Brussels II Bis | Child Protection Resource

This is a post by Sarah Phillimore

What happens if a local authority wants to make an application for a care order regarding a child who comes from another country? The Courts of England and Wales only have jurisdiction to make care orders if children are ‘habitually resident’ in the UK – mere physical presence is not enough. Although the Supreme Court have repeatedly said this is a ‘simple matter of fact’ it is clear that in practice it is not always easy to establish a child’s habitual residence.

I have no idea what the impact of Brexit will be on any of this; watch this space. – EDIT post Brexit we will rely on the Hague Convention 1996.

What power does the court have to make orders about children who come from another country?

Jurisdiction derives from habitual residence.

The following basic principles can be derived from these authorities Re F (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 789; Re E (Brussels II Revised: Vienna Convention: Reporting Restrictions) [2014] EWHC 6 (Fam), [2014] FLR:

the jurisdictional reach of the courts of England and Wales in relation to care proceedings is not spelt out in any statutory provision.
Jurisdiction was normally determined by the habitual residence or physical presence of the child.
However, this was fundamentally modified by the Regulation Brussels II revised (BIIR) which applies to determine the jurisdiction of the English court in care proceedings, irrespective of whether the other country is a Member State of the European Union: see A v A and another (Children: Habitual Residence) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others intervening) [2013] UKSC 60, [2014] AC 1, para 30, and In re L (A Child: Habitual Residence) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening) [2013] UKSC 75, [2013] 3 WLR 1597, para 18..
The basic principle, set out in Article 8(1) of BIIR is that jurisdiction is founded on habitual residence. It follows that the courts do not have jurisdiction to make a care order simply because a child is physically present.
The court must deal with this matter at the outset. The court should set out explicitly the basis upon which it has accepted or rejected jurisdiction. A declaration with regard to habitual residence cannot be made by default, concession or agreement but only if the court is satisfied by evidence.
If it is necessary to address the issue before there is time for proper investigation and determination, the following suggested recital should be used: “Upon it provisionally appearing that the child is habitually resident…”.

Habitual residence is a ‘matter of fact’.

The Supreme Court have repeatedly declared that ‘habitual residence’ is no more than a ‘simple fact’ which should be determined without any gloss. That arguably optimistic declaration has to be set against the number of times in fairly recent history that cases involving habitual residence have come before the Supreme Court – suggesting that determination of this ‘simple fact’ is a far from simple exercise and reflects the greater mobility of people in recent times and the wide variety of circumstances which impact on families, their composition and their location.

The basic proposition is that habitual residence is established by the degree of integration by the child is a ‘social and family environment’. See A v A and another (Children: Habitual Residence) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others intervening) [2013] ‘

habitual residence can in principle be lost and another habitual residence acquired on the same day.
habitual residence is a question of fact and not a legal concept such as domicile. There is no legal rule akin to that whereby a child automatically takes the domicile of his parents.
the test adopted by the European Court is ‘the place which reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment’ in the country concerned. This depends upon numerous factors, including the reasons for the family’s stay in the country in question. This is the preferred test.
Factors to take into account when assessing integration are
i. The duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for being in the country
ii. The child’s nationality
iii. The place and conditions of attendance at school
iv. Linguistic knowledge
v. Family and social relationships in the country
The social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those (whether parents or others) upon whom he is dependent. Hence it is necessary to assess the integration of that person or persons in the social and family environment of the country concerned.
The essentially factual and individual nature of the inquiry should not be glossed with legal concepts which would produce a different result from that which the factual inquiry would produce.
it is possible that a child may have no country of habitual residence at a particular point in time.
For those children who have no habitual residence, Article 13 of Brussels II provides that where a child’s habitual residence cannot be established and jurisdiction cannot be determined under Article 12, the courts of the Member State where the child is present have jurisdiction.

Habitual residence requires physical presence.

Physical presence is a clear necessary precursor to a finding of habitual residence. In In the Matter of A (Children) (AP) [2013] UKSC 60 the Supreme Court by a majority agreed that a new born baby could not claim habitual residence in the UK even though it was his mother’s place of habitual residence and she had been coerced into leaving the country to give birth. However the Supreme Court agreed it was possible in such extreme circumstances to order the child’s return to the UK using the inherent jurisdiction. See also W v X Case C‐499/15, [2017] Fam 305, [2017] 2 FCR 389.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in 2017 that Article 11(1) of the Brussels II bis Regulation:

must be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation in which a child was born and has been continuously residing with his or her mother for several months in accordance with the joint agreement of the parents in a Greece, while in Italy they had their habitual residence before birth, the initial intention of the parents as to the return of the mother accompanied by the child in Italy cannot allow the child to be regarded as having his or her habitual residence in Italy. The CJEU concludes that in such a situation the refusal of the mother to return to Italy accompanied by the child cannot be regarded as an ‘unlawful displacement or non-return’ within the meaning of Article 11(1).

This case seems to resolve the dilemma, dividing national courts, as to whether the physical presence of the child in the territory of a state is a necessary precondition for establishing the child’s habitual residence

Children only recently present or intermittently present in the jurisdiction

These situations require closer examination in light of the requirement of integration into a social or family environment as necessary to establish the ‘fact’ of habitual residence. It is clear that the position of young and dependent children cannot easily be seen in isolation from the position of their primary carer. See A v A (Children: Habitual Residence) [2013] UKSC 60: “The social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those (whether parents or others) upon whom he is dependent.”

However this does not mean that the perceptions of older children about where they habitually reside are irrelevant. See Re: LC (Reunite: International Child Abduction Centre intervening) [2014] UKSC 1.[43] Lord Wilson: It will be clear from my formulation of the question in para 1 above that in my view it is, in principle, the state of mind of adolescent children during their residence in a place that may affect whether it was habitual.

However, judicial dicta from other authorities does not support ‘state of mind’ as determinative.

See Re R (A Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 674 where the Court of Appeal considered the circumstances of a 4 year old girl S. She was born in 2010 in Morocco to an American mother, who had lived in England since the age of 13, and a Moroccan father. Shortly, after her birth, the mother travelled to England and fraudulently registered the birth in Kent. Thereafter, she travelled to and from various locations before returning to the UK in March 2013. In October 2013 S suffered serious injuries and was placed in foster care. The local authority did not commence care proceedings until April 2014.

Given by the time protective measures had been taken S and her mother had been living in the UK for over a year, there seems little doubt as a matter of fact that S was habitually resident ‘at the relevant time’ i.e. the making of the care order application but it was argued on behalf of the father that S’s life had been so unhappy with a neglectful mother, that it could not be said she was ‘integrated’ into a social environment and therefore her habitual residence was in fact Morocco.

Mr Justice Hayden decided that the court had jurisdiction to make a care order with respect to S on the basis that S’s habitual residence was, and had been throughout her life, the United Kingdom. The father’s appeal was dismissed. The CoA were critical of the judge’s finding that S had been ‘habitually resident in the UK all her life’ as all that was needed was a finding that S had habitual residence at the relevant time. However, his decision was not ‘perverse’ given the complexities of this case, including the dishonesty of the parents and the mother’s ‘frequent and erratic’ changes of location.

Mr Justice Hayden at first instance said this about integration

‘Integration’ as a concept involves a fusion of both the factual and the emotional, it is where a child feels settled, secure, happy and where the focus of his interests and attachments lie. It is not merely geographical, identifying habitual residence requires much greater nuance than that, drawing inferences from facts, the parents’ conduct, the feelings a child communicates and what the child may say. Lord Wilson encapsulated the point in Re LC (supra) at para 37 emphasising that integration encompasses more than the ‘surface features’ of a child’s life.”

This did not entirely meet with the approval of the Court of Appeal: McFarlane LJ commented:

“When determining habitual residence there is no requirement that, to be sufficient to support a finding, the individual needs to be happy, well cared for or free from abuse. The ‘social and family environment’ into which a child might be integrated may include both positive and negative factors. These will not be irrelevant.”

Thus it is conceded that it is not possible to claim that any period of time spent in another country during which a child was unhappy must then automatically preclude a finding of habitual residence in that country.

Date to determine habitual residence

See the decision of Moylan LJ in London Borough of Hackney v P & Ors (Jurisdiction : 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention) (Rev1) [2023] EWCA Civ 121, which sets out that in order to provide clarity and certainty, this should initially be determined by reference to the date on which proceedings were commenced.

Law regarding the habitual residence of a baby

The relevant legal framework following the UK’s departure from the European Union is set out in the Hague Convention. The relevant provisions for the purposes of this decision are Articles 5 and 7.

Article 5 provides:

1 The judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State of the habitual residence of the child have jurisdiction to take measures directed to the protection of the child’s person or property.

2 Subject to Article 7, in case of a change of the child’s habitual residence to another Contracting State, the authorities of the State of the new habitual residence have jurisdiction.

Article 7 states:

1 In case of wrongful removal or retention of the child, the authorities of the Contracting State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention keep their jurisdiction until the child has acquired a habitual residence in another State, and

each person, institution or other body having rights of custody has acquiesced in the removal or retention; or

the child has resided in that other State for a period of at least one year after the person, institution or other body having rights of custody has or should have had knowledge of the whereabouts of the child, no request for return lodged within that period is still pending, and the child is settled in his or her new environment.

2 The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where:

it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and

at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.

3 So long as the authorities first mentioned in paragraph 1 keep their jurisdiction, the authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been removed or in which he or she has been retained can take only such urgent measures under Article 11 as are necessary for the protection of the person or property of the child.

There have been a large number of reported decisions on the question of habitual residence. Mr Austin refers to the case of Re B (A Minor) (Habitual Residence) [2016] EWHC 2174, and Miss Phillimore to A v A and another (Children: Habitual Residence) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others intervening) [2013] UKSC60.

The relevance of both authorities was confirmed in the more recent Court of Appeal decision of Re A (A Child) (Habitual Residence: 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention) [2023] EWCA Civ 659 where it was said

Habitual Residence

I have referred above to what Hayden J said in Re B, at [17(i)] and [17(x)]. The former derives from what was said in A v A which, in turn, derived from what was said by the CJEU in Proceedings brought by A [2010] Fam 42, at [44], namely that:

“the concept of “habitual residence” under article 8(1) of the Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that it corresponds to the place which reflects some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment.”

It is also right to note that Lady Hale referred to this in A v A, at [54(iii)], as being the “test adopted by the European Court”.

It is clear, however, not only from Proceedings brought by A itself but also from many other authorities, that this is a shorthand summary of the approach which the court should take and that “some degree of integration” is not itself determinative of the question of habitual residence. Habitual residence is an issue of fact which requires consideration of all relevant factors. There is an open-ended, not a closed, list of potentially relevant factors.

In Proceedings brought by A, the CJEU had earlier dealt with the issue at greater length, as follows:

“[37] The “habitual residence” of a child, within the meaning of article 8(1) of the Regulation, must be established on the basis of all the circumstances specific to each individual case.

[38] In addition to the physical presence of the child in a member state, other factors must be chosen which are capable of showing that that presence is not in any way temporary or intermittent and that the residence of the child reflects some degree of integration in a social and family environment.

[39] In particular, the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the stay on the territory of a member state and the family’s move to that state, the child’s nationality, the place and conditions of attendance at school, linguistic knowledge and the family and social relationships of the child in that state must be taken into consideration.

[40] As the Advocate General pointed out in para 44 of her opinion, the parents’ intention to settle permanently with the child in another member state, manifested by certain tangible steps such as the purchase or lease of a residence in the host member state, may constitute an indicator of the transfer of the habitual residence. Another indicator may be constituted by lodging an application for social housing with the relevant services of that state.

[41] By contrast, the fact that the children are staying in a member state where, for a short period, they carry on a peripatetic life, is liable to constitute an indicator that they do not habitually reside in that state.

[42] In the light of the criteria laid down in paras 38-41 of this judgment and according to an overall assessment, it is for the national court to establish the place of the children’s habitual residence.”

The broad nature of the analysis can also be seen from Lady Hale’s later comments (in a minority judgment but reflecting, on this issue, the majority judgment of Lord Wilson) in In re LC (Children) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre intervening) [2014] AC 1038, when she referred, at [59], to whether the residence had “the necessary degree of stability” and when she said, at [60]:

“All of these factors feed into the essential question, which is whether the child has achieved a sufficient degree of integration into a social and family environment in the country in question for his or her residence there to be termed “habitual”.” (emphasis added)

The same can be seen from what Lord Reed said in Re R:

“[17] As Baroness Hale DPSC observed at para 54 of A v A, habitual residence is therefore a question of fact. It requires an evaluation of all relevant circumstances. It focuses on the situation of the child, with the purposes and intentions of the parents being merely among the relevant factors. It is necessary to assess the degree of integration of the child into a social and family environment in the country in question. The social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those (whether parents or others) on whom she is dependent. Hence it is necessary, in such a case, to assess the integration of that person or persons in the social and family environment of the country concerned. The essentially factual and individual nature of the inquiry should not be glossed with legal concepts which would produce a different result from that which the factual inquiry would produce.”

I refer to the above, not to put forward any gloss on the meaning of habitual residence, which the Supreme Court cautioned against in In re B (A Child) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre and others intervening) [2016] AC 606 (“Re B 2016”), at [46], but simply to demonstrate that “some degree of integration” is not a substitute for the required global analysis.

I would add that, self-evidently, a test of whether a child had “some degree of integration” in any one country cannot be sufficient when a child might be said to have some degree of integration in more than one State. This is why, as referred to in my judgment in Re G-E (Children) (Hague Convention 1980: Repudiatory Retention and Habitual Residence) [2019] 2 FLR 17 (“Re G-E”), at [59], the “comparative nature of the exercise” requires the court to consider the factors which connect the child to each State where they are alleged to be habitually resident. This is reflected in Mr Tyler’s written submissions when he referred to the relevance of a child’s “degree of connection” with the State in which he/she resided before they arrived in the new State.

In Re G-E, I also quoted the “expectations” set out by Lord Wilson in Re B 2016, at [46], which bear repeating, namely:

“(a) the deeper the child’s integration in the old state, probably the less fast his achievement of the requisite degree of integration in the new state;

(b) the greater the amount of adult pre-planning of the move, including pre-arrangements for the child’s day-to-day life in the new state, probably the faster his achievement of that requisite degree; and

(c) were all the central members of the child’s life in the old state to have moved with him, probably the faster his achievement of it and, conversely, were any of them to have remained behind and thus to represent for him a continuing link with the old state, probably the less fast his achievement of it.”

I have already dealt with the legal approach to habitual residence at some length in this judgment but, finally, I would refer to In re B (A Child) (International Centre for Family Law, Policy and Practice intervening) [2020] 4 WLR 149 when, at [83]-[89], in addition to Re B 2016, I referred to the CJEU’s decision of Proceedings brought by HR (with the participation of KO) (Case C-512/17) [2018] Fam 385 and to Black LJ’s (as she then was) judgment in In re J (A Child) (Finland) (Habitual Residence) [2017] 2 FCR 542 (“Re J”). Black LJ, at [57], referred to “the relevance of the circumstances of a child’s life in the country he has left as well as the circumstances of his life in his new country” and, at [62], she said:

“What is important is that the judge demonstrates sufficiently that he or she has had in mind the factors in the old and new lives of the child, and the family, which might have a bearing on this particular child’s habitual residence.”

51 In J v E (Habitual Residence) [2024] EWHC 196 MacDonald J attempted to distil these principles for the benefit of “the busy judge”:

Each of the decisions summarised above makes clear the importance of the court examining the degree of integration of the child into a social and family environment when determining habitual residence. The judgment of the Court of Appeal in this case simply recognises that although, in circumstances where full integration is not required, some degree of integration can establish habitual residence, it must still be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court that the degree of integration contended for in the given case is sufficient to reach that conclusion. In short, “some degree of integration” must still be demonstrated to be sufficient integration if it is to establish habitual residence. Determining whether that is the position requires a global analysis of all of the relevant circumstances specific to the individual case.

Where then does this plethora of authority on the concept of habitual residence leave the busy judge who is required to determine the preliminary issue of jurisdiction, without that determination “becoming an unworkable obstacle course, through which the judge must pick his or her way by a prescribed route or risk being said to have made an unsustainable finding?” Reading the foregoing authorities together, it is tolerably clear that the task of determining habitual residence falls to be discharged by the court asking itself whether, having regard to all the relevant circumstances and as a matter of fact, the subject child has achieved a degree of integration in a social and family environment in the country in question sufficient for the child to be habitually resident there. That is the test I have adopted in this case.

The authorities further make clear that in deciding in a given case whether the degree of integration is sufficient to establish habitual residence, i.e. whether the “some” is enough, certain matters may inform the court’s global analysis of the child’s situation in, and connections with, the state in which he or she is said to be habitually resident for the purpose of determining whether a sufficient degree of integration exists. These non-exhaustive considerations, to paraphrase Lord Wilson in Re B (A Child) (Reunite International Child Abduction Centre Intervening), may include the following:

i) The factual inquiry is centred throughout on the circumstances of the child’s life that are most likely to illuminate his or her habitual residence. It is the child’s habitual residence which is in question and the child’s integration which is under consideration.

ii) The meaning of habitual residence is shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in particular on the criterion of proximity. Proximity in this context means the practical connection between the child and the country concerned.

iii) It is not necessary for a child to be fully integrated in a social and family environment before becoming habitually resident.

iv) The requisite degree of integration can, in certain circumstances, develop quite quickly. It is possible to acquire a new habitual residence in a single day. There is no requirement that the child should have been resident in the country in question for a particular period of time.

v) It is the stability of a child’s residence as opposed to its permanence which is relevant. This is qualitative and not quantitative, in the sense that it is the integration of the child into the environment rather than a mere measurement of the time a child spends there.

vi) Relevant matters can include the duration, regularity and conditions for the stay in the country in question; the reasons for the parents move to and the stay in the jurisdiction in question; the child’s nationality; the place and conditions of attendance at school; the child’s linguistic knowledge; the family and social relationships the child has; whether possessions were brought; whether there is a right of abode; and whether there are durable ties with the country of residence or intended residence.

vii) Where there are competing jurisdictions advanced as the child’s habitual residence, the comparative nature of the exercise requires the court to consider the factors which connect the child to each State where they are alleged to be habitually resident.

viii) Where there are competing jurisdictions advanced as the child’s habitual residence, the circumstances of the child’s life in the country he or she has left as well as the circumstances of his or her life in the new country will be relevant. What is important is that the court demonstrates sufficiently that it has in mind the factors in the old and new lives of the child, and the family, which might have a bearing on the subject child’s habitual residence.

ix) The deeper the child’s integration in the old state, probably the less fast his or her achievement of the requisite degree of integration in the new state. Likewise, the greater the amount of adult pre-planning of the move, including pre-arrangements for the child’s day-to-day life in the new state, probably the faster his or her achievement of that requisite degree.

x) In circumstances where all of the central members of the child’s life in the old state to have moved with him or her, probably the faster his or her achievement of habitual residence. Conversely, where any of the central family members have remained behind and thus represent for the child a continuing link with the old state, probably the less fast his or her achievement of habitual residence.

xi) In circumstances where the social and family environment of an infant or young child is shared with those on whom he or she is dependent, it is necessary to assess the integration of that person or persons (usually the parent or parents) in the social and family environment of the country concerned. In respect of a pre-school child, the circumstances to be considered will include the geographic and family origins of the parents who effected the move.

xii) A child will usually, but not necessarily, have the same habitual residence as the parent(s) who care for her. The younger the child the more likely that proposition but this is not to eclipse the fact that the investigation is child focused.

xiii) Parental intention is relevant to the assessment, but not determinative. There is no requirement that there be an intention on the part of one or both parents to reside in the country in question permanently or indefinitely. Parental intent is only one factor, along with all other relevant factors, that must be taken into account when determining the issue of habitual residence. It is possible for a parent unilaterally to cause a child to change habitual residence by removing the child to another jurisdiction without the consent of the other parent.

Conclusions

All of these discussions, while interesting, serve most usefully in my submissions to reflect the profound difficulties of applying general principles to the probably infinite variety of circumstances in which families find themselves.

I suggest that a pragmatic approach must be taken. The importance of habitual residence is clearly underpinned by asking ‘what jurisdiction is best able to make decisions about a child’s welfare’. And that jurisdiction is usually the one where the child actually lives or has spent the most time. However, the court will need to look beyond this starting point and the wishes and feelings, particularly of older children, may well be relevant.

Tag Archives: Brussels II Bis

Children’s wishes and feelings about their habitual residence.