Tag Archives: indirect contact

What is the evidence base for orders about indirect contact?

This is an article by Sarah Phillimore and Families Need Fathers. It was first published in the May edition of the Family Law Journal and is reproduced here with acknowledgment and thanks

Indirect contact: on what basis do such orders promote the welfare of children?

This article examines the evidential basis supporting orders for indirect contact to provide a mechanism whereby direct contact may at some point resume. The authors are concerned that this ‘wait and see’ strategy at best achieves nothing and at worst is actively harmful. They call for better research about the impact of indirect contact in cases of entrenched opposition, and greater willingness to consider psychological intervention at earlier stages.

For the purposes of this piece, ‘indirect contact’ is defined as letters, cards, emails – usually at specified times or events.

There are many reported cases where parents (usually fathers) are refused direct contact in private law proceedings. A recent one is R (a child – appeal: termination of contact) [2019] EWHC 132 (Fam) (29 January 2019). Here the court was initially prepared to refuse direct contact, even having accepted that the child would then be parented solely by his mother:

‘… who had been identified not only as having caused emotional harm to him through her alienation of him from his father but also and as significantly whose parenting was identified as creating an enmeshed relationship where R was unable to developmentally separate, to develop his own identity separate to that of his mother.’

The appeal was allowed in essence because (para [77]):

‘… the combination of the consequences of the findings of fact that had been made and the lack of full exploration of the options available (in particular in relation to therapy for the mother) meant that the end of the road had not been reached.’

Therefore the appellate court was ready to take a stand in a case where a finding had been made that the resident parent had caused emotional harm by alienation. But what about the presumably greater number of cases where no such clear finding is made against either parent?

Where there is no clear finding against either parent

I recently represented a father in such a case on his application for permission to appeal a refusal to make an order for direct contact. The child was born in 2007.and in 2010 the court made findings against the father of behaviour that was unpleasant but not sufficiently serious to rule out direct contact, Such contact was positive until 2011 when it ceased, the child demonstrating increased anxiety until eventually claiming to have no father at all.

The father’s position was that this was nothing to do with the quality of his relationship with his son but rather that, from the outset, the mother was ‘entrenched’ ‘ in her opposition to it. NYAS and Cafcass intervened, the court suggested that the mother undergo therapy and she had some kind of counselling, but nothing shifted.

Throughout, the court adopted the ‘wait and see’ strategy, in the hope that ‘time would heal’ and the indirect contact would blossom into direct contact. In 2015 the father’s appeal was before the full Court of Appeal who shared his concern about this strategy and noted that if it continued to fail, then expert evidence ought to be considered. The father subsequently applied for a psychological assessment of the mother.

By the time that application came to court in 2016 the child could not contemplate even discussion about his father; the applications for further expert evidence was refused. The father appealed again but in 2017 that appeal was dismissed, the Court of Appeal agreeing that continuing the proceedings was not in the child’s best interests. The father continued, with his now decade long battle which finally ended in October 2018 where Mr Justice Moor refused permission to appeal against the final decision at first instance to refuse direct contact.

The client perspective

I asked my client for his views.

‘The non resident parent usually, sooner or later, comes to a point where they see their attempt at trying to maintain contact with their child as futile. This point can be reached even before contemplating making a court application when told by those familiar with the cycle of the family justice system that it is unlikely they will maintain contact where the non resident parent opposes it, sometimes it takes one year of court attendances and going to contact centres, sometimes it takes many years before a parent gives up or is forced to give up, the system is designed to make maintaining contact as difficult as possible.
… At the last contact session my Son said “see you next time” he waved as he left, I have not seen him for seven years now.
… Where it is clear the resident parent will never support the child to have a meaningful relationship with their parent it is essential that the Judges order direct contact….It should be acknowledged by the Judges that indirect contact merely supports an entrenched resident parent’s ability, either deliberately or incidentally, to also entrench the child’s views against the other parent, indirect contact makes matters worse.’

This case appeared to me a clear example of the failure of the ‘wait and see’ strategy when one parent was entrenched in opposition. I could find no research or other literature which offered any evidential basis for this as a successful strategy. I therefore I asked Families Need Fathers if they could conduct a survey of their members.

The FNF survey on indirect contact

FNF conducted a survey of 154 service users, (95% dads), who had final orders for indirect contact only.

In just one case (0.6%) was direct contact restored, seemingly, without further intervention in a situation where the indirect contact order was mostly complied with.

Three others reported direct contact resuming, but not attributable to factors beyond indirect contact. In one case a direct relationship was re-established through the intervention of an elder sibling. In another, direct contact was established following a successful appeal and in one more through a change of residence.

Almost universally (97%) respondents said that these orders were made in response to implacable hostility towards them from the parent with whom the child lived.
In most cases (58%) someone in a position of authority specifically suggested that given time things might settle down and lead to the restoration of visitation. Cafcass were the most likely to express such optimism (37%), as did a third of Judges (34%) either in the final order, in a final judgement or both.

In the vast majority of cases (92%) the orders made included a requirement for the children to be supported in responding to letters or gifts received. However, 79% of respondents said that they ‘never’ received a response, 13% did so rarely or occasionally and just 4% reported full compliance.

Many expressed doubt that their correspondence was reaching their children at all. In one case a father who always sent gifts for his daughter’s birthday and at Christmas, reported evidence that the mother was writing brief ‘thank you’ cards for receipt of gifts purporting to be from the child so as to give the appearance of compliance with court orders.

Clearly this survey is not based on a scientifically balanced sample, but these figures suggest that parties are being offered false hope in spades with virtually no prospect of a positive outcome during the children’s minorities. Not surprisingly, some respondents, in hindsight, considered that they were being fobbed-off with hope for the convenience of the Courts or Cafcass – perhaps to make the figures of duration of proceedings look better against targets or to save their money by not exhausting all possible routes to a solution. Many expressed frustration and disappointment at the lack of stronger interventions by the courts to ensure any meaningful contact.

The low level of compliance with these orders and lack of enforcement of family court orders, precisely in the more hostile situations where it is most needed, has led to infinitesimally low levels of successful outcomes. Perhaps we need to remind ourselves that these are situations where courts were satisfied that contact was not only safe, but also best served the welfare interests of the children.

Personal stories

Dozens of respondents shared their stories of personal devastation. Several had contemplated suicide and one grandparent had done so. Two spoke of suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, others described other consequent stress on them and their families:

‘I felt – and still feel bereft. I have struggled with my mental health since then; I am on anti-depressants and sometimes cannot work because I haven’t slept in days. My wife holds me through the night when I am crying and missing my children and I wonder who holds them when they cry that they are missing me.’

Some parents agreed that indirect contact, where correspondence was received, at least informed a child that the other parent continues to love them and has not abandoned them. However, should relationships then be restored in adulthood, it does not take away from damage done. The internal ‘wiring’ of the brain is set. The relationship may be all but extinct. This suggests that indirect contact should be used only as part of or pending a plan of intervention, to restore meaningful relationships.

Family courts are there to weigh up the evidence in determining the best interests of children. Many respondents expressed the view that ‘hope’ is an inadequate basis for meeting children’s welfare needs; doing nothing may merely create the fragile illusion of calm for children. Respondents were convinced that it would be a mistake to assume that children are not being harmed whilst living in an environment that denigrates half of their family. Inevitably, the comments made to us suggested not only a deep frustration with family justice, but concern at the lack of support for children left harbouring false perspectives and unjustified hostility to once-loved parents. Respondents’ experiences also demonstrated the lack of support for themselves when court proceedings were over without a satisfactory outcome. One father, who had withdrawn his application on advice from CAFCASS after the mother promised to ‘de-escalate’ the situation, said this:

‘In the last phone call I had with my daughter, she told me that she remembered loving me once, but “luckily I have been allowed to stay away from you and now I realise only an insane person would want to see you.”’

Father who withdrew court application for direct contact on advice from Cafcass and promise of de-escalation by the mother.

Conclusion: The need for proper research

It was the view of the (now) President of the Family Division in the 2017 Bridget Lindley Memorial Lecture that judges need better information about outcomes – without information about outcomes, Judges were left trying to hit a bullseye by throwing a dart over their shoulders.

If indirect contact is to be relied upon as a mechanism to restore direct contact, then we need proper research about this. Currently data on Child Arrangements Orders does not even distinguish between orders for direct and indirect contact. There is, we suggest, a need to consider proper psychological intervention about how to break entrenched parent deadlock and more willingness to consider change of residence.

It is the view of the authors that it is clear that mere passage of time is highly unlikely to ‘heal’ entrenched opposition – rather it is likely to cement it, particularly as many fathers cannot simply sit and wait as years go by with no direct contact.

Michael Lewkowicz
Families Need Fathers
Sarah Phillimore
St Johns Chambers Bristol

Disputes between parents about seeing their children

This post looks at the law in cases following the parents separation, when the parents can’t agree about how the children should spend time with each of them. In cases where there is no evidence that contact with a non-resident parent would harm a child yet the resident parent claims contact would not be in the child’s best interests, can courts force parents out of their entrenched positions?

Sarah Phillimore, barrister at St John’s Chambers, looks at the issue and offers some practical advice.

This article was first published by Lexis on 19^th May 2015 and has since been edited – you can get more articles like this from Lexis at this web address www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexisps

To what extent can or will the courts intervene to force parties out of entrenched positions?

Most experienced Family Court judges would acknowledge that there is a category of private law Children Act disputes which present profoundly difficult challenges to the court and which frequently cause judges near despair as they endeavour to achieve a positive and enduring outcome for the child. Descriptive language is used to highlight the complexity of these cases – for example, implacable hostility, intractable dispute, high conflict dispute. In some of these cases the judge’s sense of despair at having failed to achieve a positive outcome for the child is palpable. In Re D (Intractable Contact Dispute: Publicity) [2004] EWHC 727 (Fam) Munby J memorably began his judgment by saying: ‘On 11 November 2003 a wholly deserving father left my court in tears having been driven to abandon his battle for contact with his seven year old daughter D.’

HHJ Bellamy 2018

Statute Law

The relevant statutory framework is found at section 1(1) and 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 (CA 1989). The child’s welfare is the paramount consideration and the court must have regard to the welfare checklist.

Section 8 allows the court to make what used to be called ‘contact’ and ‘residence’ orders but which are now ‘child arrangements orders’ following the Children and Families Act 2014 (CFA 2014).

The CFA 2014 also amended section 1 of the CA 1989 to include that when a court is considering a section 8 order, it must presume, unless the contrary can be shown, that the involvement of a parent in the life of a child will further the child’s welfare. ‘Involvement’ quite explicitly is not linked to any particular division of a child’s time. This amendment is thus very far from what father’s rights campaigners wanted; there is no presumption that children must spend their time 50/50 with each parent. It is difficult to see what practical change is provided by this amendment, as it offers a rebuttable presumption that is a reflection of existing law and practice.

General principles from case law.

The following cases provide general principles:

W (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 99
Re C (A Child) (Suspension of Contact) [2011] EWCA Civ 521, [2011] 2 FLR 912
Re H-B (Contact) [2015] EWCA Civ 389

Each case is unique on its own facts and requires careful scrutiny. However, there are general principles which are usually applicable to every case:

the court is concerned with the interests of the mother and the father only in so far as they bear on the welfare of the child.
It is almost always in the interests of a child whose parents are separated that he or she should have contact with the parent with whom the child is not living. Contact should thus be terminated only in exceptional circumstances.
The court has power to enforce orders for contact, which it should not hesitate to exercise where it judges that it will overall promote the welfare of the child to do so.
The state has positive obligations to protect the Article 8 rights of parents and children. Thus, the judge must grapple with all the available alternatives before abandoning hope of achieving some contact. He must be careful not to come to a premature decision, for contact is to be stopped only as a last resort and only once it has become clear that the child will not benefit from continuing the attempt.
There are rare cases where the court decides that there cannot be immediate direct contact because that would injure the child’s welfare, see Re D (A Minor) (Contact) [1993] 1 FCR 964 at pp 971G–972A per Waite, LJ.
If there cannot be immediate direct contact there should be indirect contact so that the child grows up knowing of the love and interest of the absent parent with whom, in due course, direct contact should be established
It is an important part of the obligations of being a parent that the parents take responsibility for making contact work – see paras 72 onwards of Re W [2012].

EDIT 9th April 2019 – for a thorough review of relevant practice and principle see the Court Of Appeal decision in G (Children: Intractable Dispute) [2019] EWCA Civ 548

Potential problems with the courts’ approach.

The courts have unrealistic expectations about how parents will respond to pleas to act responsibly.

A horribly clear example of where the courts’ pleas fell on deaf ears is found in the D (A child – parental alienation) (Rev 1) [2018] EWFC B64 (19 October 2018) which is discussed below.

In Re H-B (Contact) [2015] EWCA Civ 389, the court heard that direct contact with the father and his two daughters had stopped in 2008. There was an incident in which the father’s new wife had been angry with the older girl and grabbed her, causing a superficial injury. The father appealed against the refusal of his application for direct contact. Both parents were found to have behaved poorly.

The President of the Family Division considered the obligations upon parents when a child refuses contact with the other parent. See paragraph 75:

the responsibility of being a parent can be tough, it may be ‘a very big ask’. But that is what parenting is all about. There are many things which they ought to do that children may not want to do or even refuse to do: going to the dentist, going to visit some ‘boring’ elderly relative, going to school, doing homework or sitting an examination, the list is endless. The parent’s job, exercising all their parental skills, techniques and stratagems – which may include use of both the carrot and the stick and, in the case of the older child, reason and argument –, is to get the child to do what it does not want to do. That the child’s refusal cannot as such be a justification for parental failure is clear: after all, children whose education or health is prejudiced by parental shortcomings may be taken away from their parents and put into public care.

I appreciate that parenting headstrong or strong-willed teenagers can be particularly taxing, sometimes very tough and exceptionally demanding. And in relation to the parenting of teenagers no judge can safely overlook the teaching of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and anor [1986] AC 112, in particular the speeches of Lord Fraser of Tullybelton and Lord Scarman. But parental responsibility does not shrivel away, merely because the child is 14 or even 16, nor does the parental obligation to take all reasonable steps to ensure that a child of that age does what it ought to be doing, and does not do what it ought not to be doing. I accept (see Cambra v Jones [2014] EWHC 2264 (Fam), paras 20, 25) that a parent should not resort to brute force in exercising parental responsibility in relation to a fractious teenager. But what one can reasonably demand – not merely as a matter of law but also and much more fundamentally as a matter of natural parental obligation – is that the parent, by argument, persuasion, cajolement, blandishments, inducements, sanctions (for example, ‘grounding’ or the confiscation of mobile phones, computers or other electronic equipment) or threats falling short of brute force, or by a combination of them, does their level best to ensure compliance. That is what one would expect of a parent whose rebellious teenage child is foolishly refusing to do GCSEs or A-Levels or ‘dropping out’ into a life of drug-fuelled crime. Why should we expect any less of a parent whose rebellious teenage child is refusing to see her father?’

The ‘tough’ approach of the court cannot however be a a solution to the problem of intractable contact disputes, because it does not adequately or even at all address the following circumstances:

The increasing autonomy of the older child.
The resident parent who simply will not or can not support a relationship with the other parent.

The older child

For older children, the suggestions by the sir James Munby that it is a straightforward matter of simply exercising a bit of parental muscle to bribe or compel a child, does not reflect the reality of the child’s growing autonomy. Various cases demonstrate that it is likely that the child will simply refuse to do what is expected and may even react in quite extreme ways to the expectation: see for e.g Re K (Children) [2014] EWCA Civ 1195 where the children simply ran away.

Of course, parental responsibility does not ‘shrivel away’ when dealing with a Gillick competent teenager, but as a child’s autonomy develops, the ability of a parent to impose his or her will inevitably decreases. A parent simply cannot dictate to a 15 year old as if he were 5 or even 10 years old. To do so is likely to be emotionally abusive and ineffective.

This is reflected in section 9(6) of the CA 1989; section 8 orders will only be made for children over 16 if the circumstances are ‘exceptional’. In reality, many judges will be wary of imposing orders upon teenagers even younger than 16; recognizing that they can and do ‘vote with their feet’.

The parent with whom the child lives does not support contact

This second part of the problem is not even touched upon in re H-B; the mindset of the resident parent and the impact of this on the child. The likely reality in many cases is that the resident parent has consistently exposed the child to a very negative view of the absent parent. In terms of the impact of this on the child, it probably doesn’t matter what motivates the resident parent, be it genuine belief or something more malicious. The child will absorb the resident parent’s reality. What else can they do?

These problems are then further compounded if the child has not seen the absent parent for some time and/or was very young at the last meeting and therefore has little or no independent memory of the absent parent.

In such cases, experts consider it unlikely – even impossible – that a child living in such circumstances can start thinking positively about the absent parent. The resident parent will assert that it is simply not in the child’s best interests to have this positive view. It is not possible to force therapeutic work on an unwilling resident parent.

The parent who deliberately alienates a child

Discussion of D (A Child – parental alienation) 2018

A very interesting case about parental alienation has been published by the DFJ for Derbyshire, HHJ Bellamy. This is D (A child – parental alienation) (Rev 1) [2018] EWFC B64 (19 October 2018). This case involved the child D who was born in 2005. Proceedings had been ongoing for over ten years, albeit with a four year respite from 2012 – 2016, and had cost a staggering amount of money for both parents – about £320,000 over ten years. A judge hearing the case in 2008 commented: ‘On the face of it this is already a dispute which is going to escalate, or has the potential to escalate and the risk is that D will be damaged by these matters.’ And sadly, that is exactly what came to pass.

There was a residence order made in the father’s favour in 2011 and the mother’s application to appeal was refused in 2012. Following a relatively peaceful four years, the mother then refused to return D to his father’s care in November 2016 and the father did not see D again until March 2017. A final hearing was listed for April 2018 after the instruction of a psychologist. We can see clearly in this chronology how such cases often end up drifting.

in early 2018 D made allegations of a serious assault upon him by the father and contact against ceased. The police became involved but took no further action and the Judge granted the father’s application in August 2018 that D give evidence at the finding of fact hearing.

D gave evidence and was very clear, saying (para 74):

I just want a normal life, living in happiness with mum. I cannot go back to my father’s. I was promised by my mum and the police officer that dad wouldn’t hurt me ever again. Now, I am here in court because he hurt me bad. Why can’t I just have a life that isn’t based on court and stress? I just want a life that I can live not live in fear from, please.’

D’s guardian put forward a schedule of six allegations that D made against his father. The court noted the evidence of the psychologist Dr Spooner at para 85.

D presented with what seemed like a pre-prepared and well-rehearsed script of all the things he wanted to tell me about his father. He took every opportunity to denigrate him, his family and his partner. Each time I attempted to ask him about issues not related to his father, such as school, hobbies and so on, he quickly derailed himself and continued on his frivolous campaign of denigration.

The court heard a great deal of evidence from social workers and other experts about the alleged injuries suffered by D. It is disturbing to note how the Judge was not assisted by some of the evidence from the local authority, not least because the social worker who prepared the section 37 report was working from the assumption that everything a child said must be true.

The father denied assaulting D but had to hold his arms when D was being aggressive towards him. The Judge did not find any of the allegations proved; he found the father and his partner to be honest witnesses and this was a case where the mother was determined to ‘win’ at any cost. The judge found that she had deliberately alienated D from his father.

Analysis of what is meant by ‘parental alienation’

From paragraph 165 the Judge considers the issue of parental alienation. At para 169 he refers to the research Dr Julie Doughty at Cardiff University. She comments:‘

There is a paucity of empirical research into parental alienation, and what exists is dominated by a few key authors. Hence, there is no definitive definition of parental alienation within the research literature. Generally, it has been accepted that parental alienation refers to the unwarranted rejection of the alienated parent by the child, whose alliance with the alienating parent is characterised by extreme negativity towards the alienated parent due to the deliberate or unintentional actions of the alienating parent so as to adversely affect the relationship with the alienated parent. Yet, determining unwarranted rejection is problematic due to its multiple determinants, including the behaviours and characteristics of the alienating parent, alienated parent and the child. This is compounded by the child’s age and developmental stage as well as their personality traits, and the extent to which the child internalises negative consequences of triangulation. This renders establishing the prevalence and long-term effects of parental alienation difficult…’

At para 170 the Judge considers the new CAFCASS assessment framework for private law cases. The assessment contains a section headed ‘Resources for assessing child refusal/assistance’ which in turn has a link to a section headed, ‘ Typical behaviours exhibited where alienation may be a factor ’. These include:

The child’s opinion of a parent is unjustifiably one sided, all good or all bad, idealises on parent and devalues the other.
Vilification of rejected parent can amount to a campaign against them.
Trivial, false, weak and/or irrational reasons to justify dislike or hatred.
Reactions and perceptions are unjustified or disproportionate to parent’s behaviours.
Talks openly and without prompting about the rejected parent’s perceived shortcomings.
Revises history to eliminate or diminish the positive memories of the previously beneficial experiences with the rejected parent. May report events that they could not possibly remember.
Extends dislike/hatred to extended family or rejected parent (rejection by association).
No guilt or ambivalence regarding their attitudes towards the rejected parent.
Speech about rejected parent appears scripted, it has an artificial quality, no conviction, uses adult language, has a rehearsed quality.
Claims to be fearful but is aggressive, confrontational, even belligerent.

What can lawyers to either stop cases going wrong or intervene positively when they do?

Unfortunately, it is my view that the ability of lawyers or the courts to have much positive impact on the more extreme examples of intractable dispute, is very limited. This is because these are not legal problems. They arise out of the psychological vulnerabilities of one or both of the parents. Even if parents could be persuaded to go to family therapy or family mediation it is unlikely that many could afford to do this and no state agency can be compelled to pay. The court room is clearly a very unsuitable arena to try to deal with the often toxic emotional fall out from failed adult relationships.

However, there are elements to these proceedings that the lawyer can influence and the court can attempt to dictate, which may have a positive influence on the outcome – or at the very least reduce the time taken and the emotional and financial costs incurred. See further the judgment of Hedley J in re E (A Child) [2011] EWCH 3251 at paragraph 11 onwards and A (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1104.

I suggest that the fundamental requirements are:

Careful analysis of the issues and the available options;
Which feeds into a realistic timetable, avoiding drift

Intractable contact disputes that go horribly wrong usually have dragged on over many years. This increases the child and the resident’s parent aversion to the whole process; they simply want it to end. Lawyers can help by trying to identify as soon as possible which of their cases are likely to turn into intractable disputes and then being clear sighted about the options which are realistic in their case. It is essential at the earliest possible stage, all agree a clear timetable for either achieving contact or recognizing that it is not achievable whilst the child remains with the resident parent. There will then need to be full and honest appraisal of the likely success if a child is removed from the resident parent – either into foster care or to care of non- resident parent.

Proper analysis of the available options and the impact of each on the child’s welfare requires knowledge and understanding about what is in reality available to a family; little point in considering ‘specialist family mediation’ for example, if there are no providers within a reasonable distance or no one can afford to pay for it.

The following considerations may help this process:

Clear analysis at the earliest stage as to the degree and nature of opposition to contact. How objective and reasonable is the opposition? How flexible are the parents prepared to be? How quickly did problems escalate? Warning bells will start to ring at an early stage and should not be ignored.
If the non-resident parent does not accept the objections raised by the resident parent, consider an early fact finding so that there is a clear understanding of potential problems. Courts are often reluctant to go down this route (see Re E, para 11), worried that parents may simply focus on allegations against each other rather than the welfare of the child. However, this risk needs to be considered against the problems that can be caused by allegations that are never confronted and which linger on throughout the proceedings, to the detriment of any resolution;
If a case shows signs of being intractable, judicial continuity is very desirable;
Robust enforcement of any contact orders made at an early stage – don’t let this drift, bring non-compliance straight back to court. Be clear about why it hasn’t worked – did the resident parent fail to encourage? Did the non-resident parent fail to comply, for e.g. with indirect contact?;
The non-resident parent should be prepared to make reparation for any behaviour that has contributed to the resident parent’s distrust – not every case involves an absent parent who is wholly without reproach;
Making timely decisions about when a guardian or expert evidence is required. If the resident parent for example refuses to accept the outcome of a finding of fact this is usually the time when it is abundantly clear more needs to be done;
Exploring if there is any possibility of any help via therapeutic intervention/specialist mediation and how this is to be funded, etc
If it becomes clear that contact is not achievable whilst the child is living with the resident parent, there must be proper analysis of the available options and the impact on the child’s welfare of each – for example, should the court be invited to make an order under section 37 of CA 1989 for an interim care order so that the child goes into foster care?

Dr Doughty’s recommendations (cited with approval by HHJ Bellamy in para 171 of his judgment in Re D above), following a review of the case law and literature about parental alienation are:

Courts will not allow the implacable hostility of one parent to deter them from making a contact order where the child’s welfare otherwise requires it. In such a case contact should only be refused where the court is satisfied that there is a serious risk of harm if contact were to be ordered.
In some very exceptional cases, where the non-resident parent’s behaviour cannot be criticised, the effect on the child of ongoing contact proceedings is such that the court will decide those proceedings should not continue.
Where allegations of parental alienation are made, the court will need to record a determination of the facts, or risk an unnecessary appeal.
There is no blanket solution, but outcomes ae more likely to meet the child’s needs where there is:
- Early resolution of disputed facts about domestic violence.
- Early intervention where alienation appears to be an issue

The need to consider findings of fact seriously has been endorsed by the President of the Family Division – note J (DV Facts) [2018] EWCA Civ 115 (06 February 2018)

The views of Sir James Munby

The former President of the Family Division delivered a talk to the Annual General Meeting / Conference of NACCC, Amersham 24 November 2018, entitled ‘Dealing with Parents’ Conflict and Unreasonable Behaviour’ where he commented:

What do I have in mind?

First, the court must decide whether the proceedings should be allowed to continue or whether the matter should be dealt with out of court, either
- because the parents should be required to exercise their parental responsibility and resolve matters themselves: see T v S[2013] EWHC 2521 (Fam), [2014] Fam Law 1664, and, for an elaboration, my lecture, A Matter for the Parents? A Matter for the Judge? Thoughts on 30 years of the Children Act and the revival of the inherent jurisdiction, [2019] Fam Law (forthcoming); or
- because the parents should be diverted into some form of N-CDR, for example, mediation, arbitration or whatever.
Secondly, the court must decide whether or not there needs to be a fact-finding hearing and, if so, give appropriate directions for a focused fact-finding hearing at the earliest possible opportunity.
Thirdly, and if the case is to remain in court without an immediate fact-finding hearing, the court must decide which ‘track’ the case should follow:
- what I will call the ‘in and out’ track, where it is realistic to imagine that the case can be resolved at the First Hearing Dispute Resolution Appointment (FHDRA); or
- what I will call the ‘ordinary’ track, where although it is not realistic to anticipate resolution at the FHDRA there is nothing to suggest that the case is or will become intractable; or
- what might be called the ‘special’ track for the potentially more complex cases.

Finally, and assuming that the case is to proceed in court, two things are essential:

First, proper assistance, before and at the hearing, for unrepresented litigants.
Secondly, radical reform of the process at the hearing itself.

I take these in turn.

Proper assistance, before the hearing, for unrepresented litigants raises a fundamental issue of enormous practical importance. The simple reality, I fear, is that:

the guidance and other explanatory literature available for litigants in person is sadly inadequate;
the court forms are very far from user friendly; and
the Family Procedure Rules 2010 and associated materials are simply not fit for purpose and, from the point of view of the litigant in person, an obstacle to proper access to justice.

Conclusion

However, in my view, the fundamental issue will always remain; these are not legal problems. These cases are almost always a manifestation of the psychological vulnerabilities of one or both of the parents.

Lawyers and the courts have poorly designed and often ineffectual tools at their disposal to make much headway. But unless and until a more effective arena is available to tackle the problem of intractable contact disputes, we will have to do our imperfect best.