Author Archives: Sarah Phillimore

Significant concerns about the Children and Social Work Bill

I am grateful to Rodney Noon for permission to re-publish here his December Editor’s Blog on the exemption clauses in the CSW Bill. This originally appeared on the Seen and Heard pages of the Nagalro website – and I think it needs the widest possible audience. 

POWER TO TEST DIFFERENT WAYS OF WORKING: WHERE ARE WE NOW?

The Government’s controversial clause 29 to the Children and Social Work Bill was deleted in its entirety, by a significant majority in the House of Lords. The Bill has now moved to the Commons and the Children’s Minister, Edward Timpson, is proposing an amendment which would reintroduce the provisions in what he describes, in a letter of 7 December 2016, as a ‘significantly amended’ form. What has changed from the original clauses and is it enough to make the provisions acceptable?

Scope of the Provisions

Living in the countryside, we sometimes have field mice coming into the outbuildings. If someone called round, claiming he could get rid of them, but carrying an assault rifle, plastic explosives and a flame thrower, I would be alarmed. I doubt if that alarm would be reduced by assurances that these things were not going to be used. The question, ‘why are they even here?’ would not have been answered. This was one of the problems with the original provisions of the Bill. It had the capacity to suspend vast swathes of both primary and secondary legislation. The Government has, to this day, not satisfactorily explained why it should even want to have such far-reaching powers.

The new clause has exactly the same starting point as the old clause 29, namely, that it covers ‘a requirement imposed by children’s social care legislation’. There follows the self-same definition of ‘children’s social care legislation’ that we found in the old version, namely:
‘any legislation specified in Schedule 1 to the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 so far as relating to those under the age of 18;’
together with ss23C and D of the Children Act 1989, the Children Act 2004 and any secondary regulations and such made under any of those Acts.

The first task therefore, has to be to look at what is actually in Schedule 1. Here is the list as it currently stands, insofar as it relates to children:
• Children and Young Persons Act 1933 Parts III and IV
• Children and Young Persons Act 1963 Part I
• Children and Young Persons Act 1969
• Adoption Act 1976 (transitional and saving provisions only)
• Children Act 1989
• Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999 sections 1 and 2(4)
• Adoption and Children Act 2002
• Children Act 2004 sections 9A and 13 to 16
• Children and Young Persons Act 2008 Part 1
• Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 section 92 (functions in relation to a child remanded to local authority accommodation)

The schedule contains many other pieces of legislation which are, at least primarily, concerned with the care of adults.

Although Schedule 1 has only a small number of sections from the Children Act 2004 included, the proposed provisions of the Bill would bring the whole of the 2004 Act within the scope of the potential exemptions.

On top of these, any statutory instruments, made under these pieces of legislation are susceptible to suspension. The list will be rather larger than the human mind can comfortably accommodate.

It was the sheer breadth of the potential exemptions which caused such consternation amongst many. Was it just rushed, or lazy drafting? Schedule 1 to the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 also includes disability and mental health statutes. Would a list of legislation specific to the use of these powers have been too much to ask? The overall impression is that the draftsman wanted to make his work as impenetrable as possible. A much better way of drafting the Bill, if clarity was desired, would have been to list the specific provisions from which exemptions might be given. Debate could then have centred around the merits of those individual sections or statutory instruments. Instead a ‘blank cheque’ is sought and an injured innocence expressed, when there is vociferous opposition.

Having initially proposed the same wide-ranging possibilities for exemptions, the new clause offers to exclude various provisions from its scope. They are:
• Section 17 Children Act 1989 (Duty to provide services to children in need)
• Schedule 2 (Part I) Children Act 1989
• Section 20 Children Act 1989 (Provision of accommodation for children in need of it)
• Section 22 Children Act 1989 (Duty to promote the welfare of looked after children)
• Section 47 Children Act 1989 (Duty to make enquiries and take action to promote the welfare of children at risk)
• Section 10 Children Act 2004 (Promoting co-operation to improve the wellbeing of children)
• Section 11 Children Act 2004 (Making arrangements to ensure that regard is had to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children)

Those seven provisions are the ‘comfort blanket’ which is offered to those who oppose the legislation. Are they sufficient? The first test has to be to carry the proposal to its logical extreme. A ‘stress test’ if you will. What would the world of children’s social care look like if that were all that were left? A fearful sight, you may think.

Now, those who promote the clause will say that this is an unfair test because there are safeguards in sub-clause 1 which require any suspension to be for the purpose of promoting the wellbeing of children and the regulations giving exemptions must be approved by Parliament and subject to consultation. All of this is true. However, since one of the objections to the initial clause was its breadth of application; the sense that everything was ‘up for grabs’, I would argue it is a legitimate test to perform. The retreat from the old clause 29 on this issue has been a very small one, with the provisions protected, probably never seriously considered for exemption in the first place.

What remains on the ‘at risk’ list? To list every set of regulations and each section of each Act would tax the patience of writer and reader alike, but some examples, picked at random, might inform the debate.
• Section 14F Children Act 1989 (special guardianship support services)
• Special Guardianship Regulations 2005 (Supporting s14F above)
• Sections 17ZA to 17ZC Children Act 1989 (young carers needs assessments)
• The Young Carers (Needs Assessments) Regulations 2015
• Section 21 Children Act 1989 (provision of accommodation for children in police protection or detention or on remand)
• Sections 22A to 22G Children Act 1989 (local authority duties to provide accommodation and maintenance for looked after children). It should be noted that only the general duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of looked after children under section 22 is protected from suspension. The more detailed duties, inserted into the Children Act by the Children and Young Persons Act 2008, are not subject to any protection against suspension.
• Section 23ZA Children Act 1989 (duty of local authority to visit looked after children and arrange for them to receive advice, support and assistance)
• Section 23ZB Children Act 1989 (independent visitors for looked after children)
• Section 23CZA Children Act 1989 (staying put arrangements)
• Section 25 Children Act 1989 (restrictions on the use of secure accommodation)
• Children (Secure Accommodation) Regulations 1991
• Section 25A Children Act 1989 (appointment of independent reviewing officer)
• Section 34 Children Act 1989 (local authority duties to allow contact with children in care).

Despite the Secretary of State’s statement that the Bill is compatible with the Human Rights Act, it has to be said that this sits uneasily with article 8.
• The whole of Schedule 2 Part II Children Act 1989, which not only set out the duties of a local authority towards looked after children, but also forms the basis of a substantial body of regulations including provisions for the local authority to supervise and inspect foster carers and the accommodation which they offer. Part II includes paragraph 15 which imposes a duty on a local authority to promote contact between a looked after child and his family.
• Section 49 Children Act 2004 (payments to foster carers)
• Care Planning, Placement and Care Review (England) Regulations 2010. These regulations are of crucial importance to ensuring that children are placed safely and include, amongst much else, the regulations dealing with the placement of children in care with parents and the regulatory framework for IROs.
• Fostering Services Regulations 2002
• Section 4 Adoption and Children Act 2002 (assessment for adoption support services)
• Adoption Support Services Regulations 2005

Those who propose the reinsertion of these provisions into the Bill, must surely explain, in plain, practical terms, why they might wish to have the power to suspend each of these provisions (and many more). If the answer should be that they would not want to suspend, for example, the staying put arrangements, then they must explain why they, notwithstanding this, seek the power to do something which would be contrary to the best interests of the child. It is a position which seems to defy logic.

I would suggest that no list of safeguards about consultations, purposes and parliamentary approval can save this amendment from the fatal flaw which sits at its very heart; namely that it potentially authorises steps which could not, under any conceivable circumstances, be in the interests of the child. Once it is accepted that there are provisions in the clause’s net which should never be suspended in this way, the whole provision becomes indefensible.

Risk and Informed Consent

The heading of the proposed new clause is significant, saying that it is the ‘power to test different ways of working’. Any test carries with it risks that it may not produce the desired outcome. If that were not the case, the test would not be needed. These tests however, will be carried out on real people; real parents and real children. If we were dealing with a trial of a new drug, this would be hedged about with provisions to ensure that only those who wished to be involved were subjected to the test and that their consent was fully informed, both as to benefits and risks. Such provisions are totally absent from these proposals. How is the seven-year-old child to give a valid consent to the risks of a test? If a local authority obtains an exemption then all the children in its jurisdiction will be the subjects, whether they agree or not. They will have no individual say in the matter.

Our path to the current system for child protection is littered with casualties. Most of the provisions which we now have, are there because children were neglected, injured or died. The state’s track record as a parent is far from unimpeachable. If a test turns out to be misconceived and children are in fact harmed, who will offer them redress? The proposal does not contemplate this and gives no thought to victims. Let us suppose that a child’s IRO is withdrawn and as a result of this the child ‘stagnates’ in an unsuitable placement. That child will, perhaps, have to suffer the consequences of these omissions for the rest of her life. Will anyone give her so much as an apology?

Conflicts of Interest.

The clause completely ignores the inherent conflicts of interest faced by local authorities asking for exemptions under the proposed clauses. In a period of austerity and budget cuts more than ever, local authorities must try to live within massively reduced budgets and ensure the on-going favour and support of the Secretary of State. Anything which helps spread the budget further is going to be greeted like manna from heaven in County Hall. There is a powerful political motivation here to seek exemptions from an administration already favourably inclined, which may well relegate the welfare of the individual child from its proper place, at the heart of the matter.

It is telling that almost all those who have no conflict of interest and are viewing matters solely from the perspective of the child, are opposed to these provisions.

We still have little in the way of specific examples of what it is said local authorities want to be exempted from and why. If there were a genuine, child welfare based, case for these powers, why is the Government not explaining how, if such a provision were suspended, these things could be achieved? Instead, we are left to grapple with vague aspirations and vaguer drafting.

Conclusions

What then of these provisions? Have they been ‘significantly amended’ and even if they have, have the flaws in clause 29 been overcome? I am far from convinced that there has been any significant change.

Careful reading and rational analysis of the new clause reveals it to be more akin to the ‘cut and shut’, dodgy motor car on the backstreet car lot. It has been given a polish, a wheel trim replaced and some tyre-wall black liberally applied. For all that, it is still dangerous. Would you want to see a child of yours riding in it?

My belief is the same as your fact; campaigning in the post truth world.

On 25th January 2017 I was very pleased to attend an event at the Bristol Festival of Ideas to hear from Daniel Levitin, neuroscientist and author of ‘A Field Guide to Lies’

He introduced a discussion about how we distinguish misinformation, pseudo-facts, distortions and outright lies from reliable information and how can we recognise misleading announcements, statistics, graphs and written reports.

His central argument as described by the Festival organisers:

in order to be successful at work, play and in making the most of our lives, we need to think critically about the words and numbers we encounter, checking their plausibility and reasoning – not passively accepting, repeating and making decisions based on the information we receive.

This is of enormous interest to me. Ironically, I was not familiar with Dan Levitin’s work until he was recommended to me by a parent who was campaigning against the ‘evil and secret’ family courts and who accused me of being insufficiently alive to what was the obvious ‘truth’ of the corruption in the system.

There was some useful advice about questions we should ask before uncritically accepting what is told to us, even when the person doing the telling purports to be an ‘expert’. We must ask

  • Is the expert offering the information the ‘right’ expert? Beware the pseudo expert! Professor Sir Roy Meadows remains saddest and starkest example of an expert who went outside his narrow field of expertise and gave information to a criminal trial which lead to a significant miscarriage of justice for Sally Clark.
  • Does the statistic being quoted support the argument being made? For example, US Today reported that as deaths from air travel in 2014 were significantly higher than deaths in 1960, this ‘proved’ air travel was much more dangerous now. This of course, ignored the total numbers of people now travelling by air in 2014 when compared with 1960. Air travel remains significantly safer than any other form of transport.

The key message from Dan Levitin was that we must ALL take personal responsibility for educating ourselves to think critically and challenge people that we know are pushing misinformation. We cannot discuss issues sensibly or at all unless we are able to agree on what the ‘facts’ are. There are no ‘alternative facts’ only ‘facts’. But peoples’ beliefs about what is or is not a fact can shift over time.

https://twitter.com/SVPhillimore/status/824236867151335425

In light of my often weary and unproductive crusade over the last two years to improve the quality of debate and information available about the child protection system, I asked Dan Levitin if he had any practical tips. He reminded me of the power of confirmation bias; people will believe what they want to believe. You cannot reason someone out of a position that they did not reach by reason and getting angry with one another merely widens the gulf of distrust and further impedes communication.

A timely reminder. I left the discussion with renewed excitement about the task ahead, with my clear moral imperative to call out those people I know to be talking nonsense – but to attempt to do so in as diplomatic and careful as way as possible.

On leaving the venue, I got a phone notification from Facebook. I challenged it. Will it make any difference? Possibly not. But remaining silent is not an option, now more than ever.

https://twitter.com/SVPhillimore/status/824256381410770944

What happens if I want to change my legal aid solicitor in care proceedings?

Thanks to TakenUK and DVHurts for their contribution to what sounds like a very necessary discussion. I am particularly concerned to hear that parents are not routinely given a copy of the court bundle. Little wonder distrust and suspicion grows.

This is a guest post by TakenUK. 

As where most interesting discussions arise these days, one recent twitter topic was that of issues arising from changing legal aid solicitors. A simple process you may think, but if you have a legal aid certificate, the myriad of problems associated with this is enough to drive any to the proverbial bottle.

Problems start to arise the moment a client elects to change representation, either due to the relationship between client and solicitor breaking down or when the client feels that a different solicitor is better suited to their cases requirements. I focus here specifically on the first request to change, not subsequent requests by the same client. In the past, changing law firms was troublesome but not as it is now, as the LAA insists that the client must lodge an official complaint against the solicitor and the current solicitor must attempt to remedy any issues, before the LAA will even consider consenting to the legal aid certificate being transferred to the newly appointed firm.

This is not about whether one or either of the parties is at fault here, but whilst there is some logic to the reasoning behind this required process, it does create a litany of problems for the client and the newly appointed law firm.

I just don’t trust my solicitor anymore – the need to make formal complaint

If the relationship is one of a breakdown in trust, the client is expected to lodge a formal complaint to the law firm, who then has to investigate this complaint and attempt resolution. The reality is that once trust has broken down, there is little hope in progressing forward amicably. So we now have a problem. The solicitor, to prevent from opening themselves up to further allegations or complaints, can not realistically continue to act for the client; but until the legal aid certificate is officially transferred, the client in essence is without representation.

Now complaint handling can take days, weeks, months to resolve to the point where the LAA is satisfied to transfer the certificate. If however the LAA feel there are not sufficient grounds to cease representation, the process can take far longer. Reasons for delays are numerous, from insufficient staff to investigate, solicitor is obstructive or that the firm intentionally delays the process for various reasons. The client in the meantime, is unable to have the new solicitor officially go on record unless the new solicitor is prepared to act pro-bono or as a Mackenzie friend whilst the transfer is taking place. If proceedings are ongoing and there has been allotted timescales for reports or hearings, unless there are delays to proceedings, the client is forced to act as an LIP or indeed, file statements etc which many are ill equipped to do.

The implication of delay and the 26 week timetable for care proceedings

Once the law firm has officially signed release of the case and the LAA is satisfied in transferring the legal aid certificate, the new legal team require time to adequately understand the case and prepare their case going forward, that is of course if they already have the case bundles. In many circumstances, the new solicitor has to file reports under the tightest of time frames once the certificate is transferred, with little understanding of the clients case due to existing case management time frames which do not allow for delays within proceedings.
Art 6 is very much at play at this point.

When a complaint is lodged against a solicitor, many firms are reticent to release the bundles until the complaints have been dealt with. Many clients are not even aware they are entitled to their own court bundles and some firms are asking outrageous fees from the clients to make copies of the bundles. In today’s technological age, most firms already have digital copies of the bundles and are able to supply them on a USB drive or other such means. Where clients are either not techno savy or do not have access to computers etc, hard copies of the bundles are requested, which is further delayed when the law firm does not have someone available to copy/print/file them. Some law firms are asking clients for fees to cover the cost of the relevant employees time and cost of materials. I have been asked on numerous occasions to write on behalf of the client, requesting bundles which should have been supplied two or three months prior, and often it has only been supplied once the Legal Ombudsman has been requested to intervene.

Things are even more dire, as recently witnessed by a trainee solicitor I work with. When clients are forced to act as interim LIP’s without support, clients are attending court (unprepared) and are deliberately being informed on arrival that their presence was no longer required, who then subsequently return home on the understanding that the case was being decided on paper. The result is that the client then finds themselves with judgement made against them due to non attendance with the added bonus of costs orders made against them. This concern was noticed relating to various cases within the daily listing and not specific to child matters. This is currently under investigation and I look forward to the outcome.

Now, by the time this entire process is complete and the new law firm can officially go on record, quite a sufficient amount of time has lapsed. This is not only not in the child’s time frame or best interest, but it goes against the very clients position within proceedings, not to mention the added stress to what can only be a very stressful time for them, and especially for clients with learning difficulties. LA’s have also been known to use these procedural delays to discredit the client’s position as being intentionally obstructive.

Whilst most of us are either in the legal field or have some inner knowledge of the workings of this system, it must be remembered that most clients do not and have no idea where to begin when things go wrong. There is currently no means to explain to the layman how to go about processes, what’s expected and what to do if things go wrong.

I hope that helps explain what it is like on ground level and is something that does need sorting. The amount of time consumed and paper generated to an already overwhelmed legal system, not to mention overworked lawyers, can surely be simplified.

Experience of another

Here another parents writes of what happened when she was left as a litigant in person for five months in care proceedings. 

I read the 1989 Children Act and got hold of a second hand law book that dealt specifically with that Act , from which I found out the Local Authority had acted unlawfully. I wrote out what I had found and handed it to the solicitor that had taken over the case, because she dealt with public law children’s proceedings, at the next hearing. She seemed bemused and asked who had written what I had handed to her. She said she would have to find out. She came back to me saying I was right but it would have made no difference. By this time I had done some more reading and believed that the case should have gone to judicial review and I also completely lost faith in the solicitor.

I contacted another firm of solicitors who were happy to take me on , but told me I would have to make a complaint about the original solicitors first. So I did, and was told by them that I had to meet the Senior Partner to resolve the complaint. So I turned up for the meeting, it was February, but the partner was dressed much the way senior politicians do on a factory visit, shirt sleeves rolled up and tie off;man of the people . I am obviously not legally trained, nor a high educated professional but I put my complaint across as best as I could and he dealt with me until I mentioned judicial review … He did not answer my question.

It appeared from his perspective, the complaint had been dealt with satisfactorily, from mine it was outstanding. They basically refused to let me transfer, neither the solicitor nor partner would answer my emails or phone calls, in the end I resorted to using my maiden name to get through.What happened next was even more shocking, the LAA would not transfer the legal aid as they said there was no reason to change solicitors, effectively leaving me without representation. It turned out, eventually that they had told the LAA that I was complaining about the private law proceedings and of course a lack of judicial review would not be relevant, as it is a procedure only used against public authorities.

All this took time and I was eventually a litigant in person for a little short of five months, a time of being petrified ( I am definitely more on the introvert side, so not an aspiring/failed actor) trying to present my own case against a courtroom full of seasoned professionals including of course the top notch Barrister representing the Local Authority. It was only when on the phone to the LAA yet again, that between us, I and the very pleasant lady on the other end of the phone twigged what had happened and it was put right.

So the solicitor got away scot free, even when I reported them to the Legal Ombudsman, who wouldn’t get involved as the dispute did not resolve money, if my memory serves me correctly and I had months of the Local Authority taking full advantage of my lack of legal representation to exploit my naivety.

Non molestation orders made without the other party present

This is Practice Guidance issued by the President of the Family Division on 18 January 2017

Family Court – Duration of Ex Parte (Without Notice) Orders

This Guidance was originally issued on 13 October 2014. This revised Guidance, issued on 18 January 2017, supersedes the previous Guidance.

1 The Magistrates’ Association and the National Bench Chairs’ Forum have raised with me the question of whether it is proper to grant an ex parte non-molestation injunction for an unlimited period. They suggest that practice varies. They express the view that to grant such an order for an unlimited time is wrong in principle.

2 In expressing that view, the Magistrates’ Association and the National Bench Chairs’ Forum are entirely correct. To grant an ex parte (without notice) injunction for an unlimited time is wrong in principle. The practice of granting such orders for an unlimited time, if this is still occurring, must stop.

3 Subject only to paragraph 8, the same principles, as set out below, apply to all ex parte (without notice) injunctive orders made by the Family Court or by the Family Division, irrespective of the subject matter of the proceedings or the terms of the order.
4 The law is to be found in Horgan v Horgan [2002] EWCA Civ 1371, paras 5–6 (Ward LJ), R (Casey) v Restormel Borough Council [2007] EWHC 2554 (Admin), paras 37–41 (Munby J), In re C (A Child) (Family Proceedings: Practice) [2013] EWCA Civ 1412, [2014] 1 WLR 2182, [2014] 1 FLR 1239, para 15 (Ryder LJ) and Re A (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 572, [2016] 4 WLR 111, paras 49-61, esp paras 59-61 (Munby P).

5 The relevant principles, compliance with which is essential, are as follows:
(i) An ex parte (without notice) injunctive order must never be made without limit of time. There must be a fixed end date. It is not sufficient merely to specify a return day. The order must specify on its face and in clear terms precisely when it expires (eg, 12 noon on 20 March 2017).
(ii) The order must also fix a return day. The order must specify the date, time and place of the hearing on the return day. The return day should normally be no more than 14 days after the date when the order was made. How long the hearing on the return day should be listed for must be a matter for the discretion of the judge. However, having regard to paragraph 6, often a very short listing may well be appropriate.
(iii) Careful consideration needs to be given to the duration of any order made ex parte (without notice). Many orders will be of short duration, typically no more than 14 days. But in appropriate cases involving personal protection, such as non-molestation injunctions granted in accordance with Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996, the order itself can be for a longer period, such as 6 or even 12 months, provided that the order specifies a return day within no more than 14 days. This must be a matter for the discretion of the judge, but a period longer than 6 months is likely to be appropriate only where the allegation is of long term abuse or where some other good reason is shown. Conversely, a period shorter than 6 months may be appropriate in a case where there appears to be a one-off problem that may subside in weeks rather than months.
(iv) The order must make it clear that (a) it was made in the absence of the respondent and that the court has considered only the evidence of the applicant and (b) the court has made no finding of fact. Where the evidence is written, it must be identified in the order. Where, exceptionally, the court has received oral or other evidence (eg, a photograph) that evidence should be recorded on the face of the order or reduced to writing and served with the order.
(v) Where the order has been made in accordance with Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996 it must recite that the court has had regard to sections 45(1) and (2) of the Act.
(vi) The order (see FPR 18.10(3)) ‘must contain a statement of the right to make an application to set aside or vary the order under rule 18.11.’ The phrase ‘liberty to apply’ is not sufficient for this purpose. The order must spell out that the respondent is entitled, without waiting for the return day, to apply to set aside or vary the order.
(vii) If the respondent does apply to set aside or vary the order the court must list the application as a matter of urgency, within a matter of days at most.

6 Experience suggests that in certain types of case, for example, non-molestation or other orders granted in accordance with Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996, the respondent frequently neither applies to set aside or vary the order nor attends the hearing on the return day.
(i) When, in such cases, there is no attendance by the respondent and the order, having been served, does not require amendment there is no need for re-service. The order made on the return should however record that the respondent, although afforded the opportunity to be heard, has neither attended nor sought to be heard.
(ii) If, however, variation of the original order is sought by the applicant (eg by extending the ambit or the duration of the order) then:
(a) Paragraphs 5(i), (iii)-(v) must be complied with in relation to the new order and the new order will need to be served.
(b) Unless, before the return day, the respondent was given proper notice of the proposed amendments, either in the application or in the initial order, (a) the new order must specify a new return day, and (b) paragraph 5(ii) must be complied with in relation to the new order.

7 I remind all practitioners and judges of the principle, which applies to all ex parte (without notice) injunctive orders made by the Family Court or by the Family Division, irrespective of the subject matter of the proceedings or the terms of the order, that a without notice application will normally be appropriate only if:
(a) there is an emergency or other great urgency, so that it is impossible to give any notice, however short or informal, or
(b) there is a real risk that, if alerted to what is proposed, if ‘tipped off’, the respondent will take steps in advance of the hearing to thwart the court’s order or otherwise to defeat the ends of justice. In an appropriate case this can justify the grant of a non-molestation injunction without notice, lest the respondent, having been served with an application, further molests his (or her) victim or exerts pressure on her (him) to abandon the proceedings.

8 Nothing in this Guidance derogates from, or otherwise modifies, the principles and safeguards to be observed on an application for an ex parte (without notice) freezing or search order: see L v K (Freezing Orders: Principles and Safeguards) [2013] EWHC 1735 (Fam), [2014] Fam 35.

Sir James Munby
President of the Family Division

A.H. and Others v the Russian Federation

A case about adoption and the best interests of children.

Application no. 6033/13

Judgment in this case was circulated on 17th January 2017. It involved 16 applications against the Russian Federation by 45 US citizens and involved 27 children. The claimants had all been in the final process of adopting Russian children when in 2013 the Russian Federation imposed an unexpected and swift ban on any adoption by US Citizens.

The case ended with the ECtHR agreeing that US parents had been discriminated against and awarding a small amount of damages as ‘just satisfaction’. The arguments about the rights and wrongs of the ban on adoption by US citizens were wide ranging and illustrate, yet again, that the rights of individual children are very often lost in the competing political and social arguments made by adults. 

The saddest part of the judgment is where the court notes that the peremptory ban on adoption lead to many of the children remaining in orphanages for months, even years. Some remain in orphanages still. 

Background to the claim

The death of Dima Yakovlev in 2008 had led to an outcry in Russia and concern over ill-treatment of other Russian children who had been adopted by American citizens. Dima died after being left in a car for 9 hours by his American adoptive father, who was later acquitted of involuntary manslaughter. On 1st January 2013 the Russian Federation introduced a law prohibiting any further adoption by US nationals of Russian children.  The US parents argued that preventing them from completing their adoption applications because of their nationality was unlawful discrimination and claimed breach of Article 14 of the ECHR in conjunction with Article 8. They also made a claim arguing breach of Article 3 because the children, many of whom had disabilities, had been deprived of medical treatment in the US.

At the time of the ban, the US State Department issued a statement highlighting its regret, pointing out that some children who had already formed bonds with their potential new families would now not be able to live with them. There was further serious criticism from various human rights agencies such as Amnesty international, who said it was politically motivated and not in the best interests of the children concerned.

Judge Dedov had the following view of the political background to the ban:

Obviously, the impugned Law was a reaction to the political pressure constantly exercised by the US authorities in relation to Russia since 2002, when the Russian authorities started taking steps to reinforce the independence and sovereignty of the country. Finally, in 2015 Russia was officially declared to be one of the most serious threats (together with ISIS and Ebola) to the USA. The US strategy was implemented through political and economic sanctions, cultural isolation, intensive political propaganda demonising the so-called “political regime” in Russia and establishment of military bases surrounding Russian territory.

Inter-country adoption is recognised as a mechanism to promote the welfare of children who cannot otherwise remain with their birth family by Art 21 of the 1989 UN Convention of the Rights of the Child, which was ratified by Russia in 1990. In 2013 the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted a Resolution on Inter Country Adoptions (see jmt para 301) which recognised that ‘a bond forms rapidly between the child and prospective adopters during the adoption process but before legal parent-child relationship has been effected’ and urged participating States to resolve its disputes about inter-country adoption in a way that did not harm the best interests of the child or damage this ‘nascent family’.

Article 8 and the right to a family and private life/ Article 14 prohibition on discrimination

All parties agreed that Article 8 right to a family life did not protect a mere wish to start a family (see para 376); it presupposes the existence of a family thus does not support a ‘right’ to adopt. The US applicants had initiated the inter-country adoption processes in 2010-12 so most of them had met the child they were seeking to adopt, had spent time with him or her, and had either submitted the adoption application to a Russian court or had their file ready for submission. They were all therefore in the ‘final stages’ of the adoption procedure (para 422).

Some applicants were clearly further down the road to establish ‘familial ties’ with the children  – for example, one family had already adopted the sibling of one of the children and thus had a clear argument on both right to family life and right to a private life.

The court noted at para 383 that the US applicants had a genuine intention to become parents by applying for inter country adoption when it was still lawful in Russia. Therefore the issue was their decision to become parents and ‘their personal development through the role of parents that they wished to assume’. This fell within the scope of ‘private life’ protected by Article 8. 

The Court therefore agreed that Article 14 and Article 8 applied and dismissed the arguments of the Russian Federation to the contrary. However, Article 14 could only apply to the US potential parents, who were discriminated against on the grounds of nationality. It could not apply to the children.

Russian Government – ban on adoption by US nationals was ‘measure of last resort’ to protect children

The Russian Government argued that the ban on the adoption of Russian children by US nationals was not discriminatory but based on objective and reasonable grounds and the children’s best interests (See para 392). The US citizens could still adopt from elsewhere and other countries had implemented similar blanket bans – for example the UK banned adoption from Cambodia in 2005. Other countries permit inter-country adoption only in exceptional circumstances or subject to strict requirements.

There was also concern that parents in the US had failed to provide reports about the wellbeing of 653 Russian children over the past 3 years and the Russian Government further relied upon reports from NGOs and the US Department of Health and Human Services, of a hidden ‘epidemic of violence’ against children in the USA, citing 5 children who died every day because of abuse or negligence perpetrated by adults (in 80% of cases being biological or adoptive parents). The Russian Government were concerned that at least 20 children adopted from Russia had been killed by American adoptive parents, although they did not have precise statistics to support this figure (para 396).

Thus a ban on adoption of Russian children by US nationals was not discrimination but a measure of last resort, prompted not only by instances of death, injury and sexual abuse of Russian adopted children but also by the lack of co-operation by the US to help ensure their safety and psychological well being (para 398).  Also cited was the desire to increase adoptions by Russian nationals.

US parents response – no objective justification for ban

The claimants responded (para 403) that death and serious injury to Russian adoptive children comprised on a tiny proportion of the overall number of Russian children so adopted and that the Russian Government had not provided any information that the situation was any better for Russian children in any other country, or indeed in Russian orphanages. The claimants rejected the argument that one of the aims behind the ban was to encourage adoption by Russian families as adoption by foreign nationals was only permitted when it was ‘impossible’ to find a Russian family willing to adopt. The claimants argued that the Russian response was disproportionate and excluded an entire category of potentially loving parents for children for whom no adoptive family could be found in Russia (para 405).

The Decision of the Court – in imposing ban on adoption, no consideration given to the interests of the children

The Court agreed that American nationals were being treated differently. Did that have an objective and reasonable justification (para 412)? The Court noted that the ban on adoption came only two months after the introduction of the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption between Russia and the US which was aimed at providing stronger legal safeguards for such inter-country adoptions. Most of the concerning incidents involving Russian children in the US had occurred before the entry into force of that Bilateral Agreement. Thus it was doubtful that the ban on adoption had a reasonable justification (para 420).

The claimants were all in the final stages of the adoption process and their proceedings were brought to an abrupt end because of the automatic ineligibility provided by the ban on adoption that unexpectedly came into force over ten days.

The Court found at para 425:

‘No consideration was given to the interests of the children concerned, and those of them who were eventually placed in a different adoptive or foster family were obliged to stay in the orphanage for additional periods ranging from several months to several years. At the date of this judgment, some of them are still in orphanages.

The Russian Government had thus failed to show that there were compelling reasons to justify a blanket ban applied retroactively and indiscriminately to all prospective adoptive parents from the US (para 426). The difference in treatment was thus discriminatory in breach of Article 14, in conjunction with Article 8. There was thus no need to examine a separate complaint under Article 8.

The Article 3 breach

The claimants further alleged that most of the children concerned needed specialist medical care that was only available in the US and depriving them of that treatment was a breach of their Article 3 rights, which protects against inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court considered this at para 432 onwards. The Russian Government provided evidence about medical treatment available and conditions in Russian orphanages and rejected the argument that the Russian state could not provide suitable medical care for the children. The claimants relied upon expert statements and academic works concerning the general situation in Russia as the medical files relating to the children were in the Russian Government’s possession.

Submissions of third party intervenors about the importance of early permanence for children.

At para 440 onwards the Court heard argument from the intervenors. The Harvard Law School’s Child Advocacy Program (CAP) and the Bucharest Early Intervention Project (BEIP) argued that extensive research over many years demonstrated the importance of placing children in permanent adoptive homes as early as possible. Nurturing parenting in child’s early months and years is vital to normal physical, emotional and intellectual development. CAP cited particular concerns about Russian orphanages, saying ‘95% of Russian children who grow up in orphanages end up on the streets… and are likely to die shortly after their 18th birthday’. As the world became more global, the idea ‘that children belonged in some essentialist sense with their racial or national groups of origin was outdated’ (para 443).

The Russian Government countered that Article 8 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child protected the child’s right to preservation of his or her identity, including nationality. They rejected the arguments about dire outcomes for children in Russian orphanages as ‘unsubstantiated and untrue’ (para 446).

The Court ruled that the complaint based on Article 3 was inadmissible as manifestly ill founded. The information provided by the claimants was largely of a general nature and the evidence from the Russian Government showed that these particular children received adequate medical care in Russia.

Damages

The Court awarded the applicants EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and around $600 dollars for costs and expenses of the court proceedings.

The Partly Concurring Opinion of Judge Dedov

This raises a sad and salient point:

There is a more serious problem in Russia. The Russian Government informed the Court that there were still more than 66,000 children abandoned by their parents and subsequently placed in orphanages. The total number of such children who have been accommodated in orphanages during the last 25 years may be close to 300,000. Obviously this is the result of a structural social problem caused by the deterioration of values and lack of social responsibility. This problem cannot be resolved either by inter-country adoption or by political pressure’.

 

A Response to Maggie Mellon

This exchange began after I read a press release for the documentary The Stolen Children of England (Les Enfants Voles D’Angleterre), that was shown on French TV Canal 5 on 15 November 2016. I commented about how uneasy that made me here. 

I was then sent a English language version of the documentary which I transcribed here and made more detailed and critical comments. In brief, I was alarmed by the number of serious misrepresentations and distortions of reality which were permitted unchallenged air time. It was clear that the majority of the contributors had strong and existing links with a number of extreme campaigners against ‘forced adoption’. I have written about my serious concerns about the two most prolific,  John Hemming and Ian Josephs, on numerous occasions over many years.

What was interesting however was the appearance of Maggie Mellon, a former senior social worker of many  years experience who was introduced as a member of the British Association of Social Workers. I agreed with much of what Maggie said in the documentary but I was concerned that her appearance alongside the other more extreme campaigners could be interpreted by some as providing legitimacy for what they were saying.

I challenged Maggie about this via Twitter and was initially dismayed by her response – which was in effect that I should just ‘get over it’. So I am relieved that she chose to respond at greater length. Her response has been published on the Transparency Project.

I make my response here because I think the issues now being ventilated are going beyond the remit of the Transparency Project which does not exist to toe any particular line about adoption in particular, but to promote clarity and understanding about the family justice system in general.

Enjoy the Silence

I will set out at the end of this post my particular comments on Maggie’s response. Some of which I agreed with and some I did not. I am glad she took the time to respond. I think this is a very serious and important area and the quality of debate so far has been really poor. Vulnerable people are told things which are frightening and untrue and they are encouraged to disengage from both social workers and lawyers.

So what was most interesting for me were the things that Maggie didn’t say.  She diminishes the very serious complaints I make about the misrepresentations of Hemming  and Josephs and answers none of them.  I think the time is long overdue for some collective, considered response from both the social work and the legal profession about the activities of these campaigners and the damage they do. Failure to act is a choice in itself and silence invites complicity.

Towards the end she says:

Until such time as I can make a programme that allows me editorial control of content then I will accept invitations that allow me to offer a challenge to what I believe is a collective failure to protect and promote human rights.

And I reply:

I applaud Maggie’s passion and commitment to speak out against a failure to protect and promote human rights. I remain dismayed and alarmed that she thinks this documentary is a vehicle for either noble ambition. I would ask her again to consider the story of Colin and Clare. Who went into their final hearing unrepresented, save for the ‘advice’ of Ian Josephs. How did they end up in such a parlous position? Who did they listen to and why? Who preyed on their vulnerability and to what end? There are serious problems with the child protection system and we need to deal with them. But this is not the way. If Maggie wishes to continue to sup with the devil, I hope her spoon is long enough.

Maggie Mellon’s response and my comments (in bold and in brackets)

I appeared on this programme on the request of the documentary makers. They had read an article that I had written in 2014 in Professional Social Work, the monthly magazine of the British Association of Social Workers. In this article, I had expressed strong concerns about current policy and practice on adoption, and asked if, in future, this would be recognised as a scandal of the same magnitude as removal of children from care to Australia, Canada, New Zealand in the previous century.

These removals have now been acknowledged by the government, and by the charities who carried them out, to have been very wrong. My plea was for us not to wait forty or fifty years to ask if the current policy and practice on adoption is right. In my view, this is a crucial issue for social work. BASW has now mounted an enquiry into the social work role in adoption which will report in 2017. You can read about this here (https://www.basw.co.uk/adoption-enquiry)

In November Sarah posted up a strong condemnation of the documentary, prior to having watched it. After watching the programme Sarah has now enlarged on this condemnation in a detailed piece on her blog (the Transparency Project is NOT ‘my blog’ – I am simply one of many members of the Transparency Project. We do not necessarily speak with one collective voice) which contests some of the editorial commentary, throws doubt upon the validity of the families’ cases, and generally asserts that it composes a nasty campaign to discredit English courts, and to frighten people unnecessarily. (I don’t simply ‘assert’ and I don’t ‘throw doubt’ – I have provided clear evidence for my criticisms. It is beyond doubt that very important information about some of the people interviewed was simply not shared. Which is a great shame, as that information was very relevant to the arguments being made. Failure to share this information was dishonest and seriously detracts from the credibility of this documentary). 

Sarah has asked me to respond to her blog, and whilst she may be disappointed, I am not going to offer a point-by-point commentary on all of the issues that she raises about the documentary’s content. I am instead going to focus on the key issues. (Fair enough. I can’t compel anyone to answer my questions. I can only hope when I raise such serious issues as I do here that people who wish to be a credible voice in this debate will want to respond.)

The documentary had the legitimate aim of exposing what the makers considered to be serious breaches of human rights in the UK, with a particular focus on the number of mothers travelling to France to avoid having their babies taken at birth. (this is asserting that the ‘aim’ of the documentary makers was ‘legitimate’ because they had declared it to be so. The problem with this is that the ‘aim’ was decidedly NOT legitimate as it was based on false or partial information. There was no attempt to provide the missing information, which would have cast an entirely different light on both the mothers who ‘fled’ and the men who facilitated this ‘fleeing’.)

The aim was to draw attention to the policy and practice of forced adoption by UK social services and courts, a practise which is almost unique in Europe, and certainly nowhere so prevalent as in the UK. (I don’t quibble that it is legitimate to raise serious questions about why were are so unique in Europe – not for having a mechanism for non consensual adoption, as every European country has such mechanisms – BUT that we resort to it so often. However, the context in which this documentary chose to raise these questions was on a decided and false assumption about the degree of deliberate corruption in the English system.)

I don’t believe that it is necessary to endorse all the claims or concerns expressed in the documentary in order to believe that it is good that it was made and broadcast.  (Maybe not. But you certainly do have to grapple with my central accusation – that much of it was dangerously and deliberately false – before determining that it was a good thing it was broadcast.)

The nature of a documentary is that it features a number of interviews of people with relevant knowledge, points of view and experiences. I do not feel it necessary to defend the nature of independent documentary filmmaking, which is what Sarah seems to be inviting me to do. ( I am not inviting general discourse on ‘independent documentaries’ I am asking for comment on this particular documentary, relying on it does on so many unreliable and dangerous sources.)

I did not make the documentary, so I am neither obliged, nor interested in debating incidental issues such as the programme makers’ assertion that Thatcherism was responsible, or whether case A may not be properly explained, or that person B may have less than pure motives and the other criticisms and allegations that Sarah makes (Fair enough. But the issues of substance I raise about the honesty and credibility of this documentary as a whole are NOT ‘incidental’ and they cannot be simply brushed aside in this way). 

The issue for me is whether the programme had legitimate aims and whether it carried these out. This comes down to two crucial criticisms which Sarah seems to hold about the very premises of the documentary’s aim.

One is her belief that the family courts are mostly to be trusted in arriving at their judgements on this issue. (I do indeed hold that belief. It is based on 17 years in practice. That does not mean I am blind to examples of bad practice. I simply don’t accept they are common place. But I fully accept they exist, they have serious consequences and that we need to do as much as we can to stop them occurring. I have written about this many times in many different places. Here is one example).

The other is that forced or non-consensual adoption is a reasonable policy for the UK to have adopted. From everything that Sarah writes, neither of these beliefs was liable to be shaken by any evidence to the contrary that the documentary might present (I do believe that for some children, adoption is the best option. I also believe – and have said so, many times and in many different places – that the ‘push’ for adoption by successive Governments is wrong and unprincipled and risks offence to the rule of law. Sadly, I have also had cause to doubt what respect Maggie’s own profession has for the rule of law in his field. And I agree that the documentary is hardly likely to ‘shake’ any beliefs I hold – because my ‘beliefs’ are forged on experience and on evidence and thus are not liable to any ‘shaking’ from a documentary based on distortion and misrepresentation). 

First of all – belief in the family courts:

Here is an exchange between ‘Stacey’ and Sarah in the comments following her initial blog criticising the (then yet unseen) programme:

Stacey “What is going to happen when future generations of children who have had a bad experience in foster care or adoption want answers to why they were removed from their families?”

Sarah “If a child wants answers about why they were removed, they can access all the documents that went before the Judge.”

This is not an acceptable answer to the question. It rests on an assumption that there is a level playing field for families in the courts, and that the wheels of British justice ground slow and smooth. Ultimately Sarah believes that transparency would reveal the worthiness of the British legal system, and that children who have been removed from their parents will be sufficiently comforted and reassured when they are grown, by her confirmation that the process was carried out properly (Maggie reads an awful lot into a short comment. I was not trying to suggest that being able to access papers in the future is the ‘answer’ to any real or perceived inadequacies or injustice in the system. I was simply pointing out that it is not right to suggest that children ‘never’ get the opportunity to find out what happened to them – as was strongly asserted in the documentary. I have commented in many places about what happens when the system goes wrong. I don’t believe transparency will reveal ‘worthiness’ – I believe it will reveal reality. Cases do go wrong and people do make mistakes, but most people try hard and do their best. )

For me, there are a number of flaws in this position. One is that it assumes that if the court made the right decision based on whatever information it was presented to it, then that is just fine and dandy. But it’s not. We know that the civil courts decide on the balance of probability, not beyond reasonable doubt. Sarah herself, in a post on another issue, protests that this test means that ‘truth’ only needs to be 51% probable. The balance of probability is not an objective test, and must often necessarily be decided by what a judge finds the most probable assertion between two competing claims. Is there a level playing field in the struggle to assert what is ‘probable’, if the case is contested between a group of professional social workers, and an understandably distraught and ill-resourced family? (I agree with Maggie that the weight that is placed on the balance of probabilities should make us uneasy. I agree there is debate worth having about the standard of proof in care proceedings and what it is sometimes asked to achieve.) 

Social services and the courts are not immune to the prejudices and injustices of the wider world that sustains their existence. This directly challenges any assumption that the best interests of children is as sound a guide for decision making as those who use it to justify their actions and decisions would have us believe. Just because the law and the courts embrace the principle of the best interests of the child, it does not follow that these may be reasonably decided in court. In practice the test of ‘the best interests of children’ is open to many interpretations, and to flagrant abuse. It can be used to justify the ‘rescue’ of children from the problems that their parents are experiencing or are assessed as experiencing to the ‘safe’ world of ‘care’. I discuss the actuality of ‘care’ later, but for now, I want to consider the rapid changes to the notion of ‘best interests’ judgements. (I agree with this) 

Not so long ago, homosexuality was illegal, and at best a sign of mental illness or at worst of perversion. Homosexual young people were subject to religious or psychiatric ‘treatment’. Not much longer ago, a woman who left her husband was assumed to have forfeited her right to custody of the children. Within my lifetime unmarried mothers have been locked up in Magdalene laundries, or confined to mother and baby homes, and forced to give up their children – all in the children’s ‘best interests’. Now we are apologising to those mothers and their children – too late for many, who have died without ever being offered contrition. What are the prejudices or convictions today about children’s best interests that future generations may look back on in disbelief and horror? (I agree with this – and have said so)

Aside from these issues of principle and of politics, in any case a court case is at the end of a process, during which the best interests of children are supposed to determine all decisions made in intervening in a child and family’s life. The ‘best interests’ argument in these cases is often deployed to justify the termination or severe restriction and policing of contact between children and their parents, from the point that a child is removed and long before a case comes to court. It is used to prohibit parents from telling their child they love them and are fighting to get them back, it is used to prevent parents showing upset, and to demand that they are cheerful and assure the child that they want them to be happy in ‘care’ and that their social worker is doing the right thing, and it has also been used to forbid the parent talking to the child in their common language of origin. The consequence is quite often the long drawn out destruction of the parent-child relationship, the evidence of which, ironically, is then used as the main reason why the child must be permanently separated from the parent(s) by adoption. These and other social work decisions on contact are not founded on any reliable body of knowledge, and yet are accepted by the courts as the result of ‘expert’ application of knowledge about children’s best interests. (I agree with this. I am particularly troubled by the lack of clear and reliable access to relevant research and how often unevidenced assertions about issues such as ‘attachment’ are made in care proceedings.)

Florence Bellone, a French journalist whom Sarah dismisses in her blog as not credible to comment on the programme, because she has consistently and outspokenly criticised UK adoption law and practice, offers this advice to Sarah (I dismiss Ms Bellone as not credible because of what she says and who she associates with. Being ‘outspoken’ is not a problem for me. Consorting with Sabine McNeill definitely is. If Ms Mellon is not familiar with who Ms Bellone associates with, I suggest she does some reading here).
.
“The only thing I could say is: ‘follow parents on the field to see the evidence…Don’t rely on what is written in the paperwork…If there is one thing which is covering up real rubbish, it is that mantra of the “BEST interest of the child” which is covering up all possible rubbish.’

Stacey continues with this advice from her knowledge of a case based on the mother’s alleged ‘failure to bond’ with her child. She points out that evidence that points away from this conclusion even if it is presented in court by the mother’s representative, will not weigh against the social workers’ assessment and that ‘… the social worker should have evaluated the evidence before writing the assessment and the mother’s time might be better spent focusing on her infant’s development rather than worrying about having to defend such nonsense in front of a judge, even if she does have a lawyer.’

Giving birth to a baby while the threat or knowledge of its forcible removal hangs over a mother is one of the most likely ways to damage her relationship to her unborn child. The uncertainty, the suspicion, the stress, the knowledge that any love felt might inevitably mean unbearable pain of loss: what could be more likely to make a mother hesitate to commit to a child? And then to find that that very self-preserving distance may be used as justification for removal? I have yet to be persuaded that there are any circumstances beyond psychosis, or other evidence, that the parent represents an imminent physical threat to the child that would make removal at birth necessary or right (I agree, and so does the law, that removal of a child at birth is the most serious of all interferences in family life. It should not be done lightly, and in my experience, it is not done lightly. But it is sad reality that there are sometimes not enough safe and protective mother and baby placements available and thus sometimes hard decisions have to be made. Those cases I have experienced when mother’s lose babies do not involve psychosis but generally involve long standing and serious issues of substance abuse which was on going during pregnancy).

And that brings me to the second part of my disagreement with Sarah; her apparent acceptance of non-consensual adoption as a response to circumstances which are much short of absolutely critical, or where the parent’s consent can’t be sought due to absence or refusal to respond. Other countries in Europe require a far higher standard – if it happens at all. Forced adoption against the explicit opposition of parents is not contemplated as a routine childcare option anywhere in Europe, to the extent that it is here (I agree, as I have said that other European countries do it differently and it would be interesting to know more about why and what are the outcomes for children). 

What is peculiar is that Sarah does not even begin to grapple with the contention that ‘failure to bond’ with a child after birth should be advanced as a reason for the removal and adoption of that child. (I don’t grapple with it because I was not aware it was being raised in the documentary. The documentary asserted that children were removed for ‘no reasons’ or reasons that were not explained to the parents – which I don’t accept. I don’t know what Maggie means by ‘failure to bond’. It is not something I have seen asserted in any threshold criteria. If that were the only thing contained in a threshold document, of course I would challenge it. It’s a meaningless assertion on its own. We seem to be moving far away now from the issues which I thought were under discussion).

Apart from any other concern, the child will be first moved to a foster mother, who is being paid to care for the child and has no bond at all with the child, and will not be required to prove one. And from there to a succession of such foster mothers, including ‘respite carers’ offered to give the paid carer a break from the 24/7 demands of a young baby – curious that it is an expensive justifiable for a paid carer, but not for the original mother. Finally, the child will be moved to a placement with adopters who may or may not ‘bond’ to the standard demanded of the birth mother. If they don’t they will be offered post-adoption counselling and support, rather than the child protection assessment and removal offered to the birth mother. It is ironic that such a support structure can be utilised for the paid recipients of the child, but not its birth mother, and callous that the emotional cost, of knowing your child is being passed around such a series of strangers, without your consent or knowledge, is not considered (I agree that frequent moves of placement are generally disastrous for children. But this was not, so far as I recall, an issue raised in the documentary so I am unsure why I am criticised for not dealing with it.)

Over the last couple of years, I have had the privilege and the pain of acting as an independent social worker in a number of adoption cases. Invariably I find major discrepancies between the file records and the reports that are presented to Children’s Hearings and to the Sheriff courts. These are usually the result of a number of either deliberate or accidental misrepresentations. Within these records, I rarely, if ever, see reference to any research by social workers to justify their assessments and their decisions. I often find claims about the damage to infant brains that ‘failure to bond’, or exposure to ‘emotional abuse’ will cause, or that children’s upset after having contact with their mother ‘must be’ a result of ‘re-traumatisation’. These claims are scientifically and intellectually suspect at best, but worse, they are professionally incompetent. (that is really worrying. I have also found misrepresentations and I have challenged them. However, they are not commonplace. If others have found them commonplace, this definitely requires investigation.)

This is at the crux of the issue, there is a dearth of critical thinking, and a dearth of professional robustness in the carrying out of forced adoptions. (This is the ultimate irony for me. This document represents something far worse than a dearth of ‘critical thinking’ or robust analysis. It promotes lies and distortions. It is indefensible, particularly from one who rightly recognises the fundamental importance of proper analysis.)

So, no, I have no regrets about taking part in a programme that addressed the pain of parents separated from their children and their very poor experiences of social services and the courts. (and that’s fine. And important. So far as it goes. But Maggie appeared under the flag of the British Association of Social Workers and thus added a gloss of credibility to some very incredible assertions.)

The programme was worth making and worth watching (no it wasn’t and I have explained precisely why) and deserves more than a litany of complaints about everything and everyone associated with it. (this trivialises, diminishes and demeans the very serious nature of my criticisms.)

Yes, my contribution and that of others was edited – unless a programme is live, editing is inevitable. I have appeared or been quoted in many articles and programmes and there is always editing. (I have agreed with much of what Maggie says in the documentary. My complaints and concerns are not about how her contributions were edited – but that she cannot bring herself to accept that Ian Josephs and John Hemming are not a force for good in this debate). 

My own unedited views are clearly expressed in a number of published articles, in Professional Social Work, in The Herald, Scotsman and Guardian newspapers, online in Community Care, Common Space, Scottish Review, Scottish Justice Matters, amongst other places. Until such time as I can make a programme that allows me editorial control of content then I will accept invitations that allow me to offer a challenge to what I believe is a collective failure to protect and promote human rights. (I applaud Maggie’s passion and commitment to speak out against a failure to protect and promote human rights. I remain dismayed and alarmed that she thinks this documentary is a vehicle for either noble ambition. I would ask her again to consider the story of Colin and Clare. Who went into their final hearing unrepresented, save for the ‘advice’ of Ian Josephs. How did they end up in such a parlous position? Who did they listen to and why? Who preyed on their vulnerability and to what end? There are serious problems with the child protection system and we need to deal with them. But this is not the way. If Maggie wishes to continue to sup with the devil, I hope her spoon is long enough). 

John Hemming: An apology

In the matter of CB (A Child)

This post arises out of discussions on Twitter on New Year’s Day regarding the ‘Latvian case’ and the extent to which John Hemming is able or willing to accept the findings of various courts about the harm suffered by the child CB. I will set out a summary of my response and then a more detailed chronology of the case to support that summary.

On January 1st 2017 I published a tweet to which Mr Hemming objected.  This was part of a discussion with other Twitter users about the nature and extent of Mr Hemming’s misrepresentations about the case of CB (A child) – ‘the Latvian case’

I said, in the context of a question about what the mother had done to make necessary changes to her parenting:

Mr Hemming denied that he had said the mother hadn’t done anything wrong and asked me to retract this statement and apologise. He referred me again to this blog post from 2015. I have already commented on Mr Hemming’s involvement in the Latvian case in this post and again in this post.

I concede that I owe Mr Hemming an apology. I don’t know when he first made direct contact with the mother in this case so I cannot imply that he was ‘advising’ her during the care proceedings in 2011. However, it is clear that by the time of her appeal to the Court of Appeal in April 2013 she had dispensed with her lawyers and was represented by ‘Mr H’ – who I shall assume is Tim Haines, one of Mr Hemming’s trusted advisers with his Justice For Families organisation. This assumption is bolstered by the fact that it was Mrs Julie Haines who was representing her in 2015.

It is also clear that Mr Hemming did concede on his blog that going out and leaving your 20 month old alone before the babysitter had turned up, was not great parenting. So I accept, it is misleading for me to suggest that Mr Hemming thought ‘nothing’ wrong had happened here.

However, what is abundantly clear, from his blog and his discussions via Twitter, he certainly didn’t think anything had happened to justify the removal of CB from her mother’s care and her eventual adoption. According to Mr Hemming, this was a case of a child adopted ‘because of nappy rash and a missed babysitter’.

So here is what I should have said

I don’t know when Mr Hemming first spoke directly to the mother. But he was clearly involved with her by 2013. He persistently and consistently asserts that this case was about no more than ‘nappy rash’ or a ‘late babysitter’ . This is utter, unmitigated hogwash and displays a chilling lack of concern for CB or recognition of the danger in which she was placed. The facts of this case – which I summarise below – show the clear and cogent reasons by which various courts have accepted that CB had suffered significant harm in her mother’s care and would be at risk of suffering more harm in the future if not removed. Mr Hemming’s continued misrepresentations about this case are wrong, ridiculous and dangerous. He should apologise for making them and agree never to repeat them.

But don’t just take my word for it. Have a look at the Court of Appeal judgment from 2013, from where I take the summary of facts and chronology set out below.

CB was born on 30th April 2008. On the 4th April 2009 the mother accepted a caution for the offence of being drunk in charge of a child under 7 when she was found at 1am with CB in a buggy, drunk and barefoot in the middle of the road.  On 18th January 2010 a social work assessment concluded that this was not the mother’s usual behaviour and CB would be ok in her care. However in February 2010 the local authority received complaints that CB was screaming and running about ‘almost every night’ until about 2am. On 5th March 2010 the mother’s landlord called the police who arrived and found CB, aged about 20 months, alone and in a pitiful state.

What did the court accept about CB’s circumstances? From para 8 of the 2013 judgment:

  • the room had a strong and overpowering smell of urine and faeces
  • CB’s clothes were wet and she was shivering
  • It was clear she had not been changed or cleaned ‘all day’
  • She had only an empty bottle within reach
  • Her nappy was so swollen she couldn’t walk properly
  • Her skin was soaked in urine to extent that a rash was noted when she was examined in hospital

Para 11 of the judgment confirms that by 3rd August 2010 CB, who had been taken into police protection and then into foster care, had been assessed as having significant delay in ALL aspects of her development.

Para 17 confirms the finding that the mother had maladapted personality traits which made her prone to denial and repression and reliance on ‘avoidance strategies’ such as alcohol.

On 26th October 2010 the  mother was again detained by the police on suspicion of being drunk.  On 15th June 2011 care proceedings were issued and on 10th July 2012 a placement order was made by DJ Mc Phee. The mother appealed against this to HHJ Cryan who dismissed that appeal on 8th October 2012 which is how she ended up in the Court of Appeal in April 2013, where her second appeal was also dismissed.

So how does Hemming deal with this?

By minimisation, denial and apparent lack of any regard for the welfare of CB. His blog post refers to the case ‘starting with two incidents’. The first becomes simply a mother crossing the road after a night out with a friend, having slipped off her shoes because they were hurting her. No mention of fact it was 1am and the mother accepted a caution for a criminal offence.

The second incident he admits ‘was more serious’. CB had been ‘found home alone and with a full nappy’. But, he asserts, the mother had actually arranged a babysitter and her only mistake was to leave CB before the babysitter arrived.  Mr Hemming goes on to quote the police report from the time  which simply underscores how ridiculous his analysis is.

The report notes that the police arrived at the scene at 18.50. We know they were called by the landlord so presumably CB had been alone for some time by now. Shortly after the police arrived a female also turns up and tells the police that she was the babysitter and she had just popped out for 10 minutes ‘and had been looking after the child all day long’. The ‘babysitter’ was promptly arrested. At 19.08 a decision was made to take CB to the hospital as she was very cold and possibly dehydrated. At 20.10 CB’s older sister arrives. The mother does not turn up until 21.30.

Mr Hemming states that the mother ‘accepts and I agree that she should not have left home before the babysitter arrived’.

And that appears to be the full extent to which Mr Hemming or the mother would accept any wrongdoing here.

This ignores entirely:

  • the fact the mother accepted a caution and therefore admitted guilt for being in charge of CB whilst intoxicated at 1am in April 2009;
  • the disgusting state in which CB was found in March 2010, cold, wet, whimpering and clearly having been left in a filthy nappy ‘all day’;
  • The ‘babysitter’ and the  mother clearly giving conflicting accounts of when this ‘babysitter’ was due to arrive – the babysitter maintaining she had been there ‘all day’. If the babysitter had indeed been there ‘all day’ then given the state in which CB was found, the mother’s judgement in choosing this person to care for her daughter is seriously in question;
  • That by August 2010 CB was found to be delayed in ALL aspects of her development, which points to significant neglect in her mother’s care.

The conduct of this case by the local authority does not escape criticism and nor should it. I note that earlier assessments of the mother which were positive are described as ‘naive’. I have to accept it must have been hard for the mother to process why initial positive reports about her parenting did not then translate into her daughter’s return to her care .Nor do I understand why it took so long to make an application for a care order given the findings about global developmental delay for CB in 2010.

But nothing in any failings or delay by the local authority can justify Mr Hemming’s persistent and deliberate mischaracterisation of this very sad case, as one where a baby was adopted for having a nappy rash. The impact on the mother has been obvious. She has been encouraged by Hemming and his entourage to see her conduct as attracting very little criticism, her child ‘stolen’ to meet adoption targets and the last 5 years of her life wasted in an utterly futile fight.

I’m not an idiot

I’m not an idiot. I realise that nothing I say here or anywhere else is going to stop Hemming. His distortions and misrepresentations about the family justice system are now part of his DNA. A great deal of his activities and his identity is tied up now with this crusading role. Presumably quite a lot of money too – I keep asking how much the Haines charge to take parents to the Court of Appeal and I have never got an answer, but I hear from some disgruntled parents that its about £1,500 a time.

But I hope that my activities in attempting to call him to account might give some others pause for thought about how much they take him seriously or how much they think it wise to engage with him.

As I have taken the time to deal with his blog post, perhaps he could return the favour and deal with mine? I’ve only been asking since September 2016.

‘Mums on the Run’ – Where do they go? How safe are they?

The importance of challenge in the post truth world

2016 has been a terrible year but perhaps a necessary year. Just as the boil has to burst or be lanced before it can heal, we do need to confront why so many people are so angry and so unhappy and so willing not only to embrace distortions and misrepresentations of what is true, but to help spread them far and wide.

I operate on a small canvass. My interest, knowledge and expertise is around court proceedings when the State wishes to remove a child from a family. But this superficially small area of law and policy encompasses a whole world of human pain and really interesting and necessary discussions about the limits and justifications to State interference with individual liberties.

So I think it is a hugely important topic and worthy of proper discussion. I have tried to do my bit to be part of that; I have organised two multi disciplinary conferences in 2015 and 2016 with the help of the Transparency Project – read about 2015 here. I try to provide clear information on this website and provide a forum for debate. I have learned a lot from those who comment here; my perspectives have shifted and needed to shift.

But what I will continue to refuse to do is accept or promote issues which I know are not true. This seems to attract a lot of negative attention, which in the past few months has increased considerably.  I have had emailed threats directly to my chambers – for the first time ever in December 2016 I went to the police (who were very good indeed).

My dismay has now reached even higher levels. In November a documentary called ‘England’s Stolen Children’ was aired in France. I saw a short press release about it in English and was immediately alarmed. I wrote about that here. 

I then requested an English language version from the producer and I transcribed it here. I was even more alarmed after watching the whole thing. I won’t repeat the lies, distortions and mispresentations I found here, you can read if you are interested, the post on the Transparency Project.

However, instead of trying to engage in discussion about these really serious points, what I got were insults. These are just examples from the comments to the first of my posts on the Transparency Project. I am told things are even worse on Facebook where I am variously accused of being a ‘kiddy fiddler’ or forcing my mother to buy me a car.

So, dear Sarah, if you do not understand what is going on in UK, simply shut up and make deep reserches.

So, I not suprising when illiterate baristers are resuming their ”experiences”. Sorry, Sarah, but when you will began to demonstrate real ability to think and act proffesionally, we can to discus, but at present I can see just very dangerous presentations of UK justice, full of personal illiterate ambitions, who is able to destroy any family in UK. Justice,

I do not understand how people involved in the justice business can support such practices, pocket the legal aid money and defend Mother System for their own comfort. You say “bonkers” ? Yeah… Bonkers are all those professional loosers on the LAs lawyers lists that I have seen, taking no risk and no pride, acting like rats when they should stand for justice. (this from an allegedly ‘award winning’ journalist)

Forced adoption and forced long term foster care should be abolished immediately, so you , Sarah, wlll find some more dignified job rather than defend totally discredited, shameful system which even not allow my son to read his own judgement and UNCRC .

How dishonnest you are, Mrs Phillimore, by quoting me uncorrectly. The sentence is : “You might know that foreign families are even prohibited contacts in their own language! You need to understand that this is something that no journalist from any country has read on the parents’paperwork without wanting to vomit.” It’s a bit different, isn’t it ? So you are a barrister and you transform the facts ? Maybe you did this too many times and you can’t anymore realise if you are doing it again? Is your insulting and panicking style ok in court ? Well it is true that all those bad parents are giving you a living…
But now maybe I understand your point. You hate Ian Josephs who did help loads of family and of course in these cases, no child, no fee.

You also ‘sneered’ because I was not visibly ‘disabled enough’ to suit you!
I don’t believe I have said I support Hemming or Josephs; just that their answers to you raise major issues that I can evidence.
Your accusations of ‘barbed comments’ is exactly what I would expect from an LA solicitor or Barrister!!!!

Time and time again I ask for help understanding where my analysis has failed. I have set out my position in detail here.  Time and time again the response is simply insults and hysterical language.  It might be naive of me to expect differently from those who have obviously gone through very painful and real life experiences. I cannot expect emotional detachment and precise analysis in those circumstances and I hope I have showed how patient I try to be, even in the face of the most disgusting comments and assertions.

But I had hoped rather more from the professionals. One former social worker, Maggie Mellon was interviewed extensively in the documentary and was introduced as a member of the British Association of Social Workers. Clearly, this will give an air of legitimacy to her appearance. I do not provide comment as ‘a Member of the Family Law Bar Association’ – I don’t speak for the members of that organisation and I certainly don’t ask that they legitimise my campaigning activities. I think it would be helpful for BASW to review their policy about how their name is used for the future.

I agreed with much of what Ms Mellon had to say about the impact of poverty on parents and the probably disastrous consequences that will flow from privatisation of any part of child protection services. But I was concerned that she was prepared to be part of such a documentary which relied on demonstrable untruths and offered such uncritical support to Ian Josephs. I asked for her comments. She said ‘you disagree with the programme. Some people disagree with you. Get over it’.

I replied that I could not simply ‘get over’ the promulgation of really serious lies that would not only frighten vulnerable people but scare them away from the very help that could achieve something for them – which seems to be the case for Colin and Clare in the documentary.

I received this response.

Let’s be clear. I am not ‘designated’ by anyone, God or court to do what I do. And  nor do I think I require any such ‘designation’ to challenge what I know and have proved to be really dangerous distortions of truth, made under a false flag of campaigning for human rights.

I think we all have a moral duty, simply as human beings, to strive to identify the truth and then promote it. I am not naive enough to think I have a monopoly on ‘the Truth’ or that my perspective is always and only the ‘right’ one. But if you disagree with me – tell me why. Tell me without insulting my intelligence, my lack of attractiveness, my marital status or my mother. And then we can have a dialogue. And out of that dialogue we might be able to agree on some common ground.

Or not. Frankly, the way 2016 has been going, I’m not holding my breath. But I won’t stop just because I am ordered to do so. I will carry on lighting my candle and I hope others will join me.

 

Further reading

If you are interested in the debate, I recommend the following websites which both provide clear, accessible information about the family court system and the importance of distinguishing truth from lies.

https://hoaxteadresearch.wordpress.com – very good and through debunking of the Satanic Ritual Abuse Hoax fiasco which still rumbles on in some quarters.

The Transparency Project – a registered charity of which I am a proud Trustee.

‘Is likely to suffer significant harm’ – to what extent are social workers relying on their crystal balls?

Thanks again to Kate W a retired social worker for her thoughts about the meaning of ‘likely to suffer’ significant harm. Consideration of the ‘risk of future harm’ is often a hot topic in debates about the child protection system; its detractors complain that this is no more than ‘crystal ball gazing’ and removal of children without actual proven harm is ‘punishment without crime’. What does Kate say in defence of ‘future risk’?

There appears to be a degree of confusion/misunderstanding about the meaning of “likely significant harm” Children Act 1989. The standard of proof needed is that the children IS suffering significant harm or is likely to suffer significant harm.

I can to some extent understand this confusion, as the wording can suggest that it is possible to see into the future and there is talk of social workers gazing into “crystal balls” etc. Very often parents involved in care proceedings talk of “future emotional harm” though significant harm covers all aspects of abuse and neglect. It would be difficult to argue that any child suffering abuse and/or neglect was not also suffering from emotional harm.

There are some cases where the issue of “likely significant harm” can be proven in court, and I provide some examples from my own experience below.

Case Studies – when parents just can’t cope

Case Study 1: D is a 25 year old single woman, pregnant with her first child. D suffers from schizoid affective disorder, a complex and enduring mental illness. She was diagnosed with the condition at the age of 18 years, though had suffered from mental illness since she was aged around 13 years. The illness from which D suffers is characterised by episodes of deep drug resistant depression and frequent psychotic episodes (as in not being in touch with reality) D hears voices that tell her god wants her to kill herself and she has made numerous suicide attempts by way of ligatures to her neck. She has been sectioned under the Mental Health Act on many occasions and is well known to the Mental Health Crisis Team and the emergency services.

D lives alone on the 10th floor of a high rise block of flats. She has no family support and her only friends are other flat dwellers, one of whom is allegedly the father of the child. However he is completely disinterested in D and claims that he is not the father of the child. He is a drug user and has criminal convictions. D is a heavy smoker, and a moderate drinker, and self harms on a frequent basis, almost always needing hospital treatment. The only support she has is a CPN (Community Psychiatric Nurse) who visits on a monthly basis to deliver medication. D rarely leaves the flat, only to buy essential items of food etc from a nearby shop. Neighbours sometimes shop for her and generally befriend her.

D is 28 weeks pregnant and refuses to access ante natal care though has allowed the health visitor to visit. D claims that she will be able to care for the baby. The HV does not share this opinion. The flat is very unhygienic, the floors are dirty and sticky, the only furniture is a very worn sofa; there is a TV and small table. The kitchen is dirty and greasy – there is a portable cooker and no fridge. The bathroom is dirty as is the bedroom. D has not collected any items for the baby and is dependent on state benefits and the flat is cold in the winter as she rarely has money for the electricity meter. In discussions D shows a complete lack of understanding of caring for a child, either practically or emotionally.

The psychiatric report states that D’s mental health condition will prevent her from giving good enough care to a child. The point is made that this may not be the case if there was a supportive partner and a good support network but this is not the case.

A pre-birth multi disciplinary case conference made a unanimous decision that the LA should make application to the court for an ICO on the basis that this baby is “likely to suffer significant harm” if left in the care of the mother.

D gave birth at 32 weeks to a premature baby who needed several weeks in the Special Care Baby Unit. D left hospital and didn’t visit the baby or show any concern for her child. The baby made good progress and was discharged and placed with foster carers at aged 3 months.
The court made an ICO and later a Placement Order. D did not contest the application, and the Orders were made by consent.

I would stress that it was in no way any fault of D that she was unable to care for her child. Indeed because of her severe mental illness she was barely able to care for herself and that given the extreme deprivation and poverty in which she lived, the care of a baby would have presented her with insurmountable difficulties and of course would place the child “at risk of significant harm.”

Case Study 2: This case concerns a couple who have lived together for 2 years. B (the female partner) and C (male partner). B has moderate learning difficulties and C has mild LDs. There are 2 children aged 2yrs and 8 months. C is not the father of the elder child. A social worker is allocated to the case and is in frequent contact with the family. The SW is concerned because C appears to be spending very little time at home and instead goes to the home of friends to play computer games. This leaves B alone to cope with the 2 children, which puts her under a great deal of pressure. A family support worker is allocated to the family and she visits twice per week and she too is concerned for the welfare of the children in B’s care. She has talked to C about the need for him to spend more time at home to help B care for the children, and despite his promises to do so this isn’t borne out in fact. C’s mother gives support from time to time but other than that, there is no support, although a neighbour “looks in” from time to time.

A nursery place for the 2yr old girl is being financed by CSs for 3 days per week. When C was part of the family he would take the child to nursery but since his absences, B is not motivated to take the child to the nursery hence the child only attends spasmodically. The nursery are concerned that the child is thin, often appearing dirty and smelly and unable to interact with the other children, preferring to cling to one of the adults.

There is growing concern that C is no longer living with B and the children and has in fact moved in to live with another young woman and her children. Initially B denies this but later admits that she thinks he is “not coming back.” The situation is deteriorating, and it is becoming evident that B cannot cope with the house and children. One day the neighbour contacts the social worker to allege that the 2yr old is screaming and B has shut her outside into the small yard. It is cold and the child is wearing only a vest and wellington boots. When the social worker visits a short time later, the child is in the house but C admits to shutting her outside because she was “getting on her nerves” – the child is still cold and distressed. C admits to smacking her to make her stop crying and is vague when asked what the children have had to eat that day. The baby is asleep in a pram and is suitably clad. During the visit C continues to shout at the 2 yr old and is threatening to shut her outside again and the child is crying inconsolably. It’s a grim picture and the social worker tells C she is not capable of caring for the children on her own. C immediately says “well you can take her – she’s a little shit…” the child is moved to foster carers under a S.20 on a temporary basis.

The issue of “likely significant harm” arises with the 8 month baby. He is of normal weight but very pale and has bad nappy rash. Again C cannot say what the baby has had to eat and there is no baby food to be seen in the house. C is disinclined to talk about the child’s diet other than to say he has a bottle of milk at bedtime but there is no formula to be seen, though there are feeding bottles which are dirty and have encrusted milk around the rims. The social worker asks C if there is any formula for the baby or baby porridge/jars etc and C says she doesn’t know but he can have some orange squash. This of course is not suitable nourishment for an 8 month baby. C is disinterested in the baby or his care but is very distressed about B leaving her, which is understandable, and is threatening to go round to the flat where he is living and leaving the baby with him. The social worker speaks to B on his mobile phone and he confirms that he has left C and has a new relationship. He does not want to care for the baby and claims that he is not the father. He is told about the EPO on the 2 year old and makes no comment, other than to say it’s a good thing as C is a “lazy cow who sits on her arse all day.” The SW asks if C’s mother will look after the baby and he says he doesn’t know but provides a telephone number, but she is totally unwilling to care for the baby or support C and repeats the claims that her son is not the father of the baby.

The social worker goes next door to talk to the neighbour who gives more information and states her concern that things have “gone downhill” since B left the family. Upon the social worker’s return to C’s home, she is half asleep on the sofa and the baby is wailing. She is refusing to give her consent for the baby to be taken from her. The social worker advises that she will have to seek an EPO on the grounds that the child is “likely to suffer significant harm” if he remains in the care of his mother. The EPO is granted and the baby moved to foster carers later that evening. He thrived in the care of the foster carers and was described as an “easy pleasant baby who ate and slept well.” C made very little effort to take advantage of contact offered to her whilst the children were with foster carers. However it was recognised by all concerned that C needed care and support for herself, given her moderate learning disabilities and this was provided by a social worker to some extent. It was an impossible task to expect that she could care for 2 young children when she was functioning as a child herself. It had been possible while B was in the family home as he was far more able than C and there hadn’t been any serious concern until he actually left the family.

Both children were later made subject to Placement Orders and adopted, though separately as it became clear that the 2 year old needed to be the youngest child in the family as she had clearly been immensely traumatised in the first 2 years of her life in the care of her mother and step father. This was manifested in some very difficult and challenging behaviours – and like many children who have suffered abuse/neglect, there was a significant gap between her emotional age and chronological age. Additionally she was also failing to meet her developmental milestones and there was concern about global developmental delay. The baby fared better as he had been with the mother and step father for a shorter time and so was much more able to form secure attachment patterns with his adopters.

Case study 3: this involved J (a young woman aged 18 years) who lived with her mother and younger brother. It was a very stable family and J enjoyed a close relationship with her mother and brother. Her mother reported that J was a quiet girl who had a few friends but was a “homebird.” Then J formed a relationship with a man (T) she met through a friend also in his late teens. J became pregnant very soon after the relationship started. Her mother was shocked and very concerned as she had no liking for T sensing a difference in her daughter, in that she seemed afraid of him although she denied this was the case.

The couple moved into a flat near to J’s mother’s home and the baby (M) was born but it was obvious from the beginning that the baby had physical disabilities – diagnosed as cerebral palsy of a severe nature. The young parents and J’s mother were distraught as can be imagined. J’s mother did all she could to support the young family and ensure that baby M got all the medical support that he needed. However a few weeks after M’s birth J told her mother than she was not to visit the flat again as T didn’t like her and thought her interfering. J said she would try and bring M to see her mother when T was out. J’s mother was a feisty woman (I’ll explain how I know all this at a later stage) and most definitely had J and baby M’s best interests at heart. She refused to abide by T’s rules and continued to visit the family as her concern for J and baby M was increasing. T would usually absent himself when she visited, slamming the door and telling her to F off.

J arrived at her mother’s house one day with baby M and she had a badly bruised eye and was shaking and crying, saying that T had “lost the plot” and she was terrified of him. Her mother immediately said that she and the baby should not in any circumstances go back to the flat. They were both welcome to stay with her and she would tell T not to come near her daughter again. But before this could happen, J took a phone call from T and immediately rushed back to the flat. This kind of event happened several times and J’s mother was very worried and frustrated that J was clearly dominated by T. When baby M was aged 6 months, T was bathing him and held his head under the water, gripping him tightly around the neck. J was hysterical and dialled 999 and M was taken to hospital and T arrested, claiming he was only playing with the baby.

However on examination baby M was found to have bruising and old fractures to both of his legs. T was later charged with grievous bodily harm and given a custodial sentence of 2yrs 6 months. Fortunately baby M survived and was hospitalised for 3 weeks. Obviously CSs were involved and were not satisfied with J’s account that she was not aware that T was harming baby M. They initiated care proceedings and placed baby M with J’s mother (baby M’s MGM) Contact between J and the baby was allowed x 3 per week but always to be supervised by J’s mother. J’s mother did not believe that J was unaware that T was harming baby M but she was convinced that her daughter was dominated by T and would therefore be unable to protect the baby.

J was adamant that she would have no contact with T in prison or when he was released but her mother didn’t believe her and was more or less certain that she was visiting him in prison. She challenged her of course, but she denied emphatically that she would have anything to do with him after what he had done to baby M. Apparently he had told J that he had done it as it was the best thing for a kid like that with twisted arms and legs and wished that he had drowned in the bath. J blurted this out to her mother but later denied that he had made such comments.

When T was released from custody J’s mother kept a close watch on the flat to see if T was visiting J as she believed this to be the case. Within 3 months of T’s release J became pregnant again but denied that T was the father. J’s mother immediately involved CSs and advised that she believed T was the father although she obviously had no proof of this. J’s mother began to visit J at the flat but there was no evidence of T. However one day J’s mother’s suspicion was aroused as J asked her not to visit that day as she was having a friend to visit with her baby. J’s mother kept a watch on the flat and decided to stand outside and wait to see if T went in or came out. She waited for over 2 hours and in the lobby area and finally saw T leaving the flat.

J’s mother “saw red” and as he ran off, she gave chase (she was a very fit woman, a hillwalker and strong swimmer) – he eventually jumped on a bus and the chase ended. J’s mother immediately contacted the social worker and the police (as T was on licence) and admits to slapping her daughter across the face, as she was so disgusted with her. J was apparently hysterical but her mother’s only concern was baby M. and the unborn child. J was trying to convince her mother and the social worker that T had only been in the flat for a few minutes to collect some belongings, but no one believed her, especially as her mother had stood outside the flats for 2 hours. I did ask J’s mother what she would have done had she caught T and she admitted that she didn’t know, as her anger had taken over!

There was a pre birth Case Conference and it was decided to initiate care proceedings on the basis that the unborn child was likely to suffer significant harm, given the injuries to baby M and the fact that J was still in a relationship with T and it was likely that T was the father. It was made clear to J that whether he was the father or not, she had been unable to protect baby M, given her fear of T and his controlling and bullying behaviour, and hence this unborn baby was at risk of likely significant harm. She eventually admitted that T was the father.

The baby girl was born and placed with J’s mother. She was made subject to a Care Order. J’s mother later successfully applied for SGOs on both children. I undertook the assessment initially for kinship care of the children and later for an SGO.

What do these case studies demonstrate?

I hope that I have been able to demonstrate in the 3 cases above exactly why that wording was contained in the CA89 “likely to suffer significant harm” and not because someone looks into a crystal ball and thinks “Oh they look like they might abuse or neglect that child in the future, so we’d better ask the court for an Order to be on the safe side.”

I don’t understand why so many people talk of the injustice of “future emotional harm” – I don’t see how emotional harm (be it in the present or the future) can be a “stand alone” reason to give as a justification for seeking an Order to remove a child. If a child is physically abused, sexually abused or neglected, then they are by definition going to be emotionally harmed – they can’t not be…………..can they?

Special Guardians – Impact of ‘local guidance’ for courts?

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore

EDIT – 20th June 2018 the Court of Appeal  have now considered this issue of such ‘gloss’ upon the statute n the case of P-S (Children) [2018] EWCA Civ 1407 (18 June 2018), The CoA held that the Judge was wrong to make a care order instead of an SGO, relying on the local guidance which said that SGOs should not be made if the child had not lived with the prospective SGs for some time. If there were concerns about the appropriateness of the SGO, the correct response was to adjourn the final decision not make a ‘short term’ care order.

Recently I attended the Family Court at Worcester where I was representing a family member who wished to apply to be a Special Guardian to a new born baby. I was alarmed to be told by the local authority representative that there was a local direction that prevented a Special Guardianship Order being made unless the child had lived with the prospective Special Guardians for ‘some time’.

I asked to see a copy of this guidance/directive as, of course, this is not a requirement in the statute. When the court is being asked to make a SGO it looks at the welfare checklist in the Children Act and makes the child’s welfare its paramount consideration. There is no specific direction to consider how long the child had already lived with the prospective Special Guardians – and of course, if the child in question is a new born baby, its highly unlikely that child has lived much with anyone at all.

I was relieved to see that the guidance/directive was not in fact a prohibition on the making of a SGO where the child had not lived with the applicants – but it did seem to be adding quite a significant extra layer to the requirements of the statute.  See this post for more detailed discussion about how an SGO can be made under section 14 of the Children Act 1989.

I assume this guidance/direction must be a response to the general concern that SGOs were being made too hastily in cases where local authorities did not feel they had sufficient evidence to jump the hurdle of ‘nothing else will do’ that would justify the making of a care order with a plan for adoption. I discuss this further in this post which examines the huge rise in SGOs made alongside Supervision Orders.

But issuing local guidance in response to Special Guardian Orders that should not have been made,  is like changing the colours of your bucket when your roof is leaking. The roof needs to be fixed. If there really is such a serious and widespread inability of lawyers and social workers to prepare and analyse cases so that judges can make orders in the best interests of children, how reasonably can anyone expect piecemeal local guidance to fill the gap?

I also raise serious questions about the legitimacy of any such guidance which purports to add such a significant gloss to a statute. Lawyers and Judges cannot ‘make’ law’  – we must identify existing law and apply it. If the Children Act and its requirements for the making of a SGO are insufficient, those gaps must be filled by Parliament.

 

The relevant part of the local guidance/directive reads as follows. I have put my comments in bold:  
1. Special Guardianship Orders … In public law proceedings where the court is being invited to consider a placement with prospective special guardians should the court, assuming the threshold criteria are satisfied, (i) make a care order and leave it to the local authority and the prospective guardians to decide when the time is right to place the child with them and/or to support the prospective special guardians making an application for an SGO or (ii) keep the proceedings open under interim orders pending a time when the court considers it appropriate to make a SGO in favour of the prospective special guardians? The answer is that it all depends on the particular circumstances of each case. Exactly. This is why additional ‘guidance’ can often do more harm than good. Each case is dependent on its own facts and a consideration of what is in the best interests of the particular child involved. I suggest the following points may be of assistance to determine what is the right course in any particular case:
a. a SGO must not be made without the court having a full special guardian assessment report. It is an essential component of the court’s decision making process; this should go without saying. It is depressing therefore that it has to be said. 
b. a SGO should not be made, absent compelling and cogent reasons, until the child has lived for an appreciable period with the prospective special guardians; this is alarming. This is not a provision in the Children Act. It seems to operate to exclude very young children from consideration. This is neither rational nor reasonable and is promoting a move away from considering the welfare of the particular individual child before the court. 
c. the special guardianship assessment report process must not be curtailed in an attempt to conclude proceedings within 26 weeks; again – should go without saying. Depressing it needs to be said. 
d. in some cases a child arrangements order may be the order which meets the welfare best interests of the child; Yes. Why even bother saying this? But if the matter before the court is in care proceedings then equally we need to recognise that child arrangement orders are not going to be a likely mechanism for keeping a child safe. Care orders can only be made if child has suffered or is at risk of suffering significant harm. 
e. where the care plan (providing for placement with the prospective special guardians and, in time, support for the prospective special guardians to apply for a SGO) is agreed and/or is approved by the court, the proceedings should be concluded with the making of public law or private law orders; Yes.
f. where a local authority cannot approve a placement of a child with prospective special guardians under the auspices of an interim care order (i.e. the requirements of placement or fostering regulations cannot be met) the court may sanction a placement under an interim CAO or, if the circumstances justify the same, under wardship;
g. only in exceptional cases should care proceedings be prolonged solely for the purpose of awaiting the outcome of a trial placement of a child with prospective special guardians and/or the completion of a SGO assessment report. Agreed – but this requires recognition that assessments must therefore be on going as soon as possible if they are to be finished within the timescales of 26 weeks. Judges are continually critical of late arrival of family members but we need them to start actually exercising their judicial authority over this and managing cases; the message needs to go out loud and very clear that there is no excuse for late arrival of family members as prospective carers. Everyone’s minds needs to be focused on what other family members could be available. And courts need to start having the courage to refuse to consider assessments of people who arrive late, unless there is exceptionally good reason and they really didn’t know what was going on.