Author Archives: Sarah Phillimore

Response to Commentators #1

Our aims as a site

We want not only to provide useful and credible information to ALL those involved in the child protection system, but also to be part of the debate about what we can do to make our child protection system the best it can be.

That means we don’t want anyone to feel shut out of the debate or that we will censor or ignore their contributions.

However, we worry that for far too long, constructive debate has become hostage to a number of people who put forward extreme and unsupported allegations about the ‘evil’ and ‘corruption’ of an entire system.

We are going to try to strike a balance between welcoming debate and views that may not chime with our own and not becoming overwhelmed or overrun by hyperbolic conspiracy theorists.

It may take a while to see if we have that balance right. But in the spirit of welcoming debate we here provide a response to a number of points raised by commentator ‘Winston Smith’.

We are having discussions at the moment about the best way to deal with comments here that we feel are not helping: we agree with this very helpful article from Urban 75 about the kind of commentators we don’t want to encourage.

We think we will probably delete comments to various posts which we think are obvious trolling or attempts to push unsupported theories.

However, we will continue to collect them in Mythbusting and try to answer them. In that way, we can’t be accused or ignoring or censoring, but equally our attempts to debate and inform won’t be derailed by malice, ignorance or wild accusations made without any evidence in support.

This response is provided by Sarah Phillimore, a family barrister since 1999. If she has got anything wrong or there is anything you would like to add, please let us know.

I am going to respond to some of the recent comments of a Mr Winston Smith. Mr. Smith asserts:

Adoption targets

Unfortunately a major scandal erupted in 2008 when it was finally proved that Central Government were paying generous grants to each LA. to increase the numbers of children Forced Adopted each year. In many LA’s bonuses were also being paid to SW’s to secure Forced Adoptions.
I have the printout showing the sums paid, including the £1,025,000 paid to “Blogshire Council” , my own, and with which Elected Members still deny was happening and go white when I hold it under their noses.

They were known as Public Service Agreements and if you failed to meet your target by the end of the year you were financially penalised, not only on this, but across the board on the other 11 PSA’s.
So you had every incentive to prioritise the adoption of babies.

This appears to be the familiar territory of ‘adoption targets’ where the wish of successive governments to increase the number of children adopted from the care system led to targets and performance incentives to encourage LA to find permanent homes for children who may have spent many years in the care system.

This is of course very different from a system which sets ‘targets’ for the removal of babies because they are easier to adopt.

We don’t deny that most adopters would prefer to adopt a child who is as young as possible – hopefully the younger a child the less trauma he has already suffered and the more easily he  will become part of the adopter’s family.

But does this translate into LA taking babies for no good reason, because babies will be more easily adopted and this in turn will enable them to meet their ‘adoption targets’ ?

I don’t agree.  We have already dealt with this issue in our Mythbusters section but I think I should repeat the salient points here

  • Even though local authorities have targets to match children in their care with adoptive parents faster than before, in England the average age at adoption was three years and eight months at 31 March 2013.  Just 2% of children adopted in England in the year ending 31 March 2013 were under one year old
  • Only 6% of Looked After Children in England were under one year old at 31 March 2013.
  • It usually takes at least three months for adoptive parents to be matched with a child after they have been approved to be adopters (see column A12 in the Underlying Data spread sheet)

Although the amounts of money paid to local authorities who meet their targets for placing children in their care and for assessing adoptive parents can be large (see this official Written Answer from 3 September 2007 towards the bottom of this page) they do not exceed the cost of the proceedings.  For example, the largest payments in this table were made to Kent County Council, who received £2,156,583 over three years.  Information on the numbers of children placed for adoption by Kent County Council in 2005-2007 is not readily available, but more recent information suggests that the average number is 205 children per year (see the adoption scorecard for 2008-11 here).  Dividing £2,156,586 by 205 would give an average payment of £10,519.93 per child placed for adoption.  Even without details for the costs of all social workers involved in a case, plus legal representatives at court – usually for both the local authority and the family involved – plus court time, plus foster carers, it is clear that any money paid in the form of a bonus does not come close to covering the cost of removing a child from their family and placing them for adoption.

 

 

Since then subsidies have returned on a more indirect basis.

There has been TWO MSBP/FII/AIB Relaunches since, on a very similar basis to your site.

This has always been the focus of all of this.

Sadly I cannot respond to this as I don’t understand what it means, so I will need Mr. Smith to clarify.

 

 

Since the mothers are accused of “Munching” the kids and won’t “confess” they if under 5 are likely to end up being Forced Adopted as they cannot be returned home.

We agree that if a child is subject to care proceedings and is aged 5 or under, then adoption is much more likely to be considered as part of the final care plan than if the child was older. Simply, adoptions are less likely to succeed the older a child gets and once a child is over 7 it is unlikely that adoption will be a realistic option.

However, here Mr Smith appears to ignore all the other options that are routinely before the court in care proceedings such as Residence Orders or Special Guardian Orders to family members. The LA is under a statutory obligation to undertake kinship assessment.

Presumably Mr Smith must have access to some clear statistics to be able to assert confidently that those under 5 are ‘likely’ to be subject to ‘forced adoption’ and we would be grateful if he could share this information with us so we can consider it.

 

Since peoples’ “professional” theories are involved they have just gone on behaving in the same way and continued to try and prove their theories.

Ruralsocialworker, the last thing we need is yet another campaign which denies everything, of which there have been a number over the years.

I think this comment shows Mr. Smith has misunderstood the aims of this resource. We do not say and have never said that the system is perfect and that no mistakes are ever made. What we do say is that we do not accept that professionals routinely lie and collude to ensure that children are removed from loving homes for the purposes of meeting adoption targets.

We are keen to discuss new and better ways of operating, the only rule which we insist upon is that serious assertions require serious evidence.

If Mr. Smith truly believes we wish to be ‘another campaign which denies everything’ then he needs to have another look at the site and what we are trying to do. Hopefully then he will accept this criticism is untrue and unfair.

 

Meanwhile anew campaign has been created by the adoption agencies and members of the government ,also appointing Martin Nairey as Adoption ,and include bringing in the American “Fost-Adopt” system and reducing times to6 months. So we are back where we started.

Mr. Smith appears to be referring here to attempts to speed up adoption times for children in care and to make it less traumatic for children by encouraging their foster carers to adopt them. I think both are very good ideas. I do not see how this fits into an allegation that the State steals children for adoption. Rather they are examples of how the State is attempting, quite rightly, to improve outcomes for children already in the care system.

 

Children are taken into Care for silly reasons and in breach of procedures. Once there they will not be returned and dubious or provably inaccurate evidence concocted as the LA does not wish to be proved wrong.

I cannot and do not deny that mistakes are made and mistakes in this field can have very serious consequences. But none of us here, from a variety of perspectives within the system, accept such mistakes are routine or are made deliberately and maliciously in furtherance of some State plot to steal babies.

It is emphatically NOT my experience that children are taken into care for ‘silly reasons’. Again, assuming Mr. Smith has some statistical information to back up this assertion, we would like to see it. As far as we know, serious reasons are needed before a child can be taken away from his home – which is entirely as it should be.

I refer Mr. Smith to the legal section of our site and in particular our discussions of what is meant by ‘significant harm’. I  can find nothing ‘silly’ there.

I reject the assertion that evidence is routinely ‘concocted’ and again would request that Mr. Smith provide his evidence for this extremely serious assertion so that we can consider it.

In 15 years I have never come across deliberate concoction of evidence. Yes, I have seen sloppy evidence gathering and reporting, misunderstandings that became hardened into believed ‘facts’ and people making assumptions where they shouldn’t. It is my job to challenge that.

But deliberate falsification of evidence? Never. So either I am a stooge of the system and too stupid to notice when this is happening under my nose OR it doesn’t actually happen very often or at all.

 

The greatest area of corruption is the Expert Witness, in view of the huge sums being paid, and they repeatedly give diagnoses NHS or private clinic experts say do not exist.

Mr. Smith seems unaware of recent changes to public funding of expert witnesses. The sums paid on legal aid rates are very far from ‘huge’ and in fact the prevailing concern is now that we will lose the services of valuable expert witnesses as they won’t agree to be instructed on the new low rates.

I would urge Mr. Smith to read what the Legal Aid Agency are now saying about the remuneration of experts.

I don’t understand what he means by ‘repeatedly give diagnosis NHS or private clinic experts say do not exist’ and again I think that such a serious allegation requires some serious proof.

 

There is an almost 100% “Guilty” verdict in the Family Court

I accept that if care proceedings are brought, the most likely outcome is that a court will make a care or supervision order. Two conclusions can be reached from this:

  • Care proceedings are a farce and the conclusion is a rubber stamp; OR
  • Care proceedings are not bought lightly given the enormous expense and time they involve for cash strapped LA and only the most serous cases will go to court.

I support the latter conclusion.  Mainly because this fits exactly with my own experience over many years.  In fact, when I am critical of the way a LA has conducted a case, I can think of only a handful of cases where I felt they acted too quickly; the majority of my complaints are that they waited far too long before taking decisive action.

 

Basically we are into the same scenario as Cleveland, Satanic Abuse, Constructive Memory, MSBP, those cosmic megascandals all those years ago, where groups of true believers continued to doggedly defend them, even though disproved.

Here Mr. Smith refers to a number of ‘megascandals’ and appears to lump our site in with those ‘true believers’ who continue to doggedly defend the indefensible, even in the face of evidence.

I am  not quite sure what he means here and again, suspect he has misjudged or misunderstood the aims of this site.

I think this artice from Slate is interesting about the hysteria which surrounded the issue of child satanic abuse. It is a good example of the danger of proceeding to reach conclusions about extremely serious matters when your evidence is weak or even non existent.

 

However, regarding KinCarers , this statutary duty is regularly ignored by LA’s.

Admittedly grandparents maybe too old but other relatives are ignored.

Regularly aunties or sisters are advised to file for Residence Orders or SGO’s themselves. Uproar round at LAQ legal offices.

LA will go for Forced Adoption and only after a bitter battle with numerous court hearings agree to an SGO.

This isn’t my experience. Every case I do, when a family member puts themselves forward they are assessed – they have to be. It is the law. If the LA assessment is negative, the family member can come to court and argue their case or even seek permission for a further assessment. I was involved in a very recent case where the court agreed the maternal grandparents hadn’t been properly assessed and ordered a further report from an Independent Social Worker.

 

This includes busting the Placement Order in the CoA on Appeal.

I would like to respond to this but I don’t understand Mr Smith’s point.

 

These are usually either with the foster carer or a remote relative with either no contact or once every six months.

Again, I am going to need some statistics to back this up as it is very far from my own experience of the orders courts will make and the contact parents are likely to have.

 

LA’s and FD judges will move heaven and earth to prevent any child’s witness statements, prevent the Wishes and Feelings Pact being done, and prevent them being called as witnesses in violation of Practice Direction on Child Witnesses Dec 2010.

The children are kept isolated to prevent their view a being known and the are routinely obstructed from instructing their own solicitors if Gillick Competent.

Again, evidence please. This isn’t my experience. Courts are rightly worried about the impact of children becoming directly involved in court proceedings, particularly if it involves them giving evidence about the abuse they have suffered but to say ‘heaven and earth’ is moved to prevent them is nonsense.

I invite Mr. Smith to read the case of Re W in 2010 about the court’s approach to children giving evidence, which may assist his understanding.

What does ‘section 20’ mean? And when should it be used?

The law is perfectly clear but perhaps requires re-emphasis. Whatever the impression a casual reader might gain from reading some newspaper reports, no local authority and no social worker has any power to remove a child from its parent or, without the agreement of the parent, to take a child into care, unless they have first obtained an order from a family court authorising that step …

NB We now have the benefit of a March 2021 ‘Best Practice Guide’ from the Public Law Working Group.

Basically,  section 20 of the Children Act 1989  is about the LA’s duty to provide a child with somewhere to live because the child doesn’t currently have a home, or a safe home:

  • there isn’t anyone who has parental responsibility for him (for e.g. an asylum seeking child who has come to the UK on his own);
  • the child has been lost or abandoned;
  • the person who has been caring for the child can’t provide him with a suitable home, whatever the reason for this and regardless of whether this is short term or long term problem.

It is a very important section with regard to care proceedings, because it often happens that a local authority (LA) will ask parents to sign a ‘section 20 agreement’. This means the parents are agreeing to let their children live somewhere else, usually in LA foster care, while the LA carries out more investigations or the parents get some time to sort themselves out (‘respite care’).

The child is therefore out of the parents’  care without the need for the LA to go to court and get the Judge to make a care order. Because the court is not involved to oversee this, it’s very important that section 20 agreements are used properly and don’t become a way of letting the case drift on without proper consideration or getting a care order ‘by the back door’.

I discuss these issues further below:

  • What is the impact of section 20
  • What have the courts said about the requirements of section 20
  • When it goes wrong
  • What you can do if its going wrong

On 24th February 2016 the Transparency Project published Guidance for parents and professionals about the use of section 20, which you can download here.

There has been some controversy about ‘foster to adopt’ placements where section 20 is used to put a child in such a placement before the matter gets to court. You can read more about this, and the report of the Family Rights Group here. 

Impact of section 20: the BIG difference between section 20 and a care order – the LA does NOT have parental responsibility

The difficulties around section 20 were summed up by Lady Hale in para 34 of the Supreme Court judgment Williams & Anor v London Borough of Hackney [2018] UKSC 37 (18 July 2018)

iThese cases illustrate a number of problems with the use of section 20: separation of a baby from the mother at or shortly after birth without police protection or a court order, where she has not delegated the exercise of her parental responsibility to the local authority or been given in circumstances where it is questionable whether the delegation was truly voluntary; retention of a child in local authority accommodation after one or both parents have indicated a desire to care for the child or even formally asked for his return; and a lack of action where the perception is that the parents do not object to the accommodation, even though this means that no constructive planning for the child’s future takes place. They also illustrate the dilemma posed to the local authority: something has to be done to look after the child but there are serious doubts about whether the parent can validly delegate the exercise of her responsibility. Equally, they illustrate the dangers if the local authority proceed without such delegation or obtain it in circumstances where the parents feel that they have little choice. There are none of the safeguards and protections for both the child and the parents which attend the compulsory procedures under the Act. Yet, rushing unnecessarily into compulsory procedures when there is still scope for a partnership approach may escalate matters in a way which makes reuniting the family more rather than less difficult.

  • Section 20 accommodation is very different to your child being removed from your care against your will under a care order. The LA do NOT share parental responsibility for your child just because you have agreed that your child should be in foster care under a section 20 agreement.
  • Under section 20(8) any person who has parental responsibility can remove the child from LA accommodation at any time unless there are objections to this by someone who has a child arrangements order to say the child lives with him/her (what used to be called a ‘residence order’), a special guardianship order or has care of the child by a special order of the High Court.
  • Section 20(4) says that the LA may provide accommodation for any child in their area, even if the child has a parent who is able to provide accommodation, if the LA thinks that they need to do this to keep the child safe.
  • Section 20(7) provides that the LA cannot provide accommodation for a child if there is someone who has parental responsibility for the child and objects to the LA providing the accommodation.

So if the parents won’t agree to section 20 accommodation, their child can only be removed by court order or by the intervention of the police using their special powers.

Problems have arisen when parents feel they have been ‘rushed’ or even bullied into making a decision to agree to let their children be accommodated under section 20. Sometimes, LAs get consent from only one parent but the other objects. A LA should always try to get the consent of everyone who has parental responsibility.

What do the courts say?

Evolving case law and the case of Williams v Hackney

A very important case when considering how section 20 should work is the case of Coventry City Council v C, B, CA and CH [2012]. This should be read together with the case of Williams and Another v London Borough of Hackney [2015]. See also the case of Medway Council v M and T [2015] which appears to be the highest amount of compensation paid for unlawful use of section 20 – £20K to both mother AND child.

In the Coventry case, Mr Justice Hedley gave guidance about what should happen if a LA want to remove a baby immediately or soon after birth – it can be appropriate to use section 20 in these circumstances but obviously it is vital to make sure the parents understand what is being proposed and give real consent.

The Hackney case, involved parents of 9 children who were taken into foster care in 2007 after the police intervened saying the home conditions were not suitable for the children to live in. The children spent about 2 months in foster care.

The parents took legal action against the local authority, saying it had acted unlawfully by taking the children into care under section 20 of the Children Act as they had not understood what was going on. The court found that they had not been informed of their right to object to the children’s continued accommodation under section 20(7) or of their right to remove the children at any time under section 20(8) and that their consent was not informed or fairly obtained (para 65).

Therefore Hackeny was found in breach of its statutory duty and the parents were awarded the £10,000 each and Hackney was ordered to pay 75% of their costs.

Hackney appealed and this decision was overturned on appeal in December 2016.

The Court of Appeal agreed with Hackney and pointed out that the word ‘consent’ does not appear in section 20  – the relevant word is ‘objects’. At the time the children were accommodated pursuant to section 20, the parents were subject to bail conditions that prevented them from providing suitable accommodation for their children. Their consent was not required in these circumstances. There was no breach of the HRA and damages should not have been awarded.

However the Court of Appeal stated that guidance from other cases about issues of ‘consent’ was still relevant:

“The guidance given in the family court … identifies clear, co-operative and sensible ways in which a voluntary arrangement can be made between a parent and a local authority when a child may need to be accommodated; it is, in short, good practice guidance and a description of the process that the family court expects to be followed. For reasons of good administration, the practice guidance should continue to be followed … but a failure to follow it does not, of itself, give rise to an actionable wrong, or found a claim for judicial review.”

The case then went to the Supreme Court, the main ground of appeal being was there or was there not a lawful basis for the children’s accommodation under section 20 of the 1989 Act once the 72 hours of police protection under section 46 had expired? Judgment was handed down on 18th July 2018 in Williams & Anor v London Borough of Hackney [2018] UKSC 37 (18 July 2018), dismissing the appeal.

The UKSC commented that it was potentially confusing to talk about ‘consent’ to section 20 and it was better to refer to the process as the parent agreeing to delegate their PR to the LA for a period of time. However, it remained important that the parents genuinely understood what was going on so previous ‘good practice’ should be adhered to.

Lady Hale considered at paras 57 and 58

Whether the local authority had a lawful basis to continue to accommodate the children all depends, therefore, on whether the parents’ actions after the expiry of the police protection order amounted to an unequivocal request for the children to be returned. The judge did not see the bail conditions as an insuperable impediment to their making such a request (para 65.b). There could have been a number of solutions, including the parents or the Council persuading the police to vary bail to allow alternative accommodation with family and friends, if there were any to help, or with the parents themselves. Breaking police bail conditions is not a criminal offence and there was no evidence of what would have happened if the children had returned home. The bail conditions did not operate to give the Council any greater powers than they had under the 1989 Act. The ostensible reason for the conditions was not a good reason for keeping all eight of the children – particularly the baby – apart from their parents. It is not surprising that they were lifted soon after contact from a senior Council officer, even though there was still the prospect of criminal proceedings against the parents.

But it is difficult to know how to construe the events of 9 July, when the parents went to the Council’s offices and, according to them, asked for the return of their children. The judge accepted the social worker’s denial that she had told them that the children would never be returned. But he found it probable that they were told that the document they had signed authorised the children to be kept, because that is what she believed at the time. However, he went on to say that “it is difficult to determine whether, and if so on what terms, the claimants asked for their children to be returned”. Given his earlier finding about the events of 6 July, he made no finding about it (para 68). It is therefore difficult for us to construe these events, either as a clear objection to the children’s accommodation under section 20(7) or as an unequivocal request for their immediate return under section 20(8). There would be little point in our sending the case back to the judge for him to make findings on this matter. It is fairly clear that, on that date, he would have regarded the continued interference in the family’s life as a proportionate means of protecting the children from harm. In those circumstances, even if the events of 9 July had removed the lawful basis for the local authority’s actions for a matter of days, which must be doubtful, no damages would be payable.

The Supreme Court therefore decided that as the parents had not objected or unequivocally requested the children’s immediate return, there was a lawful basis for the children’s continued accommodation under section 20.

Summary of legal principles from case law.

Considering the evolving case law, it appears that the ‘good practice’ guidance identified in earlier cases remains relevant and LA would be wise to ensure that it is complied with. A useful precis is found at the very final paragraph of Lady Hale’s judgment:

In sum, there are circumstances in which a real and voluntary delegation of the exercise of parental responsibility is required for a local authority to accommodate a child under section 20, albeit not in every case (see para 40 above). Parents with parental responsibility always have a qualified right to object and an unqualified right to remove their children at will (subject to any court orders about where the child is to live). Section 20 gives local authorities no compulsory powers over parents or their children and must not be used in such a way as to give the impression that it does. It is obviously good practice in every case that parents should be given clear and accurate information, both orally and in writing, both as to their own rights and as to the responsibilities of the local authority, before a child is accommodated under section 20 or as soon as practicable thereafter.

As the Supreme Court did not resile from any of the guidance set out in previous cases, I will summarise it here.

  • Parents must give valid consent to section 20 accommodation; their agreement must be ‘real’ –
    • but note Hackney case (above) where the parents were subject to bail conditions that meant they were prevented from offering a home to their children. Consent was not an issue in these circumstances. If parents are prevented from ‘objecting’ to section 20 accommodation this may be enough to make it lawful.
    • Also note comment of Lady Hale in SC decision in Hackney (para 39) a delegation of parental responsibility (i.e. agreeing to section 20) can be “real and voluntary” without being fully “informed”.
  • The parents must understand what they are agreeing to; they must have ‘capacity’
  • The parents must have all the relevant information
  • Removing a child under section 20 must be fair and proportionate
  • Parents must be told they have a right to take legal advice
  • Parents must be told they have a right to withdraw their consent

These principles are dealt with in more detail below.

Agreement must be real – parents must give valid consent to section 20 accommodation

  • Every parent who has capacity has the right to give consent under section 20 to have their child accommodated by a LA (for a discussion of what is meant by ‘capacity’ see our post on the Mental Health Act 2005);
  • Every LA has the power to accommodate a child, if to do so is consistent with the child’s welfare.

The parent giving consent must have capacity – they must understand what they are agreeing to

  • every social worker obtaining a parent’s consent is under a personal duty to be satisfied that the person giving consent has the capacity to do so;
  • The social worker must actively consider the issue of capacity and consider the questions raised by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 at section 3 and in particular the person’s capacity to use and weigh all the relevant information;
  • If the social worker has doubts that the person has capacity they should stop trying to obtain consent and seek advice from the Team Leader or Management.

The parent must have all the relevant information to be able to agree

If the social worker is satisfied the parent is able to agree, the next question is whether the consent is ‘fully informed’. Does the parent:

    • understand the consequences of consent or refusal?;
    • appreciate the full range of choices available?
    • know about all the relevant facts?

If the social worker is not satisfied the parent is ‘fully informed’ again, no further attempts should be made to obtain consent and further advice should be sought, including legal advice if necessary.

The decision regarding section 20 accommodation must be fair and proportionate

  • If the consent is considered to be fully informed, the social worker must then be satisfied that the giving of such consent and subsequent removal of the child is fair and proportionate.
  • To answer that question, the social worker should consider the current physical and psychological state of the parent, whether or not they have a lawyer, or have been encouraged to seek legal advice, whether it is necessary for the child’s safety to be removed at this time or whether it would be fairer to seek a care order from the court.

The parents must be told they have a right to legal advice and can withdraw their consent at any time.

See para 65 of the Hackney judgment:  a section 20 agreement HAS to convey that the parents have the right to withdraw their consent. The parents must also be told of their right to take legal advice. Otherwise their apparent ‘consent’ to section 20 may be no consent in reality. This is confirmed in the Supreme Court decision although the point is made that consent can be real without necessarily having ‘full information’. This is not a point I find easy to reconcile and presume that the focus then falls on what is ‘relevant’ information – which I assume is primarily being informed that the parent can remove the child from section 20 accommodation at any time. 

These principles were cited with approval by the Supreme Court judgment in 2023 HXA (Respondent) v Surrey County Council (Appellant);

When it goes wrong

The parents didn’t understand what was going on

For a case that went badly wrong, when the LA did not make sure the parents were supported to understand what was going on, see the case of H (A Child – Breach of Convention Rights: Damages) [2014]. The parents were awarded damages of £6,000 for breach of their human rights in a case that drifted due to unacceptable use of section 20 accommodation.

The court had real doubts about the reality of the parents’ consent in the case of P (A Child: Use of section 20) [2014] EWFC 775. The Judge commented at paragraph 32:

Finally, I would also add that on my assessment of the undisputed facts in this case there is real doubt as to whether [the LA] had proper consent from the parents to the accommodation of P after he was removed from the PGF. In the first statement filed by the [LA] there is an acknowledgement that the parents did not want P to be placed in foster care after he had been placed with the PGF. The author of the statement comments that in spite of this knowledge once he was moved to foster carers the parents did nothing to come and get him – as if the responsibility was somehow theirs. These parents go everywhere with an advocate. They are vulnerable young people. It is the responsibility of the local authority to ensure that they give proper consent. Unless they abandon their child, they do not give consent by omission. I should add that they have never abandoned him.

When it starts ‘drifting’: Judicial Warning

Sometimes, when a child is in foster care under section 20, that has lead to unacceptable drift and delay in making decisions about the child’s long term future. In the case of H (A Child – Breach of Convention Rights: Damages) it took the LA nearly a year to issue proceedings, while the child was in section 20 accommodation,  a delay that the court decided was both ‘unjustified’ and ‘inexcusable’. Also, the LA did not take enough care to ensure the parents understood what was going on. The parents were awarded £6,000 each for breach of their human rights.

On 26th November 2014 the Designated Family Judge for Avon, North Somerset and Gloucestershire issued the following warning about the use of section 20:

Misuse of accommodation under section 20 of The Children Act 1989

1. There have been several recent instances in this area where it is quite apparent that accommodation of children under Section 20 of The Children Act 1989 has continued in an unstructured way for excessive periods of time and in circumstances where proceedings are either inevitable or otherwise highly likely to be issued. I regard such accommodation in those circumstances to be unprincipled and wrong. Further, where this occurs, it leads to unjustifiable delays in the completion of arrangements for the child concerned.

2. I refer, in particular, to the decision of Hedley J in Re CA (A baby) [2012] EWHC 2190 in which guidance is given about the use of accommodation under that section. It includes guidance that the Local Authority should consider: ‘Would it be fairer in this case for this matter to be the subject of a court order rather than an agreement’. That question should be read as if the word ‘fairer’ were to be expanded so that the question reads: ‘Would it be fairer and in the better interests of the child in this case for this matter to be the subject of a court order rather than an agreement?’ It is not in the interests of a child for accommodation to be used in the unstructured way that I have described in paragraph one above.

3. Therefore, in any cases before District Judges or Magistrates in this area where there is any significant suggestion that accommodation under section 20 has been misused in the manner that I have described, the case should be listed before a Circuit Judge following the Case Management Hearing. Circuit Judges are encouraged to give judgments on any such issues that arise before them on referral or on a CMH listed before them. Where possible and appropriate, the judgments should be placed on Bailii in accordance with the transparency provisions. I consider it to be in the public interest that any such misuse of accommodation under that section should be made public.

HHJ Wildblood QC – 26th November 2014.

In the case of P (A Child: Use of section 20) [2014] EWFC 775, the child had been in section 20 accommodation for 2 years whilst the case drifted. Then there were enormous problems in getting another LA to agree to help the parents with housing. The Judge commented at para 30:

It goes without saying that it is totally inappropriate for a local authority to hold a child in s. 20 accommodation for 2 years without a plan. That is what happened here. The local authority has “disabled” these parents from being able to parent their child with every day of inactivity that has passed. The driver for the issue of proceedings was the parents’ lawyers making clear that they did not give their consent. To its credit LBR, during the hearings before me, has accepted its errors in this regard and has tried to make good but there needs to be a careful examination internally of how it was this family was treated in this way.

In these situations it is the local authority that holds all of the power. I think it likely the mother was told that if she did not agree to P’s accommodation then the LBR would issue proceedings. Parents are unlikely to want to drive the local authority to issue proceedings and so the vulnerable are left almost powerless to object. Meanwhile the child is “parked” and the local authority is under no pressure or scrutiny to ensure that it is dealing with the case in an appropriate and timely fashion. In my capacity as DFJ for East London I warn that there will be nowhere to hide for those authorities in this designated family area who fail the children in their borough in this way.

There was further serious criticism about the misuse of section 20 in the case of A (A Child) in 2015 where the President of the Family Division stated at paragraph 99 of his judgment:

Quite apart from all the other serious failures, the delay in this case was shocking. A was born on 11 January 2014. There had – appropriately and commendably – been much pre-birth planning. Yet it was not until 16 September 2014 that the care proceedings were issued. This delay is, to all intents and purposes, unexplained. The gap was covered by the local authority’s use of section 20 in a way which was a misuse, indeed, in my judgment, an abuse, of the provision.

There is, I fear, far too much misuse and abuse of section 20 and this can no longer be tolerated. I draw attention to the extremely critical comments of the Court of Appeal in Re W (Children) [2014] EWCA Civ 1065, as also to the recent decision of Keehan J in Northamptonshire County Council v AS and Ors [2015] EWHC 199 (Fam).

Unfortunately, its still going wrong. HHJ Wildblood QC identified what had gone awry in Bristol City Council v S [2015]

  • The circumstances of the children were allowed to drift in the pre-proceedings stage and the use of section 20 of the Children Act 1989 was too prolonged.
  • The absence of a meeting of professionals from the Local Authority’s Children’s and Adults’ Services in the early stages of the Local Authority’s intervention.
  • A lack of understanding of The Care Act 2014.
  • There were inadequate assessments of the mother in the pre-proceedings stage. If there was insufficient information available to the local authority for it to formulate a satisfactory care plan at that stage a proper and full psychiatric assessment of the mother should have taken place within the pre-proceedings stage. It should not have been left to the time of the proceedings.
  • The apparent lack of information held by Dr. S as to exactly what has been provided to the mother by way of therapy within the community.

EDIT The case of Herefordshire Council v AB [2018] EWFC 10 (1 February 2018) reveals further serious unlawful use of section 20; Mr Justice Keehan describing this case as representing “two of the most egregious abuses of section 20 accommodation it has yet been my misfortune to encounter as a judge”.  Once child spent 8 years in section 20 accommodation from the ages of 8 – 16 and the other spent the first 9 years of his life without any plan for permanent accommodation.

It’s going wrong and you don’t agree to section 20 anymore

If you don’t want your child in foster care any more then you can stop agreeing at any time. BUT this may mean that if the LA aren’t happy with you taking your child home, they may want to try to stop you.

To do this lawfully, there are only two options:

  • The LA try to persuade the police to exercise their powers to take a child to a place of safety for up to 72 hours;
  • OR the LA will have to apply to court for an order.

If they think the situation is urgent they might apply for an Emergency Protection Order. See our post on interim removals.

In some situations, parents might be better off if there was an application for a care order – this will ensure the matter is now subject to a strict court timetable and a judge will be in charge of making decisions. Being involved in care proceedings will also mean parents can get free legal advice and representation.

The LA want me to sign a ‘written agreement’.

Often section 20 agreements go hand in hand with other written agreements; for example, setting out what the LA would like the parents to do or stop doing, while their child is in foster care. These documents don’t have any specific legal force but they are often relied on in evidence in later care proceedings to show how co-operative (or un co-operative) the parents have been and therefore, how much they can be relied on in the future.

Written agreements should not be used to get care orders ‘by the back door’. See the case of Re W [2014] for discussion about this. Also, read this blog post by suesspicious minds for further consideration about written agreements and their consequences.

His advice to parents is:

  • Don’t sign one unless you understand every single bit, and you’ve been told clearly what will happen if you don’t stick to it;
  • If you have a lawyer, you should ask for legal advice BEFORE you sign it. If you don’t have a lawyer, say that you want the Local Authority to hold a Meeting Before Action, so that you can have free legal advice about the agreement;
  • If you think that something isn’t fair, say so;
  • If you’re willing to do what is being asked, but you want help, ask for that help to be identified and put in the agreement;
  • Never ever sign a written agreement if you don’t intend to stick to it – your position is made worse by signing it and not doing it than by not signing it.

Section 20 – other issues

Watch out for section 22 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002

There can be serious consequences flowing from section 20 accommodation and parents need to be aware of these. In particular, parents will need to bear in mind section 22 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 which states that if a LA is providing accommodation for a child, the LA MUST apply for a placement order if :

  • they think the conditions of section 31 of the Children Act are met (significant harm);
  • and they are satisfied the child ought to be placed for adoption.

See further LB v London Borough of Merton [2013] EWCA Civ 476.

See further discussions at The Transparency Project about the ‘foster to adopt’ controversy, where parents may agree to place babies in such a placement, under section 20, therefore without the oversight of the court.

Review and monitoring of section 20 accommodation.

Under the Review of Children’s Cases Regulations the LA must appoint an Independent Reviewing Officer (IRO) to carry out the functions in section 26(2A) of the Children Act 1989;

  • participating in the review of the case in question;
  • monitoring the performance of the LA’s functions in respect of the review;
  • referring the case to Cafcass, if the IRO thinks it is appropriate.

Every case must be reviewed within 4 weeks of the child being provided with accommodation and a second review must follow after that within 3 months. After this second review, the reviews must be at least every six months. The LA should be considering whether or not the child can go home at these review meetings.

The IRO is under a duty to:

  • make sure that the child’s views are understood and taken into account;
  • to identify who is responsible for making sure decisions taken in the review get acted upon;
  • inform senior management at the LA if reviews are not properly carried out;
  • to assist the child to obtain legal advice; or
  • to find out whether an appropriate adult is able and willing to provide such assistance or bring the proceedings on the child’s behalf.

Making parents pay for section 20 accommodation?

For consideration of the very odd situation outlined by Schedule 2 of the Children Act, see this excellent blog post by suesspicious minds.  Such charges can’t be imposed on any parent who is receiving state benefits and they don’t apply to any child subject to a care order.

The Schedule reads:

Schedule 2 para 21. —(1) Where a local authority are looking after a child (other than in the cases mentioned in sub-paragraph(7)) they shall consider whether they should recover contributions towards the child’s maintenance from any person liable to contribute (“a contributor”)

Parents on bail: condition not to contact their children

The court initially stated in  Williams and Another v the London Borough of Hackney [2015] that the LA should still get informed consent to section 20 accommodation, even when the parents were subject to bail conditions that meant they could not have unsupervised contact with their children. This was overturned by the Court of Appeal who pointed out that the statute uses the word ‘object’ not ‘consent’ and the parents clearly couldn’t ‘object’ to the LA providing their children with accommodation, when they were prevented by their bail conditions from giving them a home.  See discussions above and in particular the comments from Lady Hale in the Supreme Court judgment about bail conditions and their impact.

Further reading

What do we mean by the ‘welfare stage’ of care proceedings?

Care proceedings involve a two stage legal test

As we discussed in another post about ‘threshold criteria’,  a court can only make a care or supervision order if it is satisfied it has passed both parts of a two stage test –

First – that the necessary ‘threshold criteria’ must be found proved on the balance of probabilities  in order to show that the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering significant harm.

Second – is it is in the best interests of the child to make a care or supervision order?

This second stage is often called ‘the welfare stage’ because the court has to focus on what order would best meet the child’s interests; or in other words, what does the child’s welfare require the court to do?

It used to be called the ‘disposal stage’ but it was soon noticed that this was an unpleasant way to refer to children’s proceedings. ‘Welfare stage’ is a much more appropriate way of signposting that the focus should now be on what the child needs.

Therefore, even if the court is satisfied a child has suffered significant harm, a care order and removal from the parents does not automatically follow. For example, if the parents have engaged with the LA and are working to change things for the better, the court may make no order or only a supervision order.

Or the court may make a child arrangements order (previously ‘residence order’) or Special Guardianship order in favour of another family member, which may mean the parents can carry on having direct contact with the children after the final hearing.

 

What does the court need to consider when looking at the ‘welfare stage’ ?

The fundamental principle behind the Children Act 1989 can be found in Part 1, section 1. This states that when the court is determining a question with regard to a child’s upbringing:

The child’s welfare shall be the paramount consideration

We need to unpick what is meant by that. Section 1(2) reminds the court of the principle of ‘no delay’ i.e there is an assumption that any delay in making a decision is likely to harm the child’s welfare. You can argue that ‘planned and purposeful’ delay could actually be a good thing for the child – for example, you need more time to finish assessments of family members who could care for him. But you will need to remember the impact of the new Public Law Outline which sets a strict 26 week timetable for care proceedings to finish.

Section 1(5) sets out the ‘no order principle’ – the court should only make an order if this would be better for the child than no order at all. This is in line with the principle of ‘least intervention’ and the requirements of Article 8 of the ECHR.

Section 1(3) is very important as this sets out the ‘welfare checklist’ which is a reminder to the Judge of all the things he or she needs to show have been considered in the judgment. If a Judge makes a decision about a case but can’t show how the welfare checklist was considered, this could make the judgement vulnerable to an appeal.

 

The Welfare Checklist under the Children Act 1989

  • the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in light of his age and understanding)
  • his physical, emotional and educational needs
  • the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances
  • his age, sex, and background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant
  • any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering
  • how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs
  • the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question

 

The welfare checklist under the Adoption and Children Act 2002

When the court is considering placement or adoption orders, the court must also consider a similar checklist in section 1(4)(a) to (f) of the 2002 Act

  • the child’s ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision (considered in the light of the child’s age and understanding)
  • the child’s particular needs
  • the likely effect on the child (throughout his life) of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person
  • the child’s age, sex, background and any of the child’s characteristics which the court or agency considers relevant
  • any harm (within the meaning of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41)) which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering
  • the relationship which the child has with relatives, and with any other person in relation to whom the court or agency considers the relationship to be relevant, including
    • the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so
    • the ability and willingness of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop, and otherwise to meet the child’s needs
    • the wishes and feelings of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, regarding the child.

 

The warnings from Re B-S (Children) [2013]

The recent case of Re B-S (Children) [2013] contained stern warnings from the Court of Appeal about the importance of good clear analysis about what was in a child’s best interests, particularly when the court was thinking about endorsing a care plan that would lead to adoption. 

The key points of the judgment can be summarised as:

  • Adoption is the ‘last resort’ [para 22]
  • the starting point needed to be consideration of the law around Article 8 of the European Convention and the fact that this imposes a positive obligation upon States to try to keep families together [paras 18]
  • the least interventionist approach is to be preferred [para 23]
  • The child’s interests are paramount, but the court must never lost sight of the fact that these interests include being brought up by his/her natural family [para 26]
  • There must be proper evidence from the LA and the Guardian that addresses all options which are realistically possible and must contain an analysis of the arguments for and against each option.[para 34]
  • The court then ‘must’ consider all available realistic options when coming to a decision; [para 27, 44]
  • That the court’s assessment of the parents’ capacity to care for the child should include consideration of what support was available to help them do so [ para 28]
  • The LA cannot press for a more drastic form of order because it is unable or unwilling to support a less interventionist form of order; it is their obligation to make the court order work [para 29]
  • The Court of Appeal made it clear that it was ‘essential’ that a decision was made after a proper and thorough analysis of  all relevant evidence. There was a real danger of not making the right decision if the court took a ‘linear’ approach to the options, i.e rejecting option A, then moving on to option B etc.

They said at paragraph 44 of the judgment:

“We emphasise the words “global, holistic evaluation”. This point is crucial. The judicial task is to evaluate all the options, undertaking a global, holistic and (see Re G para 51) multi-faceted evaluation of the child’s welfare which takes into account all the negatives and the positives, all the pros and cons, of each option.”

The court also made it clear that proceedings could take longer than 26 weeks if more time was needed to resolve a case justly. See paragraph 49.

Suesspicious minds offers a good analogy to show us why  ‘linear evaluations’ of evidence can be so dangerous in this blog post  

 

A Day in the Life of a Family Solicitor

Here one legal aid family solicitor shares the timetable of her typical day

7.40am I start my journey to the office by train.

8.45am I arrive at the office and start the day by looking through my post and emails having a cup of tea. I answer as much as I can before the first client of the day….

10am   I see a new client for the first time. He is here to talk about social services’ involvement with his family. He is worried as they have applied to the court to have his child removed from his care. We talk about what has happened in the past and what the situation is now.  We consider whether there are any family or friends who can help. We discuss the court process and what happens next.

11.30am I receive a phone call from a Guardian at CAFCASS asking me to represent a child in care proceedings. I am emailed the papers and start reviewing them, analysing the information for the key issues: is the child at risk, what are the local authority’s proposals for the short and long term care of the child, are any assessments needed, next steps.

12pm I leave the office to travel by train to court for a hearing. I have my lunch whilst on the train.

12.50pm I arrive at court and meet the other professionals involved for the case; the solicitors for the parents and the Local Authority. Acting for the child in the case, I meet the guardian to take some up to date instructions.

1.45pm The professionals convene to discuss the case and to see if there is an agreed way forward today.  We consider: is an order agreed, is it agreed where the child will live, are contact arrangements agreed, is the timetable for the case and assessments agreed.

Whilst at court I keep an eye on my emails on my phone for any pressing matters which need attention.

3.30pm We present the case to the Judge for consideration. The Judge gives further direction to the case and makes a decision about matters which are not agreed.

4.15pm I start the journey back to the office.

5.10pm I arrive back at the office.  I check what has happened since I have been out. Make some phone calls.  I then start to draft an application for the instruction of an expert. I prepare my papers for court the next day.

6.45pm I start the journey home. Whilst on the train I think about my work for the next day and make a list.

8pm I arrive home

The danger of polarised positions

A failure to grasp the complex realities of child protection work.

Here is an interesting article from Ray Jones of Community Care who points out that the debate about child protection needs much more nuance than can be obtained from ‘headline grabbing simplicity’ about what social workers should be doing.

Read the article here.

What if I don’t have a lawyer?

All parents in care proceedings should qualify for non means and non merits tested public funding i.e. the State will pay the costs of your solicitor or barrister.

Other people who want to be involved in care proceedings, such as grandparents, may not get any public funding. What happens if the cost of paying for lawyers privately is out of your reach?

Another option is to be assisted by a ‘lay advocate’ or a ‘McKenzie friend’. At the moment, lay advocates are not widely used in care proceedings but this may become more common.

The ‘Court without a Lawyer’ website provides a definition of McKenzie friend here, as well another advice for those going to a family court without a lawyer.

Here Ian Julian, a Lay Advocate since 2003, gives some information and makes some suggestions you might find helpful.

 

Solicitors and Barristers can cost a considerable sum of money but will be able to prepare your case and present it before the Court. Many Barristers offer a Direct Access service, which can provide you with an Advocate in the Courtroom but without the cost of Solicitors preparing, drafting and advising you along the way. This may suit someone of limited means who can handle their own paperwork confidently. (The Bar Council Public Access directory can be found here)
Litigation Friends come in many guises and can be more or less helpful and / or experienced. Common Law provides that a person may have any person speak on his behalf in a Court of Law. Courts will want you to have every reasonable assistance and will recognise that the Courtroom is an alien environment for most people in stressfull circumstances. While you may be confident and it can be helpful for the Judge to hear from you directly, it may also be useful to have some additional help to explain what you want and why.
– you may need a Litigation Friend to assist you in understanding the proceedings if you have a disability. This can be in addition to your lawyer (more often now that the Official Solicitor is less available);
– in hearings held in private, the Guidance for Family Courts allows the assistance of a McKenzie Friend (to quietly advise you, take notes and to assist you with papers);
– If granted Rights of Audience, you may have a Lay Advocate who will present your case to the Court as a Barrister does.
It is at the Judge’s discretion to allow your assistance and the presumption is in favour of a McKenzie Friend unless there is good reason to refuse you (it should not be an antagonistic relative for example).
The Judge may permit you to have a Lay Advocate if he is of good reputation and can assist the Court in dealing with the proceedings effectively. This can save time and expense for everyone and an experienced assistant will help the Court by guiding you as to what is possible and what is unhelpful.
You should write to the Judge in advance asking permission for the assistance you want to use and inform the other Parties. Your Friend should send a CV to the Judge, which will assist his decision.
Only Solicitors are permitted to “conduct litigation” (i.e. hold client monies or sign letters on your behalf). Direct Access Barristers cannot “conduct litigation” either.
(Author: Ian Julian, Lay Advocate since 2003)

Court gives guidance on how to ensure fair proceedings for learning disabled parents

You may also be interested in this post about supporting parents with learning disabilities in care proceedings. 

In the case of Re A [2013] the Court of Appeal had ordered a retrial due to concerns that a father with learning difficulties had not had a fair hearing regarding findings that he had inflicted an injury on his child.

At the re-trial, Mr Justice Baker gave the following advice on how to conduct proceedings where a party is vulnerable due to a learning disability.

(a) There is duty on those acting for the parent(s) to identify their client’s need for assistance in responding to questions and giving instructions, which must be considered by representatives at the outset of their instruction.  Any need for support must be addressed at the earliest opportunity.

(b) When this is known prior to the outset of proceedings, on issuing, local authorities should draw the issue of competence and capacity to the court’s attention. In turn, on the day following issue, the court will give directions for the appointment of a litigation friend.

(c) When the issue of capacity and competence is not identified at the outset, it should be addressed fully at the case management hearing.  At that hearing, those representing the parents should apply for special measures, where the case for such measures can be made out without any expert advice. Alternatively, where expert advice is necessary to identify the existence or extent of the learning difficulties, they should make an application in accordance with Part 25 of the Family Proceedings Rules for an expert to carry out an immediate assessment of the capacity and competence of the party.

(d) The legal representatives should normally by the date of the case management hearing identify an agency to assist their client to give evidence through an intermediary or otherwise if the court concludes that such measures are required.  If the court is satisfied that an expert report is necessary to determine whether the party lacks capacity or competence and/or as to the extent of any special measures required, it may direct a further case management hearing to take place once the expert has reported so that detailed directions can then be given for the instruction of an intermediary and/or such other assistance as may be necessary.

(e) So far as funding is concerned, there is a distinction between the cost of obtaining a report from an expert as to capacity and competence, and the cost of providing services from an intermediary.  The former will, subject to the approval of the legal aid agency,whereas the latter, as a type of interpretation service, will be borne by the Court Service.  Those representing the relevant party should address these funding issues at the earliest opportunity.  They should obtain prior approval from the legal aid agency for the instruction of the expert and, as soon as possible, give notice to Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service that the services of an intermediary are likely to be required.

A further important case is Re D (No 3) [2016] where the President set out the following as an Annex to his judgment.

Extract from the judgment of Gillen J in Re G and A (Care Order: Freeing Order: Parents with a Learning Disability) [2006] NIFam 8, para 5:

“(1) An increasing number of adults with learning difficulties are becoming parents. The Baring Foundation report records that whilst there are no precise figures on the number of parents with learning difficulties in the population, the most recent statistics come from the First National Survey of Adults with Learning Difficulties in England, where one in fifteen of the adults interviewed had children. Whatever the figure it is generally recognised that their number is steadily rising and that they represent a sizable population whose special needs require to be adequately addressed. The Baring Foundation report refers to national policy in England and Scotland committing government to “supporting parents with learning disabilities in order to help them, wherever possible, to ensure their children gain maximum life chance benefits.” Nonetheless the courts must be aware that surveys show that parents with learning disabilities are apparently more likely than other parents to have their children removed them and permanently placed outside the family home. In multidisciplinary jurisdiction such as the Family Division, it is important that the court is aware of such reports at least for the purposes of comment. It is important to appreciate these currents because the Children Order (Northern Ireland) 1995 places an emphasis on supporting the family so that children can remain with them and obligations under disability discrimination legislation make public services accessible to disabled people (including parents with learning difficulties). Moreover the advent of the Human Rights Act 1998 plays an important role in highlighting the need to ensure the rights of such parents under Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”).

(2) People with a learning disability are individuals first and foremost and each has a right to be treated as an equal citizen. Government policy emphasises the importance of people with a learning disability being supported to be fully engaged playing a role in civic society and their ability to exercise their rights and responsibilities needs to be strengthened. They are valued citizens and must be enabled to use mainstream services and be fully included in the life of the community as far as possible. The courts must reflect this and recognise their need for individual support and the necessity to remove barriers to inclusion that create disadvantage and discrimination. To that extent courts must take all steps possible to ensure that people with a learning disability are able to actively participate in decisions affecting their lives. They must be supported in ways that take account of their individual needs and to help them to be as independent as possible.

(3) It is important that a court approaches these cases with a recognition of the possible barriers to the provision of appropriate support to parents including negative or stereotypical attitudes about parents with learning difficulties possibly on the part of staff in some Trusts or services. An extract from the Baring Foundation report provides a cautionary warning:
“For example, it was felt that some staff in services whose primary focus was not learning difficulties (eg in children and family teams) did not fully understand the impact of having learning difficulties on individual parents’ lives; had fixed ideas about what would happen to the children of parents with learning difficulties and wanted an outcome that did not involve any risks (which might mean them being placed away from their family); expected parents with learning difficulties to be ‘perfect parents’ and had extremely high expectations of them. Different professionals often had different concepts of parenting against which parents were assessed. Parents’ disengagement with services, because they felt that staff had a negative view of them and ‘wanted to take their children away’ was also an issue, as were referrals to support services which were too late to be of optimum use to the family – often because workers lacked awareness of parents’ learning difficulties or because parents had not previously been known to services”.

(4) This court fully accepts that parents with learning difficulties can often be “good enough” parents when provided with the ongoing emotional and practical support they need. The concept of “parenting with support” must underpin the way in which the courts and professionals approach wherever possible parents with learning difficulties. The extended family can be a valuable source of support to parents and their children and the courts must anxiously scrutinize the possibilities of assistance from the extended family. Moreover the court must also view multi-agency working as critical if parents are to be supported effectively. Courts should carefully examine the approach of Trusts to ensure this is being done in appropriate cases. In particular judges must make absolutely certain that parents with learning difficulties are not at risk of having their parental responsibilities terminated on the basis of evidence that would not hold up against normal parents. Their competences must not be judged against stricter criteria or harsher standards than other parents. Courts must be acutely aware of the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination and how this might be relevant to the treatment of parents with learning difficulties in care proceedings. In particular careful consideration must be given to the assessment phase by a Trust and in the application of the threshold test.

(5) Parents must be advised by social workers about their legal rights, where to obtain advice, how to find a solicitor and what help might be available to them once a decision has been taken to pursue a care application. Too narrow a focus must not be placed exclusively on the child’s welfare with an accompanying failure to address parents’ needs arising from their disability which might impact adversely on their parenting capacity. Parents with learning disabilities should be advised of the possibility of using an advocate during their case eg from the Trust itself or from Mencap and clear explanations and easy to understand information about the process and the roles of the different professionals involved must be disclosed to them periodically. Written information should be provided to such parents to enable them to consider these matters at leisure and with their advocate or advisers. Moreover Trusts should give careful consideration to providing child protection training to staff working in services for adults with learning disabilities. Similarly those in children’s services need training about adults with learning disabilities. In other words there is a strong case to be made for new guidelines to be drawn up for such services working together with a joint training programme. I endorse entirely the views of the Guardian ad Litem in this case when she responded to the “Finding the Right Support” paper by stating:

“As far as I am aware there are no ‘family teams’ in the Trusts designated to support parents with a learning disability. In my opinion this would be a positive development. The research also suggests that a learning disability specialist could be designated to work within family and childcare teams and a child protection specialist could be designated to work within learning disability teams. If such professionals were to be placed in the Trusts in Northern Ireland they could be involved in drawing up a protocol for joint working, developing guidelines, developing expertise in research, awareness of resources and stimulating positive practice. They could also assist in developing a province-wide forum that could build links between the Trusts, the voluntary sector and the national and international learning disability community.”

(6) The court must also take steps to ensure there are no barriers to justice within the process itself. Judges and magistrates must recognise that parents with learning disabilities need extra time with solicitors so that everything can be carefully explained to them. Advocates can play a vital role in supporting parents with learning difficulties particularly when they are involved in child protection or judicial processes. In the current case, the court periodically stopped (approximately after each hour), to allow the Mencap representative to explain to the parents what was happening and to ensure that an appropriate attention span was not being exceeded. The process necessarily has to be slowed down to give such parents a better chance to understand and participate. This approach should be echoed throughout the whole system including LAC reviews. All parts of the Family justice system should take care as to the language and vocabulary that is utilised. In this case I was concerned that some of the letters written by the Trust may not have been understood by these parents although it was clear to me that exhortations had been given to the parents to obtain the assistance of their solicitors (which in fact was done). In terms therefore the courts must be careful to ensure that the supposed inability of parents to change might itself be an artefact of professionals ineffectiveness in engaging with the parents in appropriate terms. Courts must not rush to judge, but must gather all the evidence within a reasonable time before making a determination. Steps must be taken to ensure that parents have a meaningful and informed access to reports, time to discuss the reports and an opportunity to put forward their own views. Not only should the hearing involve special measures, including a break in sessions, but it might also include permission that parents need not enter the court until they are required if they so wish. Moreover the judges should be scrupulous to ensure that an opportunity is given to parents with learning disabilities to indicate to the court that something is occurring which is beyond their comprehension and that measures must be taken to deal with that. Steps should also be taken throughout the process to ensure that parents with learning disabilities are not overwhelmed by unnecessarily large numbers of persons being present at meetings or hearings.

(7) Children of parents with learning difficulties often do not enter the child protection system as the result of abuse by their parents. More regularly the prevailing concerns centre on a perceived risk of neglect, both as the result of the parents’ intellectual impairments, and the impact of the social and economic deprivation commonly faced by adults with learning difficulties. It is in this context that a shift must be made from the old assumption that adults with learning difficulties could not parent to a process of questioning why appropriate levels of support are not provided to them so that they can parent successfully and why their children should often be taken into care. At its simplest, this means a court carefully inquiring as to what support is needed to enable parents to show whether or not they can become good enough parents rather than automatically assuming that they are destined to fail. The concept of “parenting with support” must move from the margins to the mainstream in court determinations.

(8) Courts must ensure that careful consideration is given to ensuring that any decision or judgment is fully explained to such parents. In this case I caused a copy of the judgment to be provided to the parties at least one day before I handed it down to facilitate it being explained in detail before the attendance at court where confusion and consternation could be caused by a lengthy judgment being read which the parents could not follow at the time.”

 

Further reading

See the President’s Guidance issued on 10th April 2018 relating to family proceedings and parents with learning disabilities.

Also the guidance from the Family Justice Council, also April 2018, about those who lack capacity to litigate in children’s proceedings.

Overview of Medical Experts in cases of suspected non-accidental injury

 

Rachel Carter, a family law solicitor, writes a blog ‘Parents accused’ which offers help and advice to parents who are involved in cases of suspected non accidental injury.

In this post she gives a useful overview of the different type of medical experts you may meet in such care proceedings.

Emotional Abuse

The Systematic Diminishment of Another

The issue of ’emotional harm’ causes concern for some as they don’t think it is a sufficiently serious reason to justify removing a child from home. In this post we will examine some of the definitions of emotional abuse so you can decide for yourself whether or not you think this kind of behaviour can have serious consequences.

Emotional abuse of adults

Domestic Violence UK use the definition put forward by  Andrew Vachss, who described emotional abuse as:

the systematic diminishment of another. It may be intentional or subconscious (or both), but it is always a course of conduct, not a single event.

Hidden Hurt a website offering information about domestic abuse, say:

Many forms of abuse are obviously cruel. Emotional abuse is more subtle. Quite often such abuse goes unseen, as even the victim does not recognize that she is being abused. Although emotional abuse does not leave black eyes or visible bruises, it is often more seriously damaging to your self-esteem.

Of course, we all have bad days, we can all lose our temper and shout and snap at the people we love or say hurtful, belittling things. But one bad day doesn’t make you a bad parent or a bad person. The key thing is to be honest with yourself – why am I behaving like this? Am I tired or stressed out? Am I sorry? Can I stop? Do I want to stop? Do I think there is a problem?

If you think there is a problem and you want to do something to change it then this is very positive.  Most abusers find it very hard to admit to anyone, least of all themselves, that they are treating other people badly. If you can show you have insight into what is going wrong, you will find it easier to ask for and to accept help.

 

Emotional abuse of children

Andrew Vachss further describes emotional abuse of children  in these terms:

Emotional abuse can be verbal or behavioral, active or passive, frequent or occasional. Regardless, it is often as painful as physical assault. And, with rare exceptions, the pain lasts much longer. A parent’s love is so important to a child that withholding it can cause a “failure to thrive” condition similar to that of children who have been denied adequate nutrition.

Professor Iwaniec (1995) defines emotional abuse towards children as:

hostile or indifferent behaviour which damages a child’s sense of self esteem, degrades a sense of achievement, diminishes a sense of belonging, prevents healthy and vigorous development and takes away a child’s well being.

NSPCC definition of emotional abuse of children

The NSPCC say that emotional abuse includes

  • humiliating or criticising a child
  • disciplining a child with degrading punishments
  • not recognising a child’s own individuality and limitations
    • pushing them too hard
    • being too controlling
  • exposing a child to distressing events or interactions
    • domestic abuse
    • substance misuse
  • faling to promote a child’s social development
    • not allowing them to have friends
  • persistently ignoring a child
  • being absent
  • never expressing positive feelings towards a child
  • never showing any emotions in interactions with a child (emotional neglect).

 

Who can help

If you are worried that a child is being subjected to emotional abuse or any other form of abuse, you can call the NSPCC on 0808 800 5000 for help and advice on what to do.

If you are worried about the way you treat your partner or ex partner, call Respect who offer a confidential and anonymous helpline and who can offer you help, advice and support.

See our links and resources page for further information.

Further reading

  • Research shows that the consequences of emotional and physical abuse can be similar for children.
  • The Government proposed in 2014 to introduce a law that would make emotionally abusing a child a criminal offence – there is a good article discussing this here.
  • See here for  a useful article by Andrew Pack looking at the issue of emotional abuse and how often it appears in care proceedings.
  • The featured picture is taken from this post: Emotional abuse, recognising the signs

 

Be ALERT!

One of our contributors suggested ALERT would be a good acronym for us to use

I thought of the acronym ALERT standing for.

Attention
Listen
Engage
Respond
Trust

Attention draw Social Services attention if you feel that there are children at risk or who need additional support.

Listen If the Social Worker is telling you something no matter how hard it is to hear, try to really listen and take in what is being said.

Engage  Always attend meetings, allow Social Workers access to you and the child/ren involved. Show you realise how serious it is and engage with each step of the process.

Respond  If you are asked to do something then act on it. If Social Services raise concerns about the state of your house, clean-up. Your drinking, seek help. A violent relationship, make steps towards ending it etc etc.

Trust  trust that Social Workers aren’t involved as they want to steal your child, trust that they are working within a legal framework and most importantly trust that they are working in the best interest of your child, even if you disagree on what that is.