting a 16-year old’s access to a mobile phone or the internet. If this is outside the ‘zone of parental control’ then it is submitted that it is desirable for the local authority to seek authorisation from the court, rather than run a risk of being found to have unlawfully breached either Article 5 or Article 8 of the ECHR. 

Article 5 ECHR provides that everyone has a right to liberty and security. Distinguishing between a ‘deprivation’ of liberty and a mere restriction is one of ‘degree or intensity’ and not one of nature or substance. The question whether a person’s liberty is restricted is determined by comparing the extent of that person’s actual freedom with someone of similar age and situation whose freedom is not limited. All children should be subject to restraint upon their freedom to do as they wish, but these restraints necessarily decrease as the children grow. 

Many cases involving a deprivation of liberty involve restriction on physical movement, such as refusing to allow a person to leave premises without supervision. Such cases are governed by the three limbed test set out in Storck v Germany (Application No 61603/00) (2005) 43 EHRR 96, para 71, and 74 emphasising physical confinement. 

However, deprivation of liberty is not restricted solely to limits set on physical movement. Lord Kerr in Cheshire West described ‘liberty’ as “the state or condition of being free from external constraint” 

The Mental Capacity Act (2005) Deprivation of Liberty Code of Practice states that denying social contacts constitutes restraint and therefore is a significant factor as to whether the care and treatment amounts to a deprivation of liberty. The importance of social contact for a child is reflected in article 37 of the UNCRC “…. every child deprived of liberty… shall have the right to maintain contact with his or her family through correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances.”

In the case of HC (A Minor Deprivation of Liberty) [2018] EWHC 2961 (Fam) the court considered a variety of issues beyond mere physical confinement which had the cumulative effect of depriving a child of his liberty. For example, at para 40 the judge commented on the issues of ‘supervision, support and control’. 

Linked to the question of freedom of movement is the question of supervision.  A typical 13-year-old will certainly be supervised or controlled in certain formal or dangerous settings.  For example, at school, much of the time is supervised to a greater (e.g., in the classroom) or lesser (e.g., during break-time) extent, and a risky sport or activity will generally be conducted under close adult supervision.
However, a typical 13-year-old will also enjoy significant periods of time without any active supervision whatever.  In particular, it is intrinsic to the lives of teenagers that they are able to spend ever-increasing periods of time speaking to and interacting with their friends and peers, and without this being subjected to adult scrutiny.  Equally, it is very much a part of a teenager’s life that they are able to spend time alone, without the presence of an adult or any other person, whenever they like (and their routine allows).

The Judge considered further the consequences of restricted access to social media and the internet. 

Most 13-year-olds have access to social media and the internet.  For many, this represents a very significant element of their burgeoning independence, sense of self and social life.  Of course, for most, the use of social media is important because of and to the extent of that young person having both an immediate network of friends and possibly a secondary network of online acquaintances or ‘followers’ using any particular medium or platform.
To a greater or lesser degree, most 13-year-olds will be subjected at least to parental attempts to monitor and to restrict their use of social media and the internet.  Close and constant monitoring of all use would, in my view, be unusual

Conclusions 

This child was 16 years old and therefore it was highly unlikely a court would agree that it was within the ‘zone of parental authority’ to deny her access to her mobile phone for more than a short period of time or to monitor her use of it by way of ‘spyware’. (If a parent is paying for the mobile phone, it is probably lawful to refuse to keep paying for it!) and thus the proposed restrictions may amount to a deprivation of liberty, for which the court’s authorisation must be sought. It not a deprivation of liberty, this could be an unlawful breach of Article 8, but if its neither then the local authority will be reassured that its actions are within the lawful boundaries of its exercise of parental responsibility. 

UPDATE 23 November 2022

When this matter came before the court, the Judge did not agree that restrictions on use of mobile phone, or adding ‘spyware’ was a deprivation of liberty (which required the court’s authorisation) but it was a breach of Article 8. However, this breach was lawful as it was necessary and proportionate to protect the health and morals of the child. The Judge did not think the local authority required authorisation from the court as this situation was within their parental responsibility.

I think there is probably room for further argument about all of this, certainly on the deprivation of liberty point but for the time being, local authorities should consider carefully such restrictions, make sure that the reasons for them are articulated and impose restrictions for the shortest time necessary. This will protect against any future assertions of an unlawful breach and possible action under the Human Rights Act 1998.

Further reading

More general discussion of depriving children of their liberty and secure accommodation https://childprotectionresource.online/depriving-children-of-their-liberty/

NSPCC Guidance Keeping children safe on line

Manchester City Council v P (Refusal of Restrictions on Mobile Phone) (Rev1) [2023] EWHC 133 (Fam) – court clear that restriction on use of mobile phone is not an issue of deprivation of liberty, but of the exercise of PR

Parental alienation and the limits of the courts’ jurisdiction.

On 15th July 2022 the Court of Appeal agreed that a decision to refuse to allow the police to interview children,was wrongly decided. The court made an injunction prohibiting the police from interviewing two teenage children A and B without the judge’s express permission, unless they needed to determine if the children were at immediate risk of harm. The police appealed, saying the court did not have the power to make this injunction. The Court of Appeal held that a previous finding that the children were manipulated to make false allegations does not exclude the possibility that the recent allegations are credible, nor did that previous finding absolve the police from its responsibility to consider whether or not to investigate. The court had overreached its powers.

Background

This appeal came about in a very long running private law dispute, with at least four published judgments and a number of experts. Re A and B (Parental Alienation) at [2020] EWHC 3366 (Fam); [2021] EWHC 2601 (Fam); [2021] EWHC 2602 (Fam) and [2021] EWHC 2603 (Fam). The conclusion was that A and B could not remain living with their mother as they would suffer further serious emotional and psychological harm because she had alienated them from their father. The court ordered that A and B live with their father and they moved in November 2020.

Things did not go smoothly at the outset and the children ran away twice. However, then they appeared to be settled and happy in their father’s care until the summer of 2021. The family went on holiday to the USA whereupon B ran away, went to the police and made allegations against his father. The family then returned to the UK. Then on 15th October 2021 the children sent an email to A’s school to say that the father has ‘hit, choked and pushed’ them and that they lived ‘in a constant state of terror’.

The school notified the police who spoke to B, then aged 12 who confirmed the allegations but no injuries were seen. A had already gone to school but left and was reported as missing. The mother’s solicitors informed the father that the children would be seeking separate representation in court and had instructed a solicitor to whom they gave a detailed statement about their father’s abuse. The police and children’s services decided to conduct a joint investigation and went to B’s school. However, by 4.27pm the police were told that the father had been granted an injunction to prevent the interview.

The court order stated that the court was ‘satisfied’ the father had not abused the children and it was later amended to say that the police could speak to the children if they were at immediate risk of harm. The police objected, asserting that the court did not have the power to interfere with the operational decisions of the police to investigate criminal matters. The police made an application on 24th October 2021 to interview the children to assess whether there were allegations that required further criminal investigation. The father resisted. But the police did not seek to set aside the order in light of the court’s concerns about the emotional impact on A and B, instead asked for their application to be adjourned to provide further evidence. The police did not pursue that application.

On 15th December the father attended court ‘ex parte’ – without the attendance of any other party – and Ms Woodall, a therapist working with the children, gave evidence that A told her she had been repeatedly contacted by her mother via third parties and the mother instructed the children to make allegations against the father. The maternal grandparents were also involved. The court was very concerned to hear this and considered the children at ‘exceptional risk of significant harm’, reciting in the order that the mother should not be told in advance of a hearing listed in January 2022 and nor should the children attend school until after the hearing.

At the January hearing the court considered the existing police application to interview the children and ordered that the police should consider the report of Karen Woodall and then seek permission to withdraw its application. The police did not withdraw and the matter came back on 24 March 2022. The judge was clearly hostile to the police involvement, pointing out that other allegations made against the father had been found to be false. He refused the police application on the basis that the police had not taken into account the welfare interests of the children and he was ‘exceedingly’ worried about their well being, noting it was now 5 months since the allegations were made. He commented that the local authority were satisfied the children were safe and well – but it does not appear that the local authority spoke directly to A and B.

The Appeal

The police appealed on the basis that the judge overreached his otherwise extensive inherent jurisdiction and usurped the common law and/or statutory duties of the police in the detection, prevention, and prosecution of crime. The Court of Appeal were very unhappy with the ‘wholesale lack of discipline’ that then followed in preparing for the appeal to be heard and noted the ‘partisan slant’ of the mother’s skeleton argument which should not be ‘a vehicle for the pursuit of a partisan agenda in relation to other matters’. The father’s skeleton argument was not served until the morning of the hearing and did not deal with the issues at hand. Nor had there been original compliance with procedure when seeking the ex parte injunction – it seems the judge was not referred to the Practice Guidance (Family Courts: Without Notice Orders) [2017] 1 WLR 478. The police did not cite relevant authorities in October, to point out how ‘vanishingly rare’ are the circumstances in which a High Court Judge could make a prohibitory order against a public authority exercising statutory powers.

Analysis

The Court of Appeal agreed that in theory, the High Court has retained a parens patriae jurisdiction to prohibit a police officer from questioning the children. But exercise of that theoretical power must be seen in the light of a ‘considerable body of jurisprudence which has endured more than 40 years, conveniently summarised by Sir James Munby, President in A Ward of Court [2017] EWHC 1022 (Fam).’

The starting point are the words of Lord Scarman In re W (A Minor) (Wardship: Jurisdiction) [1985] AC 791 at p 797:

“The High Court cannot exercise its powers, however wide they may be, so as to intervene on the merits in an area of concern entrusted by Parliament to another public authority. It matters not that the chosen public authority is one which acts administratively whereas the court, if seized by the same matter, would act judicially. If Parliament in an area of concern defined by statute (the area in this case being the care of children in need or trouble) prefers power to be exercised administratively instead of judicially, so be it. The courts must be careful in that area to avoid assuming a supervisory role or reviewing power over the merits of decisions taken administratively by the selected public authority.”

The Court of Appeal noted that the facts as found by the family court may be influential but do not bind another public body from exercising a power based on “altogether different considerations.” (See R v Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte T [1995] 1 FLR 292.)

The Court of Appeal stated

Whether it was fair to categorise the MPS as taking “no account” of the welfare best interests of A and B is not the subject of this appeal, but the judge’s subsequent comparison of “welfare best interests” as against “simply the broad duty upon the police to investigate crime…”(emphasis provided) is suggestive that the judge had lost sight of the “altogether different considerations” which fall within the remit of other public bodies. As it is, I find the order of 15 October 2021, (as amended), impermissibly interferes with an operational decision made by the MPS regarding the scope and manner of the criminal investigation to be conducted into the circumstances of the case.

A previous finding that the children were manipulated to make false allegations does not exclude the possibility that the recent allegations are credible, nor did that previous finding absolve the police from its responsibility to consider whether or not to investigate.

Comment

An article by Hannah Summers gives some more background detail

Ms Woodall was not criticised by either court, but the article notes

While the important appeal shines a light on the interplay of powers between the Family Division’s emphasis on child welfare and the statutory duties of public bodies, the wider case also raises questions as to the extent and use of court appointed psychological experts in cases where allegations of “parental alienation” are raised.

In documents submitted to the court for the 28 June hearing the Met’s advocates highlighted the role of Woodall, writing: “The concern is as to the appearance or otherwise of her independence and that too much emphasis has been given … to the report and opinions of Ms Woodall in respect of the police speaking to the children. She is seemingly playing a large role in the Metropolitan police Service being unable to even have a preliminary talk with the children.”

A skeleton argument supporting the appeal from the mother’s legal team outlined her concerns that Woodall’s recommendations are relied on by the court despite her not being registered with the regulatory body the Health and Care Professionals Council.

Of course, this case does not shed any light on whether or not ‘parental alienation’ exists but rather is added to the sadly ever growing pile of cases that highlight the dispute between those who claim to be a victim of it and those who claim that a parent who alleges ‘parental alienation’ is simply seeking to cloak their own abusive behaviour. I suggest that reading the 2020 judgment shows very clearly where the truth lies here. The frustration of the first Judge and his grave concerns for the children are well founded. However, those concerns did cause him to fall into error. The police should have spoken to the children.

And I suggest that public trust and confidence in these type of very difficult cases is not assisted by the continued reliance on experts who are not subject to any external regulation. I have previously written about the need for all such experts to be regulated, if only to give parents a route of complaint. But at this current time, the Family Court System has rejected that need. I think this is a mistake. It simply feeds into the narrative of some that ‘parental alienation’ does not exist or is promoted by charlatans to protect abusive fathers. Whereas those of us who represent mothers and fathers in private law disputes are very clear that parents can and do alienate their children from the other parent and that the consequences of this can be severe and life long. But all of us would benefit from knowing that the experts who opine on such serious cases, have agreed to submit themselves to external regulation. And that we have to carefully weigh the impact on children of being encouraged to speak about allegations that may be false – against the harm done by not allowing their voice to be heard at all.

Further reading

Some useful discussion in Re C (‘Parental Alienation’; Instruction of Expert) [2023] EWHC 345 (Fam)  about the instruction of unregulated experts, the court endorsing this position:

Much like an allegation of domestic abuse; the decision about whether or not a parent has alienated a child is a question of fact for the Court to resolve and not a diagnosis that can or should be offered by a psychologist. For these purposes, the ACP-UK wishes to emphasise that “parental alienation” is not a syndrome capable of being diagnosed, but a process of manipulation of children perpetrated by one parent against the other through, what are termed as, “alienating behaviours”. It is, fundamentally, a question of fact. 

The Care Review

We all know the care system isn’t working. Conference after conference, review after review over the last 20 years tells us so. In 2014 I helped to set up this website, over growing concerns from many lawyers, parents and social workers that the system just wasn’t working. In 2015 I organised the first of three multi disciplinary conferences in 2015, 2016 and 2018 examining why the current child protection system wasn’t fit for purpose.

In February 2016 I attended a conference about more humane social work practice and noted

What kind of society do we want? Is social work about ‘helping’ or ‘fixing’? What’s going wrong, and what can we do about it? The paradox is that we pump enormous amounts of resources into a system that doesn’t seem to be helping – in fact is often terrifying families. There is too much focus on a complex system that ‘investigates’ more than it helps.

A quick review of the posts on this website reveals myriad attempts to analyse and address the problems and suggest solutions since 2015.

In 2015 there was a ‘Solution Finding Conference’ at the Bristol Civil Justice Centre and I attended a conference in Finland to discuss the ‘leap to co-working’ between parents and professionals. I wrote that the system was in ‘continual crisis’.

In 2018 the Family Rights Group published the Care Crisis Review

In February 2020 the Westminster Legal Policy forum keynote seminar

In December 2020 came the report of the Family Justice Board with vague statements of intent such as

…the system needs to be ready to support all vulnerable children and adults who depend upon it, and the greatest need is to ensure that those who need support and safeguarding receive it at the right time. Where appropriate, pre-proceedings work and the extended family network should be used. The priority should be to renew existing good practice within the Public Law Outline and implement a system-wide leadership focus on practice improvement.

In March 2021 we had the President’s Public Law Working Group Report

So what does the latest Review recommend? How likely do I think it is that any recommendations will be implemented or have a positive impact?

The 2022 Review

The final report of the Independent Review of Children’s Social Care was published on 23 May 2022. There is an executive summary and a child friendly version.

There are over 70 recommendations including the creation of around 20 new ‘Regional Care Co-operatives’ or RCCs to run and set up new fostering services and commission services from other sectors. Ultimately the Review would like to see all children’s homes managed by the regional bodies. There is a further recommendation for the abolition of the role of the Independent Reviewing Officer.

The Review describes its remit as

…a once in a generation opportunity to reset children’s social care. What we need is a system that provides intensive help to families in crisis, acts decisively in response to abuse, unlocks the potential of wider family networks to raise children, puts lifelong loving relationships at the heart of the care system and lays the foundations for a good life for those who have been in care. What we have currently is a system increasingly skewed to crisis intervention, with outcomes for children that continue to be unacceptably poor and costs that continue to rise. For these reasons, a radical reset is now unavoidable.

Recommendations are made in ten areas

  • Helping families
  • Keeping children safe
  • Making good use of family networks
  • Adoption
  • Transforming care
  • Listening to children’s voices
  • Protecting care experienced people from stigma and discrimination
  • Moving on
  • Helping the workforce be the best it can be
  • Making sure the system is focused on children and families

The full report is 278 pages so I am going to comment here on just a few areas and recommendations I think are significant. A primary focus appears to be on recognising and supporting the child’s links to their family and communities. Those contributing to the review expressed the concern – with which I agree -that the system often seems intent on ‘assessing’ rather than helping and parents and children find this confusing and frightening.

There is a recommendation to make ‘care experience’ a protected characteristic in the Equality Act, which seems a good idea. I agree with the following assertion

The disadvantage faced by the care experienced community should be the civil rights issue of our time. Most children in care feel powerless, they are often invisible to society, and face some of the greatest inequalities that exist in England today. 

There is a recommendation for a new form of ‘Family Help’ which seems sensible, to replace ‘targeted early help’ or ‘child in need’ work.

The aim of Family Help should be to improve children’s lives by supporting the family unit and strengthening family relationships. This will help children to do well and keep families together, helping them to provide the safe, caring environments that children need. 

If concerns escalate, despite the intervention of Family Help an “Expert Child Protection Practitioner” will start to work alongside the Family Help Worker, to provide continuity and to hopefully enable parents to find the process fairer and more understandable.

There is increased focus on maintaining the child’s relationships with wider family. While I agree that the first step should always be to investigate what help the wider family can provide – indeed, this is a statutory requirement, I did find this comment odd

Currently there isn’t enough time spent identifying family members who, with the right support, could either provide full time care, or share care with a child’s parents, whilst the parents work through resolving the problems they’re facing.

That isn’t my experience in court at all – quite the reverse. In all my care cases considerable time is spent on viability assessments of various relatives. It is common for final hearings to be delayed due to the late arrival of a family member. Of course, the Review is looking at how to avoid care proceedings and I assume that this comment is directed at work done prior to the application to court. But my experiences in the court process do show that in the majority of cases where I am instructed, family hep and support is patchy at best – or at worst it was the parents’ experience of growing up within their own abusive families that have left them unable to recognise and implement any template of good parenting. The answer to the current crisis cannot simply be to assume that family ties conquer all. And ‘the right support’ is doing a lot of heavy lifting here. What is this ‘right support’ and how much will it cost?

A system that is ‘relentlessly focused on children and families’ – as the Review wants it to be – will still have to grapple with the fact that some children face the most serious risks of harm from their own families. This problem of ‘two hats’ in the child protection system will remain; helping to support a family while at the same time gathering evidence about why the family isn’t safe. This is a constant and damaging tension and I think needs more explicit recognition than this Review is willing to give.

Why am I cynical?

I have absolutely no doubt that the Review correctly identifies the problems inherent in the vast expense of care proceedings, which usually come far too late to help cement any positive change and that it makes more sense to spend this money on helping families before they get to care proceedings and supporting familial ties of love and affection. I agree with this comment from the Executive Summary

Without a dramatic whole system reset, outcomes for children and families will remain stubbornly poor and by this time next decade there will be approaching 100,000 children in care (up from 80,000 today) and a flawed system will cost over £15 billion per year (up from £10 billion now).1 Together, the changes we recommend will shift these trends and would mean 30,000 more children living safely and thriving with their families by 2032 compared to the current trajectory.

But to get the new systems approach up and running is going to require a considerable initial cash injection and the returns on this investment may not be seen for many years. The State will have to continue providing a framework of legal support for those parents who face the removal of their children.

The Review suggests the Government should invest £2 billion now “to make Family Help a reality for families now and to keep supporting families in the future.” More training is needed for social workers and other professionals. That is broken down

….achieving this whole system reform programme will require £2.6 billion of new spending over four years, comprising £46 million in year one, £987 million in year two, £1.257 billion in year three and £233 million in year four.

The Review recognises the current crisis in foster care by calling for a drive to recruit 9,000 more foster carers. All of these once recruited, will need to be paid.

I am afraid I think that a cash injection of £2 billion is never going to happen. In the next few years we will see another child protection scandal, where a child is killed, and the cries will start up again about useless social workers and their incompetence and how children at risk should just be removed as soon as possible. We get the child protection systems we are prepared to fund and the quality of social workers we are prepared to respect.

The Review suggests that some of this funding will come from “a one-off payment from the following people to cover the cost of changing the care system: the largest private children’s home providers and large independent fostering agencies. This payment will be based on the profit they have made from children’s social care.”

I am ignorant as to how this will work in practice, how such a levy will be organised or profit calculated and how much money all that will cost. I assume legislation will be needed. Handing over child protection to private profit making agencies was not something that happened without the Government’s knowledge -it was done with their full connivance, in the continuing hopeless and naive (corrupt?) view of many politicians that the private sector is necessarily lean and efficient, rather than focused on profit for a few individuals.

Without doubt the Review is correct to focus on making child protection work well – to make the right decisions at the right time about when investigation is necessary, where support would be the best way to keep children safe, and where a child needs to come into care so that they are safe. 

But Social Work is at its foundation about relationships. This is explicitly recognised by the Review

This means giving professionals the time and resources they need to build strong, respectful relationships with children and families.

Relationships take time and skill to build. The Family Help Workers and ‘Expert Child Protection Practitioners’ will not work for free. And to do their jobs effectively they will need time to do them. Making rules about when agency workers can be appointed, is not addressing the reasons why so many expensive agency workers are relied upon – because so many social workers are off work, burnt out from stress.

The current massive strain on the existing system, where social workers routinely have to juggle case loads way in excess of recommended safe levels, suggests to me that – and sadly – this review will join all the others that float about the internet in ghostly recrimination of us all. We have all known for decades what is going wrong. But there seems very little political will and certainly no public money to fix it. As ever, I will delighted to be proved wrong.

Further reading

Commentary from Article 39 – which sounds a note of caution

“There are thousands of children in care who are living in unregulated properties where there aren’t any carers or consistent adult supervision. Children are being sent hundreds of miles away from their communities to Scotland, and the family courts are inundated with stories of desperately vulnerable children and local authorities who have nowhere for them to go. Children who arrive in the UK on flimsy boats, without parents or carers, are being put by the Home Office into hotels because the care system has been closed to them. In every part of England, our communities have adults in them still struggling to come to terms with childhoods where they didn’t feel loved or that they mattered, and a care system which left them to fend for themselves at the earliest opportunity. The care system, like many other collective endeavours in our country, has been undermined and starved of public funds.

“Against this backdrop, it is heart-sinking that the care review’s principal recommendations are for major structural reorganisation, which will, for years, consume many millions of pounds and the hearts and minds of people who could instead be leading cultural change to put children and their rights at the heart of everything. It is depressing that, yet again, there are proposals to take away legal protections from children, and that the promise of strengthened advocacy services, which exist to make sure children are always heard and their rights defended, has been tied to the loss of other independent roles.

“The review is rightly passionate about the need for fundamental change, and sets out a powerful case for it. There are individual proposals within the review’s report which have the potential to make life hugely better for children in care, particularly for those children whose families can be properly supported to look after them well. But this will be a review remembered for the structural reorganisation of children’s social care, moving people, services, power and funding away from local authorities. At any time, this kind of major structural upheaval would be questionable. When there are children in the care of the state who are living in hotels, bedsits and caravans, it could be an unforgivable distraction.”

Statement from the Children’s Society

Statement from Pause

Patrick Butler in the Guardian

Book review: Sexy but Psycho

This is a review from a contributor who wishes to remain anonymous. The issue of how female victims of domestic abuse are treated in the family justice system is a controversial one. My experiences as a lawyer in the system over 20 years does not support the narrative that I often hear from others, that women’s experiences of violence and abuse are dismissed or actively turned against them. But what is equally clear is that many disagree with me. I am still not clear how we square this circle. Either I am a victim myself of a misogynistic system and simply cannot see the truth as it is played out – or there is a degree of exaggeration by the system’s critics. Presumably the truth, as ever, lies somewhere in between. I cannot deny the number of women who feel very strongly that something is going very badly wrong; here one women gives her history to explain why. I can’t dismiss something simply because it does not chime with my experience or belief – but it is a matter of continuing curiosity and worry to me, how big the gap can be between mine and other women’s experiences.

Sarah Phillimore

“She’s mental “ is currently being played out both in court and in the media in the Heard versus Depp defamation case. What is happening under the gaze of the world, could have been a case study in Dr Jessica Talyor’s latest book.

Amber Heard has been evaluated by the defendant’s witness to have two personality disorders . This is a common diagnosis in family law cases, where there are allegations of intimate partner violence.

The blurb on Sexy but Psycho proclaims “ Angry , opinionated,mouthy,aggressive,hysterical, mad …. Why are women and girls who report violence against them so likely to be diagnosed with personality disorders ? Why are women and girls pathologised for being angry about oppression and abuse ”  Dr Taylor argues ( yes she is angry ) that women are classified by the psychiatric profession as mentally unwell when they in fact are having a normal stress response to trauma. She delves into the historical context, women who did not play the game being labelled as witches or locked up in institutions. Any protesting was seen as further evidence of mental illness. Little girls and grown women it seemed were in the words of the nursery rhyme supposed to be made of “ sugar and spice and all things nice” – woe betide them if they stepped over the line.

The Heard-Depp case proves that this is not just historical, it is happening today. The book includes a chapter titled “ Pathologising women and children in the courtroom” , which starts with the case study of a young mother labeled with emotionally unstable personality disorder and depression after being abused and raped by her partner. He then used the label against her in the courtroom. This may be familiar to many. The woman continued to be labelled for years afterwards as unstable, without the violence she had been a victim of being recorded in her files as well.

I eagerly awaited this book and it did not disappoint. I too, was labelled with a personality disorder by a court appointed psychiatrist after years of intimate partner violence, ignored by the authorities the times I asked for help. I had no previous mental disorders or addictions. The NHS could find nothing to treat when I referred myself to mental health services. My daughters were placed under a care order with my abusive ex partner; his previous offending was ignored.  I was told that my condition was not treatable by the court expert in the timescale for the children. It was unbelievably surreal, but sadly, is not unique. 

Dr Taylor demonstrates that the system is unwell rather than the women.It is misogynistic, created by men to control women. Despite so-called equal rights it still does so. She sets out a plan to change , starting with psychiatric services pathologising and medicating trauma victims. She wants to remove funding from pharmaceutical companies and instead invest that funding in free trauma treatment. She advocates for training for all professionals dealing with women , to understand why the woman may be presenting as she is, a frightened person rather than an unstable person out for revenge /attention …..

Abuse and findings of fact

But if coercive control involves ‘patterns of behaviour’ – how are those patterns to be discerned?

The case of K v K [2022] EWCA Civ 468 (08 April 2022) re-emphasises the general guidance on the court’s approach to fact- finding hearings in private family proceedings following the Court of Appeal’s decision  Re H-N [2021] EWCA Civ 448 (Re H-N). I have written about that decision and its guidance here. It also provides a fresh emphasis on methods of ‘non-court’ dispute resolution and when they should be considered.

The case was about whether or not the findings of fact made by the District Judge should be over turned. On the first appeal, the findings were upheld but the Court of Appeal gave permission for the father to re-argue his grounds. Briefly, the father submitted that the District Judge had not considered his case that the mother had alienated the children and the findings made of rape, coercive and controlling behaviour and physical abuse of the children are unsound. The mother argued that there was a high threshold needed to over turn findings of fact, and it had not been reached in this case.

The Court of Appeal found that there had not been proper consideration of the need for a finding of fact, and the findings made were unsafe. The case would therefore be sent back to a Circuit Judge to decide if a fresh finding of fact is needed, following the guidance set out in Re H-N. In brief:

  • The parties had not taken advantage of a MIAM – Mediation Intake and Assessment Meeting and this might have resolved logistical issues about the father’s contact. The mother had initially agreed to unsupervised contact and had not seen the allegation of rape or generalised controlling behaviour as central to the resolution of the issues between them. .
  • Any judge considering a finding of fact must identify at an early stage the real issues in the case, as relate to the welfare of the child. A finding of fact is only necessary if the alleged abuse is relevant to what the court is being asked to decide relating to the children’s welfare.
  • The finding of rape was unsafe as the Judge did not consider all the available evidence, including the mother’s untrue assertion that she had reported this to the family doctor.

Non- court dispute resolution

The Court of Appeal examined the various ways of reaching resolution in a case where the the initial difficulties between the parties appeared to be ‘entirely logistical’ rather than an objection to contact with the father in principle. These needed to be considered at the FHDRA – the First Hearing and Dispute Resolution Appointment which has as its ‘essential purpose’ an opportunity for judicially led dispute resolution. The Court of Appeal were concerned that the father avoided the MIAM simply by stating the case was urgent. Such assertions should have been checked at or before the FHDRA under rule 3.10(1) FPR. See further Practice Direction 12B.

As well as attendance at a MIAM the court noted the Family Mediation Voucher Scheme; eligible parties can apply for a voucher during the MIAM process and receive up to £500 towards the costs of mediation. The Court of Appeal said at para 36:

We would urge all parties to private law proceedings to make use of this valuable resource. This case provides an example of a situation in which mediation would have been particularly appropriate, because there was at the start, no issue between the parents as to whether unsupervised contact was appropriate.

What issues of child welfare are relevant to the finding of fact?

The Judge has to consider this question carefully. The Court of Appeal relied on the ‘key guidance’ from Re H-N, including para 139:

Domestic abuse is often rightly described as pernicious. In recent years, the greatly improved understanding both of the various forms of abuse, and also of the devastating impact it has upon the victims and any children of the family, described in the main section of this judgment, have been most significant and positive developments. The modern approach and understanding is reflected in the ‘General principles’ section of PD12J(4). As discussed at paragraphs 36–41 above that does not, however, mean that in every case where there is an allegation of, even very serious, domestic abuse it will be either appropriate or necessary for there to be a finding of fact hearing, so much is clear from the detailed guidance set out in paragraphs 16–20 of PD12J and, in particular, at paragraph 17.

It is clear that a decision to hold a fact-finding hearing is a ‘major judicial determination’ – it will inevitably introduce delay and increase the negative impact on the parents’ on going relationship and ability to co-operate with each other as parents. The District Judge had made a ‘premature’ decision to hold a finding of fact and he should have first identified the issues between the parents as to the children’s welfare and given the mother time to decide what factual findings she wanted the court to decide, always bearing closely in mind that she was not seeking to prevent contact between the children and their father.

The Court of Appeal were crystal clear at para 65

A fact-finding hearing is not free-standing litigation. It always takes place within proceedings to protect a child from abuse or regarding the child’s future welfare. It is not to be allowed to become an opportunity for the parties to air their grievances. Nor is it a chance for parents to seek the court’s validation of their perception of what went wrong in their relationship. If fact-finding is to be justified in the first place or continued thereafter, the court must be able to identify how any alleged abusive behaviour is, or may be, relevant to the determination of the issues between the parties as to the future arrangements for the children.

The Court of Appeal were concerned that the guidance in Re H-N at para 53 may have been misunderstood. This warned judges against a failure to properly consider issues of coercive control as this might make their judgments vulnerable to appeal. But that requirement to consider the overarching issue of coercive of controlling behaviour was when it was necessary to determine a dispute relating to a child’s welfare. It is not a requirement for the court to determine every single subsidiary factual allegation that may also be raised.

Concluding remarks

This is a useful reminder of the need to consider the justification for finding of fact hearings, given their inevitable negative impact on both the speed of resolution of a conflict and the further polarisation of the parties in adversarial proceedings. It’s also clear to see the focus on ‘non-court’ dispute resolution, which was the focus of the recent Family Justice Council conference.

However, one thing I do not understand. Coercive and controlling behaviour involves a ‘pattern’ of behaviour. Judges are criticised for focusing too much on individual events rather than stepping back and asking what is the prevailing ‘weather’ of this relationship. But how do we discern a pattern if we do not identify its individual elements? Surely no finding of overall coercive and controlling behaviour can be made without findings as to individual events? This case is of limited use in helping me square this circle, as it was an appeal from a decision which had been made without the benefit of the judgment in Re H-N and the Judge could not be criticised for that. What we need now is an appeal from a decision which has tried very hard to stick with the Re H-N guidance.

Further Reading

Guidance to Judges and Magistrates on holding fact finding hearings in private law cases, May 2022

Successful appeal when Judge got it wrong about structure of finding of fact hearing B v P [2022] EWFC B18 (31 March 2022) “It appears to me that she did not follow the approach endorsed in Re H-N, of stepping back from the precise allegations and considering the behaviour as a whole.“

Cases involving Domestic Abuse – how should the court handle this?

This is the text of a presentation given at the Bristol Civil Justice Centre on 19th January 2022, considering how the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Re H-N has been working out ‘on the ground’ We are left with the distinct impression that its not possible to resolve the tension between two competing principles – undertake a sensitive and detailed analysis of patterns of behaviour in a relationship AND take up less of the court’s time. But the need for early and robust findings of fact is clear.

We first met to discuss this in May 2021 and we thought it would be helpful to meet again to see how the guidance was working on the ground. I am going to remind you of the Court of Appeal guidance and consider how it was applied in the case of A Child (Application of PD12J : No.2 – Findings of Fact) [2022] EWFC 2 (12 January 2022)

Re H-N and Others (children) (domestic abuse: finding of fact hearings)

Neutral Citation Number: [2021] EWCA Civ 448

In March 2021 the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment in four conjoined appeals. A number of intervenors were involved, including the Association of Lawyers for Children and Families Need Fathers. The Court of Appeal was clear that PD12J was ‘fit for purpose’ – the issue was how it was being implemented in proceedings. 

The first 77 paragraphs deal with some general guidance. The fundamental issue was, where domestic abuse is alleged in children cases, should the focus be on patterns of behaviour rather than specific incidents?

Summary of guidance

The Court of Appeal will expect to see recognition of the following issues in cases involving allegations of domestic abuse. 

Do we need a finding of fact hearing?

  • At the earliest stage, consider the detailed guidance in PD12J about the need for a finding of fact. 
  • Remember that PD12J is focused on child arrangement orders – it does not establish a free-standing jurisdiction to determine domestic abuse allegations that are not relevant to child welfare issues.
  • Fact finding hearings are to provide a factual basis for assessments or orders/interventions
  • Only allegations that are necessary for assessment purposes or particular orders should be considered
  • Does the fact finding need to be a separate hearing, or can it be bundled up with the final hearing?

CAFCASS made the very sensible suggestion that it would help to have more input from their officers at an earlier stage to help answer these questions and the Court of Appeal agreed this was a good idea worthy of more consideration – I am not sure how this is playing out on the ground. 

Awareness of ‘patterns of behaviour’ means we have to consider the limitations of a Scott Schedule as a means of pleading a case

  • In every case where domestic abuse is alleged, both parents should be asked to describe in short terms (either in a written statement or orally at a preliminary hearing) the overall experience of being in a relationship with each other 
  • Where one or both parents assert that a pattern of coercive and/or controlling behaviour existed, and a fact-finding is necessary, that assertion should be the primary issue for determination at the fact- finding hearing. 
  • Any other, more specific, factual allegations should be selected for trial because of their potential probative relevance to the alleged pattern of behaviour, and not otherwise, unless any particular factual allegation is so serious that it justifies determination irrespective of any alleged pattern of coercive and/or controlling behaviour (a likely example being an allegation of rape). 

BUT how do we square the circle between increased focus on pattens of behaviour and a need to save court time and scarce resources? 

In essence, decisions about fact findings must be made at an early stage and any interim arrangements for contact must be safe for the child. The key words are ‘proportionality’ and ‘necessity’. We have to keep in mind the ‘overriding objective’ to deal with cases efficiently and recognise that resources are finite and need to be allocated to other cases than just our own. 

As the President’s Guidance ‘The Road Ahead’ (June 2020) set out:

‘if the Family Court is to have any chance of delivering on the needs of children or adults who need protection from abuse, or of their families for a timely determination of applications, there will need to be a very radical reduction in the amount of time that the court affords to each hearing. Parties appearing before the court should expect the issues to be limited only to those which it is necessary to determine to dispose of the case, and for oral evidence or oral submissions to be cut down only to that which it is necessary for the court to hear.’

But the Court of Appeal at para 54 were alert to the immediate tension that exists, between dealing with matters efficiently and doing justice to allegations of ‘patterns of behaviour’. I have certainly never experienced two week finding of fact in a private law case – I consider myself very lucky if I can get a day within a reasonable timescale. 

In promoting the need for courts to prioritise consideration of whether a pattern of coercive and/or controlling behaviour is established over and above the determination of any specific factual allegations, there is the potential that this additional layer of evaluation may add to an already lengthy forensic evaluative process. By example, the fact-finding hearing that had been listed in Re B-B (one of the four appeal cases before the court) was planned to last five days (that is 25 court hours) in order to consider five factual allegations.

How to meet the need to evaluate the existence, or otherwise, of a pattern of coercive and/or controlling behaviour without significantly increasing the scale and length of private law proceedings is therefore a most important, and not altogether straight- forward, question. 

A number of suggestions were made by the parties in submissions including; 

  • a ‘threshold’ type document, similar to that used in public law proceedings,
  •  formal pleadings by way of particulars of claim as seen in civil proceedings and 
  • a narrative statement in prescribed form. 

A recent case is a useful illustration of the difficulties of trying to ‘square the circle’ 

A Child (Application of PD12J) [2021] EWFC B59 (6 October 2021) sets out the tension so often apparent in private law cases – either one party is a victim of domestic abuse, including sexual abuse and controlling and coercive behaviour, with the children being exposed to this abuse or one party has laid a trail of false and/or exaggerated allegations to justify removal of the children from their family home or refusal to permit contact with the other party. 

On 30th September 2021 HHJ Dancey gave permission to appeal to the mother of three children, aged 10, 8 and 5 from an order made by a district judge three days earlier that she return the children from the North of England to Dorset and for shared time with their father.  In default of return the district judge had made a transfer of ‘residence’ order. The mother alleged significant abusive behaviour from the father, including that he had lied about being HIV positive and had repeatedly raped her. 

One ground of appeal was that the judge failed to address PD12J at any point in his judgment and failed therefore to consider the harm the mother and/or the children would suffer if he made the orders sought, the level of supervision required, the risk to the children and the impact domestic abuse could have on their emotional well-being and the safety of the mother. He treated it effectively as a summary return in a relocation case. 

The Judge found the district judge was entitled to take a critical view of the mother’s position and weigh that in the balance. He was also entitled to expect a rational explanation for a move of such distance and to consider the proportionality of the mother’s decision-making.   But he was not entitled to dismiss the mother’s allegations summarily, ignore CAFCASS recommendations and fail to properly consider PD12J. 

It’s worth reading the submissions in full as they set out the huge difficulties of these kind of cases. 

Judge commented at para 120 

The acutely difficult question the present appeal poses is the balance to be struck by the court between (a) the potential harm identified by PD12J of making orders that may place children at risk of the consequences of domestic abuse and (b) the emotional harm and potential relationship damage that may be caused by unilateral removal a considerable distance away from the family home and cessation of contact.  

These are decisions that have to be made on an urgent basis, often with limited and untested information.    Get it wrong and the court risks placing children at risk of harm either way.   This is a welfare analysis that requires caution, balance and proportionality – often not easy to achieve at an interim stage.

Para 122 he endorses the framework of analysis proposed by Peter Jackson LJ in the different context of public law care and placement orders in Re F (A Child) (Placement Order: Proportionality) [2018] EWCA Civ 2761 :

a)         What is the type of harm that might arise (for present purposes, putting the mother’s case at its highest)?   

b)        What is the likelihood of it arising?

c)         What would be the consequences in terms of severity of harm if it happened?

d)        Can the risks of harm happening be reduced or mitigated so that they are manageable (including in this case by the making of protective measures)?

e)         What does a comparative evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of each option (here, return or not, contact or not) say about the best interests of the children, having regard also to the need to protect a parent vulnerable to abuse?

f)         Is the outcome proposed proportionate?

At para 124 the judge comments that the court is not bound to simply accept whatever a party says without some kind of critical analysis but at an interim stage is required to consider the circumstances around the allegations, including:

a)             the seriousness of the allegations and the harm that might result;

b)             whether there is already evidence from other sources which supports or undermines the allegations;

c)             the consistency or otherwise of the allegations (making allowance for the fact that it is in the nature of domestic abuse that accounts are often given piecemeal and incrementally, especially in relation to allegations of sexual abuse which may be delayed because of embarrassment, shame or simply thinking ‘I won’t be believed’);

d)             possible motivations for making allegations;

e)             how the children are presenting and what they are saying.

His last comment at para 139 is interesting 

I should add that the current practice, driven by resource demands, of Cafcass not interviewing both parents for the purpose of preparation of the safeguarding letter has contributed to the sense that the Cafcass recommendations were based solely on what the mother told them. At the moment Cafcass are leaving it until the FHDRA before speaking to the parties at court.   I am concerned that interviewing parents in this pressured environment rather than independently away from court risks safety issues being missed.  In this case of course the hearings were on non-Cafcass days and there was no opportunity to speak to both parents even at court.   The father was not spoken to by Cafcass at all until after the decision under appeal.  

The finding of fact was then heard in December, court reminding itself that Section 63 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which came into force on 1 October 2021, requires amendment of the Family Procedure Rules to ensure that, where a person is, or is at risk of being, a victim of domestic abuse carried out by another party, or relative of another party or witness, it is to be assumed that the quality of their evidence and, where they are a party, their participation in the proceedings, are likely to be diminished by reason of vulnerability.

The following special measures were therefore put in place

a) separate waiting areas were arranged for the mother;

b) in court the father was screened from sight by the mother and arrangements were made when going in and out of court and during adjournments to ensure she would not see the father;

c) the mother was screened from the father while giving her evidence from the witness box;

d) breaks were taken during the mother’s evidence which spanned the afternoon of the first day of the hearing and the morning of the second and took some 5 hours;

e) additional opportunities for breaks were offered to the mother at points when she appeared to find questions about intimate matters particularly difficult, although in fact the mother opted to carry on;

f) given that there were some long pauses before the mother was able to answer some questions, I ensured that adequate time was given to the mother to answer questions fully before moving on to the next.

The difficulty for the court was that one of the parties had to be lying. Their starkly different accounts could not be resolved. The Judge was clearly alive to the difficulties In assessing the evidence of victims of trauma – at para 180 he said

This has been a troubling and difficult case. Experience shows that victims of domestic abuse, who are by definition vulnerable witnesses, sometimes find it difficult to talk about intimate and highly personal information, particularly allegations of sexual abuse. Because victims live in a state of fear, with patterns of abusively controlling behaviour, it is not uncommon for dates and incidents to become confused. Lived experiences are revealed over sometimes lengthy periods, including during court proceedings and, in my recent experience, in the course of giving evidence. Sometimes this iterative process is a matter of victims gaining the independence and courage to talk about their experience. Sometimes something is said which triggers a victim to be able to speak.

However on a careful analysis of the evidence he found that the mother had fabricated allegations against the father to justify her departure from an unhappy marriage. Although the father’s failure to disclose his HIV status was ‘abhorrent and abusive’ it did not create a risk to mother or children and therefore was not a matter to be relied upon to restrict contact. 

What this case clearly underscores is the need for careful analysis of all the factors set out in PD12J at an interim stage, followed by swift and robust findings of fact. The only way to do this is I am afraid by taking up court time. I can’t see any other way to square the circle. 

Further reading

Another useful example of how to apply the Court of Appeal guidance B-B, Re (Domestic Abuse: Fact-Finding) (Rev1) [2022] EWHC 108 (Fam) (20 January 2022) – in this case the father was found to have behaved abusively.

‘The Shake’

On Thursday 4th November 2021 at 7 p.m. we will be presenting by Microsoft Teams a play about a young baby who gets shaken and badly injured whilst in the care of her parents. The family portrayed in the play are involved in care proceedings. The play shows the social circumstances, so frequently encountered in criminal and Family proceedings, which lead to this sort of injury.

The play is graphic, and some may find it distressing. It lasts for about 40 minutes. We show it as an acted play-reading. It has been written be HHJ Wildblood QC. There is no charge for attendance.

After the play, there will be a short talk by Dr Imelda Bennett, Consultant Paediatrician explaining the nature of injuries that are often encountered when a baby is shaken. That will be followed by a short talk by DCI Kristina Windsor about the criminal procedures that may arise and the charging options that may need to be considered. Finally, HHJ Wildblood QC will speak about Family Court procedures and the need for communication between the Family and Criminal proceedings. There will be a chance to send in questions using the Team’s ‘chat’ function.

We estimate that the event will last a total of about 1 ½ – 2 hours. The intention is to improve our understanding of how these distressing injuries can occur and the consequences that may arise for everyone involved. Those attending are asked to turn off their microphones and cameras when joining the Teams link.

The Teams link is here. If you have difficulty joining on the night, please email HHJ Wildblood QC on his email address: [email protected]

If you are attending, please could you send a brief email to Stephen on the above email address so that we have some idea of numbers.

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