Author Archives: Sarah Phillimore

Child in need or ‘looked after child’. Why does it matter?

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore.

Teasing out the various issues arising under section 17 and section 20 of the Children Act when it comes to ‘providing accommodation’ and the consequences that flow from that, appears to be yet another example of complicated and confusing statutory provisions which put enormous obstacles in the way of parents being able to understand the process. We must either simplify our laws or increase provision of legal aid.

What happens to children under 16 who need help from the State with somewhere to live?

Mrs Justice Black SA v KCC [2010] EWHC 848 (Admin)

“There are various provisions of the Children Act 1989 apart from s 17(6) which deal with the provision of accommodation by a local authority. Although this is not the first time I have had to consider this aspect of the Act, I continue to have difficulty in understanding how the various provisions fit together, how it was envisaged that the scheme would work in practice and how it was thought that it would enable local authorities and others to ascertain, relatively simply, whether a child is looked after or not…”

The distinction between ‘in need’ and ‘looked after’

A child can be a ‘child in need’ and get help and services under section 17 of the Children Act 1989. Or a child can be a ‘looked after’ child and get help and services under section 22 of the Act.

The distinction between these two is significant. A ‘looked after’ child gets more help, including a duty on the LA to consider offering support even when she is older than 18. A ‘looked after’ child will also experience more intervention from the LA, for example the statute provides that frequent reviews are required.

The Children (Leaving Care) Act 2000 creates new categories of young people entitled to support.

Eligible child – aged 16 or 17 and are currently looked after, either on a care order or accommodated, who has been looked after for a period or periods of 13 weeks since their 14th birthday (this total should include at least one spell of over 4 weeks, but does not include respite). This category defines those who will go on to become Relevant and Former Relevant young people when they cease to be looked after.
Relevant child – Aged 16 or 17 (not yet 18) and have left care, having previously been in the category of Eligible child.

There is a duty to financially support them up to the age of 18. The allowances paid to them should not fall below the level of Income Support or Income Based Job Seekers Allowance.

There is a further category of ‘Former Relevant child’ , being those aged 18 to 25 and who have
left care having previously been Eligible or Relevant, or both. The LA is under a duty to consider the need to financially support them.

A ‘looked after’ child is defined at section 22 of the Children Act 1989 as a child who is under a care order OR IF the accommodation provided is by the LA ‘in the exercise of its functions’

‘Functions’ exclude anything done under section 17, 23B and 24B of the Children Act 1989.

Accommodation is only ‘accommodation’ if it is provided for a continuous period of more than 24 hours.

So what does this mean?

Section 17 imposes a general duty on the LA to safeguard and promote welfare of children in their area. This may include providing accommodation.

Section 23B relates to 16-17 year olds and section 24B relates to those who are at least 16.

Therefore if your accommodation is provided under section 17 you are NOT a ‘looked after’ child. We must then look to sections 20 and 23 of the Children Act 1989 to understand what are the relevant ‘functions’ which decide whether or not a child is ‘looked after’.

Section 20(4) is ‘permissive’ . It does not impose a duty on a local authority to accommodate a child but says that they can do so if they think it would promote the child’s welfare and those with PR consent.

Section 20(1) however is mandatory – so a local authority MUST provide accommodation to a child if there is no one who has parental responsibility for him, or no one who can exercise it.

Section 23 is also mandatory and tells the LA that when they are looking after a child they must provided accommodation and other services. Section 23(2) sets out that accommodation can be provided by placing the child with family or any other suitable person. These people will be considered foster carers (so must be assessed and found suitable to meet regulations around standard of foster care) UNLESS that person is the child’s parent or has PR for the child or a Child Arrangements Order.

Further, section 23(6) sets out the LA ‘looking after a child shall make arrangements to enable him to live with’ a parent or person with PR, or a relative, friend or other person connected with him. The LA must also try to find accommodation near to his home and with other siblings (section 23 (7)).

The drafting of this section, as Mrs Justice Black recognises, is confusing and seems to set up different routes into ‘providing accommodation’.

It’s not the label that matters, its the facts and the legal consequences.

R (on the application of M) v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham [2008] UKHL 13 made it clear that if the LA claim to be acting under section 17, a child will still be a looked after child if the circumstances are such that the LA should have gone down the section 20 route.

Difficulty has arisen when a child goes to live with a relative and the LA claim that this is a ‘private’ arrangement and therefore not one that should be described as the LA ‘providing’ accommodation. The court is willing to accept that there may be some cases where a LA could ‘side step’ their duty to accommodate by helping to set up a private fostering arrangement.

Private fostering arrangements are dealt with in section 66 of the CA and cover children who are under 16 and cared for in their own home by someone other than a parent, a person with parental responsibility or a relative. A ‘relative’ is defined under section 105 of the Children Act 1989 as a grandparent, brother, sister, uncle or aunt (whether by blood or marriage) or step-parent.

Has the LA taken a ‘major role’ in making arrangements for the child to be accommodated?

It is a question of fact in every particular case. Where a LA takes a ‘major role’ in making arrangements for a child to be fostered, it is more likely to be considered to be exercising its duties under sections 20 and 23, no matter what it claims is the label to be attached to its actions.

Helpful issues to analyse are likely to be:

is the LA attempting to regulate the terms of the placement? for e.g. having a view about the child’s school or who has contact with the child?
What is the LA saying about providing financial help for the child? A true private arrangement will be between the parents and the proposed carers who must understand that the parents will be providing financial support.

Does it then matter if the LA argues section 23(2) or 23(6)?

The court said ‘no’ in SA v KCC [2010] and set out a simple approach to the statute. If the child falls within section 20(1) – there is no one with PR or no one who can exercise it – then the LA is providing accommodation for the child regardless of whether or not it finds a home with a friend or relative and regardless of whether or not the LA chooses to accommodate a child under section 23(2) or 23(6).

The LA in that case had tried to argue that whenever a child goes to live with a relative under section 23(6) then such children are not ‘provided accommodation’ unless there is care order in place. The court rejected this ‘rigid position’ as being potentially disadvantageous to the child and ignores the ‘enormous variation that there is in the circumstances of children, and their parents and carers’.

When should a child’s trans identity be permitted to be a material issue in a family case?

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore

On March 26th I was alerted to what I was told was a blog post by a lawyer for the charity Mermaids. The lawyer does not identify him or herself or claim any affiliation to Mermaids but the title of the blog is clearly identified as about ‘Trans Law’ and the author purports to be a qualified and registered solicitor. I will assume therefore that this analysis of the law may be read with interest by charities and other campaigning groups which assert that they protect the rights of trans children.

The blog is entitled When should a child’s trans identity be permitted to be a material issue in a family case?

I am concerned by what I read in this blog post. Not because I am a bigot who hates transpeople. But because I am a lawyer and I respect the rule of law. The law is no salve to hurt feelings. The law exists to constrain or promote behaviour that can be identified on evidence, to either the civil or criminal standard of proof depending on the nature and quality of the act. The law is interpreted and applied by those qualified and trained so do to. It is not something that is within the power of any one individual to describe and enforce.

So what is my problem with this blog? It promises to be 1 of a 4 part series. The inherent and fundamental problem is set out in its very headline which manages with admirable economy to set out a broad and undefined term – what is a child – coupled with an a priori assumption about the existence of ‘trans identity’.

So there are two issues we need to unpick:

First – what is a child?

Second – how and when is the transgender identity of a child discovered?

What is a child?

A child is a human aged between 0-18 years. The difference between a toddler and a 16 year old is vast. That span of time encompasses the growth of a child from not much more than a blob to a thinking, reasoning, decision making human being. There can also be huge differences between even neuro typical 12 and 15 year olds. For these obvious reasons, the law operates on a ‘sliding scale’ when it comes to children and the weight that must be attached to their wishes and feelings.

As a rough rule of thumb a child under 6 is highly unlikely to be able to formulate a world view that differs significantly from the adults caring for him or her. However, most children over 16 years old will be able to make their own decisions and the courts recognise the futility of attempting to impose orders upon them at this age – note for example the provision in the Children Act 1989 that private law orders will only be made about 16 year olds in the most exceptional circumstances.

The difficult age range is likely to be between 12 – 15 years when many children will present as articulate and fluent and may have quite decided ideas about what is in their best interests but have still only lived on this earth for a brief span of time and still require the guidance, love and support of their adult carers.

Most neuro typical children in this age bracket are likely to be considered ‘Gillick competent’ and able to make decisions about their basic health and welfare which must be respected by their adult carers. However, even a Gilick competent child may find the court willing to force them into treatment if there are sufficient concerns about their welfare, for example when refusing a heart transplant. Such matters are clearly highly fact specific and will be decided on a case by case basis.

On this very short and rough analysis hopefully it is immediately clear that to talk of ‘a child’, defined in law as any person under 18, without any attempt to reflect the ‘sliding scale’ of a child’s autonomy and capacity to make serious decisions, is simply ludicrous. The court would not treat a 6 year old in the same way as a 16 year old and no one could assert in good faith that they should.

So the author of the this document will need to revisit it and set out their understanding of the law with regard to a) very young children and b) children who are Gillick competent but not yet 16 .

How and when is transgender identify discovered?

This question is of course inextricably linked to the issues raised above about Gillick competence. If the mother of a 4 year old asserts the her son ‘disdains his penis’ and wishes to live as a girl, the court is going to subject this to rather more anxious inquiry than if the same child was a teenager. This is exactly what happened in the case of Re J which I discuss at length in this post in December 2018: ‘In whose best interests? Transgender Children: Choices and Consequences’

And who was the charity which supported this mother in court, which condemned the Judge’s decision to remove the child from the care of his mother into his father’s care (where he lived happily as a little boy), and promised an appeal of the decision that never came? Mermaids of course.

I commented in December that it would have been good to have seen a little humility from Mermaids that they had backed the wrong horse in this case and supported a mother to do significant harm to her child by way of emotional abuse. If this blog post is indeed from a self identified lawyer for the Mermaids charity, this shows me that any such hope was naive indeed.

The author comments:

As a matter of legal principle and good practice (and to avoid frustration from the Bench), a child being trans should not come in to a case’s dialogue unless

it is materially relevant to an issue in question; or

it can be legally justified as a materially relevant issue in and of itself, i.e. the child’s trans identity is a contested ‘fact’.

I don’t take issue with that. I accept that there are a small minority of children who experience ‘gender dsyphoria’ and who seek and are entitled to help and support about that. I would however be astonished if any child under 6 – and the child in Re J was four years old – could ever fit into that category. For younger children, any self declaration about ‘disdaining’ their body is going to come from one of the parents and it cannot simply be accepted at face value, as Re J clearly shows.

The author rather skates over Re J and its implications (and certainly makes no mention of the role Mermaids played in encouraging a mother to cause harm to her child) and says

Further case law is needed to clarify the nuance between the scenarios of ‘forcing a child to be trans’ as emotional abuse in itself,

I don’t agree with this comment. It does not seem to me a matter of any uncertainty that ‘forcing’ a child of any age into ANY identity which they do not in reality choose, can be anything other than emotional abuse of a really serious kind. However, the author seems to go even further and seems keen to discourage the very analysis that he/she says is necessary. There is a clear wish to turn the spotlight away from any anxious inquiry into the truth of a child’s circumstances:

It would and will always be deeply problematic and symptomatic of the historic ‘gender policing’ (to which the trans population, both in the UK and across Europe, have been subject to) should the court be used to decide on whether someone, in this case a child, is ‘actually transgender’ or not. This is not the courts (nor anyone’s) – save for the individual themselves – right.

And this of course is a nonsensical assertion. It is entirely the job of the family court’s to concern themselves with a child’s welfare and make decisions for them when their parents cannot or will not. To afford a very young child ‘a right’ to determine something so significant is not protecting children’s welfare – it is rather risking them as proxies for the psychological dysfunction of their parents.

The author then appears to argue that such anxious inquiry must also be avoided in case it ‘triggers’ the child.

…the Issue must be dealt with incredibly delicately. Not doing so would be extremely dangerous as it would have an intrinsic risk of violating the subject child’s Article 8 and Article 14 rights, but it is also exposing a child to a triggering scenario that may subject them to psychological harm.

Again, this is – in my view at least – an assertion that is both dangerous and foolish. To assume that investigating a child’s situation will in and of itself harm the child is to assume a great deal about what is actually being investigated. I understand that it may well be embarrassing and painful for a 15 year old to have to justify the decisions they want to make about their own body and I do not think that the court should inflict this upon any Gillick competent teenager.

However, to suggest that we shy away from what emotional abuse a parent might be inflicting on a 4 year old, in case we risk ‘triggering’ that child is utter, unmitigated hogwash. This line of thinking puts children at risk of very significant harm indeed.

But the real beating heard of the argument is here.

….someone’s gender identity, at any age, must be respected. A child identifying as trans, whether it has been submitted this is as a result of harm or not, is identifying as trans and that must be respected throughout proceedings…More often than not, if a child says they are trans, they will be trans.

As I hope I have made clear, any such assertion made without attempting even the barest of analysis of the vast gulf in understanding and capacity between a 6 year old and a 16 year old is an assertion of no value. Worse than that, it is an assertion which attempts to pave the way to leave young children entirely unprotected from their parents.

Most parents love their children and want to do what is in their best interests. A small minority of parents fail to do that. The courts absolutely must be ready, willing and able to step in and to protect such children.

What’s in a name? The right of parents to name their child – when can the state interfere?

I was reminded of the case of C (Children) [2016] EWCA Civ 374 at a recent court hearing where the issue arose about the local authority’s duty to register the birth of a child who is subject to a care order. Hopefully that matter will be subject of some further guidance – my argument being that a failure by a parent to register a birth is an abnegation of parental responsibility, not an exercise of it and therefore the local authority ought to be allowed to register after the required 42 days without needing the court’s permission.

However the issue of what name a child should be registered with is of much greater significance and It is clear that any argument between parent and local authority must be subject to over sight by the court. But what gives the local authority the right to have an opinion in the first place? To answer this question requires an examination of what happened in C Children.

How far can the state interfere with a parents wish to register (or not) the birth and name of their baby?

The issue of registering a birth is interesting in the context of care proceedings as there appears to be a view in some quarters that registering a birth makes your baby the ‘property of the state’ and refusing to register means the local authority cannot issue care proceedings. This view has no substance, but of course that doesn’t prevent people from spreading it and believing it.

Registering the birth: the operation of the Birth and Deaths Registration Act 1953

The purpose of the BDRA 1953 is to create a document of public record evidencing all births and deaths in England and Wales. It determines what information is needed to register a child’s brith, who may provide that information and when they must do it. There is no absolute requirement to register a ‘name’ at the same time as the birth, but provision is made in section 13 BDRA 1953 for the registration of a forename following a delay of up to twelve months or for the alteration of a name during the same period of time:

Section 1(2) BDRA 1953 sets out who is qualified to provide the necessary information to the Registrar; these people are known as “qualified informants”: They are the father and mother, the occupier of the house where the child was born, any person present at the birth or any person having charge of the child. These ‘qualified informants’ have 42 days from the date of birth to register it

Section 4 BDRA 1953 provides that where, after the expiration of forty-two days, ‘the birth of the child has, owing to the default of the persons required to give information concerning it, not been registered…’, the Registrar can require any qualified informant to attend at a place appointed by the Registrar to give the required information and to sign the register in the presence of the registrar.

So it seems pretty clear from this that the act of registering a birth is an exercise of parental responsibility but is not restricted to actual parents; the focus here is on the proper registration of the birth so that the child can be recognised and identified in the society into which he is born. It is an administrative requirement, not an illustration of something special and particular for parents.

Naming your child – an issue of fundamental significance

if registering a child’s birth is rightly described as a mere administrative act, it is clear that the choice of name for a child is an act of a very different nature and quality and is likely to be of far more emotional importance to most parents. This exercise of parental responsibility should only be interfered with in exceptional circumstances. As was recognised in C Children at para 40:

One of the first questions asked by friends and relatives following the birth of a child is ‘what is the baby’s name?’ It may be thought that any individual who has had the happy experience of debating with his or her partner possible forenames for their unborn child would be astonished at the proposition that the choice of the name of their child could be regarded as other than their right as the child’s parents, and their first act of parental responsibility. The name given to a child ordinarily evolves over the months of the pregnancy through a bundle of cultural, familial and taste influences. The forename finally chosen forms a critical part of his or her evolving identity….If a baby cannot be brought up by his or her parents, often the forename given to him or her by their mother is the only lasting gift they have from her. It may be the first, and only, act of parental responsibility by his or her mother. It is likely, therefore, to be of infinite value to that child as part of his or her identity….The naming of a child is not however merely a right or privilege, but also a responsibility; people, and particularly children, are capable of great unkindness and often are not accepting of the unusual or bizarre. It does not need expert evidence or academic research to appreciate that a name which attracts ridicule, teasing, bullying or embarrassment will have a deleterious effect on a child’s self-esteem and self-confidence with potentially long term consequences for him or her. The burden of such a name can also cause that child to feel considerable resentment towards the parent who inflicted it upon him or her….

Facts of C Children [2016]

So what happened in this case to justify the court refusing to allow a mother to name her children? This case involved a mother with serious mental health issues. She had a long standing diagnosis of a psychotic disorder and of schizophrenia of an “undifferentiated type with an underlying personality disorder”. She did not accept the diagnosis and thus would not accept any treatment but she was found to have capacity to give instructions in the care proceedings.

Her three elder children had been removed from her care. She then had twin children who were subject to ICOs shortly after birth. Their father was not known; the children were conceived after the mother was raped. She told the midwife she wanted to call the twins ‘Preacher’ and ‘Cyanide’. The local authority tried to persuade her against this but failed – the mother argued that it was a ‘lovely, pretty name’ and that because Hitler killed himself with cyanide, this was a positive connotation.

After some weeks of attempts to change the mother’s mind, the local authority first asked the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under s.100 Children Act 1989 to prevent the children being so named but the court did not agree that this was the right route. However, as registering a birth and naming a child were ‘aspects of parental responsibility’, they were actions of a parent which could be limited by the local authority under s.33(3)(b) Children Act 1989. The court then declared that the local authority were allowed to prevent the mother from registering the children with those names.

The mother appealed on the basis that that the judge was wrong in concluding that the naming of the child and the registration of the child’s birth were each an exercise of parental responsibility and that the judge erred in concluding that a local authority has power under section 33(3)(b) CA 1989 to determine that the mother should not register her children’s births with her chosen names. Therefore, it was her human right to choose their names and register them without the interference of the local authority.

The Court of Appeal rejected the mother’s grounds and agreed that the registration of the births and naming of children were acts of parental responsibility, but also that a court could, under its inherent jurisdiction intervene in these circumstances and that the appropriate statutory route was therefore s.100 Children Act 1989.

The first court had not been happy to consider use of the inherent jurisdiction because it did not consider that the test of significant harm was met but King LJ in the Court of Appeal held that some names – such as Cyanide – were so awful that they gave rise to reasonable cause to believe that any child given that name was likely to suffer significant emotional harm. The Court did not have the same objections to ‘Preacher’ but did not think it right for one child to be named by the mother and the other not, so agreed that this name should not be registered either.

Happily in October 2015 the twins moved permanently to live with the foster family caring for their two eldest half siblings live, who chose names that they would like their brother and sister to be called

The limits to what a parent may do to a child under heading of “parental responsibility”.

This case is a useful illustration of the fact that PR while very important and worthy of protection, is not a green light for a parent to do whatever they want. The Children Act defines “parental responsibility” as “all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property.”

In Re H-B (Contact) [2015] EWCA Civ 389, the then President of the Family Division, Sir James Munby P, quoted with approval the judgment of McFarlane LJ in Re W (Direct Contact) [2012] EWCA Civ 999 at para 72: i:

I wish to emphasise this, parental responsibility is more, much more than a mere lawyer’s concept or a principle of law. It is a fundamentally important reflection of the realities of the human condition, of the very essence of the relationship of parent and child. Parental responsibility exists outside and anterior to the law. Parental responsibility involves duties owed by the parent not just to the court. First and foremost, and even more importantly, parental responsibility involves duties owed by each parent to the child.

The foundation of the exercise of PR is therefore those acts which contribute to or secure the welfare of the child. Refusing to register your child’s birth or giving a child a name that many others are likely to find offensive or ludicrous is an abnegation of PR, not an exercise of it and parents have no ‘right’ to do harm to their child.

What weight do we attach to the welfare of a child when considering publishing information about care proceedings?

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore

This post is the text of my advice to the journalist Louise Tickle with regard to the extent to which the welfare of the child would be considered ‘paramount’ in any application to publish information about care proceedings. This matter was raised before the Court of Appeal by Paul Bowen QC on February 15th 2019 as potentially an issue with which the Court should grapple when considering Ms Tickle’s application, but all agreed that this was not the appropriate case to investigate such arguments – though no doubt it will require resolution in some future case.

I conclude very firmly that the child’s welfare simply cannot be paramount in any attempt to balance the competing rights protected by Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR. Paramount means ‘more important than anything else; supreme’. It therefore cannot be part of any ‘balancing exercise’. If a right is ‘supreme’ then it will always tip the scales in its favour, no matter what counterbalancing weight is added to other side of the scales. To afford the child’s welfare ‘paramountcy’ would be to render the balancing exercise obsolete.

I stress that what follows is my own view – the potential for further interesting argument is underscored by the fact that at least one QC who has read it expresses scepticism about my conclusions. Watch this space!

Advice concerning any possible ‘tension’ in the applicability of the paramountcy principle to those cases where requests are made for publicity

I have been asked to consider the following remarks made by the President of the Family Division in the case of In re W (Children) (Care Proceedings: Publicity) [2016] EWCA Civ 113 2015 Nov 23; 2016 Feb 25 (para 41 – 43):

During the hearing of the appeal we accepted the jointly argued approach of counsel and that, in turn, was the basis upon which we came to the decision on the appeal which we announced at the conclusion of the oral hearing. In the process of preparing this written judgment, however, I have come to the preliminary view that there may be a conflict, or at least a tension, between the apparently accepted view that welfare is not the paramount consideration on an issue such as this, on the one hand, and Court of Appeal authority to the contrary on the other hand. As this present judgment is a record of the reasons for our decision announced on 23 November 2015 and that decision was based upon the children’s welfare not being the paramount consideration, I do no more than flag up this potential point which, if it is arguable ,must fall for determination by this court on another occasion.
The key authorities to which I am referring are a criminal case in the House of Lords, In re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2004] UKHL 47; [2005] 1 AC 593; [2004] 3 WLR 1129, a private law family case in the Court of Appeal, Clayton v Clayton [2006] Fam 83,and a public law child case in the High Court, In re Webster [2007] 1 FLR 1146.
Although, in my view, a reading of those cases may give rise to a potential point relating to the paramountcy of the child’s welfare, which, as I have stated, must fall for determination on another occasion, it is not necessary to go further in this judgment and consider the matter in any detail.

Summary

It is my very clear view that there is neither ‘conflict’ nor ‘tension’ as to when we must apply the paramountcy principle in cases involving requests to allow or restrict publicity about a case that involves a child. What there is however is potential for confusion, which in my mind is most likely to flow from a lack of engagement with what ‘welfare’ requires in any given case; a view having appeared to have taken hold of late that any publicity is of necessity a ‘bad thing’ for a child. I note for example and with some concern the President’s recent championing of the ALC/Brophy research about the views of ‘young people’. Given the small and self selecting nature of their research group, I and many others do not consider that research can properly bear the weight that some apply to it.

Having reviewed the authorities cited by the President it does not appear to me that there exists any such declaration, obiter or otherwise, against settled understanding. What would probably assist both practitioners and the judiciary would be some clear pronouncement in these current proceedings as to the necessary distinction between two different classes of case: Is the court faced with:
a. a matter directly pertaining to the child’s upbringing – when welfare IS paramount and IS the trump card –BUT still needs to be identified;
b. Or a matter of much wider significance that engages the rights and freedoms protected by Article 10 of the ECHR – when the welfare of any individual child, while relevant and important cannot be the ‘trump card against the Convention rights of others and a balancing act then commences.

In the latter scenario it is clear that it would be unlawful to then ‘put the child’s welfare on a pedestal which is incompatible with a Convention right’ (see Mr Justice Munby as he then was, at para 59 of his judgment in Norfolk County Council v Webster & Ors [2006] EWHC 2733 (Fam)

I assert that the correct distillation of the current law that is that there is no special privilege accorded to children who are the subject matter of proceedings save as is strictly necessary for their protection in the context of the proceedings themselves – see R v Central Independent Television PLC 1994 Fam 192 at 207 per Waite LJ.

In cases where ‘welfare’ is the paramount consideration, the analysis cannot simply stop there and on an assertion that greater publicity will inevitably harm the child. There must be a clear analysis of what exactly is proposed by way of greater publicity and what exactly it is anticipated will be the impact on the child – note the analysis carried out in Clayton v Clayton [2006] EWCA Civ 878.

I shall explain my reasoning in more detail below.

The statutory basis for the paramountcy principle.

In proceedings under the Children Act 1989 section 1 (1) reads:

When a court determines any question with respect to—
(a) the upbringing of a child; or
(b) the administration of a child’s property or the application of any income arising from it,
the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration.

We are given little assistance in fleshing this out in the definitions section which reads simply:
“upbringing”, in relation to any child, includes the care of the child but not his maintenance;

The dictionary definition of ‘upbringing’ is
the treatment and instruction received by a child from its parents throughout its childhood.

If the court is deciding a matter that goes to ‘upbringing’ then children do rightly have this special privilege of a ‘trump card’. The matter before the court is relating to their private family life and the decision made by the court will matter hugely to them, but probably not very much to anyone else outside their family circle.

The authorities considered by the President

A possible explanation for how confusion has arisen with regard to the applicability of the paramountcy principle may be seen from the comments of Lady Justice Hale (as she then was) in the Court of Appeal when considering Re S [2004] (op cit).

This case involved a decision by Hedley J to dismiss an application for an injunction restraining the publication by newspapers of the identify of a mother who was on trial for the murder of her elder child. This had been sought to protect the privacy of the younger surviving sibling who was not involved in the criminal proceedings. A child psychiatrist had opined that if there were a ‘long period of adverse publicity’ this would significantly increase the surviving child’s propensity to develop a ‘psychiatric disorder’. However the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by a majority and the House of Lords came to the same conclusion.

Hedley J commented that he would have come to the same conclusion even if he had been persuaded that the surviving child’s welfare was paramount. Hale LJ rightly commented that this was an odd thing to say; had the child’s welfare been paramount then it was the ‘trump card’. However, it was not felt necessary to resolve this ‘dilemma’, presumably because all agreed that the child’s welfare was NOT paramount in these circumstances. The House of Lords eventually decided that Hedley J had made the right decision but had not properly carried out the required balancing exercise between the child’s right to privacy and the established importance of criminal proceedings being open and transparent.

Therefore, it does not appear to me that Re S raises any difficulty about the general proposition that the child’s welfare is NOT paramount in such cases. This was about a criminal trial and the identification of the defendant. It did not concern the child’s upbringing – but no doubt might have some impact on it. However, and sadly as Hedley J identified, it was ‘inevitable’ that those who know the child would realise who he was and the nature of his mother’s alleged crime, whether she was named or not.

The cases of Clayton and Webster engaged in more detail this distinction between cases involving ‘upbringing’ and those that engage much wider concerns about rights of freedom of expression .

For example, in Clayton, the father had been restrained from publishing any information about matters concerning his daughter until her 18th birthday. The father argued that this impeded his ability to effectively lobby, comment upon or campaign about the family court because this involves discussion of the human aspects of individual cases and specifically his own. Although he had behaved badly and abducted his daughter to Portugal, the parents had in the end been able to agree shared care arrangements and he wanted to be able to talk about that.

The court agreed that the father should not be restrained from his campaigning work as this was a legitimate wish and those activities did not relate to the upbringing of C or substantially engage her welfare interests. His one proposal that did engage her upbringing was his wish to return with C to Portugal and film her there, possibly for a documentary. The court refused to allow this, describing it as a ‘self exculpatory publicity exercise’.

So again, there is no identifiable tension here. Where the matters did not pertain directly to C’s welfare, the balancing exercise between Articles 8 and 10 had to be conducted. Where the matter did pertain directly to her welfare then this was the paramount consideration and overrode the father’s wish for greater publicity.

An interesting tension however does arise in paragraph 59 where Sir Mark Potter comments that even when welfare is paramount ‘it does not exclude the necessity for the court to consider Article 8 and 10’, citing Re Z A Minor 1997 Fam 1.

This would appear to contradict Hale LJ’s observation that the welfare principle, if applied, was indeed the trump card and renders the distinction between ‘upbringing’ and ‘non- upbringing’ cases as obsolete. It is then even more intriguing that the President appears to have identified a rather different tension in the opposite direction!

However, it is my assertion that this is arid territory and matters are drifting into unnecessarily complication. The ‘tension’ – such as it is – is clearly sensibly resolved by the focus being on whether or not the court are engaged with matters of ‘upbringing’ .It may not always be possible to draw a clear line but I suggest that there will be certain classes of case that fall more clearly on one side of the line than others.

For example, the present case under appeal cannot, in my view, be sensibly characterised in any way as relating to any child’s upbringing. The Article 10 rights in play relate clearly to the public interest in being able to discuss what happened to a mother who needed to find £20K to fund an appeal against a decision that was found to be inadequate by the Court of Appeal – a decision that could have lead to the adoption of her child by strangers.

There is further useful discussion in the case of Webster. This had involved a considerable amount of publicity around the birth of the Webster’s fourth child – their elder three children having been removed and adopted in what the Webster’s and many others asserted was a gross miscarriage of justice. Munby J (as he then was) opened the proceedings to selected media representatives. Again, this was not a case about ‘upbringing’ of an individual child but broader comments on the operation of the family justice system.

As Munby J stated at para 59 of his judgment, he agreed with the submissions of those who argued that section 97(4) of the Children Act had to be read as permitting the court to dispense with the prohibition on publication in section 97(2) where the right of free expression under Article 10 or other Convention rights require it:

‘To do otherwise would, as Mr Warby put it, place the child’s interests on a pedestal in a way which is incompatible with the Convention. I agree’.

Any attempt to argue that ‘upbringing’ should be extended to include influence on those rights and freedoms protected under Article 10 of the ECHR would, in my view, fall foul of section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 which requires legislation to be read and given effect in a way that is compatible with Convention Rights.

The rather intriguing comment that the balancing exercise should still follow even after identification of welfare as paramount, is in my view best explained by reframing that concern as the need for a proper analysis of what the child’s welfare actually requires in any given case. Clayton shows the court clearly engaging with this and considering in some detail exactly what the father proposed by way of additional publicity and what the impact on the child should be.

Conclusion

I therefore propose that the Court of Appeal should be invited to state the law in the following way:
a. The principle that the child’s welfare is paramount applies only to those cases directly engaging issues around the child’s upbringing.
b. Cases which involve significant media interest around issues pertaining to matters of wider importance – such as proper conduct of criminal proceedings or a wish to shine a light on a possible miscarriage of justice – are unlikely to be categorised as relating solely or even primarily to a child’s upbringing and the balancing exercise between Articles 8 and 10 must then be undertaken
c. Even if the court decides the child’s welfare is paramount, that still requires some analysis of what ‘welfare’ actually demands; it cannot be assumed that the mere fact of publicity will cause a child harm.

EDIT MARCH 9th 2019 – Consideration of further case law.

Paul Bowen QC asked me to consider further 2 authorities; one from the Constitutional Court of South Africa Case CCT 53/06 [2007] ZACC 18 and R v Petherwick [2012] EWCA Crim 2214.

On considering these two cases, I remain firm in my view that ‘paramountcy’ alone using its dictionary definition as ‘supreme’ is an empty vessel. One cannot determine ‘paramountcy’ without a clear sighted analysis of what impact each decision will have on each child. The South African Courts appeared stuck with the very broad reference of their Constitution but managed to wiggle out by reframing ‘paramountcy’ as requiring a detailed analysis of the impact of the decision upon the child, whilst weighing in the balance competing rights that impacted on society more widely.

I do not accept that section 1 of the Children Act bears comparison to section 28 of the SA Constitution as it is explicitly restricted to matters of ‘upbringing’. If I am wrong about that, it seems to matter not as presumably the English court could simply follow the South African example and accept that ‘paramount’ when applied to questions of children’s welfare in the context of wider societal demands – such as imprisoning criminals or letting journalists do their job – cannot possibly mean ‘supreme’ but rather a reminder that we must focus on the impact of each decision on the child and strive for the most proportionate balance between competing rights and interests.

The first case in the South African court asked the question:

When considering whether to impose imprisonment on the primary caregiver of young children, did the courts below pay sufficient attention to the constitutional provision that in all matters concerning children, the children’s interests shall be paramount?

This case involved a single mother of three children, two teenagers and an 8 year old. She was a habitual fraudster and was eventually sentenced to four years in prison, despite a report saying the mother was a strong candidate for a non-custodial sentence.The Centre for Child Law of the University of Pretoria was admitted as amicus curiae and made wide-ranging written and oral submissions on the constitutional, statutory and social context around this question.

The court agreed that the nature of the crime, the personal circumstances of the criminal and the interests of the community are all relevant considerations when determining the appropriate sentence for a criminal offence. It cited with approval the words of Friedman J in the case of Banda who advanced a clear balancing exercise between these tensions:

A court should, when determining sentence, strive to accomplish and arrive at a judicious
counterbalance between these elements in order to ensure that one element is not
unduly accentuated at the expense of and to the exclusion of the others.

The issue now before the court was the extent to which the Constitution had impacted upon this balancing exercise. Section 28(2) of the Constitution provides that “[a] child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.”

There were already serious questions about the efficacy of such a wide-ranging provision. The court cited Van Dijkhorst J in the case of Jooste:

The] wide formulation [of section 28(2)] is ostensibly so all-embracing that the
interests of the child would override all other legitimate interests of parents, siblings
and third parties. It would prevent conscription or imprisonment or transfer or
dismissal by the employer of the parent where that is not in the child’s interest. That
can clearly not have been intended. In my view, this provision is intended as a
general guideline and not as a rule of law of horizontal application. That is left to the
positive law and any amendments it may undergo.”

However, the court then went on to comment about the necessary change in ‘mind-set’ brought about by the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child, reflected in the constitution:

The unusually comprehensive and emancipatory character of section 28 presupposes that in our new dispensation the sins and traumas of fathers and mothers should not be visited on their children.

The court referred to a variety of commentary about the inherent weakness in any argument about ‘welfare being paramount’ or that matters must be decided ‘in the child’s best interests’ – because everyone had such different ideas about what exactly this would encompass. However, the court ingeniously declared that far from this being a weakness it was as strength – as it pushed people to clearly focus on the individual child before them.

Yet this Court has recognised that it is precisely the contextual nature and inherent flexibility of section 28 that constitutes the source of its strength. Thus, in Fitzpatrick this Court held that the best interests principle has “never been given exhaustive content”, but that “[i]t is necessary that the standard should be flexible as individual circumstances will determine which factors secure the best interests of a particular child.”29 Furthermore “‘(t)he list of factors competing for the core of best interests [of the child] is almost endless and will
depend on each particular factual situation’.”30 Viewed in this light, indeterminacy of
outcome is not a weakness. A truly principled child-centred approach requires a close
and individualised examination of the precise real-life situation of the particular child
involved. To apply a pre-determined formula for the sake of certainty, irrespective of
the circumstances, would in fact be contrary to the best interests of the child concerned.

Equally if the ‘paramoutcy phrase’ was spread ‘too thin’ then it risked becoming empty rhetoric. Its application cannot mean that the direct or indirect impact on children of any action is enough to oust proper considerations of that action. The court stated that section 28 was not mean as ‘an overbearing and unrealistic trump of other rights’ and is capable of limitation, discussing for example the obligation to return a child to the country of habitual residence in cases of child abduction.

Interestingly the court then stated

Accordingly, the fact that the best interests of the child are paramount does not mean that they are absolute.Like all rights in the Bill of Rights their operation has to take account of their relationship to other rights, which might require that their ambit be limited.

This appears to be linguistic trickery if we take the standard dictionary meaning of ‘paramount’ as ‘supreme’ or ‘more important than anything else’.

The court decided that it was not imprisoning a primary care giver that violated section 28 of the Constitution but rather any such imprisonment that did not give proper consideration to the rights of the children involved. The court suggested the following areas should be considered when dealing with sentencing a primary care giver.

To establish whether there will be an impact on a child.
To consider independently the child’s best interests.
To attach appropriate weight to the child’s best interests.
To ensure that the child will be taken care of if the primary caregiver is
sent to prison.

What is this if not another clear example of a balancing exercise? The court recognised that of course children have a right and a need to be cared for by their primary care giver – but they also have a right to grow up in a society where criminality is dealt with. To say simply that ‘the child’s welfare is paramount’ without further examination is to risk sacrifice of other hugely important rights that impact on society at large. The parallels with arguments for reporting resections are obvious.

The court eventually decided in this case that M, her children, the community and the victims who will be repaid from her earnings, benefitted more from her being placed under correctional supervision, rather than imprisonment.

In the second case the mother was sentenced to four years and nine months imprisonment for causing death by dangerous driving and appealed on the basis that this sentence did not take sufficient account of the Article 8 rights of her young son. This was a serious case of its type and the starting point for sentencing was 8 years. Happily her son had not gone into state care but was being cared for by family members. The Court of Appeal were content that the trial judge had carefully weighed all relevant matters in the scale and his approach was ‘immaculate’ – however they would reduce the sentence from four years 9 months to 3 years 10 months in light of the representations made on the mother’s behalf.

This case therefore does not appear to engage discussion of the paramoutcy principle, other than to cite with approval the South African case discussed above –

Seventh, the likelihood, however, of the interference with family life which is inherent in a sentence of imprisonment being disproportionate is inevitably progressively reduced as the offence is the graver and M v The State SA 2008 232 is again a good example.

In the Court of Appeal – Reporting Restrictions Order in Care Proceedings

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore.

I was junior counsel in this appeal lead by Paul Bowen QC, which was born – as is so much – from an exchange with the journalist Louise Tickle on Twitter. It was clear from the outset that she raised an important point of legal principle and a clear failing of the lower court to abide by the law and correct procedure.

The appeal was granted today. I took a note of the judgment which isn’t perfect but which hopefully gives you the gist. While I am happy that sense prevailed and guidance will be forthcoming, it is extremely sobering to realise this matter was highly unlikely ever to come to court without the bravery of a journalist, the willingness of a variety of barristers and solicitors to provide their time for free AND the generosity of those online who contributed to Louise Tickle’s crowdfunder – the application fee alone was a staggering £2K and for a long time the spectre of costs was apparent.

Also a very sad omission from the legal line up was anyone from CAFCASS to be the voice of the child. They had no funding.

Equally while the court said some very nice things about the barristers acting for free in the best traditions of the Bar, it would have been good to hear some similar praise for the solicitors who did an immense amount of necessary work that so often goes unsung. The Bundle is probably THE most important aspect of any hearing; a botched or mispaginated one causes significant chaos and irritation. Insufficient attention or praise is given to those who do the very necessary behind the scenes work.

I understand and sympathise with those who critise pro bono lawyers as those who are in effect propping up successive Government’s determination to run legal aid into the ground. But what else are we supposed to do? This appeal dealt with an important matter and it was important that it be heard. It is very necessary and frankly long overdue that the President issues general guidance.

The most crucial comment – for me – was that of Lady Justice King. Fears about ‘jig saw’ identification appear to have become simply a button that is pressed and obviates need for any thought or analysis. Judges should not restrict press freedom to report on family cases on anything other than evidence of harm to a child.

The judgment of the President of the Family Division

The court has before it an appeal against a RRO made by HHJ Levey 19 Oct 2018. Care proceedings with history of substantial litigation in family court. Originally HHJ Hess had made placement order. That Order was subject to appeal witch was granted by full court, heard on Feb 2018. Judgment in public and reported on BAILII and in official law reports. As a result of CoA judgment the case had to be redetermiend by a different judge and that process came before HHJ Levey in the autumn. By that time case had attracted attentnion in media and 3 respected journalists appeated in court as they were entitled to do. Prior to hearing certain journalists had communicated directly to the court of their intention to attend and apply for relaxation of RRO.

Journalists attended and were not represented. As transcript makes plian the issue was dealt with relatively swiftly and Judge made order to restrict reporting of information already in public domain by way of CoA judgment.

One of the three journalists Ms Tickle lodged an application for permission to appeal which was granted. Set down in March for full day.

However, it has however come to pass that all of the parties involved are now agreed as to replacement of reporting restrictions stand in place imposed by HHJ Levey. No longer dispute with respect to appeal decisions. Appeal would proceed by consent.

Because a RRO against all the world not a matter to be dealt with simply on paper and requires this court to consider if it should replace the order.

The court therefore established a short hearing this morning to take stock of process and see if full appeal hearing required. Because the appellant Ms Tickle and those representing BBC wishes to canvass wider issues of principle and practice generated by facts of this case that go beyond terms of order.

Court extremely grateful to Paul Bowen who leads Miss S Phillimore for the very full skeleton that has been prepared that sets out legal landscape in this complicated but very important legal area that relates to transparency in the family court and elements identified by PB that should be encapsulated as guidance. BBC applies to be parties, not contested. Written submissions from AW.

Unfortunately legal funding not available from child but letter submitted. Heard counsel for LA and for child’s mother.

Issues we have to determine are narrow. Should appeal hearing be retained in courts diary in order to determine what priority the welfare of the child should have when court considering relaxation or imposition of RRO? Neither PB nor AW press for hearing in this case on that topic with any force. They are right to do so. It is a matter that undoubtedly requires full consideration but this case is now constituted that no party wishes to argue against propositions media want to make. AW submits this may not be right vehicle for this process and we agree and decline to hold hearing in March for that purpose. That hearing will be vacated and hearing determined today.

Process by which appeal is allowed. In short terms ground of appeal assert Judge gave no reasons for failing to refer to CoA judgment and fails to consider existing case law re transparency in family court. Finally and crucially he failed to undertaken necessary balancing exercise between Article 8 and 10 of EHCR.

This court has sympathy with any judge in current time faced with application such as this. Sympathy for journalists involved often appearing without any legal representation. At present there is no detailed guidance or route map as to how such applications determined. It is my resolve as President to issue such guidance at the earliest opportunity. I therefore propose to develop a draft set of guidance and to consult with various interested parties with a view to issuing.

Reading transcript indicates basic grounds of appeal would be made out. Appeal not contested. Appeal should be allowed on basis that order made by HHJ Levey re RRO was wrong, arising from procedural irregularities that I have done no more than highlight.

The order in relation to the appeal and recording BBC as appellant, appeal allowed and RRO set aside, fresh reporting restriction to be made. Draft order will be further amended and attached.
The element of controversy that remains re the draft takes me to submissions by LM. It is the case that country of origin is stated plainly in CoA judgment Feb 2018. Common ground that if possible there should be no reference to the mother’s country of origin. The question is whether the new reporting restriction order should encapsulate that by restricting repetition of country of origin and in particular by in some way of distancing any report to direct reference of case name and neutral citation of CoA and BAILII link.

My Lady and I heard LM’s clear submissions and understand the important the mother places on this information. The court however does not have any detailed information about detrimental impact on mother if journalists otherwise freely able to connect it with other information in the public domain. Court must balance Article 8 rights against freedom of publication in Article 10. In my view, given the information under consideration is already out in public domain in CoA judgment it would be wrong for this court now to prevent any step that prevents ordinary linking to CoA judgment.

I am not persuaded that the mother’s and child’s Article 8 rights are compromised to a degree that would justify any other course and I therefore refuse LM application.
I think that deals with all matters currently before the court. The appeal is allowed with orders I have described being made in due course after any drafting amendments

LADY JUSTICE KING I agree.

Hi please find the unroll here: Thread by @GeorgeJulian: " sitting in front of President of the Family Division Sir Andrew MacFarlane and Lady Justice King https://t.co/aNYry6PDck […]" #RROAppeal https://t.co/EdRT5IwZMc
See you soon. 🤖

— Thread Reader App (@threadreaderapp) February 15, 2019

EDIT May 2019

This was a significant achievement for Louise Tickle. But perhaps the best outcome of all has been the recent announcement by the President of the Family Division that he is to conduct a review of the entire issue of openness and transparency in family cases. Watch this space!

Children’s wishes and feelings about their habitual residence.

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore

What happens if a local authority wants to make an application for a care order regarding a child who comes from another country? The Courts of England and Wales only have jurisdiction to make care orders if children are ‘habitually resident’ in the UK – mere physical presence is not enough. Although the Supreme Court have repeatedly said this is a ‘simple matter of fact’ it is clear that in practice it is not always easy to establish a child’s habitual residence.

I have no idea what the impact of Brexit will be on any of this; watch this space. – EDIT post Brexit we will rely on the Hague Convention 1996.

What power does the court have to make orders about children who come from another country?

Jurisdiction derives from habitual residence.

The following basic principles can be derived from these authorities Re F (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 789; Re E (Brussels II Revised: Vienna Convention: Reporting Restrictions) [2014] EWHC 6 (Fam), [2014] FLR:

the jurisdictional reach of the courts of England and Wales in relation to care proceedings is not spelt out in any statutory provision.
Jurisdiction was normally determined by the habitual residence or physical presence of the child.
However, this was fundamentally modified by the Regulation Brussels II revised (BIIR) which applies to determine the jurisdiction of the English court in care proceedings, irrespective of whether the other country is a Member State of the European Union: see A v A and another (Children: Habitual Residence) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others intervening) [2013] UKSC 60, [2014] AC 1, para 30, and In re L (A Child: Habitual Residence) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening) [2013] UKSC 75, [2013] 3 WLR 1597, para 18..
The basic principle, set out in Article 8(1) of BIIR is that jurisdiction is founded on habitual residence. It follows that the courts do not have jurisdiction to make a care order simply because a child is physically present.
The court must deal with this matter at the outset. The court should set out explicitly the basis upon which it has accepted or rejected jurisdiction. A declaration with regard to habitual residence cannot be made by default, concession or agreement but only if the court is satisfied by evidence.
If it is necessary to address the issue before there is time for proper investigation and determination, the following suggested recital should be used: “Upon it provisionally appearing that the child is habitually resident…”.

Habitual residence is a ‘matter of fact’.

The Supreme Court have repeatedly declared that ‘habitual residence’ is no more than a ‘simple fact’ which should be determined without any gloss. That arguably optimistic declaration has to be set against the number of times in fairly recent history that cases involving habitual residence have come before the Supreme Court – suggesting that determination of this ‘simple fact’ is a far from simple exercise and reflects the greater mobility of people in recent times and the wide variety of circumstances which impact on families, their composition and their location.

The basic proposition is that habitual residence is established by the degree of integration by the child is a ‘social and family environment’. See A v A and another (Children: Habitual Residence) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others intervening) [2013] ‘

habitual residence can in principle be lost and another habitual residence acquired on the same day.
habitual residence is a question of fact and not a legal concept such as domicile. There is no legal rule akin to that whereby a child automatically takes the domicile of his parents.
the test adopted by the European Court is ‘the place which reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment’ in the country concerned. This depends upon numerous factors, including the reasons for the family’s stay in the country in question. This is the preferred test.
Factors to take into account when assessing integration are
i. The duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for being in the country
ii. The child’s nationality
iii. The place and conditions of attendance at school
iv. Linguistic knowledge
v. Family and social relationships in the country
The social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those (whether parents or others) upon whom he is dependent. Hence it is necessary to assess the integration of that person or persons in the social and family environment of the country concerned.
The essentially factual and individual nature of the inquiry should not be glossed with legal concepts which would produce a different result from that which the factual inquiry would produce.
it is possible that a child may have no country of habitual residence at a particular point in time.
For those children who have no habitual residence, Article 13 of Brussels II provides that where a child’s habitual residence cannot be established and jurisdiction cannot be determined under Article 12, the courts of the Member State where the child is present have jurisdiction.

Habitual residence requires physical presence.

Physical presence is a clear necessary precursor to a finding of habitual residence. In In the Matter of A (Children) (AP) [2013] UKSC 60 the Supreme Court by a majority agreed that a new born baby could not claim habitual residence in the UK even though it was his mother’s place of habitual residence and she had been coerced into leaving the country to give birth. However the Supreme Court agreed it was possible in such extreme circumstances to order the child’s return to the UK using the inherent jurisdiction. See also W v X Case C‐499/15, [2017] Fam 305, [2017] 2 FCR 389.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in 2017 that Article 11(1) of the Brussels II bis Regulation:

must be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation in which a child was born and has been continuously residing with his or her mother for several months in accordance with the joint agreement of the parents in a Greece, while in Italy they had their habitual residence before birth, the initial intention of the parents as to the return of the mother accompanied by the child in Italy cannot allow the child to be regarded as having his or her habitual residence in Italy. The CJEU concludes that in such a situation the refusal of the mother to return to Italy accompanied by the child cannot be regarded as an ‘unlawful displacement or non-return’ within the meaning of Article 11(1).

This case seems to resolve the dilemma, dividing national courts, as to whether the physical presence of the child in the territory of a state is a necessary precondition for establishing the child’s habitual residence

Children only recently present or intermittently present in the jurisdiction

These situations require closer examination in light of the requirement of integration into a social or family environment as necessary to establish the ‘fact’ of habitual residence. It is clear that the position of young and dependent children cannot easily be seen in isolation from the position of their primary carer. See A v A (Children: Habitual Residence) [2013] UKSC 60: “The social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those (whether parents or others) upon whom he is dependent.”

However this does not mean that the perceptions of older children about where they habitually reside are irrelevant. See Re: LC (Reunite: International Child Abduction Centre intervening) [2014] UKSC 1.[43] Lord Wilson: It will be clear from my formulation of the question in para 1 above that in my view it is, in principle, the state of mind of adolescent children during their residence in a place that may affect whether it was habitual.

However, judicial dicta from other authorities does not support ‘state of mind’ as determinative.

See Re R (A Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 674 where the Court of Appeal considered the circumstances of a 4 year old girl S. She was born in 2010 in Morocco to an American mother, who had lived in England since the age of 13, and a Moroccan father. Shortly, after her birth, the mother travelled to England and fraudulently registered the birth in Kent. Thereafter, she travelled to and from various locations before returning to the UK in March 2013. In October 2013 S suffered serious injuries and was placed in foster care. The local authority did not commence care proceedings until April 2014.

Given by the time protective measures had been taken S and her mother had been living in the UK for over a year, there seems little doubt as a matter of fact that S was habitually resident ‘at the relevant time’ i.e. the making of the care order application but it was argued on behalf of the father that S’s life had been so unhappy with a neglectful mother, that it could not be said she was ‘integrated’ into a social environment and therefore her habitual residence was in fact Morocco.

Mr Justice Hayden decided that the court had jurisdiction to make a care order with respect to S on the basis that S’s habitual residence was, and had been throughout her life, the United Kingdom. The father’s appeal was dismissed. The CoA were critical of the judge’s finding that S had been ‘habitually resident in the UK all her life’ as all that was needed was a finding that S had habitual residence at the relevant time. However, his decision was not ‘perverse’ given the complexities of this case, including the dishonesty of the parents and the mother’s ‘frequent and erratic’ changes of location.

Mr Justice Hayden at first instance said this about integration

‘Integration’ as a concept involves a fusion of both the factual and the emotional, it is where a child feels settled, secure, happy and where the focus of his interests and attachments lie. It is not merely geographical, identifying habitual residence requires much greater nuance than that, drawing inferences from facts, the parents’ conduct, the feelings a child communicates and what the child may say. Lord Wilson encapsulated the point in Re LC (supra) at para 37 emphasising that integration encompasses more than the ‘surface features’ of a child’s life.”

This did not entirely meet with the approval of the Court of Appeal: McFarlane LJ commented:

“When determining habitual residence there is no requirement that, to be sufficient to support a finding, the individual needs to be happy, well cared for or free from abuse. The ‘social and family environment’ into which a child might be integrated may include both positive and negative factors. These will not be irrelevant.”

Thus it is conceded that it is not possible to claim that any period of time spent in another country during which a child was unhappy must then automatically preclude a finding of habitual residence in that country.

Date to determine habitual residence

See the decision of Moylan LJ in London Borough of Hackney v P & Ors (Jurisdiction : 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention) (Rev1) [2023] EWCA Civ 121, which sets out that in order to provide clarity and certainty, this should initially be determined by reference to the date on which proceedings were commenced.

Law regarding the habitual residence of a baby

The relevant legal framework following the UK’s departure from the European Union is set out in the Hague Convention. The relevant provisions for the purposes of this decision are Articles 5 and 7.

Article 5 provides:

1 The judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State of the habitual residence of the child have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the protection of the child’s person or property.

2 Subject to Article 7, in case of a change of the child’s habitual residence to another Contracting State, the authorities of the State of the new habitual residence have jurisdiction.

Article 7 states:

1 In case of wrongful removal or retention of the child, the authorities of the Contracting State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention keep their jurisdiction until the child has acquired a habitual residence in another State, and

each person, institution or other body having rights of custody has acquiesced in the removal or retention; or

the child has resided in that other State for a period of at least one year after the person, institution or other body having rights of custody has or should have had knowledge of the whereabouts of the child, no request for return lodged within that period is still pending, and the child is settled in his or her new environment.

2 The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where:

it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and

at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.

3 So long as the authorities first mentioned in paragraph 1 keep their jurisdiction, the authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been removed or in which he or she has been retained can take only such urgent measures under Article 11 as are necessary for the protection of the person or property of the child.

There have been a large number of reported decisions on the question of habitual residence. Mr Austin refers to the case of Re B (A Minor) (Habitual Residence) [2016] EWHC 2174, and Miss Phillimore to A v A and another (Children: Habitual Residence) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others intervening) [2013] UKSC60.

The relevance of both authorities was confirmed in the more recent Court of Appeal decision of Re A (A Child) (Habitual Residence: 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention) [2023] EWCA Civ 659 where it was said

Habitual Residence

I have referred above to what Hayden J said in Re B, at [17(i)] and [17(x)]. The former derives from what was said in A v A which, in turn, derived from what was said by the CJEU in Proceedings brought by A [2010] Fam 42, at [44], namely that:

“the concept of “habitual residence” under article 8(1) of the Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that it corresponds to the place which reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment.”

It is also right to note that Lady Hale referred to this in A v A, at [54(iii)], as being the “test adopted by the European Court”.

It is clear, however, not only from Proceedings brought by A itself but also from many other authorities, that this is a shorthand summary of the approach which the court should take and that “some degree of integration” is not itself determinative of the question of habitual residence. Habitual residence is an issue of fact which requires consideration of all relevant factors. There is an open-ended, not a closed, list of potentially relevant factors.

In Proceedings brought by A, the CJEU had earlier dealt with the issue at greater length, as follows:

“[37] The “habitual residence” of a child, within the meaning of article 8(1) of the Regulation, must be established on the basis of all the circumstances specific to each individual case.

[38] In addition to the physical presence of the child in a member state, other factors must be chosen which are capable of showing that that presence is not in any way temporary or intermittent and that the residence of the child reflects some degree of integration in a social and family environment.

[39] In particular, the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the stay on the territory of a member state and the family’s move to that state, the child’s nationality, the place and conditions of attendance at school, linguistic knowledge and the family and social relationships of the child in that state must be taken into consideration.

[40] As the Advocate General pointed out in para 44 of her opinion, the parents’ intention to settle permanently with the child in another member state, manifested by certain tangible steps such as the purchase or lease of a residence in the host member state, may constitute an indicator of the transfer of the habitual residence. Another indicator may be constituted by lodging an application for social housing with the relevant services of that state.

[41] By contrast, the fact that the children are staying in a member state where, for a short period, they carry on a peripatetic life, is liable to constitute an indicator that they do not habitually reside in that state.

[42] In the light of the criteria laid down in paras 38-41 of this judgment and according to an overall assessment, it is for the national court to establish the place of the children’s habitual residence.”

The broad nature of the analysis can also be seen from Lady Hale’s later comments (in a minority judgment but reflecting, on this issue, the majority judgment of Lord Wilson) in In re LC (Children) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening) [2014] AC 1038, when she referred, at [59], to whether the residence had “the necessary degree of stability” and when she said, at [60]:

“All of these factors feed into the essential question, which is whether the child has achieved a sufficient degree of integration into a social and family environment in the country in question for his or her residence there to be termed “habitual”.” (emphasis added)

The same can be seen from what Lord Reed said in Re R:

“[17] As Baroness Hale DPSC observed at para 54 of A v A, habitual residence is therefore a question of fact. It requires an evaluation of all relevant circumstances. It focuses on the situation of the child, with the purposes and intentions of the parents being merely among the relevant factors. It is necessary to assess the degree of integration of the child into a social and family environment in the country in question. The social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those (whether parents or others) on whom she is dependent. Hence it is necessary, in such a case, to assess the integration of that person or persons in the social and family environment of the country concerned. The essentially factual and individual nature of the inquiry should not be glossed with legal concepts which would produce a different result from that which the factual inquiry would produce.”

I refer to the above, not to put forward any gloss on the meaning of habitual residence, which the Supreme Court cautioned against in In re B (A Child) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others intervening) [2016] AC 606 (“Re B 2016”), at [46], but simply to demonstrate that “some degree of integration” is not a substitute for the required global analysis.

I would add that, self-evidently, a test of whether a child had “some degree of integration” in any one country cannot be sufficient when a child might be said to have some degree of integration in more than one State. This is why, as referred to in my judgment in Re G-E (Children) (Hague Convention 1980: Repudiatory Retention and Habitual Residence) [2019] 2 FLR 17 (“Re G-E”), at [59], the “comparative nature of the exercise” requires the court to consider the factors which connect the child to each State where they are alleged to be habitually resident. This is reflected in Mr Tyler’s written submissions when he referred to the relevance of a child’s “degree of connection” with the State in which he/she resided before they arrived in the new State.

In Re G-E, I also quoted the “expectations” set out by Lord Wilson in Re B 2016, at [46], which bear repeating, namely:

“(a) the deeper the child’s integration in the old state, probably the less fast his achievement of the requisite degree of integration in the new state;

(b) the greater the amount of adult pre-planning of the move, including pre-arrangements for the child’s day-to-day life in the new state, probably the faster his achievement of that requisite degree; and

(c) were all the central members of the child’s life in the old state to have moved with him, probably the faster his achievement of it and, conversely, were any of them to have remained behind and thus to represent for him a continuing link with the old state, probably the less fast his achievement of it.”

I have already dealt with the legal approach to habitual residence at some length in this judgment but, finally, I would refer to In re B (A Child) (International Centre for Family Law, Policy and Practice intervening) [2020] 4 WLR 149 when, at [83]-[89], in addition to Re B 2016, I referred to the CJEU’s decision of Proceedings brought by HR (with the participation of KO) (Case C-512/17) [2018] Fam 385 and to Black LJ’s (as she then was) judgment in In re J (A Child) (Finland) (Habitual Residence) [2017] 2 FCR 542 (“Re J”). Black LJ, at [57], referred to “the relevance of the circumstances of a child’s life in the country he has left as well as the circumstances of his life in his new country” and, at [62], she said:

“What is important is that the judge demonstrates sufficiently that he or she has had in mind the factors in the old and new lives of the child, and the family, which might have a bearing on this particular child’s habitual residence.”

51 In J v E (Habitual Residence) [2024] EWHC 196 MacDonald J attempted to distil these principles for the benefit of “the busy judge”:

Each of the decisions summarised above makes clear the importance of the court examining the degree of integration of the child into a social and family environment when determining habitual residence. The judgment of the Court of Appeal in this case simply recognises that although, in circumstances where full integration is not required, some degree of integration can establish habitual residence, it must still be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court that the degree of integration contended for in the given case is sufficient to reach that conclusion. In short, “some degree of integration” must still be demonstrated to be sufficient integration if it is to establish habitual residence. Determining whether that is the position requires a global analysis of all of the relevant circumstances specific to the individual case.

Where then does this plethora of authority on the concept of habitual residence leave the busy judge who is required to determine the preliminary issue of jurisdiction, without that determination “becoming an unworkable obstacle course, through which the judge must pick his or her way by a prescribed route or risk being said to have made an unsustainable finding?” Reading the foregoing authorities together, it is tolerably clear that the task of determining habitual residence falls to be discharged by the court asking itself whether, having regard to all the relevant circumstances and as a matter of fact, the subject child has achieved a degree of integration in a social and family environment in the country in question sufficient for the child to be habitually resident there. That is the test I have adopted in this case.

The authorities further make clear that in deciding in a given case whether the degree of integration is sufficient to establish habitual residence, i.e. whether the “some” is enough, certain matters may inform the court’s global analysis of the child’s situation in, and connections with, the state in which he or she is said to be habitually resident for the purpose of determining whether a sufficient degree of integration exists. These non-exhaustive considerations, to paraphrase Lord Wilson in Re B (A Child) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre Intervening), may include the following:

i) The factual inquiry is centred throughout on the circumstances of the child’s life that are most likely to illuminate his or her habitual residence. It is the child’s habitual residence which is in question and the child’s integration which is under consideration.

ii) The meaning of habitual residence is shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in particular on the criterion of proximity. Proximity in this context means the practical connection between the child and the country concerned.

iii) It is not necessary for a child to be fully integrated in a social and family environment before becoming habitually resident.

iv) The requisite degree of integration can, in certain circumstances, develop quite quickly. It is possible to acquire a new habitual residence in a single day. There is no requirement that the child should have been resident in the country in question for a particular period of time.

v) It is the stability of a child’s residence as opposed to its permanence which is relevant. This is qualitative and not quantitative, in the sense that it is the integration of the child into the environment rather than a mere measurement of the time a child spends there.

vi) Relevant matters can include the duration, regularity and conditions for the stay in the country in question; the reasons for the parents move to and the stay in the jurisdiction in question; the child’s nationality; the place and conditions of attendance at school; the child’s linguistic knowledge; the family and social relationships the child has; whether possessions were brought; whether there is a right of abode; and whether there are durable ties with the country of residence or intended residence.

vii) Where there are competing jurisdictions advanced as the child’s habitual residence, the comparative nature of the exercise requires the court to consider the factors which connect the child to each State where they are alleged to be habitually resident.

viii) Where there are competing jurisdictions advanced as the child’s habitual residence, the circumstances of the child’s life in the country he or she has left as well as the circumstances of his or her life in the new country will be relevant. What is important is that the court demonstrates sufficiently that it has in mind the factors in the old and new lives of the child, and the family, which might have a bearing on the subject child’s habitual residence.

ix) The deeper the child’s integration in the old state, probably the less fast his or her achievement of the requisite degree of integration in the new state. Likewise, the greater the amount of adult pre-planning of the move, including pre-arrangements for the child’s day-to-day life in the new state, probably the faster his or her achievement of that requisite degree.

x) In circumstances where all of the central members of the child’s life in the old state to have moved with him or her, probably the faster his or her achievement of habitual residence. Conversely, where any of the central family members have remained behind and thus represent for the child a continuing link with the old state, probably the less fast his or her achievement of habitual residence.

xi) In circumstances where the social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those on whom he or she is dependent, it is necessary to assess the integration of that person or persons (usually the parent or parents) in the social and family environment of the country concerned. In respect of a pre-school child, the circumstances to be considered will include the geographic and family origins of the parents who effected the move.

xii) A child will usually, but not necessarily, have the same habitual residence as the parent(s) who care for her. The younger the child the more likely that proposition but this is not to eclipse the fact that the investigation is child focused.

xiii) Parental intention is relevant to the assessment, but not determinative. There is no requirement that there be an intention on the part of one or both parents to reside in the country in question permanently or indefinitely. Parental intent is only one factor, along with all other relevant factors, that must be taken into account when determining the issue of habitual residence. It is possible for a parent unilaterally to cause a child to change habitual residence by removing the child to another jurisdiction without the consent of the other parent.

Conclusions

All of these discussions, while interesting, serve most usefully in my submissions to reflect the profound difficulties of applying general principles to the probably infinite variety of circumstances in which families find themselves.

I suggest that a pragmatic approach must be taken. The importance of habitual residence is clearly underpinned by asking ‘what jurisdiction is best able to make decisions about a child’s welfare’. And that jurisdiction is usually the one where the child actually lives or has spent the most time. However, the court will need to look beyond this starting point and the wishes and feelings, particularly of older children, may well be relevant.

Why does everyone hate the Family Court ? Part Two

I am grateful for Emma Sutcliffe for this guest post. Its been an interesting month for thinking and talking about why the family court seems to inspire such strong and invariably negative feelings. I first wrote about this on January 8th where I shared two narratives from two parents – a mother and a father, both with a very different perspective but united in their fear and distrust of the process they had experienced.

Then I heard Professor Jo Delanhunty QC’s Gresham College talk, wishing the Children Act 1989 its happy 30th Birthday, and her clear and urgent reminder that the ethos of the Act was in serious danger of being undermined by the lack of resources now provided to support what it wanted to do – to recognise the child as the heart of every decision and to enable parents to care safety for their children.

Short on the heels of this, I had to then consider the astonishing allegations of Victoria Haigh; who appears to be developing a presence as a ‘campaigner’ against the family court system without apparent concern or criticism from others in this field and despite the very serious findings made against her about the harm she inflicted on her own child. I can only assume the lack of challenge to her more fantastical assertions stems from the fact that they ‘feel right’ to a lot of people. This is depressing indeed.

So what do we do? I have very little power or influence. But that’s the same for most of us. Acting alone we can achieve little. But if we come together and were prepared to talk – openly and honestly – I want to believe that we could achieve something positive.

So I am very grateful for Emma for sticking with our conversations on line, not always easy for either of us at times, and producing a powerful articulation of how and why her reaction to the family justice system was so negative.

Why do people hate family court?

Emma Sutcliffe

People hate family court for the same reasons they hate hospitals; something pathological has happened to you that you cannot resolve alone and you have to put your life in the hands of people who are deemed to be more expert about your condition than you are. If you’re in family court you’ve likely been through something painful, there’s no guarantee it will stop hurting and the interventions themselves cause bruises. There’s also a hefty bill at the end and the surrounding quality of life direct and indirect costs of loss of earnings and utter exhaustion. Plus … like lots of diseases, it might not go away, it might come back; next time it could be fatal.

Why the determined correlation with medicine? I’m trying to align what I know with what I’ve experienced – knowledge of facts and wisdom of interpretation. I’ve been a medical writer for 25 years following a degree in medical biochemistry and application of that in the research and development of medicines. My entire nature is that of enquiry and fact-based decision making and behaviours. I believe in logic, cause and effect, sensibly following ‘doctor’s orders’.

I’ve also spent too much time in family court as a petitioner which saw 18 hearings in 22 months. My faith in facts, practitioners and the sensibility of court orders was put to the test before, during and after every one of those hearings. It was like preparing for surgery.

Let’s cut to the end result to be able to get back to the original question of ‘hatred’: although technically ‘I won’ — as in the contact order I applied for (on police recommendation) was granted — the experience was like surgery without anaesthetic where you leave feeling as though the presenting diseases may have been excised but fragments of infection are lingering away in septic reservoirs leaving with you a body and mind too reversibly damaged to recover and parent well. ‘Our case’ was just a lose:lose for the entire family. Both families; the old and the new and the penumbrae of families around us.

Our case had its ‘final hearing’ (an oxymoron if you consider that toxic parenting is a chronic condition) more than a year ago. I’m still haunted by the ghosts of hearings past and have my very own reservoir of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder leaving a lasting impression. The reality of the court orders is that unlike doctor’s orders, I’m already forced into breaking them and live every day with the fresh fear that CAFCASS will find me to be in breach and my ex husband will take me back to court. Because family court transacts on what has happened and assumes that children’s needs are fixed. Funnily enough, children grow and change whereas court orders don’t (without another set of injurious hearings reopening wounds) and as I now have a sentient, articulate adolescent determinedly refusing to stay at Dad’s house that essentially turns me into a criminal and opens me up again to allegations of the never-proved, academically derided ‘junk theory’ of parental alienation.

Like Andrew Wakefield’s infamous MMR causal link to autism saw him struck off yet the myths still perpetuate; parental alienation accusations conveniently drown out what ironically is ‘the voice of the child’ – child says ‘this is happening to me; I don’t like it’, CAFCASS officers respond with ‘they’re too young to know what they’re saying, they are the mouthpiece of the parent’. Pick a lane please. By all accounts, therefore, if recent judges’ blunt condemnations that ‘alienating mothers should be subjected to a three-strikes and you’re out’ – or imprisoned – then who knows if my next blog will be about life behind bars?

Therein lies the promulgation to distrust, fear, anger — hatred.

Despite living in purgatory, I have been able to step back and consider what in the hell happened there. My observations are that, like medicine, where a diagnosis, prognosis and treatment is sought through sedulous investigation of symptoms to reach a purely factual outcome – so too does the law of family court (specifically the implementation of ‘The Children’s Act’) rely on facts to achieve a sensible outcome that secures the best outcome for the child. As such, both the practices of medicine and law are ones which rely on its participants and processes being underpinned by integrity and accuracy. Trust should therefore be implicit.

However, neither medicine nor law accommodates human nature and emotions – which when put under pressure will contort and eclipse rational and logical decision-making. When afraid, hurt, confused or distressed the easiest of the emotion to employ is anger. Family court is that A&E part of the hospital where anger dominates; complex decisions are being made amidst a melee of jargon, allegations, process and manipulation. It becomes too easy to archetype ‘all mums are histrionic and cry wolf on domestic abuse’ or ‘all dads are intimidating and claim parental alienation’. However, this isn’t about gender – it is about which parent is the angriest parent in family court because they are more likely to be the one also prepared to be the most ruthless; to take the greatest risks. When parties enter the court they will each know how to attack and defend and how far the other is prepared to go.

The hate of family court is the knowledge that parties will default to their character type and court processes and practitioners by their very need to be thorough and percipient to protect a child have to also be open to the angriest party’s determination to exploit those people and processes in continued pursuit of punishment.

People hate family court because it prolongs the pain of punitive pursuit.

I could further my anecdotes and detail the utterly ludicrous allegations postured at me that I had to defend. But that would be pointless precisely because I was able to defend them thanks to a brilliant barrister and very caring solicitor who, importantly, were able to get me to listen all the while that my anger and fears were raging towards a maelstrom that possibly would have seen me lose custody of my own children and only be permitted supervised visits. If my ex had got his way and the full force of his anger and risk-taking of out and out lies had succeeded in influencing the judge as they biased the CAFCASS officer throughout proceedings then this story might have been very different indeed and even have seen our children placed in the care system. I won’t comment on the allegations because that’s the subject of a different blog (how narcissistic parents behave in court).

But that is why only relying on ‘facts’, denying how emotions can influence behaviours and seeing things in the fixed black/white process of the law is merely sticking a plaster over a seeping wound. People hate family court because it is sterile and doesn’t accurately reflect life outside the chambers. The law is fixed, but life is fluid. And people’s emotions over their children will always spill over … the angrier, the louder, the more heinous the allegations, the blunt threats and brinksmanship of disingenuous practitioners … when faced with the prospect of fight or flight, most mothers without strong legal support will run.

There needs to be allowance for the emotions of all parties and just as a good doctor seeks to help the physical and holistic needs of a patient; so too must family court consider the importance of helping and communicating that it should be a place for resolution rather than fuelling hatred. That can only begin when we seek to align knowledge of facts and wisdom of interpretation.

Victoria Haigh: When Child Abusers are given moral authority

I first became aware of the case of Victoria Haigh in about 2013, when my concern about the activities of the then MP John Hemming began to mount up.

In 2018 I noticed Victoria Haigh on Twitter. She was supported by a number of self styled campaigners who were linked by their shared belief that the family justice system was fundamentally a tool of misogynistic oppression against women, favouring the rights of violent men over the women they abused.

I have written about this before. I don’t think its true. My position simply is this: the Children Act is the statutory expression of the need to put the welfare of the child first and foremost in any decision making process. Neither sex has the monopoly on bad behaviour and my experience in practice shows a pretty equal split between emotionally abusive behaviour by both mothers and fathers. However, as is unsurprising given mens greater physical strength, they are more likely to be physically aggressive to their partners than women.

The fact that I am insulted, threatened and blocked online pretty equally by Mens Rights Activitists and Female DV campaigners suggests to me that I must be doing something right.

When I questioned the validity of Victoria Haigh as any kind of campaigner against the family courts, given the very clear findings made against her that she had subjected her own child to serious emotional harm, I was met with instant vilification and told to ‘fuck off’ as I was a ‘narc’.

So far, so internet.

I was however extremely alarmed to see this a few weeks later.

https://twitter.com/SVPhillimore/status/1091979776036950016

A lot of people saw this tweet – at least by my standards. My tweets usually get about 300 ‘impressions’ with an ‘engagement rate’ of about 2%. This one (at time of writing February 4th 2019) 2,449 people have seen it and 279 engaged. A rate of 11.3 %. So clearly a topic that attracted more attention than I usually get on line. But no comments. No one replied to say ‘well, that looks a bit worrying.’ Silence.

So I asked again. Why the silence? did no one in the DV sector see the obvious problems with affording moral authority to a woman found to be a child abuser? Who had been fairly tried and rightly punished by the legal system? Did anyone think that this was the way to work to achieve necessary change in this area?

Zoe Dronfield replied by simply posting a link to something called The Red Mother: An interview with Victoria Haigh.

The thrust of this article is immediately apparent from the first paragraph

During the proceedings Victoria reported that her daughter had told her that her father is sexually abusing her. The response of the system was swift and cruel – the girl was taken away from Victoria and her father got sole custody of her. Victoria was accused of coaching the girl and being an emotionally abusive mother (see also this article in the UK Telegraph). Never one to buckle under, she then went public with her case and stressed further investigations. For an alledged breach of a no-contact order (no contact with her daughter that is) Victoria was eventually put on trial and sentenced to 3 years in prison. After her release she moved to France with her youngest daughter (not related to the alledged molester of her older daughter) to re-start her career as horse-trainer.

This sounds shocking. But it is not true. The truth is this. Victoria Haigh was found to have told lies about her ex sexually abusing their daughter. She was found to have tried to make contact with her on a garage forecourt and she was sent to prison for breach of a non-molestation order. She was found, on evidence, to be a child abuser.

See for example:

Doncaster MBC v Haigh, Tune and X [2011] EWHC B16 (Fam) where – very unusually – the LA asked the court to make its judgment public and to name Ms Haigh because of the amount of misleading information that she was putting out into the public domain

Family Law week summarised these proceedings in this way

This case had begun as a private law contact dispute between Victoria Haigh, who was the mother of X and the child’s father, David Tune. Following a court hearing of this dispute in respect of which Ms Haigh was clearly unhappy, she made allegations that David Tune had sexually assaulted X. These allegations were duly investigated and at a fact-finding hearing, HHJ Robertshaw had concluded that X had not been abused and that she had been coached by Ms Haigh. At that hearing, the mother’s stance was not that X had been sexually abused, but rather that X had made these allegations as a reaction to the stressful relationships around her. The judge disagreed, however, and found that the allegations were false and had originated in the mind of the mother.

The mother refused to accept the findings, despite her stance at the fact-finding hearing. Her views about the alleged abuse hardened to become a certainty which she expressed dogmatically. At a subsequent hearing, HHJ Jones concluded that the mother had continued to influence X and to manipulate her feelings whilst in fact ‘placing her own as the priority’. HHJ Jones concluded that it would be contrary to X’s best interest to live with her mother. A decision was made that X should reside with her father. The local authority offered supervised contact between the mother and X but Ms Haigh felt unable to attend and decided she would not see X at all.

The mother’s attention then turned towards a media and internet-based campaign designed to remedy what she claimed was a miscarriage of justice. Assisted by an Elizabeth Watson, who described herself as a private case investigator, she put a large number of highly critical comments and information about the case and all of the professionals involved into the public domain. She also contacted the father’s employers and colleagues and parents of children who attended X’s school and falsely alleged to them that Mr Tune was a paedophile. This was in breach of orders made by the High Court prohibiting the publication of any information that would lead to the identity of the child or any other family members. On 25 February 2011 Baker J made an order prohibiting the mother and Ms Watson from communicating via the internet, media or otherwise “any information relating to the proceedings under the Children Act concerning X”.

The author of the interview asks

Why are a mother and child punished so severly for simply talking about sexual abuse and saying that it has occured? Why is a woman sentenced to 3 years in prison for saying hello to her own child? And to what extent was this mother surveillanced, by whom and why?

The answers to these questions would have been found easily in the judgment cited above. But she clearly doesn’t think it worth checking any other source than the narrative offered to her by Victoria Haigh.

Victoria Haigh goes on to expressly assert that the findings against her were the result of deliberate corruption, a campaign ‘to cover up the truth’.

They do what they do. The police do not investigate the crimes. If one complains, the complaints are investigated by those one lays the complaint against and one is sent in a spin cycle of chaos. Then it is the complainant or victim or associate of the victim who begins to have court orders put on them! An innocent person can soon become a criminal, just like me! It was all a complete smoke screen to avoid achieving any kind of justice…

My retrial was an overall tactic by the judiciary, police, ministry of justice at the highest level, to shut me down once and for all with their utmost effort of propaganda, blackmail and whatever else they threw at me. I was not going to stay silent therefore they used their well trodden tactic of pulling my reputation to pieces. To discredit a witness is how the criminals defendthemselves. I was the mouthpiece for my child so by shutting me down, my child was shut down too.

I am quite prepared to accept that miscarriages of justice occur. That wrong decisions are made. It is certainly not impossible that Victoria Haigh has been a victim of such a miscarriage of justice, although I note she has not chose to appeal against any of the court judgments made against her. However, when asked WHY she thinks the family court system acted against her in the way it did, she gives this answer. I find this shocking. There is absolutely no evidence from any credible source that this is happening. This is delusional conspiracy theorising of the worst kind.

There is evidence through MOSAC (Mothers of Sexually Abused Children, a Charity) that women are being groomed to have babies and the babies are being ‘won’ in a ‘custody battle’ by the peodophile father. If a paodophile father uses this as a template which according to the patterns we have seen, these men are using, very successfully, the length and breadth of the UK the same tactic applying for contact through these secret courts accusing the mother of alienating them from their child, in most cases they win custody, never get prosecuted and have freedom and the law on their side to rape their own children under complete protection of the State through the court orders they achieve. The mothers in all of these cases are gagged and prevented from having any contact with their children, knowing at the same time their children are not safe from child sexual abuse. It is torture for the child and the mother.

She goes on to describe family lawyers as ‘cowards or paedophiles’.

This is deeply worrying and depressing. I do not doubt that some men sexually abuse children and women. I do not doubt some men are violent. I do not doubt the family court system could do a better job of dealing with such cases quickly and fairly. I do not doubt that many women find it hard to provide the evidence a court will insist on to prove that they are the victims of coercive or controlling behaviour. I do not doubt that many women fear the family court system I do not doubt that many do not understand what is going on. I do not doubt that many criticisms are well made, and I have made many myself.

Not everything Haigh says in this interview sounds insane. What she says, for example about the women she met in prison strikes a chord.

The women in prison ALL had crimes committed against them that were much worse than the crimes they had committed to be imprisoned including myself. This again sums up the terrible treatment of women in the UK. “It truly is a terrible country to live in. I looked around at these women and realised instantly that these women needed help and certainly not locking up. Many were products of the UK care system and it goes without saying were sexually abused in care. I was very saddened by what I saw in that place.

But I reject any allegation that the family court system is deliberately set up to oppress women or is part of some ‘baby farm’ for paedophile fathers.

Either lawyers don’t do a good enough job of explaining or the removal of legal aid has left more and more floundering as litigants in person. When I engage with those who criticise the family justice system and ask them what processes they would have in place other than the testing of allegations by a Judge, I get no answer.

Victoria Haigh is a mother who was found by a variety of judges over the years to have lied and manipulated her daughter into reporting abuse about her father that never happened. She did not appeal against those judgments. They stand as the truth. This is the operation of the rule of law.

So I put the question again to those in the ‘DV Sector’ who stand behind those such as Haigh and promote such narratives that women are being groomed to have babies who will be ‘won’ by a paedophile, that family lawyers are ‘cowards or paedophiles’

do you think this is true?
If so, where is your evidence that this is true?
If you accept you have no evidence, what real or lasting change do you think you will secure by campaigning in this way?
To what degree does financial self interest motivate your promotion of such lurid fantasies about the family justice system?

I am sorry to be so cynical as I offer the last question. But when I dare to raise polite inquiry a to the wisdom of promoting Victoria Haigh as a campaigner against the family justice system and I am told to ‘fuck off narc’ by prominent campaigners who have a link to their book or their agent in their Twitter bio, I do wonder. I wonder quite a lot.

EDIT February 5th 2019

I had a conversation with Zoe Dronfield on Twitter. I asked her a number of times if she agreed with Haigh’s narrative that the family courts facilitate the rape of children by handing them over to obvious abusers. She wouldn’t answer. This is a great shame. There is clearly something worthy of discussion here. What has gone so wrong with the system that such delusional beliefs can take such deep roots? Haigh isn’t the only person who thinks and says this, not by a long shot. I have to accept that something ‘feels right’ about this narrative to a significant minority of people and that is very troubling. What can we do about this – if anything?

Maybe nothing. But the answer cannot be to ignore it. Its an inexorable rule of of life that ignoring a problem very rarely makes it go away but it will make others seriously question your motives and your good faith.

EDIT March 9th 2019

This article originally referred to Ms Haigh being found guilty of attempting to abduct her child from the garage forecourt. On Friday 6th March I received an email from Ms Haigh’s lawyers at 10.24am accusing me of making ‘false’ allegations about Ms Haigh and threatening action in defamation. I have agreed to amend ‘attempt to abduct’ for ‘breach of a non molestation order’ as I agree it is important to be accurate about such serious and important matters. However, I assert that to call Ms Haigh a ‘child abuser’ is true and accurate and I do not resile from that description. I will await with interest any summons to the High Court to defend my position which I shall very happily do.

EDIT July 26th 2021

I make this further edit after Ms Haigh pointed out the existence of an article in The Times in May 2021 that confirms that her daughters father was found to have sent “inappropriate text messages to a 17-year-old female athlete in 2015”. He asked her to send him photographs of her without her clothing and made references to parts of her anatomy. The police took no action and he was allowed to return to coaching but his licence was restricted to allow training only of adult athletes.

This is clearly reprehensible behaviour, particularly as this man was in a position of power over the 17 year old girl. But it is not evidence that the man sexually assaulted his own daughter or that he is a paedophile. I do not see how this article ‘exonerates’ Haigh as is claimed. But I appreciate its important information that would be relevant in court proceedings when allegations about sexual misconduct are made.

Happy Birthday Children Act 1989!

But have you stood the test of time?

“Is the Act fit for purpose? Overwhelmingly yes. Able to use its basic structure to allow us to embrace changing concepts in society. Where it is failing is not where its ethos is flawed but because its ethos required it to be funded – to deliver services to families and communities. “

The Children Act is now 30 years old. For many family lawyers, its the only law we have ever known. Both the Act and I were young back in the distant days of 1993 when I graduated from University and went on to Bar School; becoming a fully fledged family lawyer in about 1998. We are both very much older now and the world is very different in very many ways – perhaps most notably in how notions of family and sexuality have shifted.

Over the years I have heard a variety of criticisms of the Act. The French documentary ‘England’s Stolen Children’ had an unusual take in 2016, that it was the creation of Margaret Thatcher to ‘liberate’ the working classes and it gives children’s services the power to remove children on a mere suspicion of maltreatment, present or future. This is of course not true. For further discussion about the risk of future harm, see this post from the Child Protection Resource from a retired social worker.

However, rather more compelling criticisms have been raised over the years. Professor Devine comments that the clear lines drawn in the Act have become dangerously blurred between offering help and support with the consent of the parent/imposing coercive measures to ‘rescue’ children. Professor Featherstone remarks upon the ‘risk monster’ that the Children Act now appears to have facilitated. More and more children are being investigated, care proceedings are rising and yet levels of child abuse are not falling. There is also evidence of a worrying geographical disparity between levels of intervention.

Patrick Philps, a retired social worker, wrote a guest post for this blog calling the Children Act a ‘deeply flawed piece of legislation’ – his primary concern being that the Act contained a nebulous definition of what was meant by significant harm and children were being removed from their families when they should not have been. He commented:

I am not suggesting that children should never be removed, and I see the ever swinging pendulum in the process of swinging away from child removal again. However, in my view the 1989 Children Act is pie in the sky and needs to be replaced with legal standards which more nearly reflect those expressed in re B-S, that is to set realistically measurable standards to govern the protection of children, rather than to push the law into ever less measurable levels of ‘abuse’ as Robert Buckland, QC, MP, Solicitor General curiously seems to advocate (The Times, 15 January 2015). Any reliable system also needs to recognise the impossibility of predicting abuse, a lesson one may draw from Eileen Munro’s early works in which she draws attention to the mathematics of risk assessment, false positives and negatives etc, but which she proceeds to ignore in her own advocacy of its use in social work (reference needed). The mathematics of ‘false positive’ identification would indicate even higher levels of mistaken removal than some of the conspiracy theorists in the field would have us believe, but not in the least due to ‘conspiracy’.

So I was interested to know what would be Professor Jo Delahunty QC’s take on the Children Act in her Gresham College lecture on 31st January 2019. Sadly, dire warnings of Snowmaggedon prevented my actual attendance but I was poised and ready by the YouTube Live link.

If I make any comments of my own on the analysis offered by Professor Delahunty, they will be in italics

The 30th Anniversary of the Children Act 1989 – is it still fit for purpose?

The Children Act 1989 embodied a change in philosophy by making the child’s welfare the courts ‘paramount’ concern, moving away from the concept of parental rights towards the right of the child. It embraced the idea of shared parental rights and responsibilities and that children are best cared for within their families but not at the expense of suffering avoidable significant harm. Has the Act done right by children since 1989? Has it adapted to the challenges of childhood and society?

The Children Act has seen 6 Prime Ministers and 6 Presidents of the Family Division come and go. Before it was born practitioners had to deal with five different Acts spanning 1933 – 1969 in a system geared very much to ‘juvenile delinquents’ so hearings were conducted in atmosphere of ‘crime and guilt’ rather than help and support. The pressure for reform mounted in the late 1980s with a number of high profile and shocking child deaths. The core concept of the Children Act was supposed to be working in partnership; offering families support.

But society has changed dramatically in the last 30 years; it has become ‘freer and more diverse’. Has the Children Act stood the test of time?

Professor Delahunty admired the drafting of section 31 setting out the threshold criteria. When she is sitting as a Judge, the various components of section 31 has shown it can adapt to society’s changing needs; it is ‘fluid’ and ‘positively directs your attention to the child’s needs’. This is the counter to the criticism of Patrick Philips above – that fluidity is needed in order for the Act to encompass and deal with the almost infinite array of sadness and difficulties that families can face. But questions about lack of clarity of definition remain troubling and probably have been exacerbated by lack of training and funding – which Professor Delanhunty discusses further on.

Of all the components to the Act, what is most important to her is that the child is at the centre. Pre 1989 you had custody and access orders; historically the father had all rights over the child and the mother none, unless born out of marriage. The hangover of those ideas carried through to 1989 and they were pernicious. ‘Custody’ gives a strong connotation of possession and control. It is a process or arrangement that happens to people. Also ‘access’ has strong physical connotations. It says ‘possession’ and that is exactly what a child should NOT be. Thus the Children Act 1989 made them words of the past and introduced important concept of ‘parental responsibility’.

However and sadly she notes that the new words of ‘residence’ and ‘contact’ introduced by the Children Act quickly hardened into words that parents used to denote who was the ‘winner’ and who the ‘loser’ in any dispute about seeing children – so we now have the opaque and cumbersome ‘child arrangements orders’. However, I strongly suspect the problem here will never be cured by tinkering with the names attached to various forms of orders; it goes much deeper and reveals the emotional difficulties many parents feel in navigating disputes about their children.

An example of how the Act could adapt and apply was shown in the decision of re M involving a transgender mother who was initially denied contact with her children because of the adverse reactions of the religious community in which her children still lived. The Court of Appeal held that the court had to consider the ‘reasonable parent’ as someone receptive to change, broadminded and tolerant. A symbol of parenthood we should all aspire to. The judge had failed to address head on the human rights issues – even secluded religious communities are not exempt from the laws of the land. This was not a set of circumstances that those drafting the Act in 1989 could have reasonably contemplated, but the court was able to respond fairly using the existing framework of the Act.

Radicalisation cases however did NOT easily fit the framework of the Children Act. Children were often making choices and keeping them secret from their parents who therefore could not easily be held to be culpable for the risk of harm a child faced. Therefore the courts revived the use of wardship for these children. The CA was designed to make wardship redundant but we now see its resurgence. This doesn’t mean the CA has failed; once crisis passed the cases often reverted to the CA jurisdiction. This shows the need for different areas of the law to act in partnership to meet children’s needs.

Have we now got the balance right? No. Children are still dying. Herefordshire v AB 2018 ‘rocked our understanding of section 20’. But what these examples of failures have in common is that they were matters that should have received the oversight of the court and did not. Professor Delahunty identifies not a failure of the legislation but a failure of implementation – and this stems from lack of resources. There is lack of training for social workers, lack of resources for the child, lack of legally aided lawyers, lack of judges to hear cases. She discussed a number of high profile cases when it was only significant press interest that appeared to prompt identification of support for a child.

Professor Delanhunty concluded with the question: Is the Act fit for purpose? Her answer was:

Overwhelmingly yes. Able to use its basic structure to allow us to embrace changing concepts in society. Where it is failing is not where its ethos is flawed but because its ethos required it to be funded – to deliver services to families and communities.

She ended with a warning – we cannot continue as we are for much longer. The system is under incredible strain, there are simply not enough judges to go round and we are in danger of paying lip service to the need to listen to the voice of the child. I can only hope as we slide further into Brexit madness that there will be some time and space for our politicians in the very near future to hear and act upon this warning.

I won’t hold my breath. I agree that the Children Act is still fit for purpose – but that our political system increasingly is not.

It was an incredible achievement. It’s been adapted and updated because of the case law attached and, I suggest, the Red Book helps with that. Sadly as I am no longer self employed I don’t buy my own, but I miss it having it on me.

— Norma Laming 💙 (@TheSandlings) January 31, 2019

The ethos of the CA was joined up thinking & assessment/support for children in need followed through with a tight legal framework for effective and timely action. It’s not the Act that’s failed its but capacity to deliver is undermined by overwhelming demand & inadequate funding

— Prof Jo Delahunty KC (@JoDQC) February 1, 2019

EDIT February 4th 2019

Professor Delanunty kindly sent me the notes of her talk and an additional quote from our now President which she wanted to include but ran out of space.

Per Sir Andrew McFarlane in a speech to the ALC in November 2018

“”Crisis” may be an overused word and some, outside the court system, may have questioned its deployment by Sir James Munby two years ago in relation to the rise of the number of care applications being received by the courts. For my part, I consider that Sir James was fully justified in calling this a crisis and, as the continuing figures have borne out since, Sir James was plainly right to blow the whistle when he did.”

“It was integral to the ethos of the Children Act 1989 that family life should be independent and free from unjustified interference by the state. That ethos was encapsulated in the central concept of “parental responsibility”, which was reinforced by the presumption that a court order modifying or restricting the exercise of parental responsibility would not be made unless to do so would promote the child’s welfare. That statutory foundation was further underpinned by the Human Rights Act 1998. Part Three of the CA 1989 set out general and specific duties imposed upon local authorities in respect to the services that they must, or may, provide to children and families. In the context of Part Three working in partnership with those holding parental responsibility and members of the wider family was a guiding principle in the effective discharge of a local authority’s duties. The principle of work in partnership was introduced and supported by the body of government guidance issued when the Act came into force […]

To my mind the category of cases that are now coming before the court in greater numbers than was seen hitherto must, almost by definition, come from the opposite end of the spectrum of harm. They are likely to be cases of poor parenting and neglect and in such cases there is a need for the courts to be astute as to the requirements of the threshold criteria. There may be a danger of the system slipping into the exercise of a broad benevolent discretion with courts accepting the need to help children who are generally in need, rather than strictly questioning whether the state of affairs for the particular child has indeed reached the level, which the architects of the Children Act clearly considered was required, sufficient to justify statutory orders.”

“It may properly be said that we have reached a stage where the threshold for obtaining a public law order is noticeably low, whereas, no doubt as a result of the current financial climate, the threshold for a family being able to access specialist support services in the community is conversely, very high.”

Professor Delahunty comments:

The lack of financial support for community resources < the rise in s 31’s > they are linked. Hence the value in reminding the audience of how the act was meant to cover community as well as court procedures with access to services, advice and support being embraced within its composite parts . However with limited legal aid for pre proceedings advice for parents , S 20 abuses , legal aid deserts for early ( any!) advice in private law , court staff / judges acting as advisors and counsellors< lack of court time as we have judges working to break point : all these deficits are crippling. Community lack of access to services and legal advice compounds an overwhelmed and overwhelming social care environment staffed by disrespected social workers , often unsupported , and inadequate managerial oversight with little joined up thinking with legal departments. I think every strand is intertwined.

Hence why I thought a reminder of what we should strive at might be timely.

What’s in a name? Why so many complicated Forms to fill?

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore

On January 24th 2019 I got a text message from a parent I know. She was applying to discharge the care order regarding one of her children. She needed to know what form to use.

The internet (and my site) told her Form C110A. The court staff on the family team of her local court told her it was C100 but when she went to file her application she was told it was a C1. My response was that I thought it was C110A but I would make a plea for confirmation via Twitter.

The responses came quite quickly and were unanimous. It’s Form C110A! However, two of the Big Beasts of the family law scene – Andrew Pack and Lucy Reed – then offered another view. Pack was clear – its a C1. The C110A is only for those wishing to apply for an EPO.

Reed’s suggestion of a C2 was a new runner in an already crowded field. She noted that no form was in fact specified for a discharge of a care order and therefore C2 was the way to go by operation of Part 18 of the rules

Another MKF agreed with Reed. Then another lawyer weighed in for C110A.

My brain was, at this point, leaking slowly from my ears. And I am not a parent trying to apply to discharge a care order against my child.

The frustration of the parent was evident. She was very worried about what form to use to make her application and texted:

They won’t accept it unless the form their demanding is used so do I do it n risk getting chucked out on a fuck up that know is a fuck up of not my choosing?

Another parent on Twitter offered their experiences about when the ‘wrong’ form was used

Not really. Told to file C100 when gone with C2, then accepted C2 with manager’s approval. Then no response (as in application not issued) for a month. When chased told C2 was the wrong form and “has been mislaid” and told to file C100 (so the “wrong” form led to a month’s delay)

— AG (@goyalam) January 25, 2019

This really matters. Filling in the wrong form can lead to your application not being issued or being delayed. Why on earth does it have to be so difficult? What message are we giving to litigants in person? The Government purports to offer some help with its ‘Form Finder’ – but unless you know exactly what you are looking for it seems impossible to find anything. There is no automatic legal aid for applying to discharge a care order. It is available on a means and merits basis; the vast majority of applicants will be going it alone.

Harsh but fair; the parent’s view

I asked the parent if she would describe the impact of this on her. This is what she said:

So you get all your proverbial ducks in a row make the leap to fighting to get your child back and ironically can’t get past the first hurdle… I seem to have really divided the entire family court scene by one question ‘what form do I use to discharge a care order?’ The options are C1, C2, C110A and C100 yeah confused yet?

Its well known us parents get a raw deal, us LiP parents the more brutal end of that raw deal desperate, bewildered, emotional, confused and to be fair is it any wonder when not even the ‘experts’ know what is going on?!

Team A siding with C1 applications are big players like Andrew Pack and the court clerk for filing. Team B siding with C110A are big players like Sarah Phillimore and the Red Book. Team C siding with C2 are the MKF and big players like Lucy Reed. Team D siding with C100 are the actual family court staff who have to accept the form you hand in!

Soooooo now here I sit and I’m not green behind the ears by a long shot, I’m what you can call hardened to the system, I’ve worked as a MKF for 8 years and been a LiP for a lot longer than that – I’ve even set a precedent or two along my journey and I’m confused. Not just a little confused but a lot confused so how does Joe Bloggs your average parent stand a chance, no legal aid no help and apparently none of the professionals knowing either.

How is that fair and respectful of ECHR 6 and 8 and equality and all that shizzle that’s often shouted about but never actually seen to happen in the family court?

I’ve got my younger children with me, I’m not your average emotional train wreck parent that’s often left in the aftermath of court proceedings I’m happy, healthy and enjoying my life , its been years now and the opportunity has arose to get my older child home, its a far stretch from the usual 6 months desperate claw back to regain your child before adoption and placement orders etc you see for these applications – and even I’m sat here thinking what is the point, the systems set for me to fail.

One can’t blame parents that have just faced in their opinion that social workers colluded to lie and steal their child for thinking its done on purpose and it’s all the LA’s fault….obviously it’s not, it is quite transparently truly from no one actually knowing than purposeful prohibition and certainly not anything to do with the LA for once they aren’t to blame!

So who is actually right?? Perhaps given its such an important issue for parents who are nearly 100% without legal aid and LiPs undertaking such applications that it is clarified once and for all so that everyone actually knows what the hell is going on and what is meant to happen step by step!

TBF it really is laughable that it’s split everyone down the lines and this is meant to be a go to app for parents to get kids back – it sums the entire family court circuit up, one big joke from start to finish with no one knowing their ass from their elbow.

Conclusion

https://twitter.com/SVPhillimore/status/1088780873917493248

(un)amusing postscript

The parent has just texted. The court has decided to accept the C110A after all.

We urgently need to do better than this.

What happens to children under 16 who need help from the State with somewhere to live?

The distinction between ‘in need’ and ‘looked after’

So what does this mean?

It’s not the label that matters, its the facts and the legal consequences.

Has the LA taken a ‘major role’ in making arrangements for the child to be accommodated?

Does it then matter if the LA argues section 23(2) or 23(6)?

What is a child?

How and when is transgender identify discovered?

Further reading

How far can the state interfere with a parents wish to register (or not) the birth and name of their baby?

Registering the birth: the operation of the Birth and Deaths Registration Act 1953

Naming your child – an issue of fundamental significance

Facts of C Children [2016]

The limits to what a parent may do to a child under heading of “parental responsibility”.

Advice concerning any possible ‘tension’ in the applicability of the paramountcy principle to those cases where requests are made for publicity

Summary

I shall explain my reasoning in more detail below.

The statutory basis for the paramountcy principle.

The authorities considered by the President

Conclusion

EDIT MARCH 9th 2019 – Consideration of further case law.

The judgment of the President of the Family Division

EDIT May 2019

Further reading

What power does the court have to make orders about children who come from another country?

Jurisdiction derives from habitual residence.

Habitual residence is a ‘matter of fact’.

Habitual residence requires physical presence.

Children only recently present or intermittently present in the jurisdiction

Date to determine habitual residence

Law regarding the habitual residence of a baby

Conclusions

Further reading

Why do people hate family court?

Therein lies the promulgation to distrust, fear, anger — hatred.

People hate family court because it prolongs the pain of punitive pursuit.

EDIT February 5th 2019

EDIT March 9th 2019

Further reading

But have you stood the test of time?

“Is the Act fit for purpose? Overwhelmingly yes. Able to use its basic structure to allow us to embrace changing concepts in society. Where it is failing is not where its ethos is flawed but because its ethos required it to be funded – to deliver services to families and communities. “

The 30th Anniversary of the Children Act 1989 – is it still fit for purpose?

EDIT February 4th 2019

Harsh but fair; the parent’s view

Conclusion

(un)amusing postscript