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Is it the end of the road for HRA claims for misuse of section 20 accommodation?

Not in principle – but in practice, maybe.

This post is the opinion of Sarah Phillimore about the impact of London Borough of Hackney v Williams & Anor [2017] EWCA Civ 26 (26 January 2017) upon claims for damages for breach of human rights in cases where children have been accommodated under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. This case has provoked significant comment from a number of lawyers and social workers – see here from Suesspcious Minds and here from Celtic Knot.

Sarah does not agree that this case means that lawyers can endorse any radical departure from existing good practice guidance – it will still be important to establish that parents have the capacity to understand what is being proposed by section 20 accommodation. Failure to do will continue to put local authorities at risk of acting disproportionately in breach of a family’s Article 8 ECHR rights. However, the Court of Appeal sound an interesting warning about the likely quantum of damages in such cases. For legally aided claimants, who will find the statutory charge bites upon any award of damages, this may well indicate the beginning of the end for viable HRA claims for the publicly funded.

FACTS

The 8 children of Mr and Mrs Williams went into foster care for 2 months in 2007 after the eldest child said he had been beaten and the police found the family home in a very bad condition. Initially, the children were taken into police protection. This is lawful for no more than 72 hours. On expiry of that period, the LA removed the children into foster care as the parents were subject to bail conditions that they could not have unsupervised contact with the children.

The Williams initially signed an agreement for the children to be accommodated under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. Thus, they retained parental responsibility and it should have been made clear to them that under section 20(8) they could remove their children from foster care at any time. If the LA did not think it was safe for the children to be removed, their only lawful option would be to apply to the court for either an emergency protection order or an interim care order.

It is possible that their full legal rights, including this right of immediate removal, were not fully explained at the time. However, the parents quickly obtained legal advice and there was no doubt that Mr Williams’ lawyer at least understood the relevant legal framework. The lawyer wrote to the LA saying that Mr Williams would consent to accommodation until the 23rd July 2007. The LA agreed that the children should go home but noted the bail conditions were still in place that prevented the parents from offering their children accommodation. The Williams had the right to apply at any time to vary these bail conditions, and it was clear that their lawyers knew this, as they referred to it in correspondence. However, the Court of Appeal felt it important to note that it was likely that the Williams wished to work co-operatively with both the police and the LA and not get involved in contentious proceedings.

The police did not vary the bail conditions until the 6th September and the children returned home five days later.

There were no criticisms of the initial police actions to remove the children for 72 hours. However, the subsequent action of the LA to accommodate the children saw the following 9 years spent in litigation as the Williams’ pursued various legal claims that their children had been wrongly removed.

Why did the Court of Appeal overturn the first instance decision?

In 2015 the court held that the LA were liable to pay damages of £10,000 to each parent for breach of statutory duty and consequent interference with the parents’ Article 8 rights. The LA appealed and won. Why then did the Court of Appeal agree the first instance decision was wrong?

At first instance, the parents had argued that their consent to section 20 accommodation had been unfairly obtained and was not thus ‘true consent’. The Court of Appeal examined this claim from para 43 of their judgment, by looking at the guidance provided in both Coventry City Council v C [2013] EWHC 2190 (Fam) per Hedley J. and by Munby J in the earlier case of R (G) v Nottingham City Council and Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust [2008] EWHC 400 (Admin).
In the Nottingham case, the LA were held to have acted unlawfully; their argument that they were justified in removing a baby without a court order because the mother knew of their plan and ‘did not object’ was rejected in the strongest terms as an unacceptable and dangerous conflation of ‘absence of objection’ with ‘actual consent’.

The Coventry case considered the issue of the capacity of a mother to give informed consent to the removal of her new born baby and offered general guidance to ensure that social workers had properly considered that the consent offered is real. However, as the Court of Appeal note at para 48 – good practice guidance does not have the force of law. Further, the circumstances of the Williams were markedly different to those of the mothers in the cited cases; in particular the fact that the bail conditions imposed by the police, over which the local authority had no control, prevented the children from living with them..

The Court of Appeal then considered the case law that had arisen since the decision in the Coventry case: Re B (Looked after child) [2013] EWCA Civ 964 (sub nom Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council v Others); Re W (Children) [2014] EWCA Civ 1065; and Re N (Adoption: Jurisdiction) [2015] EWCA 1112.

These cases all touched upon the issue of active objection or passive consent to section 20 accommodation. The Court of Appeal noted the President’s firm words in Re N :

The misuse and abuse of section 20 in this context is not just a matter of bad practice. It is wrong; it is a denial of the fundamental rights of both the parent and the child; it will no longer be tolerated; and it must stop. Judges will and must be alert to the problem and pro-active in putting an end to it. From now on, local authorities which use section 20 as a prelude to care proceedings for lengthy periods or which fail to follow the good practice I have identified, can expect to be subjected to probing questioning by the court. If the answers are not satisfactory, the local authority can expect stringent criticism and possible exposure to successful claims for damages.’

The Court of Appeal commented that the case law they had considered set out good practice guidance which had been offered prior to the Williams’s children going into foster care It was therefore necessary to examine what the law said (see para 62 onwards). The key consideration was section 20(7):
‘(7) A local authority may not provide accommodation under this section for any child if any person who:
(a) has parental responsibility for him; and
(b) is willing and able to:
(i) provide accommodation for him; or
(ii) arrange for accommodation to be provided for him,
objects.’

The Court of Appeal commented at para 68:

The word ‘consent’ does not appear within s. 20. There is no express statutory requirement upon a local authority to obtain a positive expression of consent from a parent before accommodating a child under the various provisions in s. 20(1), (3), (4) and (5), let alone any requirement for such consent to be in writing and subject to any of the various refinements that have been described in the case-law to which I have referred. Nothing that is said in this judgment is intended in any manner to detract from or alter the terms of the good practice guidance that has been given, principally by Sir James Munby P and Hedley J, in these cases; the obvious wisdom and good sense of their words are plain to see. The present case is, however, a claim for damages pursuant to s. 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, in relation to breach of statutory duty under s. 20 of the 1989 Act and breach of rights under Article 8 of the ECHR. Insofar as breach of statutory duty under s. 20 is concerned it is necessary, in my view, for a claimant to go further than establishing that the actions of the local authority fell short of what, subsequently identified, ‘good practice’ might require; the authority must be seen to have acted in breach of the terms of the statute.

The Williams could not have offered accommodation. The statutory test was not whether they offered consent but whether they actively objected. They would only have been able to do that if they had applied to vary the bail conditions, over which the LA had no control. Therefore the Court of Appeal did not agree that there was a breach of statutory duty here and thus no damages should be paid.

The Court of Appeal made brief comment about the level of damages awarded at para 87 of their judgment. Having decided that no damages should be paid, they did not need to determine quantum but expressed clear view that £10,000 was too high in any event.

ANALYSIS

I do not think that this case has any significant impact on the principle of HRA claims. The Court of Appeal are quite right to re-direct our attention back to the explicit words of the statute, where the word ‘consent’ is indeed not mentioned. However, this does not mean that the general good practice guidance offered in other cases becomes irrelevant, and the Court of Appeal expressly recognise this.

This case involved parents who could not offer a home to their children so long as the police bail conditions remained in place. The local authority did not impose these conditions and were not responsible for varying them – although there was some argument as to what information the local authority passed to the police. The parents may not have ‘consented’ to what happened to their children but even if they had made active objection, they could not have taken their children home unless and until the bail conditions were varied.

In such a situation I agree with the Court of Appeal that it is plainly wrong to hold the local authority to blame for a breach of its statutory duty. However, these are quite distinct and particular facts which acted to deprive the parents of the reality of any ability to object. Sadly I am sure there are bound to be further cases where misuse of section 20 involves vulnerable parents, who did not understand or did not have explained to them what section 20 means. Those kind of cases are often coupled with a ‘drift’ for the child in foster care of many months before care proceedings are issued. In such circumstances there is likely to be a reasonable argument for a disproportionate and hence unlawful breach of Article 8. The existence of ‘good practice’ guidance about such issues of course does not have the force of law but can provide a useful benchmark against which to measure if the local authority have acted proportionally.

However, the brief dismissal of £10,000 as an appropriate level of damages sounds an interesting warning for future cases which may well go to render HRA claims pretty hopeless in practice, given the impact of the statutory charge on damages awarded to a legally aided complainant. I agree that the amount of damages awarded in such cases does appear to be creeping ever upwards – see this post for further discussion of damages awarded – and this is not in keeping with the European jurisprudence which makes it clear that damages for human rights breaches are awarded to provide ‘just satisfaction’, not punishment for the wrongdoer. ‘Just satisfaction’ can be provided by a simple declaration of wrongdoing.

Therefore I think its an interesting case with some useful discussion of the distinction between ‘active objection’ and ‘passive consent’ – but I do not agree it is the radical ‘game changer’ that some other commentators suggest.

This post first appeared on the Transparency Project website. The Transparency Project will revise its Section 20 Guidance in light of some of the discussions in this case.

Non molestation orders made without the other party present

This is Practice Guidance issued by the President of the Family Division on 18 January 2017

Family Court – Duration of Ex Parte (Without Notice) Orders

This Guidance was originally issued on 13 October 2014. This revised Guidance, issued on 18 January 2017, supersedes the previous Guidance.

1 The Magistrates’ Association and the National Bench Chairs’ Forum have raised with me the question of whether it is proper to grant an ex parte non-molestation injunction for an unlimited period. They suggest that practice varies. They express the view that to grant such an order for an unlimited time is wrong in principle.

2 In expressing that view, the Magistrates’ Association and the National Bench Chairs’ Forum are entirely correct. To grant an ex parte (without notice) injunction for an unlimited time is wrong in principle. The practice of granting such orders for an unlimited time, if this is still occurring, must stop.

3 Subject only to paragraph 8, the same principles, as set out below, apply to all ex parte (without notice) injunctive orders made by the Family Court or by the Family Division, irrespective of the subject matter of the proceedings or the terms of the order.
4 The law is to be found in Horgan v Horgan [2002] EWCA Civ 1371, paras 5–6 (Ward LJ), R (Casey) v Restormel Borough Council [2007] EWHC 2554 (Admin), paras 37–41 (Munby J), In re C (A Child) (Family Proceedings: Practice) [2013] EWCA Civ 1412, [2014] 1 WLR 2182, [2014] 1 FLR 1239, para 15 (Ryder LJ) and Re A (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 572, [2016] 4 WLR 111, paras 49-61, esp paras 59-61 (Munby P).

5 The relevant principles, compliance with which is essential, are as follows:
(i) An ex parte (without notice) injunctive order must never be made without limit of time. There must be a fixed end date. It is not sufficient merely to specify a return day. The order must specify on its face and in clear terms precisely when it expires (eg, 12 noon on 20 March 2017).
(ii) The order must also fix a return day. The order must specify the date, time and place of the hearing on the return day. The return day should normally be no more than 14 days after the date when the order was made. How long the hearing on the return day should be listed for must be a matter for the discretion of the judge. However, having regard to paragraph 6, often a very short listing may well be appropriate.
(iii) Careful consideration needs to be given to the duration of any order made ex parte (without notice). Many orders will be of short duration, typically no more than 14 days. But in appropriate cases involving personal protection, such as non-molestation injunctions granted in accordance with Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996, the order itself can be for a longer period, such as 6 or even 12 months, provided that the order specifies a return day within no more than 14 days. This must be a matter for the discretion of the judge, but a period longer than 6 months is likely to be appropriate only where the allegation is of long term abuse or where some other good reason is shown. Conversely, a period shorter than 6 months may be appropriate in a case where there appears to be a one-off problem that may subside in weeks rather than months.
(iv) The order must make it clear that (a) it was made in the absence of the respondent and that the court has considered only the evidence of the applicant and (b) the court has made no finding of fact. Where the evidence is written, it must be identified in the order. Where, exceptionally, the court has received oral or other evidence (eg, a photograph) that evidence should be recorded on the face of the order or reduced to writing and served with the order.
(v) Where the order has been made in accordance with Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996 it must recite that the court has had regard to sections 45(1) and (2) of the Act.
(vi) The order (see FPR 18.10(3)) ‘must contain a statement of the right to make an application to set aside or vary the order under rule 18.11.’ The phrase ‘liberty to apply’ is not sufficient for this purpose. The order must spell out that the respondent is entitled, without waiting for the return day, to apply to set aside or vary the order.
(vii) If the respondent does apply to set aside or vary the order the court must list the application as a matter of urgency, within a matter of days at most.

6 Experience suggests that in certain types of case, for example, non-molestation or other orders granted in accordance with Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996, the respondent frequently neither applies to set aside or vary the order nor attends the hearing on the return day.
(i) When, in such cases, there is no attendance by the respondent and the order, having been served, does not require amendment there is no need for re-service. The order made on the return should however record that the respondent, although afforded the opportunity to be heard, has neither attended nor sought to be heard.
(ii) If, however, variation of the original order is sought by the applicant (eg by extending the ambit or the duration of the order) then:
(a) Paragraphs 5(i), (iii)-(v) must be complied with in relation to the new order and the new order will need to be served.
(b) Unless, before the return day, the respondent was given proper notice of the proposed amendments, either in the application or in the initial order, (a) the new order must specify a new return day, and (b) paragraph 5(ii) must be complied with in relation to the new order.

7 I remind all practitioners and judges of the principle, which applies to all ex parte (without notice) injunctive orders made by the Family Court or by the Family Division, irrespective of the subject matter of the proceedings or the terms of the order, that a without notice application will normally be appropriate only if:
(a) there is an emergency or other great urgency, so that it is impossible to give any notice, however short or informal, or
(b) there is a real risk that, if alerted to what is proposed, if ‘tipped off’, the respondent will take steps in advance of the hearing to thwart the court’s order or otherwise to defeat the ends of justice. In an appropriate case this can justify the grant of a non-molestation injunction without notice, lest the respondent, having been served with an application, further molests his (or her) victim or exerts pressure on her (him) to abandon the proceedings.

8 Nothing in this Guidance derogates from, or otherwise modifies, the principles and safeguards to be observed on an application for an ex parte (without notice) freezing or search order: see L v K (Freezing Orders: Principles and Safeguards) [2013] EWHC 1735 (Fam), [2014] Fam 35.

Sir James Munby
President of the Family Division

John Hemming: An apology

In the matter of CB (A Child)

This post arises out of discussions on Twitter on New Year’s Day regarding the ‘Latvian case’ and the extent to which John Hemming is able or willing to accept the findings of various courts about the harm suffered by the child CB. I will set out a summary of my response and then a more detailed chronology of the case to support that summary.

On January 1st 2017 I published a tweet to which Mr Hemming objected.  This was part of a discussion with other Twitter users about the nature and extent of Mr Hemming’s misrepresentations about the case of CB (A child) – ‘the Latvian case’

I said, in the context of a question about what the mother had done to make necessary changes to her parenting:

Mr Hemming denied that he had said the mother hadn’t done anything wrong and asked me to retract this statement and apologise. He referred me again to this blog post from 2015. I have already commented on Mr Hemming’s involvement in the Latvian case in this post and again in this post.

I concede that I owe Mr Hemming an apology. I don’t know when he first made direct contact with the mother in this case so I cannot imply that he was ‘advising’ her during the care proceedings in 2011. However, it is clear that by the time of her appeal to the Court of Appeal in April 2013 she had dispensed with her lawyers and was represented by ‘Mr H’ – who I shall assume is Tim Haines, one of Mr Hemming’s trusted advisers with his Justice For Families organisation. This assumption is bolstered by the fact that it was Mrs Julie Haines who was representing her in 2015.

It is also clear that Mr Hemming did concede on his blog that going out and leaving your 20 month old alone before the babysitter had turned up, was not great parenting. So I accept, it is misleading for me to suggest that Mr Hemming thought ‘nothing’ wrong had happened here.

However, what is abundantly clear, from his blog and his discussions via Twitter, he certainly didn’t think anything had happened to justify the removal of CB from her mother’s care and her eventual adoption. According to Mr Hemming, this was a case of a child adopted ‘because of nappy rash and a missed babysitter’.

So here is what I should have said

I don’t know when Mr Hemming first spoke directly to the mother. But he was clearly involved with her by 2013. He persistently and consistently asserts that this case was about no more than ‘nappy rash’ or a ‘late babysitter’ . This is utter, unmitigated hogwash and displays a chilling lack of concern for CB or recognition of the danger in which she was placed. The facts of this case – which I summarise below – show the clear and cogent reasons by which various courts have accepted that CB had suffered significant harm in her mother’s care and would be at risk of suffering more harm in the future if not removed. Mr Hemming’s continued misrepresentations about this case are wrong, ridiculous and dangerous. He should apologise for making them and agree never to repeat them.

But don’t just take my word for it. Have a look at the Court of Appeal judgment from 2013, from where I take the summary of facts and chronology set out below.

CB was born on 30th April 2008. On the 4th April 2009 the mother accepted a caution for the offence of being drunk in charge of a child under 7 when she was found at 1am with CB in a buggy, drunk and barefoot in the middle of the road.  On 18th January 2010 a social work assessment concluded that this was not the mother’s usual behaviour and CB would be ok in her care. However in February 2010 the local authority received complaints that CB was screaming and running about ‘almost every night’ until about 2am. On 5th March 2010 the mother’s landlord called the police who arrived and found CB, aged about 20 months, alone and in a pitiful state.

What did the court accept about CB’s circumstances? From para 8 of the 2013 judgment:

  • the room had a strong and overpowering smell of urine and faeces
  • CB’s clothes were wet and she was shivering
  • It was clear she had not been changed or cleaned ‘all day’
  • She had only an empty bottle within reach
  • Her nappy was so swollen she couldn’t walk properly
  • Her skin was soaked in urine to extent that a rash was noted when she was examined in hospital

Para 11 of the judgment confirms that by 3rd August 2010 CB, who had been taken into police protection and then into foster care, had been assessed as having significant delay in ALL aspects of her development.

Para 17 confirms the finding that the mother had maladapted personality traits which made her prone to denial and repression and reliance on ‘avoidance strategies’ such as alcohol.

On 26th October 2010 the  mother was again detained by the police on suspicion of being drunk.  On 15th June 2011 care proceedings were issued and on 10th July 2012 a placement order was made by DJ Mc Phee. The mother appealed against this to HHJ Cryan who dismissed that appeal on 8th October 2012 which is how she ended up in the Court of Appeal in April 2013, where her second appeal was also dismissed.

So how does Hemming deal with this?

By minimisation, denial and apparent lack of any regard for the welfare of CB. His blog post refers to the case ‘starting with two incidents’. The first becomes simply a mother crossing the road after a night out with a friend, having slipped off her shoes because they were hurting her. No mention of fact it was 1am and the mother accepted a caution for a criminal offence.

The second incident he admits ‘was more serious’. CB had been ‘found home alone and with a full nappy’. But, he asserts, the mother had actually arranged a babysitter and her only mistake was to leave CB before the babysitter arrived.  Mr Hemming goes on to quote the police report from the time  which simply underscores how ridiculous his analysis is.

The report notes that the police arrived at the scene at 18.50. We know they were called by the landlord so presumably CB had been alone for some time by now. Shortly after the police arrived a female also turns up and tells the police that she was the babysitter and she had just popped out for 10 minutes ‘and had been looking after the child all day long’. The ‘babysitter’ was promptly arrested. At 19.08 a decision was made to take CB to the hospital as she was very cold and possibly dehydrated. At 20.10 CB’s older sister arrives. The mother does not turn up until 21.30.

Mr Hemming states that the mother ‘accepts and I agree that she should not have left home before the babysitter arrived’.

And that appears to be the full extent to which Mr Hemming or the mother would accept any wrongdoing here.

This ignores entirely:

  • the fact the mother accepted a caution and therefore admitted guilt for being in charge of CB whilst intoxicated at 1am in April 2009;
  • the disgusting state in which CB was found in March 2010, cold, wet, whimpering and clearly having been left in a filthy nappy ‘all day’;
  • The ‘babysitter’ and the  mother clearly giving conflicting accounts of when this ‘babysitter’ was due to arrive – the babysitter maintaining she had been there ‘all day’. If the babysitter had indeed been there ‘all day’ then given the state in which CB was found, the mother’s judgement in choosing this person to care for her daughter is seriously in question;
  • That by August 2010 CB was found to be delayed in ALL aspects of her development, which points to significant neglect in her mother’s care.

The conduct of this case by the local authority does not escape criticism and nor should it. I note that earlier assessments of the mother which were positive are described as ‘naive’. I have to accept it must have been hard for the mother to process why initial positive reports about her parenting did not then translate into her daughter’s return to her care .Nor do I understand why it took so long to make an application for a care order given the findings about global developmental delay for CB in 2010.

But nothing in any failings or delay by the local authority can justify Mr Hemming’s persistent and deliberate mischaracterisation of this very sad case, as one where a baby was adopted for having a nappy rash. The impact on the mother has been obvious. She has been encouraged by Hemming and his entourage to see her conduct as attracting very little criticism, her child ‘stolen’ to meet adoption targets and the last 5 years of her life wasted in an utterly futile fight.

I’m not an idiot

I’m not an idiot. I realise that nothing I say here or anywhere else is going to stop Hemming. His distortions and misrepresentations about the family justice system are now part of his DNA. A great deal of his activities and his identity is tied up now with this crusading role. Presumably quite a lot of money too – I keep asking how much the Haines charge to take parents to the Court of Appeal and I have never got an answer, but I hear from some disgruntled parents that its about £1,500 a time.

But I hope that my activities in attempting to call him to account might give some others pause for thought about how much they take him seriously or how much they think it wise to engage with him.

As I have taken the time to deal with his blog post, perhaps he could return the favour and deal with mine? I’ve only been asking since September 2016.

‘Mums on the Run’ – Where do they go? How safe are they?

Match Mothers

Match Mothers  is a charity, run by volunteers, which supports mothers apart from their children, for whatever reason:

  • You have been through divorce and family breakdown
  • Your child has been fostered, taken into care or adopted
  • You are a mother in prison
  • Personal reasons or choice
  • Religious and cultural
  • Your child has been abducted

 

What it offers

It offers uncritical support, from other mothers who are in similar situations. There is an annual membership fee , but there are concessions for those on low incomes. The first line of support is online, via the website where there are various sources of information available including about family courts and links to resources. Members can also contact each other via the forum, either in a public post or a private message. There is also a private Face book group, which is strictly available for members only. In addition there are a number of local support groups where members can meet face to face and a pen friend matching service. There are two get together’s a year, free to attend, one in the South and one in the North of England, which are very social able meetings with fantastic raffles.

Why it helps?

It can be very isolating being a mother apart from your children. There is still significant stigma, mothers apart being judged far more harshly than their male counterparts. Just realising that you are not the only one is a relief. More experienced members can offer their personal experience in trying to either maintain contact or offer you hope for the future.
A monthly newsletter, offers members a chance to tell their stories and shares relevant topics that may be of interest to members on subjects such as parental alienation .
Members have also taken part in research and shared their stories with journalists who have contacted Match Mothers which has increased awareness.

How to contact ?

en*******@**********rs.org

Mothers in Re-current Care Proceedings – how do we break the cycle?

On 20th October a group of about 100 lawyers, social workers, local authority professionals and others interested in child protection issues, met at the Bristol Civil Justice Centre to discuss how we can break the cycle for those mother who have child after child removed from their care.

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore. 

The timetable and speakers for the event

16.30 Introductory remarks by Judi Evans, Barrister, St John’s Chambers.

16.35 Professor Karen Broadhurst of Lancaster University explained why some mothers are so vulnerable to repeated care proceedings and removal of successive children.

16.45 Georgina Perry, Co-Founder of Pause, discussed the Pause project.

16.55 Sally-Ann Jenkins, Head of Children & Young Peoples Services, Newport City Council discussed the development of their recent programme of help and support for vulnerable mothers.

17.05 Dr Freda Gardner, Chartered Clinical Psychologist and Deputy Clinical Director of Orchard House assessment and intervention centre, discussed a pre-proceedings intervention model for parents with children.

17.15 Written contribution from Surviving Safeguarding, a parent and campaigner outlining her concerns about the types of intervention proposed for mothers (read out by Sarah Phillimore as sadly Annie couldn’t make the event).

17.20 Questions from audience

18.00 Close

Presentations from the Speakers

Professor Broadhurst kicked off discussions by presenting some ‘short, sharp’ findings from her research into recurrent care proceedings. If the rate of ‘recidivism’ for mothers in care proceedings was repeated in the criminal justice system it would be a huge concern. Research in 2015 showed 1 in 4 of mothers would return to the family courts. The data she presented showed powerful argument for intervention – not merely to save money but to recognise the significant and harmful emotional cost upon mothers who have successive children removed from their care.

 

Women facing recurrent care proceedings are often very vulnerable and there is a real risk of injustice that many cannot access the interventions that the family court say they need. There was clear argument for earlier intervention – if we continue to do nothing, as care proceedings rise, we are simply creating more mothers for the family justice system.

We then heard from Georgina Perry of Pause, who gave brief overview of how the organisation started and what it wanted to achieve.  They had been ‘astounded’ to identify 205 women who had 49 children removed between them. Something had to be done to break the cycle. The group of women they met were very vulnerable – issues of violence in relationship, drug use and mental health challenges. Their vulnerability was compounded by the alien environment of the family court and the language used. They did not understand what was being demanded and they could not access the services the courts ordered them to use.

Pause requires the women they support to use Long Acting Reversible Contraception for 18 months – they appreciate that this is a controversial topic but point out that the adversarial atmosphere of the family courts gets in the way of supporting women and allowing them time and space to reflect and benefit from that support.

The wording of this tweet caused some concern from Surviving Safeguarding, which I shall discuss below.

Sally Ann Jenkins then spoke. She is Head of Children’s Services in Newport. She spoke of working in the area as a social worker in the 1980s and on her return meeting a mother she had worked with and one of her children had children in Newport’s care. This was a stark reminder of the cycle that needs to be broken.

Inspired by attending a seminar and hearing from Professor Broadhurst, Ms Jenkins became part of a local initiative to use existing funding and resources to help parents break the cycle. They work in close collaboration with Barbados. It was early days for the Newport project and it was important to manage expectations – but key message for the audience was that we are going to have to do this by better use of existing resources; unlikely to be any extra funding.

They ask parents – what do you need? What can we do to help you access our services? Work with Swansea on the ‘cost/benefit’ analysis of this approach shows clear

Dr Freda Gardner of Orchard House then spoke about some initiatives that she was piloting. She pointed out that it was often simply a waste of resources to carry on ‘assessing’ parents who had not been able to access the therapy/intervention proposed in previous proceedings by the family courts. She suggested instead a new model – use the funds to provide some therapeutic intervention.

Not all parents could or would respond to intervention. But for some, a short period of focused intervention could bring about real change – for example, helping parents understand the need to be emotionally atuned to their child. This can be taught.

Then a powerful written piece from Surviving Safeguarding. She supported the need for intervention and preventative work but was very concerned by the requirement of Pause that women agree to take LARC as condition of getting access to services. She felt strongly that for vulnerable women who had faced control all their lives, this was simply another aspect of control and she was concerned at the implications this raised around State control of women’s bodies.

She was also concerned about the language used by some professionals – there was a risk that it would continue the ‘othering’ of such mothers and treating them as less than human.

https://twitter.com/survivecourt/status/789141442438520832

 

Discussion with the audience

There was then discussion with the audience about the various issues raised by the speakers. There was exploration about the reasons why women had successive pregnancies – clearly an important driver for some would be the desperate wish to have a child they were allowed to keep.

Pause emphasised that the requirement for women to use LARC was not seen as some form of ‘control’ but to give women freedom from continuing adversarial care proceedings and to empower and educate them so that they could be able to parent in the future. However, judging from subsequent conversations on Twitter, this is clearly an issue which raises strong emotion, along with the need to use language with care in case it simply built up further barriers to engagement and communication.

There were some useful discussions about better support for parents who were often very hostile to and alienated by the court process. A suggestion was made that it would probably be cheaper in the long run to provide parents with their own social worker – the social worker for the child was unlikely to effectively advocate for and support parents.

The Designated Family Judge for Bristol, HHJ Wildblood QC raised three questions: Why has a Pause type model not been introduced in Bristol? Who will introduce it? And when? Bristol City Council confirmed that they were in the process of developing such a service and they would persist.

All recognised the importance of systemic work and recognising the networks around the parents.

It was a useful and though provoking evening and I am grateful for the energy and innovation of our DFJ to encourage these meetings and for use of the Bristol CJC.

McKenzie Friends Consultation – the Response of the CPR site

In February 2016 the Lord Chief Justice issued a consultation paper about the court’s approach to McKenzie Friends. Responses are required by May 29th. This post sets out the response from the CPR site and is written by Sarah Phillimore.

The Consultation sets out an explanation of what is a McKenzie Friend (MKF) and what previous guidance there has been from the courts about how to deal with them.  A MKF is someone who assists a litigant in person [LiP] in respect of legal proceedings. They are generally not qualified lawyers and got their name from the case of McKenzie v McKenzie [1970] 3 WLR 472. They are usually allowed to help LiPs but it is at the court’s discretion and the LiP will have to seek the court’s permission if involved in cases concerning children, which are not usually held in open court.

The strict definition of a MKF applies only to to someone providing a LiP with ‘reasonable assistance’ (moral support, taking notes etc) but it is also often used to describe individuals who are granted rights of audience on a case by case basis. Thus the terminology is potentially unclear.

Guidance was issued in 2004, 2008 and in 2010 about MKFs. There has since been a rise in  both the numbers of LiPs, in response to cuts to legal aid funding, and an increase in the number of MKF who were offering services for a fee – commonly known as ‘Professional McKenzie Friends’. Therefore there is a need for current guidance to be re-visited.

For further information about MKF and what other options are available to LiPs see this post ‘ What if I don’t have a Lawyer?

The Consultation is limited to three issues:

  • Codifying in the Civil and Family Procedure Rules the practice and procedure relating to MKF;
  • Issuing further guidance to maximise the positive benefits and minimise the negative effects MKF bring to the administration of justice;
  • Replacing the term ‘MKF’.

Question 1: Do you agree that the term ‘McKenzie Friend’ should be replaced by a term that is more readily understandable and properly reflects the role in question?

I accept that terms should be used that are clear and precise and the current terminology is not fit for that purpose.

Question 2: Do you agree that the term ‘court supporter’ should replace MKF. If not, what other term would you suggest?

The suggested replacement of ‘court supporter’ is neither clear nor precise.  It implies that the support is being given to the court, not the LiP. ‘Lay assistant’ or ‘litigant supporter’ is better as it puts the focus on what the MKF is supposed to be doing – assisting the LiP.

 

Primary Danger – MKF who have axes to grind or who just don’t understand what they are supposed to be doing.

Questions 3 – 8 appear to be directed at what I believe is the primary danger posed by ‘rogue’ MKF – namely, the lack of regulation and the corresponding lack of information/publicity about those who are dangerous.

Question 3: Do you agree that the present Practice Guidance should be replaced with rules of court?

Yes. And predominantly for the reason set out at 4.10(iii) of the Consultation. Rules of court would:

provide great clarity concerning the courts’ powers to refuse to permit individuals to act as MKF, to continue to act as such where they are providing poor quality assistance, or to bar them from acting as such in the future in order to provide better protection for LiPs and to better protect the due administration of justice.

This goes to the heart of concerns expressed about MKF by me via the CPR site. There is a small but significant group of people who purport to be MKF but who act in ways that are extremely damaging to the LiPs interest in family court proceedings. This is largely due to the belief expressed by these individuals that the family justice system is corrupt and, for example, operates according to ‘targets’ to steal children from loving families. [For further discussion of that issue, see our post on ‘Forced Adoption’]

These individuals not only cause distress and damage to the individuals unlucky enough to receive their assistance, cause public money and court time to be wasted, but also have a much wider and chilling impact on public confidence in the system due to their additional activities of campaigning, both on the street and via the internet.

For example, note the hearing in February 2016 reported in the Law Society Gazette that Sabine McNeill and Belinda McKenzie avoided incurring costs of £2,000 for their misconceived application for judicial review within care proceedings. Both are heavily involved in other family cases where their attempts to assist parties have had negative consequences for both the individual and the proceedings. See for example the judgement of Mrs Justice Pauffley in the case of re P and Q (Children: Care Proceedings: Fact Finding) [2015]  EWFC 26 (Fam), where the negative impact of the activities of McNeill and McKenzie in promoting false allegations of ritual santanic abuse, spread to the wider Hampstead community.

They are not the only ones whose activities cause me serious concern, but they are among the most prolific. There does not appear to be any easily accessible mechanism to allow for dissemination of information regarding the activities of such people. My concern is that a great many vulnerable people lack access to the necessary information to enable them to make safe choices.

[EDIT March 2019 – Sabine McNeill is now serving a term of 9 years imprisonment for her persistent harassment of the parents in Hampstead]

This is in my view the primary danger of the current system of unregulated and unmonitored provision of services by MKF. This danger could be addressed to some degree by the suggestion at para 4.10(v) to:

allow a clear, plain language guide to the law that sits outside the rules and which is specifically drafted to aid LiPs and MKF… it could provide a greater degree of clarity and place the proper extent of and role played by MKF in a more positive light…

Standard Notice form, Codes of Conduct and Plain language guides

Therefore I agree that a standard notice form (question 5) together with a Code of Conduct (see question 6) would be very useful, together with a plain language guide (see Question 7) setting out what MKF can and cannot do. This will help both MKF and LiPs to understand the nature and parameters of their roles and allow the court to have necessary information in advance about who they are dealing with.

I suspect that a non judicial body needs to take the lead in drafting such guidance (Question 8) as there is always a risk that guidance drafted by lawyers reflects the language of lawyers – which is not always helpful.

Question 4: different approaches in family/civil litigation

I have no particular view on this.

Question 9: Do you agree that codified rules should contain a prohibition on fee-recovery?

Provided the issues raised above, concerning monitoring of MKF and proper sanctions for those who need them, I do not have any particular concerns about MKF who charge for their services.

 

EDIT The Response is finally published on February 25th 2019.

Read the response here. 

It’s recommendations are short

  • The question of the reform of the courts’ approach to McKenzie Friends is one on which, as the consultation demonstrates, there are varying strongly held views. The growth in McKenzie Friends has coincided with the period following the enactment of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. The government has been reviewing the impact of the changes to the availability of legal aid. JEB conclude that the growth in reliance on McKenzie Friends, and particularly fee-charging ones, should be considered in the context of the impact of those changes. It is for the government to consider appropriate steps to be taken to enable LiPs to secure effective access to legal assistance, legal advice and, where necessary, representation.
  • The role of the judiciary is to apply the law concerning the provision of legal assistance, the light to conduct litigation and rights of audience according to the law established by the Legal Services Act 2007, the common law and precedent.
  • as are professional lawyers. The statutory scheme was fashioned to protect the consumers of legal services and the integrity of the legal system. JEB’s view is that all courts should apply the current law applicable to McKenzie Friends as established by Court of Appeal authority.
  • The Lord Chief Justice and JEB refer this consultation response and the annex summarising the views expressed in the consultation, to the Lord Chancellor.
  • Question 7 in the consultation paper concerns the provision of a Plain Language Guide for LiPs and McKenzie Friends. JEB support the view that a plain language guide could be produced by a non-judicial body for the assistance of LiPs. The judiciary continues to support the promotion of public legal education which would be aided by such a guide.
  • Finally, the Lord Chief Justice and JEB note that the current Practice Guidance on McKenzie Friends has not been revised or updated since it was issued in 2010. To ensure that it properly reflects the current case law, it should now be updated and re-issued.”

The Transparency Project comment here . They say, and I agree:

In February 2016, the Lord Chief Justice and the Judicial Executive Board issued a consultation entitled “Reforming the courts’ approach to McKenzie Friends”. Three years later, during which the problems causing and resulting from the proliferation of unregulated fee-charging McKenzie Friend services have steadily got worse, they have responded with a series of recommendations that basically involve blaming the government for the problem and suggesting that the government, not the judiciary, should sort it out.

The reason why this is feeble is that the whole idea of McKenzie Friends was basically invented by judges (in a case called McKenzie v McKenzie [1971] P 33; [1970] 3 WLR 472, in the Court of Appeal), the judiciary are responsible for what McKenzie Friends are allowed to do in court and have given Practice Guidance on the matter, yet now they are saying the problem is someone else’s to deal with.

A few days later i was sent a link by a parent to a site called Prevent Intervention Now! – protecting your family against social services. 

Under the heading ‘Help! we are under threat from social services’ ‘advice’ is given from the dodgy to the downright dangerous – see Rule 3 ‘never split from your partner’ . On its fees page it charges parents €1,200 for an appeal, going up to €2,000 for ‘full case management’. This clearly isn’t a charity.

Brian Rothery of Ectopia.com appears to be one of those behind this site.  Happily the Ectopita site is not available and appears to be ‘under construction’ . Rothery is a key player in the network of those who persuade parents to leave the jurisdiction if facing care proceedings, along with John Hemming and Ian Josephs. The damage that this can do to parents’ wish to care for their children and the dangers in which it places them are clear to see – i have commented about this further here. 

The JEB say they are

deeply concerned about the proliferation of McKenzie Friends who in effect provide professional services for reward when they are unqualified, unregulated, uninsured and not subject to the same professional obligations and duties, both to their clients and the courts…

Everyone should be worried. We are sitting back and letting parents be victims. Some MKF may have hearts in the right place but others are clearly unprincipled sharks who are out to make money off someone else’s trouble, and offering dreadful and damaging advice along the way. We should not be allowing this to happen.

 

 

The woeful state of our debate Part VI: 8 questions to ask family judges.

On November 24th I attended the 9th Annual Family Justice Council debate at the Strand Palace Hotel in London. You can read more about the debate and the work of the FJC at this post on the Transparency Project.

To my surprise, I found Ian Josephs himself in attendance; he took the floor to deliver a speech which had a strangely familiar ring – he seems to repeat the same things over and over again on various blogs. Also, on every chair was a piece of A4 paper which set out ‘Eight Questions to Ask Family Court Judges’ which I assume was also the work of Mr Josephs as it is set out on his website.

But I thought it was worth deconstructing here – to remedy a little the deep unease I felt at seeing Mr Josephs take to the floor in the way he did; without challenge or rebuttal (I did not think it would be appropriate to intervene, given my likely inability to remain composed and polite). Its all very well people saying he is a harmless buffoon – but people do listen to him and worse, they sometimes take his advice. And as his actions with regard to Marie Black show, he isn’t harmless, not by a long chalk.

We have to tread a fine line between heavy handed censorship and giving dangerous people a platform. I felt his presence and his contributions to the FJC debate stepped over that line into giving him a degree of respect and credibility I do not remotely think he deserves.

But judge for yourselves. Here are his ‘8 questions’ and my responses.

1. Great Britain is the only country in the world where substantial numbers of pregnant women seek asylum in other countries to have their babies SAFE from UK social services and forced adoption.  Yes British mothers are fleeing the country in ever increasing numbers to avoid the adoption of their unborn babies. Surely this shows that something is very badly wrong?

The immediate problem with this is that it is strong on rhetoric, weak on substance. There is a network of people helping ‘mums on the run’ ; Josephs himself claims to have helped about 200 families over an undisclosed period of time while Brian Rothery alleged in 2014 that 1 family arrived in Ireland ‘every week’.

But the problem is, as Josephs has enthusiastically confirmed on this blog, he doesn’t carry out any risk assessments or keep any records. So where is he getting the information to support this very clear assertion that ‘substantial’ numbers of women are fleeing and that these numbers are ‘ever increasing’ ?

Nor is it true that ‘Great Britain’ is the ‘only’ country ‘in the world’ where pregnant women leave the country to avoid the authorities. I can’t comment on his use of the word ‘substantial’ as he doesn’t even attempt to define it. For example, the Nordic Committee on Human Rights (whose President Ruby Harold Claesson appears to associate closely with John Hemming, Ian Josephs and Sabine McNeill) claimed in 2012 that 

Since the beginning of the 1980’s, a great number of families have fled from Sweden in order to protect their children from being taken into care and placed in foster homes.

Yes, it does show something is very badly wrong if pregnant and desperate women are choosing to leave their  homes, their families and their support networks with the assistance of cash from Josephs. But what is wrong is that vulnerable people are being so poorly advised; it is notable that Josephs never appears to talk about what happens when it goes wrong – how Ireland, for example, certainly does not see itself as offering a ‘safe haven’ to those escaping a brutal and repressive regime and will co-operate with the UK authorities to return children. 

2. Adoption without consent is a last resort when nothing else will do say the legal guidelines but this cannot be true, since many other countries such as France manage to find other ‘resorts’ and thus never need to use this so called last resort, so why cannot the UK adopt the same remedies as the French for example?

It is a reasonable point that severing the legal ties between child and parent is something that England and Wales seem keener on doing than do other European countries – see paragraph 72 of this report for the Council of Europe in March 2015. But what are these other ‘remedies’ used by the French? It seems that other countries do not keep the same kind of data that we do about the number of children who are not living with their parents. But certainly every European country permits adoption; abusive parents are a universal phenomenon. It seems that other European countries make more use of long term foster care than we do – but this doesn’t necessarily mean that children remain in contact with their parents or that the parents can enjoy any meaningful exercise of their parental responsibilities.

Ian Josephs doesn’t seem to know what other ‘remedies’ or ‘resorts’ other countries use; to be fair to him, that isn’t widely circulated knowledge. Hopefully comparative lawyers such as Dr Claire Fenton-Glynn can undertake further research so we can better understand what other countries do and why they do it.  Ironically, it seems that Ireland may reform its historically restrictive adoption laws in order to increase the numbers of children adopted from foster care.

3. The President of the family courts in re J (a Child) said that since the abolition of capital punishment the most drastic decision any judge could make was to take its child from its parents. If a sane mother with no criminal record has her new born baby removed for ‘risk of emotional abuse’ she is punished without her breaking any laws. Surely punishment without crime is as illogical as it is wrong?

The problem with this is that Ian Josephs continually frames care proceedings and the removal of children as ‘punishing’ parents, when the aim of such proceedings is to protect children. Thus this question is inapt. I understand and accept that to many parents the loss of their children is a devastating emotional blow, but that doesn’t make it a ‘punishment’ inflicted by the state.  That is why new born babies can lawfully be removed. It is not to ‘punish’ the mother but to protect that baby. The law recognises that this is an exceptionally serious course of action and is only lawful if there is a serious risk to the child based on established history, such as drug abuse or persistent cruelty/neglect by the parents of their elder children.

‘Punishment without crime’ is one of his favourite catchphrases but its meaningless in this debate.

4. Many babies and young children are taken at birth for eventual adoption from mothers diagnosed with ‘borderline personalities’ and similar mental failings by court appointed experts. Unlike defendants in criminal courts parents in family courts are not allowed to get a second opinion from a private medical source to call as their witness without permission from the judge. Surely that is a violation of Article 6 (Human Rights Act) giving persons appearing in court the right to call witnesses in determination of their civil rights?

I don’t know what is meant by ‘many’ babies and young children taken because their mother has borderline personality disorder – which is a serious mental health issue. That isn’t my experience in practice. I don’t know what information or statistics he has to allow him to state this.

What does he mean by ‘court appointed experts’ ? Yes, the court must permit the instruction of the expert but the expert must be instructed and agreed by ALL the parties, including the parents. Reference to Article 6 of the ‘Human Rights Act’ is telling – he means Article 6 of the ECHR. Does he actually understand what he is referring to?

If not being allowed a second expert is indeed a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR then it is odd that there has been no successful challenge to section 13 of the Children And Families Act 2014 which makes it very clear that the courts will now be reluctant to permit even one expert, let alone two.

5. Research has shown that Open Adoptions have better results for children then closed adoptions used in the UK that break all contact with birth families. If parents were promised at least one annual contact by court order (birthdays or Xmas perhaps?) thus avoiding the heartbreak of no contact at all (letter box being remote and seldom continued) many parents would not go through the agony of contested hearings so would not this be a good thing?

I agree that we need more research and more open minded thinking about adoption and contact – which I have discussed previously here. I don’t know what research he is talking about. Certainly continued contact with birth families who cannot support the adoptive placement or actively attempt to undermine it, is not a positive experience for anyone. Sadly, the reason why so many adoptive parents and social workers are wary of continued direct contact with birth families may well stem from the kind of advice Ian Josephs gives to birth parents, see for example the first of his ‘Golden Rules’ :

IGNORE SOCIAL WORKERS!! They have NO authority .Don’t talk to them ,never go to their meetings (You will be outnumbered by at least five or six to one and bullied accordingly),never obey them,never never believe what they say,never sign any documents they give you, never allow them in your house(but if they then call the police let the police in but not the social workers),never let them assess you, or send you to the psychobabble charlatans !They are paid to diagnose nearly every parent who is sent to them with non existent illnesses such as borderline personality disorders or narcissistic traits = you don’t like or admire social workers !Many of them really are “the scum of the earth!”and deserve to be locked up for perjury and corruption!

And is it a serious suggestion, that parents will be ‘happy’ with the promise of one direct contact a year and will not then contest the care proceedings? This is an extremely odd belief for Mr Josephs to hold, given that he appears to dedicate most of his website into urging parents to simply refuse to co-operate in any way at all with social workers. His mindset is that removal of children is not justified unless the parents have committed a criminal offence so why should any parent who is not convicted in a criminal court give up their right to care for their child in exchange for one direct contact a year? This suggestion makes no sense.

6. Many babies are taken at birth for ‘risk of emotional abuse’. Something unique in Europe and impossible for parents to defend against court experts who are usually judged more likely on probabilities to be correct than a distraught mother. When adoption follows due to risks that may never happen (from an ex partner who was violent for example) surely these at least are cases where forced adoptions should simply not be allowed?

I don’t know how many babies are taken for ‘risk of emotional abuse’. In my experience at least this is rare. Cases where new borns are removed usually involve serious and long standing issues around drugs, violence and/or mental health difficulties, often the mother has had other children removed who did actually suffer harm.  Again, the reference to ‘court experts’ – there is no such thing.

I note also the trivialising of the violent ex – a repeated refrain in the comments of Mr Josephs. He has little understanding or patience with any suggestion that a women who choses a violent partner may do so out of her own problems with low self esteem or co-dependency and may go on to chose other violent men in the future ,unless she can get some help to break the cycle (for example via the Freedom Programme). Violent men are a massive risk to children.

One of the most unpleasant and uncomfortable parts of the FJC debate for me was when Ian Josephs got a big laugh from the room when he suggested that no Italians would have their children under the UK’s approach to domestic violence. This was offensive and unreal. The problem with violent partners is not simply a bit of excitable shouting as per some offensive Italian racial stereotype. The impact of exposing children to violence is real and serious and Ian Josephs continually shows that he just doesn’t understand.

7. Article 10 (Human Rights Act) reinforces our democratic right to free speech. Surely it is a gross violation to gag mothers whose children have been taken (for possible adoption) by preventing them under threat of jail from identifying themselves and their children when protesting to the media. Similarly is it not also a violation of Article 10 to gag both children in care and parents during contact sessions preventing them from reporting abuse or injuries received in care, discussing their cases, whispering or discussing adoptions under threat that contact will be immediately stopped if parents or children break these rules?

Again, it is NOT the Human Rights Act he means, but Article 10 of the ECHR. I agree he has a point about our stringent rules on confidentiality in children proceedings – I think they are too strict and they should be relaxed; a proposition with which the President of the Family Division agrees. We do need to be able to talk about important issues, such as the State’s intervention in our family lives.

But the rest of this is odd. It underscores that Ian Josephs – in common with so many of the other campaigners in this field – don’t really see children as anything other than adjuncts of their parents. It is the parents’ feelings that matter. The children are there to mop up those feelings. It should be immediately obvious why it is not desirable in a contact session to start conversations about the proceedings or the fact that the children might be adopted. Younger children are likely to be simply distressed and confused by such conversations. Contact should be about enjoying the time with one another, not a platform for a parent to make their case to their children.

8. In many cases parents who have committed no crimes are forbidden by the family courts to contact their own children directly or even indirectly by email etc. Surely that must be a flagrant violation of Article 10 allowing free association when parents as a consequence jailed for breaching the order by sending a birthday card or waving at their own children in the street?

The reason why a parent would be forbidden to so contact their children is almost always because when the parent has been allowed direct contact they have abused that in very serious ways. For example, Vicky Haigh who attempted to brainwash her daughter into believing that she had been sexually abused by her own father. It is a useful indicator of Mr Josephs’ mind set that he cannot accept that Vicky Haigh is anything other than a victim of the Evil Secret Family courts. Again, I suspect this flows from his philosophy that children are important only in so far as they reflect their parents’ desires and emotions.

 

End of Year Review 2014

How did we do? What else can we do?

We think our first nine months have shown a clear demand for this site – and worryingly that some of the most popular searches and posts have been do to with section 20 agreements, which suggests that these are both widespread and not well understood or explained.

We hope to expand the activities of the site next year – The Transparency Project will be hosting a multi-disciplinary conference on June 1st, asking if the child protection system is fit for purpose. CPR will also be going to the 2nd Joint Nordic Conference in Helskini in June where Sarah Phillimore will deliver a paper entitled ‘The courage to communicate and the necessary building of relationships between social workers and parents.’

Please let us know what we could be doing better/differently/more or less.

Contact us at ch*********************@***il.com or via Twitter @C_P_Resource.

This site would not have been possible without the very generous contributions of their time and expertise from a great many people in many different fields. As ever, enormous thanks and gratitude is due to them all.

Overview 1st March – 22 December 2014

  • Sessions                                           35,119
  • Users                                                25,742
  • Pageviews                                        60,763
  • Pages / Session                               1.73
  • Avg. Session Duration                    00:02:25
  • Bounce Rate                                    75.07%
  • % New Sessions                              72.68%
  • New Visitor/Returning Visitor       27.3%/72.7%

 

Where did our audience come from?

We had visitors from all over the world, but the vast majority from the UK, as reflects the site’s content.

  • United Kingdom 31,158 (89%)
  • United States 1,418 (4%)
  • Australia 371 (1%)
  • Ireland 232 (0.66%)
  • Canada 217 (0.62%)
  • Brazil 193 (0.55%)
  • Netherlands 108 (0.31%)
  • Germany 78 (0.22%)
  • Finland 74 (0.21%)
  • France 74 (0.21%)

Where in the UK?

  • London 8,579 (24%)
  • Bristol 1,551(4.%)
  • Manchester 843 (2.%)
  • (not set) 796 (2.%)
  • Birmingham 712 (2.%)
  • Newcastle upon Tyne 683 (2%)
  • Liverpool 582 (2%)
  • Leeds 546 (1%)
  • Cardiff 504   (1%)
  • Sheffield 417 (1%)

How did people find us?

71% of traffic came from internet searches. Other sites have linked to us.

  • mumsnet.com 1,943 (33%)
  • Facebook 1,198 (20%)
  • Twitter 1,066 (18.%)
  • suesspiciousminds.com 290 (5%)
  • netmums.com 213 (4%)
  • familylawweek.co.uk 81 (1%)

 

What did they want to read about?

Top Ten internet searches

Annoyingly easily the most popular term was ‘not provided’ at 20,598 being 83% of the total. Of the other keywords, these were most often used:

  • interim care order 175 (0.71%)
  • section 20 care order 84 (0.34%)
  • section 20 child protection 61 (0.25%)
  • child protection resource 38 (0.15%)
  • section 20 agreement 32 (1%)
  • threshold criteria care proceedings 32 (0.13%)
  • forced adoption 29 (0.12%)
  • interim care orders 26 (0.10%)

What posts were the most popular?

The most popular was not set at 8,817 views (15%).

  • category/the-law/key-legal-principles/section-20-agreements/ 4,087 (7%)
  • tag/interim-care-orders-2/ 2,879 (5%)
  • forced-adoption/ 2,459 (4%)
  • category/the-law/key-legal-principles/threshold-criteria/ 2,311 (4%)
  • If I report mental health issues / 2,093 (3%)
  • category/the-law/key-legal-principles/interim-care-orders/ 1,627 (3%)
  • category/the-law/key-legal-principles/significant-harm-key-legal-principles/ 1,591 (3%)
  • common-concerns-we-hear-from-parents/ 1,521 (3%)
  • category/placement-and-adoption-orders/ 1,057 (2%)

Family Law Class at the Bristol Civil Justice Centre

 

 

The Bristol Civil Justice Centre is going to be trying different ways to help people involved in family law cases who can’t get access to legal representation or who want to understand more about what is going on .

One part of this initiative is the proposal for ‘Family Law Classes’  The first will be held on 4 December 2014 from 10:30 -12 noon.

HHJ Wildblood QC, some lawyers and some Court staff will hold a meeting for members of the public at which they will explain the law and procedure

The class will take place in Court 2, 2nd floor,

Bristol Civil and Family Justice Centre, 2 Redcliff Street, Bristol, BS1 6GR.

Please e-mail re************@***********ov.uk if you would like to attend the class.

 

Disclaimer

Please note that whilst we can give an overview of family law and explain court processes and forms, we cannot give legal advice on individual cases.

So you want to be a Social Worker?

An interesting perspective on the job of social worker can be found in Hilary Searing’s blog The Barefoot Social Worker, written from a radical and libertarian perspective.

She comments in her post So You Want to be a Social Worker?

Politicians, policy-makers and many middle class professionals are confused about the social work role. They seem ambivalent about the social worker’s use of authority and presume that all social work is simply ‘social care’, which is misleading. They choose to depict social work as a helping profession and as the answer to many social problems – including those that are an inherent part of the socio-economic system and require political action. Working class people, on the other hand, know that the provision of social services is closely linked with systems for monitoring, surveillance and control and are in no doubt about the social control function of social work.

…

Social work is not an easy job but there are many rewards for those who never lose touch with what is important – to understand and respect the life experience of clients and never forget the social and political context in which their problems arise. At the heart of social work is the task of alleviating the stress of clients living in poverty and in impoverished communities, where divisions arising out of class, ethnicity and religion are sometimes entrenched. Poverty and inequality are often at the root of many social problems and social work must recognise the part that class plays in perpetuating these problems.

She also poses the question – what has gone wrong with Child Protection?

Read the post here

She concludes:

My argument is that there needs to be a clearer focus on the acute end of the spectrum of children’s services. There is plenty of positive work going on but it does not get the support it deserves. The work is both challenging and rewarding and the existence of stable and supportive teams is crucial to the development of good practice. We desperately need strong, imaginative and constructive social work if Children’s Services are to improve their reliability in making the best possible decisions about seemingly intractable situations.